Beckwith v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 19

DECISION AND ORDER denying # 14 Plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings; and granting # 17 Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Commissioner's determination is affirmed, and the Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed. Signed by Chief Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 4/19/16. (lmw)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________________
KRISTIN BECKWITH,
Plaintiff,
v.

6:15-CV-0246 (GTS)

CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
________________________________________
APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

LAW OFFICES OF STEVEN R. DOLSON
Counsel for Plaintiff
126 North Salina Street, Suite 3B
Syracuse, NY 13202

STEVEN R. DOLSON, ESQ.

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL–REGION II
Counsel for Defendant
26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904
New York, NY 10278

DAVID L. BROWN, ESQ.
SUSAN J. REISS, ESQ.

GLENN T. SUDDABY, Chief United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this Social Security action filed by Kristin Beckwith
(“Plaintiff”) against the Commissioner of Social Security (“Defendant” or “the Commissioner”)
seeking Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c), are the parties’ cross-motions for judgment on the
pleadings. (Dkt. Nos. 14, 17.) For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is denied and
Defendant’s cross-motion is granted.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
A.

Factual Background

Plaintiff was born on January 23, 1977. He completed a high school education. His
employment history consists of work as a home health aide, a gas station cashier, a transporter,
and a resident counselor. Generally, his alleged disability consists of the following: obesity,
high blood pressure, asthma, sleep apnea, irregular heartbeat, back pain, leg pain, anxiety, and
depression. Plaintiff’s alleged disability onset date is June 1, 2010.
B.

Relevant Procedural History

On October 31, 2012, Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI under Titles II and XVI. His
application was initially denied, after which he timely requested a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“the ALJ”). On November 12, 2013, Plaintiff appeared before the
ALJ, Joseph Brinkley. (T. 25.) On January 31, 2014, the ALJ issued a written decision finding
Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act. (T. 21.) On January 28, 2015, the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s decision the final decision of
the Commissioner. (T. 1-3.) Thereafter, Plaintiff timely sought judicial review in this Court.
C.

The ALJ’s Decision

Generally, in his decision, the ALJ made the following six findings of fact and
conclusions of law. (T. 14.) First, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has not engaged in substantial
gainful activity since June 1, 2010, the alleged onset date. (Id.) Second, the ALJ found that
Plaintiff had the following severe impairments: morbid obesity, hypertension, asthma/allergies,
sleep apnea, irregular heartbeat, back/leg pain, and anxiety/depression. (Id.) Third, the ALJ
found that Plaintiff’s impairments do not meet or equal the severity of the listed impairments in

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20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526, 416.920(d), 416.925, and 416.926. (T. 15.)
Fourth, the ALJ found that Plaintiff retained the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform
sedentary work except that Plaintiff (1) can occasionally reach overhead with bilateral upper
extremities, climb ramps or stairs, and balance, stoop, or kneel, (2) can never climb ladders,
ropes, or scaffolds, crouch, or crawl, (3) must avoid concentrated exposure to work hazards
including dangerous machinery, unprotected heights, uneven terrain, and small boxes laying in
the open space of a work station, (4) must avoid concentrated exposure to jobs requiring bilateral
depth perception, (5) must avoid concentrated exposure to opening doors, irritants, odors, gases,
dusts, etc., as well as extreme heat and cold, wetness, and humidity, and (6) is limited to simple,
routine, repetitive tasks, superficial contact with the public, and low stress. (T. 17.) Fifth, the
ALJ found Plaintiff unable to perform his past relevant work. (T. 19.) Sixth, and finally, the
ALJ found that there are jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that
Plaintiff can perform, and therefore found him not disabled. (T. 20-21.)
II.

THE PARTIES’ BRIEFINGS ON THE ALJ’S DECISION
A.

Plaintiff’s Arguments

Generally, Plaintiff makes two arguments in support of his motion for judgment on the
pleadings. First, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ failed to properly apply the treating physician rule
by failing to give controlling weight to the opinion of Dr. Vivienne Taylor, M.D. (Dkt. No. 14 at
3-4 [Pl.’s Mem. of Law].) Second, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly substituted his own
opinion for that of a medical professional (Dr. Elke Lorenson) when the ALJ found a limitation
to Plaintiff’s overhead reaching but not to Plaintiff’s reaching in general. (Id. at 4-5.)

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B.

Defendant’s Arguments

Generally, Defendant makes three arguments in support of her cross-motion for judgment
on the pleadings. First, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly applied the treating physician
rule, because Dr. Taylor’s opinions are not entitled to controlling weight. (Dkt. No. 17 at 6-12
[Def.’s Mem. of Law].) Second, Defendant argues that the ALJ properly considered Plaintiff’s
reaching ability, because Dr. Lorenson’s opinions are not supported by the overall medical
record. (Id. at 12-14.) Third, Defendant argues that the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. (Id. at 5-6.)
III.

RELEVANT LEGAL STANDARDS
A.

Standard of Review

A court reviewing a denial of disability benefits may not determine de novo whether
an individual is disabled. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3); Wagner v. Sec’y of Health & Human
Servs., 906 F.2d 856, 860 (2d Cir. 1990). Rather, the Commissioner’s determination will be
reversed only if the correct legal standards were not applied, or it was not supported by
substantial evidence. See Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987) (“Where there is
a reasonable basis for doubt whether the ALJ applied correct legal principles, application of the
substantial evidence standard to uphold a finding of no disability creates an unacceptable risk
that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have her disability determination made according
to the correct legal principles.”); accord, Grey v. Heckler, 721 F.2d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1983);
Marcus v. Califano, 615 F.2d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 1979).
“Substantial evidence” is evidence that amounts to “more than a mere scintilla,” and has
been defined as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to

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support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). Where evidence is
deemed susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the Commissioner’s conclusion
must be upheld. See Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 1982).
“To determine on appeal whether the ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial
evidence, a reviewing court considers the whole record, examining evidence from both sides,
because an analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts
from its weight.” Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 1988).
If supported by substantial evidence, the Commissioner’s finding must be sustained
“even where substantial evidence may support the plaintiff’s position and despite that the court’s
independent analysis of the evidence may differ from the [Commissioner’s].” Rosado v.
Sullivan, 805 F. Supp. 147, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). In other words, this Court must afford the
Commissioner’s determination considerable deference, and may not substitute “its own
judgment for that of the [Commissioner], even if it might justifiably have reached a different
result upon a de novo review.” Valente v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.2d 1037, 1041
(2d Cir. 1984).
B.

Standard to Determine Disability

The Commissioner has established a five-step evaluation process to determine whether an
individual is disabled as defined by the Social Security Act. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520. The
Supreme Court has recognized the validity of this sequential evaluation process. Bowen v.
Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987). The five-step process is as follows:
First, the [Commissioner] considers whether the claimant is currently
engaged in substantial gainful activity. If he is not, the [Commissioner]
next considers whether the claimant has a “severe impairment” which
significantly limits his physical or mental ability to do basic work
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activities. If the claimant suffers such an impairment, the third inquiry is
whether, based solely on medical evidence, the claimant has an
impairment which is listed in Appendix 1 of the regulations. If the
claimant has such an impairment, the [Commissioner] will consider him
disabled without considering vocational factors such as age, education,
and work experience; the [Commissioner] presumes that a claimant who is
afflicted with a “listed” impairment is unable to perform substantial
gainful activity. Assuming the claimant does not have a listed
impairment, the fourth inquiry is whether, despite the claimant’s severe
impairment, he has the residual functional capacity to perform his past
work. Finally, if the claimant is unable to perform his past work, the
[Commissioner] then determines whether there is other work which the
claimant could perform. Under the cases previously discussed, the
claimant bears the burden of the proof as to the first four steps, while the
[Commissioner] must prove the final one.
Berry v. Schweiker, 675 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1982).
IV.

ANALYSIS
A.

Whether the ALJ Failed to Properly Apply the Treating Physician Rule

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the negative for the
reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 17.) To those reasons, the Court
adds the following analysis.
As stated above in Part II.A. of this Decision and Order, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ did
not follow the treating physician rule contained in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). (Dkt. No. 13 at
15 [Pl.’s Mem. of Law].) That regulation states in part that the ALJ shall give a treating source’s
opinion “controlling weight” if it is supported by “medically acceptable clinical and laboratory
diagnostic techniques,” and is “not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence” in the
record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). If the opinion is not afforded controlling weight, the ALJ
must determine the proper weight to afford it by considering (1) the length, nature, and extent of
the treatment relationship, (2) how well the medical source supports his or her opinion with

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evidence, (3) how consistent the opinion is with regard to the entire record, (4) whether the
source had a relevant specialization, and (5) any other relevant factors. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
When assigning weight to the opinion of a medical source other than a treating physician, an
ALJ must still consider the opinion’s supportability, its consistency with the record, the medical
source’s specialization, any examining relationship that existed, and any other relevant evidence.
20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(1)-(6). More Specifically, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ should have
given controlling weight to the opinion of Dr. Vivienne Taylor, MD. (Dkt. No. 14 at 3-4 [Pl.’s
Mem. of Law].)
Dr. Taylor is a Physician at the Rome Medical Group where Plaintiff was treated. From
the beginning of Plaintiff’s treating relationship with Rome Medical Group until after Plaintiff
applied for disability, treatment notes indicate that Plaintiff denied or failed to mention any back
or knee pain. (T. 274-98, 310-16.) Dr. Taylor herself failed to mention any pain symptoms or
difficulty sitting or standing in her own treatment notes. (T. 284.)
Then, a month after Plaintiff applied for disability benefits, Plaintiff visited the office to
have disability paperwork filled out. (T. 308.) That visit was the first one at which Plaintiff
complained of back pain; moreover, he reported that it had existed for five years, despite its
absence from any of his previous visits. (Id.) He received a new prescription for a new
diagnosis: pain in the lower back. (T. 309.)
Thereafter, Plaintiff began to report back pain at his checkups. (T. 418, 423.) However,
his reports were inconsistent: in March of 2013, Rome Medical Group treatment notes are again
silent as to this back pain. (T. 421.) Although Plaintiff was treated by multiple doctors at Rome
Medical Group, his back pain appears only in the reports of Dr. Taylor, and only after he applied
for disability.
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On October 21, 2013, Dr. Taylor filled out a Physical RFC Questionnaire. (T. 437-41.)
In that document, Dr. Taylor noted for the first time in her treatment of Plaintiff that he has
difficulty getting from a sitting to a standing position. (T. 437.) This difficulty does not appear
in any treatment notes. Knee pain likewise is absent from any of the treatment notes.
Nevertheless, Dr. Taylor opined that Plaintiff’s pain would frequently interfere with his attention
and concentration, and that he is unable to sit for more than four hours. (T. 438.) Dr. Taylor
also opined that Plaintiff cannot lift even 10 pounds. (T. 439.) None of Dr. Taylor’s opinions as
to Plaintiff’s limitations are supported by the longitudinal treatment records from her place of
business.
Furthermore, other substantial evidence–specifically, Plaintiff’s own testimony–
contradicts Dr. Taylor’s findings. Plaintiff testified that he did not have any sitting limitations.
(T. 39.) He testified that he could lift a gallon of milk if needed. (T. 45.) He also denied having
problems rising from a chair. (T. 40.)
Finally, on February 28, 2013, Dr. Taylor submitted a letter, the entire body of which
states as follows: “The above patient is totally disabled given morbid obesity, impaired vision
and anxiety/depression.” (T. 434.) This opinion is a conclusion of law reserved for the
Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(e)(1). Therefore, this opinion is entitled to no weight and
the ALJ did not err by disregarding it. Snell v. Apfel, 144 F.3d 128, 133 (2d Cir. 1999).
For these reasons, the Court finds that Dr. Taylor’s opinions are not supported by
medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques and are not consistent with
other substantial evidence. Therefore, the opinions are not entitled to controlling weight under
the treating physician rule, and the ALJ did not err in assigning them the weight he did.

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B.

Whether the ALJ Improperly Modified a Medical Opinion

After careful consideration, the Court answers this question in the negative for the
reasons stated in Defendant’s memorandum of law. (Dkt. No. 17.) To those reasons, the Court
adds the following analysis.
As stated above in Part II.A. of this Decision and Order, Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
modified the opinion of Dr. Elke Lorenson, a consultative examiner, in rendering his RFC
determination. (Dkt. No. 14 at 4 [Pl.’s Mem. of Law].) Dr. Lorenson opined, in part, that
Plaintiff had moderate restrictions in reaching. (T. 407.) Plaintiff argues that the ALJ
improperly modified this opinion when he found that Plaintiff’s RFC contained a restriction for
only overhead reaching. (Dkt. No. 14 at 4 [citing T. 17].)
However, the ALJ noted Dr. Lorenson’s unqualified reaching restriction in his analysis,
stating that “Dr. Lorenson opined that the claimant has moderate restrictions on bending, lifting
and reaching secondary to obesity and back pain.” (T. 19.) Moreover, an ALJ is not required to
adopt a medical opinion in whole, but rather “he [is] entitled to weigh all of the evidence
available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v.
Astrue, 508 F. App’x 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399
[1971] [“We therefore are presented with the not uncommon situation of conflicting medical
evidence. The trier of fact has the duty to resolve that conflict.”]).
Here, there is substantial evidence that conflicts with Dr. Lorenson’s unqualified
reaching restriction. For example, in the same examination, Dr. Lorenson found that Plaintiff
had a full range of motion in his shoulders, elbows, forearms, and wrists. (T. 407.) This finding
is consistent with Plaintiff’s treatment records, which also indicate a full range of motion. (T.

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275.) Moreover, Dr. Taylor, Plaintiff’s treating physician, opined that Plaintiff did not have
significant limitations in reaching. (T. 440.) Finally, Plaintiff himself indicated in his Disability
Function Report that he had no problems with reaching. (T. 203.)
For all these reasons, the ALJ did not act improperly when he qualified the unsupported
and contradictory opinion of Dr. Lorenson with regard to Plaintiff’s reaching restriction. Had
the ALJ instead found no restriction in reaching, such a decision would still have been supported
by substantial evidence. His decision to give some credence to an unsubstantiated opinion in
favor of the claimant is therefore within his prerogative as an ALJ, who must resolve
inconsistencies in the medical evidence. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 399 (1971)
(“The trier of fact has the duty to resolve [conflicting medical evidence].”).
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 14) is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendant’s cross-motion for judgment on the pleadings (Dkt. No. 17)
is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Commissioner’s determination is AFFIRMED; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED.
Dated:

April 19, 2016
Syracuse, NY
________________________________
Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby
Chief U.S. District Judge

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