Camarata v. Colvin

Filing 17

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER that the Commissioner's decision is affirmed and pltf's complaint is dismissed. Signed by US Magistrate Judge Andrew T. Baxter on 6/20/17. (sfp, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

CYNTHIA ANN CAMARATA,
o/b/o C.R.C.,
v.

Plaintiff,
6:16-CV-923
(ATB)

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,
Defendant.

DAVID A. EGHIGIAN, ESQ., for Plaintiff
ARIELLA R. ZOLTAN, SPECIAL ASS’T. U.S. ATTORNEY, for Defendant
ANDREW T. BAXTER, U.S. Magistrate Judge
MEMORANDUM DECISION and ORDER
This matter was referred to me, for all proceedings and entry of a final
judgment, pursuant to the Social Security Pilot Program, N.D.N.Y. General Order No.
18, in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), Fed. R. Civ. P. 73,
N.D.N.Y. Local Rule 73.1 and the consent of the parties. (Dkt. Nos. 4, 7).
I.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Cynthia Ann Camarata filed an application for Supplemental Security

Income (“SSI”) payments on behalf of her daughter, C.R.C.1, on October 4, 2013.
(Administrative Transcript (“T.”) at 222, 366-72). Plaintiff’s application was initially
denied on December 6, 2013, and she made a timely request for a hearing before an
Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). (T. 240-48, 293-300). The hearing, at which
C.R.C. appeared with plaintiff and legal counsel, was conducted by ALJ Julia D. Gibbs

1

Throughout this decision, the child on whose behalf this action was brought will be generally
referred to as “the claimant” or by her initials “C.R.C.” Cynthia Ann Camarata, who commenced
this action on behalf of her daughter, will generally be referred to as “plaintiff” or “C.R.C.’s mother.”

on October 7, 2014. (T. 67-92).
On October 17, 2014, the ALJ issued a decision finding that C.R.C. was not
disabled from the date of the application through the date of her decision. (T. 219-37).
The ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals
Council denied plaintiff’s request for review on May 24, 2016. (T. 1-7).
II.

ISSUES IN CONTENTION
Plaintiff makes the following arguments:
(1)

The Appeals Council failed to adequately consider new evidence related to
C.R.C.’s mental impairments. (Pl.’s Br. at 5-7) (Dkt. No. 14).

(2)

The ALJ’s credibility finding regarding C.R.C.’s testimony was not
supported by substantial evidence. (Pl.’s Br. at 7-8).

Defendant argues that the complaint should be dismissed, because the Appeals
Council adequately considered the new evidence, and the Commissioner’s decision was
supported by substantial evidence. (Def.’s Br. at 4-14) (Dkt. No. 15). For the reasons
stated below, this court agrees with the defendant and will dismiss the complaint. To
the extent that plaintiff’s new evidence documents a worsening of C.R.C.’s
impairments since the ALJ’s October 17, 2014 decision, the proper remedy is for
plaintiff to submit a new application for benefits on C.R.C.’s behalf.
III.

FACTUAL OVERVIEW
The court will only briefly summarize the medical, educational, and other

evidence, which is set forth at length in plaintiff’s brief (Pl.’s Br. at 2-6) and in the
ALJ’s decision. (T. 226-32). Further relevant details are discussed below in the course
2

of analyzing the issues disputed by the parties.
Claimant C.R.C. is a female child, born in December 2001, who resided with her
mother at all times relevant to this proceeding. (T. 225, 363). In September 2013,
C.R.C. was involved in a rollover accident while riding an All Terrain Vehicle
(“ATV”), and suffered the traumatic amputation of her left hand. (T. 267, 461). Efforts
to reattach her hand were unsuccessful, but she was fitted with a prosthesis. (T. 469).
After missing significant time due to her injury and rehabilitation, C.R.C. returned to
school. (T. 286). On the date of the hearing, she was in the seventh grade. (T. 26).
At the hearing, C.R.C. testified that she was right handed, but had difficulties
with many tasks due to the loss of her left hand, despite the prosthesis. (T. 268-83).
These activities of daily living included dressing herself, styling her hair, tying her
shoes, cutting food, opening jars, turning pages in a book or examination packet, and
carrying books at school. (T. 267-77). C.R.C.’s mother testified that these difficulties
continued even after her daughter was fitted with a more advanced “i-limb” prosthesis,2
because C.R.C. was often unable to access the wireless internet signal necessary to
manipulate this new prosthetic hand. (T. 291). C.R.C. had also been seeing a
counselor for the past year to help with the anger and depression stemming from her
injury. (T. 283, 502-503).
In April 2015, approximately six months after the ALJ’s decision, C.R.C. was
hospitalized for an emergency psychiatric evaluation after she told her mother that she
2

The i-limb is a prosthetic hand designed to bend at the joints of each digit. The wearer
can alter the grip pattern of the hand via a mobile device, such as an iPhone or tablet.
http://www.touchbionics.com/products/how-i-limb-works
3

had suicidal thoughts. (T. 169). C.R.C. was hospitalized again in October 2015 after
posting statements on social media about committing suicide. (T. 65). She reported that
she had previously tried to choke or hang herself, and had engaged in self-cutting. (T.
59, 65). C.R.C. received in-patient psychiatric treatment, and continued to take
prescribed psychiatric medication upon discharge. (T. 10-13). At the time of this
treatment, plaintiff’s request for review of the ALJ’s decision was still pending before
the Appeals Council. (T. 2).
IV.

APPLICABLE LAW
A.

Disability Standard

An individual under the age of eighteen is disabled, and thus eligible for SSI
benefits, if he or she has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment,
which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to
result in death, or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i). See Hudson v. Astrue,
1:06-CV-1342 (LEK/VEB), 2009 WL 1212114, at *3-4 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2009)
(discussing the standard for children’s disability benefits). However, the definition
provision excludes from coverage any “individual under the age of [eighteen] who
engages in substantial gainful activity. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3) (C)(ii).
The agency has developed a three-step process to be employed in determining
whether a child can meet the statutory definition of disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924;
Kittles v. Barnhart, 245 F. Supp. 2d 479, 487-88 (E.D.N.Y. 2003); Ramos v. Barnhart,
02 Civ. 3127, 2003 WL 21032012, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2003). The first step of the
4

test requires a determination of whether the child has engaged in substantial gainful
activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b); Kittles, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 488. If so, then by statute
and by regulation, the child is ineligible for SSI benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)
(C)(ii); 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b).
If the child has not engaged in substantial gainful activity, the second step of the
test requires examination of whether he or she suffers from one or more medically
determinable impairments that, either alone or in combination, are properly regarded as
“severe,” in that they cause more than a minimal functional limitation. 20 C.F.R. §
416.924(c); Kittles, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 488; Ramos, 2003 WL 21032012, at *7. If the
child is found to have a severe impairment, the Commissioner must then determine, at
the third step, whether the impairment meets or equals a presumptively disabling
condition identified in the listing of impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt.
P., App. 1. Id. Equivalence to a listing can be either medical or functional. 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.924(d); Kittles, 245 F. Supp. 2d at 488; Ramos, 2003 WL 21032012, at *7. If an
impairment is found to meet, or qualify as medically or functionally equivalent to, a
listed impairment, and the twelve-month durational requirement is satisfied, the
claimant will be found to be disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d)(1); Ramos, 2003 WL
21032012, at *8.
“Functional” equivalence must be examined only if it is determined that the
claimant’s impairment does not meet or medically equal the criteria for a listed
impairment. Analysis of functionality involves considering how a claimant functions in
six main areas referred to as “domains.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1); Ramos, 2003 WL
5

21032012, at *8. The domains are described as “broad areas of functioning intended to
capture all of what a child can or cannot do.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1). Those
domains include: (1) acquiring and using information; (2) attending and completing
tasks; (3) interacting and relating with others; (4) moving about and manipulating
objects; (5) caring for oneself; and (6) health and physical well-being. 20 C.F.R. §
416.926a(b)(1).
Functional equivalence is established by finding an “extreme” limitation,
meaning “more than marked,” in a single domain. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a); Ramos,
2003 WL 21032012, at *8. An “extreme limitation” is an impairment which “interferes
very seriously with [the claimant’s] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or
complete activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i) (emphasis added).
Alternatively, a finding of disability is warranted if a “marked” limitation is
found in any two of the listed domains. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(a); Ramos, 2003 WL
21032012, at *8. A “marked limitation” exists when the impairment “interferes
seriously with [the claimant’s] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete
activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). “A marked limitation may arise when
several activities or functions are impaired, or even when only one is impaired, as long
as the degree of limitation is such as to interfere seriously with the ability to function
(based upon age-appropriate expectations) independently, appropriately, effectively,
and on a sustained basis.” 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 112.00(C).
B.

Scope of Review

In reviewing a final decision of the Commissioner, a court must determine
6

whether the correct legal standards were applied and whether substantial evidence
supported the decision. Selian v. Astrue, 708 F.3d 409, 417 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting
Talavera v. Astrue, 697 F3d 145, 151 (2d Cir. 2012)); Brault v. Soc. Sec. Admin,
Comm’r, 683 F.3d 443, 448 (2d Cir. 2012); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)). A reviewing court
may not affirm an ALJ’s decision if it reasonably doubts whether the proper legal
standards were applied, even if the decision appears to be supported by substantial
evidence. Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987).
Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Talavera, 697 F.3d at 151 (quoting
Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). It must be “more than a scintilla” of
evidence scattered throughout the administrative record. Id. However, this standard is
a very deferential standard of review “ – even more so than the ‘clearly erroneous
standard.’” Brault, 683 F.3d at 448.
An ALJ must set forth the crucial factors justifying his findings with sufficient
specificity to allow a court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the
decision. Ferraris v. Heckler, 728 F.2d 582, 587 (2d Cir. 1984). “To determine on
appeal whether an ALJ’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, a reviewing
court considers the whole record, examining the evidence from both sides, because an
analysis of the substantiality of the evidence must also include that which detracts from
its weight.” Williams on behalf of Williams v. Bowen, 859 F.2d 255, 258 (2d Cir.
1988). However, a reviewing court may not substitute its interpretation of the
administrative record for that of the Commissioner, if the record contains substantial
7

support for the ALJ’s decision. Id. See also Rutherford v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 60, 62
(2d Cir. 1982).
An ALJ is not required to explicitly analyze every piece of conflicting evidence
in the record. See, e.g., Mongeur v. Heckler, 722 F.2d 1033, 1040 (2d Cir. 1983); Miles
v. Harris, 645 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1981) (we are unwilling to require an ALJ
explicitly to reconcile every conflicting shred of medical testimony). However, the ALJ
cannot “‘pick and choose’ evidence in the record that supports his conclusions.” Cruz
v. Barnhart, 343 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Fuller v. Astrue, No.
09-CV-6279, 2010 WL 5072112, at *6 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010).
V.

THE ALJ’S DECISION
As the first step in her analysis, the ALJ found that C.R.C. had not engaged in

substantial gainful activity since October 4, 2013, the filing date of the application for
benefits. (T. 225). Next, the ALJ determined that the traumatic amputation of C.R.C.’s
left hand qualified as a severe impairment. (Id.). At the third step, the ALJ found that
C.R.C. did not have an impairment or a combination of impairments that met or
medically equaled an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. § 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. (T. 28).
The ALJ continued her analysis, and found that C.R.C. did not have an impairment or
combination of impairments that functionally equaled the severity of a Listed
Impairment under the regulations. (T. 225-27).
In making her functional equivalence determination, the ALJ considered the
medical evidence, C.R.C.’s school records, a teacher evaluation, and correspondence
from C.R.C.’s mental health therapist. (Id.). Based upon her review of the evidence, the
8

ALJ found that C.R.C. had a “less than marked limitation” in all of the applicable
functional domains: acquiring and using information; attending and completing tasks;
interacting and relating with others; moving about and manipulating objects; caring for
herself; and health and physical well-being. (T. 227-32).
The ALJ also evaluated C.R.C.’s hearing testimony, and concluded that her
statements about the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of her impairments were
not entirely credible, because they were inconsistent with the record evidence. (T. 22732). Because C.R.C. did not have “marked” limitations in two or more of the functional
domains, and did not have an “extreme” limitation in any one domain, the ALJ
concluded that C.R.C. was not disabled from the date of the application for benefits. (T.
232).
VI.

NEW EVIDENCE SUBMITTED TO APPEALS COUNCIL
A.

Legal Standard

The regulations provide that the Appeals Council considers new and material
evidence if it relates to the period on or before the date of the ALJ’s decision. 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.976(b)(1). See Jenkins v. Colvin, No. 1:13-CV-1035 (GLS), 2015 WL 729691, at
*5 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 19, 2015) (citation omitted). If the Appeals Council finds that the
evidence is new and material, it will review the case if it finds that the ALJ’s decision is
contrary to the weight of the current record evidence. Id. (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.970
(b). Even if the Appeals Council finds that the evidence is not new and material and
declines to review the ALJ’s decision, the evidence in question becomes part of the
record for review by the court. Id. (citing Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir.
9

1996). If the Appeals Council denies review after reviewing the new evidence, the
Commissioner’s decision includes the Appeals Council’s conclusion that the ALJ’s
findings remain correct despite the new evidence. Id.
B.

Application

Plaintiff timely requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ’s decision. (T.
216). While this request was pending, plaintiff submitted additional evidence
consisting of more than two hundred pages of hospitalization and psychiatric treatment
records covering the period from February 10, 2015 to November 12, 2015. (T. 8-215).
These records documented two separate incidents in which C.R.C. expressed suicidal
thoughts, including one suicide attempt. (T. 23, 59, 165, 170). The related treatment
notes indicated that C.R.C. had become increasingly angry and depressed by bullying at
school that targeted her physical impairment, and had been prescribed medication for
depression, anxiety, and PTSD. (T. 8, 10, 15, 23, 33).
On May 24, 2016, the Appeals Council denied plaintiff’s request for review, and
found that the new evidence did not impact the ALJ’s determination of disability dated
October 17, 2014. (T. 2). Plaintiff contends that this new psychiatric evidence offers
additional information to support C.R.C.’s hearing testimony that she felt depressed and
angry as a result of her accident. Specifically, plaintiff contends that if this new
evidence had been available to the ALJ, it would have been “probative to the extreme
limitations that C.R.C. has in caring for herself, attending to and completing tasks, and
her health and well-being.” (Pl.’s Br. at 10).
In this case, the medical evidence submitted to the Appeals Council was
10

obviously “new,” because it was not in existence at the time of the administrative
hearing or the ALJ’s decision. Nor was it cumulative. C.R.C. received minimal
psychiatric treatment prior to the ALJ’s decision, so the only psychiatric medical
evidence available to the ALJ was a two page letter prepared by C.R.C.’s mental health
therapist, Mary Tupaj.3 (T. 502-503). Because these new psychiatric records did not
exist at the time of the hearing, plaintiff also had good cause for not presenting it to the
ALJ. See Pollard v. Halter, 377 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2004).
The only remaining question, then, is whether these 2015 medical records are
material. New evidence is material if it is (1) relevant to the claimant’s condition
during the time period for which benefits were denied, and (2) shows a reasonable
possibility that the new evidence would have influenced the Commissioner to decide
claimant’s application differently. Id. In Pollard, the Second Circuit concluded that the
Appeals Council had erred in rejecting new evidence that “strongly suggests that,
during the relevant time period, [claimant’s] condition was far more serious than
previously thought and that additional impairments existed when [claimant] was
younger.”4 Id.
The relevant new evidence is dated from April 2015, when C.R.C. received

3

This letter is undated, but Ms. Tupaj wrote that she had provided counseling services to
C.R.C. for the past year, commencing on or about October 23, 2013. (T. 502-503).
4

In Pollard, the ALJ cited a lack of other evidence as reason not to credit the claimant’s
mother’s testimony that the child was very hard to manage, got into fights with teachers and other
students, and started fires. Pollard, 377 F.3d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 2004). The Second Circuit
concluded that the new evidence, which included the child’s subsequent hospitalization in a
psychiatric ward after threatening to kill his teacher, created a reasonable possibility that the ALJ
may have reached a different conclusion if the evidence had been available. Id.
11

emergency psychiatric treatment after she told her mother that she was considering
suicide.5 (T. 162). C.R.C. also received in-patient psychiatric treatment after expressing
suicidal thoughts in October 2015. During this period, C.R.C. was prescribed
psychiatric medication for the first time. (T. 66, 79). These 2015 psychiatric records
show that plaintiff had difficulty sleeping, expressed suicidal ideations, and engaged in
self-injurious behavior, including attempting suicide and cutting herself. (T. 41, 55, 59,
169).
During this period, C.R.C. reported that she experienced regular nightmares and
flashbacks about her accident, felt her depression symptoms worsening, and had an
irregular appetite that resulted in significant weight gain. (T. 78). She also stated that
she was isolating herself in her room because she felt that “[e]veryone hates me;” that
she continued to experience bullying despite changing schools; and that she was
becoming more and more angry about her ATV accident and her injury. (T. 37, 59, 65,
78, 85). C.R.C. also expressed her belief that home school would be a better alternative
because then she would “not have to deal with other students.” (T. 46, 52).
These more recent reports of C.R.C.’s mental health symptoms stand in sharp
contrast to the evidence considered by the ALJ in October 2014. For example, the ALJ
relied upon a November 14, 2013 teacher evaluation that indicated that C.R.C. had no
problem making and keeping friends, expressing anger appropriately, respecting adults
in authority, or following rules. (T. 399-406). The ALJ also relied upon this evaluation

5

The new evidence also included records from February 2015, when C.R.C. received
treatment for back pain. (T. 122-135). Those records are not relevant to this proceeding.
12

to conclude that C.R.C. had no problem knowing when to ask for help, could respond
appropriately to changes in her mood, and could handle frustration appropriately. (Id.).
The ALJ also noted that C.R.C.’s mental health therapist reported that the child was
doing better socially with supportive therapy. (T. 226-27, 502-503). The therapist’s
only treatment recommendation was that C.R.C.’s entire family receive counseling as
they dealt with the trauma of her accident. (T. 503).
The 2015 records document the belief of C.R.C.’s treatment sources that her
depression and other mental health impairments stemmed from the physical, emotional,
and social fall-out from her accident. (T. 37, 65, 78). However, there is no indication
that C.R.C. experienced the same severity of symptoms, including thoughts of suicide
and self-harm, at any time prior to April 2015. (T. 8-121). Indeed, C.R.C.’s description
of her symptoms in the treatment notes reflect her belief that her depression and anger
were getting worse. (T. 78, 85). Therefore, this court cannot conclude that the new
evidence would have altered the ALJ’s October 17, 2014 decision, even though it may
indicate that C.R.C.’s ongoing struggle with depression had become more difficult at a
later date. See Ovitt v. Colvin, No. 1:12-CV-1522 (DNH), 2014 WL 1806995, at *11
(N.D.N.Y. May 7, 2014); see also Quinlivan v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 08-CV-1175
(MAD/VEB), 2011 WL 2413491 (N.D.N.Y. May 23, 2011) (Rep’t-Rec), adopted by,
2011 WL 2295060 (N.D.N.Y. June 10, 2011) (where new evidence outside the relevant
time frame arguably documented a worsening impairment, the “proper remedy would
be to submit a new application for benefits”).

13

VII. CREDIBILITY
A.

Legal Standard

“An [ALJ] may properly reject [subjective complaints] after weighing the
objective medical evidence in the record, the claimant's demeanor, and other indicia of
credibility, but must set forth his or her reasons ‘with sufficient specificity to enable us
to decide whether the determination is supported by substantial evidence.’” Lewis v.
Apfel, 62 F. Supp. 2d 648, 651 (N.D.N.Y. 1999) (quoting Gallardo v. Apfel, No. 96
CIV 9435, 1999 WL 185253, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. March 25, 1999)). To satisfy the
substantial evidence rule, the ALJ’s credibility assessment must be based on a two-step
analysis of pertinent evidence in the record. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.929; see also Foster
v. Callahan, No. 96-CV-1858, 1998 WL 106231, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1998).
First, the ALJ must determine, based upon the claimant’s objective medical
evidence, whether the medical impairments “could reasonably be expected to produce
the pain or other symptoms alleged . . . .” 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(a). Second, if the
medical evidence alone establishes the existence of such impairments, then the ALJ
need only evaluate the intensity, persistence, and limiting effects of a claimant’s
symptoms to determine the extent to which it limits the claimant’s capacity to function.
20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c). When the objective evidence alone does not substantiate the
intensity, persistence, or limiting effects of the claimant’s symptoms, the ALJ must
assess the credibility of the claimant’s subjective complaints by considering the record
in light of the following symptom-related factors: (1) claimant’s daily activities; (2)
location, duration, frequency, and intensity of claimant’s symptoms; (3) precipitating
14

and aggravating factors; (4) type, dosage, effectiveness, and side effects of any
medication taken to relieve symptoms; (5) other treatment received to relieve
symptoms; (6) any measures taken by the claimant to relieve symptoms; and (7) any
other factors concerning claimant’s functional limitations and restrictions due to
symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3).
B.

Application

Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to articulate sufficiently specific reasons for
discounting C.R.C.’s testimony about her physical limitations. (Pl.’s Br. at 10-11). In
particular, plaintiff argues that the ALJ ignored C.R.C.’s testimony that she had
difficulty dressing herself, preparing her hair, using a knife, carrying her books at
school, and putting on shoes. (T. 267-89). However, the ALJ’s credibility
determination was clearly premised upon a perceived inconsistency between C.R.C.’s
testimony and the record evidence. (T. 226-27). For example, the ALJ cited to
treatment records showing that after being fitted with the i-limb prosthesis, C.R.C.
reported that she was now able to tie her shoes, hold a bag or backpack, use a broom,
hold her iPod, and brush and curl her hair.6 (T. 486-87). The ALJ also considered the
report by C.R.C.’s teacher that C.R.C. had serious problems moving and manipulating
things due to the loss of her hand, but discounted this specific finding because it
predated C.R.C.’s use of a more advanced prosthetic device. (T. 230). By explaining

6

During the hearing, C.R.C.’s mother testified that her daughter was unable to get the full
benefit of the i-limb during the school day, because the school refused to provide C.R.C. with
wireless internet access, and prohibited her from using an iPod during tests. (T. 291). These
external restrictions, while understandably aggravating, do not impact the ALJ’s findings with
regard to C.R.C.’s functional limitations or credibility.
15

her comparison of C.R.C.’s testimony with the record, the ALJ provided substantial
evidence for her credibility determination.7
WHEREFORE, based on the findings above, it is
ORDERED, that the Commissioner’s decision is AFFIRMED, and plaintiff’s
complaint is DISMISSED, and it is
ORDERED, that judgment be entered for the DEFENDANT.

Dated:

June 20, 2017

7

Aside from the credibility assessment, plaintiff has not directly challenged the ALJ’s
consideration of the evidence that was available at the time of her October 17, 2014 decision. To
the extent that such challenge is implicit in plaintiff’s brief, this court concludes that the ALJ
provided substantial evidence to support her determination with respect to each of the six
functional domains, based upon my review of the ALJ’s decision and the administrative record.
16