Williams et al v. Connell et al
Filing
63
DECISION & ORDER: It is Ordered that the # 58 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, the Court finds that this matter is about whether the Defendants are liable to the Decedent for violating the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him and for failing to intervene when he was attacked by a fellow inmate. Claims addressing this issue will remain in the case. The motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiffs claims brought pursuant to the 14th Amen dment and with respect by any claims brought by the Plaintiffs on their own behalf, rather than on behalf of the Decedents estate. As such, Count 1 is hereby DISMISSED to the extent that it raises a Fourteenth-Amendment claim. Counts 4-9 of the Second Amended Complaint are also hereby DISMISSED. The motion is DENIED in all other respects. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas J. McAvoy on 7/18/2018. (jmb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------SHIKEMA WILLIAMS, administratrix of the
estate of FREDERICK VELEZ, SHIKEMA WILLIAMS,
administratrix of the estate of CHRISTINE COX,
FREDERICK HALL, and SHAMIA HALL,
Plaintiffs,
v.
6:17-CV-750
(TJM/ATB)
SUPERINTENDENT SUSAN CONNELL,
DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT PETER NAUGHTON,
SGT. RALPH CIACCIA, C.O. THEODORE ELLIOT,
C.O. ALAN ANDRE, C.O. LESLIE BAILEY, C.O. DAVID
PIERSALL, C.O. MICHAEL BOLEN, C.O. VINCENT
SANSEVIERI, C.O. K. KLEIN, C.O. J. MCNEIL,
C.O. B. FREY, C.O. GATLEY, C.O. AVERY, CAPT.
EARL BELL, C.O. THEALL, AND “JOHN DOES” 1-15
(names being fictitious and presently unknown),
Defendants.
-------------------------------THOMAS J. McAVOY
Senior United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second Amended
Complaint in this matter involving the death of Frederick Velez (“Decedent”) while in the
custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision
(“DOCCS”). See dkt. # 58. The parties have briefed the motion and the Court has
determined to decide the matter without oral argument.
I.
BACKGROUND
This case concerns the death of Frederick Velez on April 25, 2009 after he was
stabbed by another inmate at the Oneida (New York) Correctional Facility the previous
evening. Second Amended Complaint (“Complt.”), dkt. # 54, at ¶ 110. Plaintiffs generally
allege that Velez’s death was a result of Defendants’ deliberate indifference to the
dangers Velez faced while incaracerated. They seek damages for Defendants’ alleged
constitutional violations both on behalf of Decedent’s estate and on behalf of his survivors.
Plaintiffs contend that Defendants’ conduct violated these persons’ constitutional right to a
relationship with the decedent.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint alleges that on April 24, 2009, Decedent
“was playing checkers or dominoes” with another inmate, Jose Rodriguez, “in the dayroom
of G-Dorm in Building 21 of the Oneida Correctional Facility, a medium-security prison.”
Id. at ¶ 40. Jose Rodriguez, Plaintiffs allege, “was known to defendants to have vicious
and violent propensities[.]” Id. at ¶ 49. On the date in q uestion, he was in the twentyseventh year of twenty-to-life-year sentence for killing a police officer. Id. Defendants
knew this history. Id. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants knew Rodriguez had “a history
of violent and aggressive behavior and vicious and violent propensities[.]” Id. at ¶ 50.
They also knew he had a “history of violent assaults,” and that while incarcerated
Rodriguez’s disciplinary record demonstrated “mounting incidents of violence and fighting,”
in addition to possession of weapons and “at least one previous assault on another
inmate.” Id. ¶¶ 50-51. Though they knew Rodriguez was dangerous, Defendants
allegedly “failed to segregate him from the general inmate population” or place him in the
psychiatric ward. Id. at ¶ 52. Defendants instead kept Rodriguez among the general
population. Id. at ¶ 53.
Plaintiffs allege that an argument between Rodriguez and the Decedent eventually
2
broke out over the game of dominoes. Id. at ¶ 54. Rodriguez accused Decedent of
cheating, which he denied. Id. The two men allegedly shouted and cursed at each other
“for an extended period of time.” Id. at ¶ 55. Plaintiffs allege that the Defendant prison
guards heard this commotion and did nothing “to defuse the situation.” Id. at ¶ 56.
Indeed, Plaintiffs contend, the Defendant prison guards did not even make their rounds
that night. Id. at ¶ 57. This failing, Plaintiffs contend, amounted to “deliberate indifference
to the well-being and safety of the inmates under their charge[.]” Id.
According to Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint, the disagreement between
Decedent and Rodriguez at some point “turned physical.” Id. at ¶ 59. That physical
altercation allegedly continued “for an extended period or time . . . and . . . created an
enormous commotion in the recreation room[.]” Id. at ¶ 60. Many inmates gathered
around the action. Id. The two men’s argument continued for two hours, Plaintiffs allege,
between 8:00 and 10:00 p.m. Id. at ¶ 61. Plaintiffs allege that “[a]ll of this activity
occurred within earshot and view . . . and in the presence of . . . the corrections staff on GDorm[.]” Id. at ¶ 62. That staff allegedly “did not respond to the incident, make any effort
to break up the fight, maintain order, or separate” the antagonists. Id. at ¶ 64. Officers
also allegedly failed to take any measures to protect “the security and welfare of the
inmates, including . . . decedent.” Id.
Plaintiffs allege that other inmates broke up the fight between the two men, and
Decedent “retreated to his assigned cubicle in” the dorm. Id. at ¶ 65. Decedent stayed in
that room, even though Rodriguez allegedly “pursued” him, “taunting him and threatening
him with extreme physical violence.” Id. Despite the fact that the Defendant guards could
see and hear the incident, Plaintiffs claim, no Defendant made any effort “to break up the
3
fight, maintain order, separate” the two men, “or protect the security and welfare of the
inmates[.]” Id. at ¶ 66.
For the next one to two hours, Plaintiffs allege, Rodriguez paced in front of
Defendant’s cube holding “a long shank in his hand, waving it about conspicuously” and
“taunting” decedent. Id. at ¶ 67. Rodriguez allegedly cursed at Decedent, threw objects
and furniture at him, and shouted violent threats at him. Id. The shank Rodriguez
supposedly possessed was nine-and-one-half inches long and a half-inch wide. Id. at ¶
68. One end had been sharpened to a point and the other end w rapped in tape, creating
a handle. Id. Rodriguez allegedly waived the shank at Decedent and threatened to use
the weapon to kill him. Id. at ¶ 69. Decedent did not respond, rem aining in his cube.
Plaintiffs allege that Rodriguez’s conduct and threats were visible and audible to
Defendants, or should have been. Id. at ¶ 70. Despite this, Defendants allegedly did
nothing about the situation. Id. at ¶ 71. Plaintif fs also allege that Defendants did not
respond when Rodriguez defecated in a plastic container in the hallway near Decedent’s
cube and then threw feces at Decendant. Id. at ¶¶ 72-73. Decedent ev entually used a
mop in an attempt to clean the feces from inside his cube. Id. at ¶ 74. Plaintiffs allege
that Rodriguez attacked Decedent when he stepped outside the cube to rinse of f the mop.
Id. at ¶ 74. Defendants allegedly again failed to respond to this situation. Id. at ¶ 75.
Plaintiffs allege that Rodriguez then took a chair from the rec room and threw it at
Decedent; again the Defendant guards did nothing. Id. at ¶¶ 76-77. Rodriguez then
allegedly began to beat Decedent again, “punching him repeatedly,” with no response
from the guards. Id. at ¶¶ 78-79. Rodriguez then threw the chair at Decedent again. Id.
at ¶ 80. Despite the noise that action generated, Plaintiffs allege that the guards did
4
nothing about the situation. Id. at ¶¶ 80-81. Finally, Plaintiffs allege, Rodriguez assaulted
Decedent again. Id. at ¶ 82. “During an extremely prolonged and violent and noisy
physical altercation, Rodriguez stabbed [Decedent] in the chest with the shank,” leading to
Decedent’s demise. Id. at ¶ 83.
Plaintiffs initially filed a Complaint in the Kings County, New York, Supreme Court.
See dkt. # 1. Defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York on July 19, 2012. See Id. The Eastern District Court granted
Defendants’ motion to transfer venue to this Court and denied Plaintiffs’ motion to remand
on June 29, 2017. See dkt. # 38. T he Court then permitted Plaintiffs to file a Second
Amended Complaint, which they did on October 25, 2017. See dkt. # 54. T he Second
Amended Complaint raises nine counts, all brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. W hile
raised on behalf of various parties, all of the counts point to injuries caused by
Defendants’ conduct in failing to prevent the attack that killed Frederick Velez. Counts 1,
2 and 3 are raised on behalf of the estate of Frederick Velez. Count 1 alleges a violation
of Velez’s Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to Defendants’ failure to protect
Velez from Rodriguez’s attack. Count 2 alleges supervisory liability against prison officials
for creating and enforcing policies and ratifying actions that led to Velez’s death. Count 3
accuses prison guards of failing to intervene and stop the attack on Velez. Count 4, 5,
and 6 allege violations of the constitutional rights of Christine Cox, the deceased mother of
Frederick Velez. Count 4 alleges that Defendants’ violation of Velez’s constitutional rights
led to a violation of Cox’s constitutional right to a parent-child relationship and therefore
depriving her of her “Constitutional rights to intimate association, companionship and
society.” Comptl. at ¶ 145. Count 5 alleges that the prison supervisors’ violation of
5
Velez’s constitutional rights deprived Cox of her relationship with her son and thus her
right to association with him. Count 6 makes the same allegation on Cox’s behavior
against the prison guards. Counts 7, 8, and 9 are brought on behalf of Decedent’s
children, Frederick Hall and Shamia Hall. They raise similar claims to those in Counts 4-6,
but this time on the basis that Defendants’ actions deprived them of the intimate
association provided by a parent-child relationship.
Defendants then filed the instant motion to dismiss, and the parties briefed the
issues, bringing the case to its present posture.
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Defendants have filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Defendants argue Plaintiff has not stated a claim upon
which relief could be granted, even if all factual allegations in the complaint were proved
true. In addressing such motions, the court must accept "all factual allegations in the
complaint as true, and draw[] all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor." Holmes v.
Grubman, 568 F.3d 329,335 (2d Cir. 2009). This tenet does not apply to legal
conclusions. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,678 (2009). "Threadbare recitals of the
elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice."
Id. at 678. "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual
matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. (quoting
Bell Atl. V. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,570 (2007)).
III.
DISCUSSION
Defendants seek dismissal on several grounds. As a general matter, Defendants’
6
motion can be divided into two categories: (1) a motion to dismiss the substantive claims
brought on behalf of the estate of Frederick Velez; and (2) a motion to dismiss the claims
of certain parties because they cannot be asserted on their behalf. The Court will first
address the claims brought on behalf of the Velez estate, and then address whether the
individual plaintiffs not representing the estate are entitled to raise their claims.
A. Claims on Behalf of the Velez Estate
The claims on behalf of the Velez Estate all center on the incident that led
to his death and the actions of prison officials when confronted with the violent conflict that
appeared to be developing between Velez and Rodriguez. Defendants seek to dismiss
the counts related to this conduct on several grounds. They first argue that Count 1 of
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint must be dismissed. They contend that the nature
of the claim is unclear; Plaintiffs allege that the decedent was deprived of life without due
process and that Defendants engaged in conscience-shocking behavior–which suggests a
Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim–but they also allege conduct which
could be interpreted as an Eight Amendment failure-to-protect or failure-to-intervene claim.
Whatever the claim, Defendants contend, Plaintiffs have failed to allege sufficient facts to
make their right to relief plausible.
Plaintiffs’ response goes some way towards clarifying the action, which is not a
model of clarity. Plaintiffs argue that they have alleged facts sufficient to make out Eighth
Amendment claims on Counts 1, 2, and 3. They do not argue that they have attempted to
raise a substantive due process claim, and the Court will therefore address Defendants’
arguments only with respect to the Plaintiffs’ Eighth-Amendment allegations, and with
7
respect to the various Defendants charged with violating Defendants’ rights in this
respect.1 Because of the nature of the Plaintiffs’ arguments and the nature of their
pleading, the Court will address Plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claims as a whole, and with
reference to the two groups of Defendants here named, prison guards and prison
supervisors and officials.
i. Eighth Amendment Failure-to-Protect and Failure-to-Intervene Claims
“‘When the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his
will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility
for his safety and general well being.’” Blyden v. Mancusi, 186 F.3d 252, 262 (2d Cir.
1999) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32 (1993)). “[A] state prison guard’s
deliberate indifference to the consequences of his conduct for those under his control and
dependent upon him may support a claim under § 1983.” Morales v. New York State
Dep’t of Corrections, 842 F.2d 27, 30 (2d Cir. 1988). As such, “[t]he Eig hth Amendment
requires prison officials to take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of inmates in
their custody.” Hayes v. New York City Dep’t of Corrections, 84 F.3d 614, 620 (2d Cir.
1996). “Where a prison inmate has alleged that he was not protected by prison officials, .
. . ‘an inmate who is injured as a result of a prison official’s deliberate indifference to his
1
Plaintiffs appear to agree that they cannot raise a Fourteenth Amendment
substantive due process claim based on this conduct, since their claims are covered by
the Eighth Amendment, a more specific right. The Court will therefore grant the motion to
the extent that Defendants seek dismissal of any Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
process claims. See Velez v. Levy, 401 F.3d 75, 94 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[W ]here a specific
constitutional provision prohibits government action, plaintiffs seeking redress for that
prohibited conduct in a § 1983 suit cannot m ake reference to the broad notion of
substantive due process.”).
8
safety may maintain a damage action for the deprivation of his civil rights[.]’” Snider v.
Dylag, 188 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Stubbs v. Dudley, 849 F.2d 83, 86 (2d Cir.
1988)). To demonstrate the requisite “deliberate indifference,” a prisoner-plaintiff must
show that “a prison official acted with ‘deliberate indifference’ to prisoners’ health or
safety.” Blyden, 186 F.3d at 262. Plaintiff need not show “‘that a prison official failed to
act believing that harm actually would befall an inmate; it is enough that the official acted
or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Id. (quoting
Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). A prisoner could also prevail on a claim that a defendant failed
to intervene to protect him from an assault by another prisoner. Morales, 842 F.2d at 30.
“Inaction by a corrections officer to intercede and halt an attack by a fellow prisoner is
sufficient basis for deliberate indifference.” Dizak v. Hawks, No. 15cv1171, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 176283, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 2015).
As a general matter, Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to state a plausible
Eight-Amendment claim based on the circumstances of Decedent’s passing. As explained
above, Plaintiffs allege that guards were aware of a conflict between Decedent and
Rodriguez, that they were aware that Rodriguez had a history of violence, that he had the
weapon that eventually killed Decedent, that they knew that Rodriguez had been pacing in
front of Decedent’s cubicle and threatening him, and they knew that Rodriguez would likely
attack Decedent at some point. Despite this knowledge, guards did nothing to prevent the
attack. Such allegations, if proved true, would be sufficient for a jury to conclude that the
Defendant guards acted with deliberate indifference to a serious threat to Decedent’s
health and safety. Defendants’ argument is less that Plaintiffs have failed to allege
culpable conduct and more that they have failed to implicate particular Defendants in that
9
conduct. The Court will address these claims about particular Defendants in turn.
ii.
Prison Officials
Defendants first seek to dismiss claims of supervisory liability against Defendants
Susan Connell, Peter Naughton, Earl Bell, K. Klein, Ralph Ciaccia, and B. Frey.
Defendants claim that Plaintiffs have not plead any facts making it plausible that these
Defendants had any personal involvement in designing or implementing the policies that
injured Decedent. Plaintiffs respond that they have alleged supervisory liability against
these officials because they have alleged that the Defendant supervisors classified
Rodriguez as medium security and housed him in a dormitory even though they knew he
was extremely violent and aggressive. Further, Plaintiffs contend that the Second
Amended Complaint alleges that the supervisory defendants caused the G-dorm to be
overcrowded and inadequately staffed, causing the conflict that led to Decedent’s demise.
They also allege that Defendants failed to establish and implement policies to detect and
eliminate weapons like the one used to kill Decedent.
In actions of this sort, “liability for supervisory government officials cannot be
premised on a theory of respondeat superior because § 1983 requires individual,
personalized liability on the part of each government defendant.” Raspardo v. Carlone,
770 F.3d 97, 116 (2d Cir. 2014). A plaintiff must introduce “[e]vidence of a supervisory
official’s ‘personal involvement’ in the challenged conduct.” Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y.,
352 F.3d 733, 753 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Johnson v. Newburgh Enlarged Sch. Dist., 239
F.3d 246, 254 (2d Cir. 2001)). Personal involvement can include “direct participation by
the supervisor in the challenged conduct.” Id. Personal involvement by a supervisor can
10
“also be established by evidence of an official’s (1) failure to take correct action after
learning of a subordinate’s unlawful conduct, (2) creation of a policy or custom fostering
the unlawful conduct, (3) gross negligence in supervising subordinates who commit
unlawful acts, or (4) deliberate indifference to the rights of others by failing to act on
information regarding the unlawful conduct of subordinates.” Id. In other words, to prevail
on a claim against a supervisory officer, a Plaintiff must show that his injuries were a result
of some action by the Defendant, whether in supervising or in crafting policies.
Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint offers the following allegations concerning
the policies and practices employed at the Oneida facility:
38.
Defendants, intentionally, with deliberate indifference, gross negligence,
and/or reckless disregard for the safety, security, and constitutional and
statutory rights of plaintiffs’ decedent, maintained, enforced, tolerated,
permitted, acquiesced in, and applied policies or practices of, among other
things:
a.
Subjecting persons in their correctional facility to violence perpetrated
by other inmates.
b.
Selecting, retaining and assigning correction officers, deputies, civilian
personnel and civilian volunteers to their correctional facility who
exhibit deliberate indifference and reckless disregard for the safety,
security and constitutional and statutory rights of inmates;
c.
Failing to take adequate security measures to protect inmates from
unnecessary harm, including but not limited to, the following:
1.
Separation of inmates from potentially violent or dangerous
inmates; use of security cameras and audio monitors to
monitor inmate activity and violence within and without prison
dormitories, cubes, and other locations;
2.
Having in place minimally responsible mechanisms to prevent
the presence and/or use of dangerous instrumentalities as
weapons within the prison;
3.
Training deputies, civilian personnel and civilian volunteers to
monitor inmates and immediately respond to acts of violence,
or threats of violence;
4.
Monitoring inmates who, for whatever reason, are unable to
care for themselves; and
5
Recognizing potentially volatile situations [and] circumstances
that are likely to erupt into violence;
11
d.
e.
f.
g.
Failing to ensure adequate staffing to ensure that Constitutional
violations do not occur;
Failing to adequately train, supervise, and control correction officers,
deputies, civilian employees or volunteers in law enforcement;
Failing to adequately, properly, and regularly search facility spaces,
including but not limited to:
1.
Area searches;
2.
Block searches of inmate dormitories, day rooms and
other living quarters;
3.
Cube searches;
4.
Security inspections;
Failing to adequately discipline correction officers, deputies or civilian
employees involved in misconduct;
Condoning and encouraging correction officers, deputies and civilian
employees in the belief that they can violate the rights of persons
such as plaintiffs’ decedent in this action with impunity, and that such
conduct will not adversely affect their opportunities for promotion and
other employment benefits.
Complt. at ¶ 38. These allegations are sufficient to make plausible a right to relief based
on the policies and practices created by, approved of, or permitted by supervisors. Even
setting aside any allegations that supervisors were aware that prison guards were ignoring
Rodriguez’s threats to and attacks on the Decedent, the f ailings detailed above explain
how a person like Rodriguez–who Plaintiffs allege presented a credible threat to other
inmates–could be housed with Decedent, be subject to lax supervision, and have access
to the weapon that he used to kill the Decedent. As g eneral allegations, they state a claim
for supervisory liability.
Defendants argue that these allegations are conclusory and do not explain how the
particular policies led to Velez’s death. The Court finds that the allegations in the Second
Amended Complaint, read as a whole, are sufficient to make plausible that Defendants’
alleged policies, particularly those designed to deal with violence-prone inmates, weapons,
and supervision in the dormitory areas, caused Velez’s death at the hands of an inmate
12
known to be violent who was permitted to remain in a lightly supervised dormitory setting
and have access to weapons.
Defendants also argue that the allegations about the conduct of particular policymaking and supervisory officials are merely conclusory, and fail to identify any
Defendants’ role in crafting the policies in question. There is appeal in Defendants’
position, as every one of the prison official Defendants is described to have had virtually
the same role in the events that led to Velez’s death and the allegations are quite general.
Moreover, the Second Amended Complaint, without pointing to any particular Defendant,
alleges that:
34.
35.
At all times relevant hereto, defendants were responsible for creating,
continuing, implementing, and executing policies, practices, procedures,
customs and/or protocols related to the appointment, hiring, training,
supervision, monitoring, controlling, auditing, disciplining and retention of all
correctional personnel at Oneida.
At all times relevant hereto, defendants were also responsible for creating
and promulgating policies, practices, procedures, customs and/or protocols
of Oneida and for ensuring that personnel of Oneida obeyed the Constitution
and laws of the Unied States and the State of New York.
Complt. at ¶¶ 34-35.
Recognizing that these allegations are vague and do not name a particular policy
created by a particular Defendant, the Court will also deny the motion in this respect. The
allegations describe the particular title of each Defendant and allege, in the case of the
Defendants moving in this respect, that they crafted the policies that injured the particular
Defendants. See Complt. at ¶¶ 15 (Connell), 16 (Naughton), 17 (Ciacca), 24 (Klein), 26
(Frey), and 29 (Bell).2 Plaintiffs also allege that these Defendants “authoriz[ed]
2
For example, Plaintiffs allege that:
15.
At all times relevant hereto, defendant SUSAN CONNELL (“CONNELL”) was
13
condon[ed], and ratifi[ed] the acts of co-defendants,” conduct which, if proved, would
amount to “deliberate indifference to the rights of others by failing to act on information
regarding the unlawful conduct of subordinates.” Hayut, 355 F.3d at 753. Assuming, as
the Court must, that these allegations are true, the Court must conclude that Plaintiff has
alleged facts sufficient to make it plausible that Defendants had a personal role in the
conduct–either in planning or supervising–that caused the Decendent’s injuries.
iii.
Prison Guard Defendants
Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts sufficient to make
plausible the personal involvement of prison-guard Defendants Sansevieri, Andre, Avery,
Theall, Bolen, McNeil, Gatley, Elliott, Ciaccia, and Frey in the events that led to Velez’s
death. These defendants were corrections officers at Oneida during the events in
question, but Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have not alleged that they had any particular
involvement in them. Defendants deride the allegations in the Second Amended
Complaint as “shotgun pleading” that only references these Defendants “generically.”
They urge the Court to dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims as mere “speculation” about the
individual Defendants’ involvement in the incident.
Plaintiffs’ Complaint alleges that the argument between Rodriguez and Velez that
the Superintendent of Oneida Correctional Facility (“Oneida”), and as such,
was a policy maker with respect to Oneida. This defendant was responsible
for the creation and enforcement of the policy decisions described herein.
She is further responsible because of her authorization, condoning and
ratification of the acts of co-defendants and because of her failure to
intervene to prevent acts, omissions, conspiracies and other wrongful
conduct described herein.
Complt. at ¶ 15. The allegations against the other supervisory officials are nearly identical.
14
led to Velez’s death occurred in the presence of the prison-guard defendants:
56.
57.
This argument was, or should have been, in the presence of, and could or
should have been heard, and was or should have been witnessed, by the
corrections officers who were or should have been on that door, including but
not limited to defendants BAILEY, PIERSALL, CIACCIA, BOLEN, MCNEIL,
GATLEY, FREY, and ELLIOTT, but none of them took any steps to defuse
the situation.
Despite the fact that defendants BAILEY, PIERSALL, CIACCIA, BOLEN,
MCNEIL, GATLEY, FREY, and ELLIOTT were supposed to make rounds of
G-Dorm on the night of the incident, they either did not do so, or they did so,
but failed to intercede in the conspicuous, brutal, vicious, and extremely
prolonged assault of VELEZ by Rodriguez upon their arrival there, despite
having had ample opportunity to do so, and despite the fact that they were
aware that their failure to defuse the fight and maintain order in any way
possible would lead to the physical injury and death of VELEZ.
Complt. at ¶¶ 56-57. Once the two men began their physical altercation, Plaintiffs allege,
the fight “occurred within earshot and view, and in the presence of (or should have been
within earshot and view, and in the presence of), the corrections staff on G-Dorm, who
were responsible for maintaining order and security in that dorm.” Id. at ¶ 62. Throughout
the events that led to Rodriguez stabbing Velez, Plaintiffs allege, officers were aware of
the dangerous situation and did nothing to intervene. Id. at ¶ 71-85. In the end, Plaintif fs
claim:
85.
Despite having had more than ample opportunity to do so, at no time prior to
Rodriguez stabbing Velez with the shank did any of the corrections staff on
the dorm, which included without limitation BAILEY, PIERSALL, CIACCIA,
BOLEN, MCNEIL, ELLIOTT, ANDRE, SANSEVIERI, GATLEY, AVERY, and
THEALL, make any effort to separate the two men, to maintain the security
and welfare of the inmates, including VELEZ, to disarm Rodriguez, or to
address and neutralize the escalating sitution between the two men, or to
ensure VELEZ’S safety or protect his welfare.
Id. at ¶ 85.
The Court will deny the motion in this respect. Here, the question is whether
Plaintiffs have alleged facts sufficient to make it plausible that the Prison Guard
15
Defendants “acted or failed to act despite [their] knowledge of a substantial risk of serious
harm.’” Blyden, 186 F.3d at 262. The Court finds these allegations sufficiently detailed to
indicate that the moving Defendants were aware that inmate Rodriguez argued with and
threatened the decedent, that he continued to do so f or a long period of time, and that he
eventually obtained a weapon with which he killed the decedent. Despite this alleged
knowledge, the guards allegedly did nothing to halt a situation that seemed likely to cause
the tragedy that occurred. While discovery will be necessary to determine the particular
role of each officer involved, the Court finds that at this stage in the litigation Plaintiffs’
allegations are sufficient to state an Eighth Amendment claim against the moving prison
guards.
B.
Claims Brought on Behalf of Plaintiffs Other than the Decedent
Defendants also seek dismissal of the fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth and ninth
causes of action. Those claims allege that Plaintiffs Frederick Hall, Shamia Hall, and
Christina Cox suffered a deprivation of their constitutional right to intimate association,
companionship, and society because of Decedent’s passing. Cox is Decedent’s mother
and Frederick and Shamia Hall are his children. Defendants argue that a Plaintiff cannot
bring a Fourteenth Amendment Section 1983 claim based on a loss of a familial
relationship under these circumstances.
The parties here argue about the existence of a constitutionally protected interest in
intimate association that would permit the Plaintiffs to bring claims on their own behalf.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that “the Constitution in at least som e
circumstances protects familial relationships from unwarranted government interference.”
Patel v. Searles, 305 F.3d 130, 135 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Roberts v. United States
16
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-618 (1984)). The Constitution protects the “freedom of
intimate association” because the Court has a “long tradition of affording ‘highly personal
relationships a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified interference by the
State.’” Id. (quoting Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-619); see, e.g., Adler v. Pataki, 185 F.3d 35,
43-44 (2d Cir. 1999) (right of intimate association protects against firing of husband in
retaliation for wife’s filing a discrimination complaint).
The Court is not persuaded that Plaintiffs have stated a claim in this respect.
Plaintiffs’ argument is that Defendants, in acting in a way that led to Decedents’ death,
unjustifiably interfered with their right to intimate association, thus depriving them of a
liberty interest. They dispute Defendants’ argument that their claims are not actionable
because Defendants’ conduct was not aimed at disrupting the family relationship and their
injuries were only incidental to the actual constitutional violations in this case. Plaintiffs
cite to Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 685-686 (9 th Cir. 2001), for the
proposition that a defendant’s “deliberately indifferent failure to protect plaintiffs’ decedent
from lethal violence if inherently directed at his familial relationships” is a FourteenthAmendment violation. Lee, however, rests on very different facts. In that case, the
plaintiff, who was “mentally disabled,” was arrested in Los Angeles. Id. at 676. Officials
mistakenly identified him as another man who had fled a New York State work-release
program. Id. The plaintiff was extradited from California to New York and spent two years
in prison until the real offender’s capture. Id. “Had defendants at any time compared
[plaintiff’s] fingerprints or other identifying characteristics with those of [the actual
offender], or had defendants in any other way verified the identity of the man they had in
custody, [plaintiff] would not have been arrested, extradited, or incarcerated as” the actual
17
offender. Id. at 667. The 9th Circuit Court found that the plaintiff’s mother had made out a
claim for an unreasonable interference with her intimate association with her son. Noting
that the right to familial association was protected against “‘unwarranted state
interference,’” the Court found that Defendants, who ignored the mother’s repeated
attempts to locate her son and engaged in “reckless, intentional, and deliberate acts or
omissions,” and that such conduct amounted to “‘unwarranted interference’” with the
mother’s right to association. Id. at 686 (quoting Smith v. City of Fontana, 818 F.2d 1411,
1418 (9th Cir. 1987)). This case is different. The defendants in Lee ignored the mother’s
efforts to act on the familial relationship, and her inability to enjoy the familial relationship
was a direct result of the Defendant’s refusing to act on her efforts to maintain it. Here,
Plaintiffs do not allege they had any contact with the Defendants, and they do not allege
that they sought out Defendants’ assistance in maintaining their intimate associations.
Their claim is purely that Defendants’ conduct in committing a constitutional tort unrelated
to family relationships interfered with that family relationship. The interference of the
familial relationship is more a consequence of an action completely separate from the
familial relationship, and the Court cannot find that Plaintiff has or could allege that
Defendants sought to “interfere” with a family relationship.
Plaintiff’s citation to Patel v. Searles is no move availing. In Patel, the court
addressed several issues in determining whether Plaintiff could bring a Section 1983 claim
for impairment of familial relationships. First, the court found that “the Constitution in at
least some circumstances protects familial relationships from unwarranted governmental
interference.” Patel, 305 F.3d at 135. That right “derives, in part, from a broader
constitutional right to . . . intimate association.” Id. Next, the court concluded that
18
plaintiff’s allegation of interference with the familial relationships implicated in the
case–“those between [plaintiff] and his father, wife, and children— . . . receive the greatest
degree of protection because they are among the most intimate of relationships.” Id. at
136. The appeals court further concluded that plaintiff had alleged an unconstitutional
impairment of his right to intimate association. Id. at 136. Plaintiff had alleged that his
intimate relationships had been “impaired by [defendants’] conduct.” Id. The complaint
offered “several allegations specifically addressing those relationships,” including that one
defendant “gave [plaintiff’s] wife false and defamatory information about him to make her
fear for her own and her children’s lives.” Id. These false allegations were part of a
scheme for “creating sufficient hostility within his family in order to elicit false accusations
against him.” Id. The court emphasized that “[t]his Circuit has never held that a
challenged action must be directed at a protected relationship to inf ringe on the right to
intimate association.” Id. at 137; see also Adler, 185 F.3d at 45 (husband can bring
intimate association claim when he is allegedly fired in retaliation for wife’s activities)
Here, Plaintiffs do not allege that any of the conduct that injured their relationship
with the Decedent was directed at them. Instead, they argue an injury to their interests as
a result of conduct aimed at the Decedent. Plaintiffs’ position is that the Defendants
caused injury to their intimate relationship by harming the Decedent, and that this gives
rise to a distinct claim. They have not alleged, however, that Defendants had any
awareness of the potential injury their conduct could cause to them. The conduct that
Plaintiffs allege caused a violation their rights all occurred in Defendants’ failure to protect,
intervene, and supervise at the Oneida prison. None of the Plaintiffs–only the
Decedent–were inmates at that prison, and Defendants did not fail in any obligation
19
towards those Plaintiffs.
This case is like Pizzuto v. County of Nassau, 240 F.Supp.2d 203 (E.D.N.Y. 2002).
There, prison guards beat the plaintiffs’ decedent while he was sentenced to a 90-day
term. Id. at 205. After a series of efforts by prison guards and staff to cover up the
incident, decedent collapsed in his cell. Id. at 205. Guards av oided informing the
decedent’s mother–who had just arrived to visit him–of his condition and prevented her
from seeing him. Id. The decedent’s mother suspected her son was being transported to
a hospital and followed an ambulance from the jail to the hospital. Id. at 206. She and
another son determined that the decedent was at the hospital, but guards attempted to
prevent the mother from visiting her ailing son. Id. Guards continued to harass the f amily
when they were eventually able to visit the decedent, who after a time died from the
injuries he suffered in the beating. Id. at 206-207. After a trial that ended in the conviction
of five corrections officers for decedent’s murder, decedent’s family filed a civil action for
damage on their own and decedent’s behalf. Id. at 207-208.
The court in Pizzuto confronted the question of whether the family could bring a
familial privacy claim under the circumstances. Id. at 208. Decedent’s parents alleged
that defendants had “deprived them of their Constitutional right to their son’s
companionship, which they claim[ed] [was] protected under the Fourteenth Amendment
as an element of personal liberty.” Id. The court summarized the law on the right to
family relationships, noting that, in general, “family members have a constitutionally
protected right to make certain types of choices free from government interference.” Id.
The parents’ claim “rest[ed] upon the oft-repeated mantra that a parent has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in ‘the companionship, care, custody, and
20
management of his or her children[.]” Id. at 209-210 (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.
57, 66 (2000)). That principle, the court concluded, has generally been involved “only
where custodial relations are involved.” Id. at 210. After summarizing precedent from
other circuit courts on the issue, the Court rejected the notion that the parents had “a
liberty interest in the companionship of their son in the circumstances of this case.” Id.
The court also rejected the application of Patel to the case. Id. “Patel falls within
that category of cases where government agents take actions intended to undermine or
interfere with family relationships.” Id. As in this case, plaintiffs had argued that dicta in
Patel stating that “‘this Circuit has never held that a challenged action must be directed at
a protected relationship for it to infringe on the right to intimate association.’” Id. at 212
(quoting Patel, 305 F.3d at 137). The court rejected that argument, noting that the Patel
court had not decided the question of whether the action must be directed at the protected
relationship and, before Patel, had addressed such questions to cases involving
disruptions in family association protected by the First Amendment rather than the
Fourteenth Amendment, as here. Id. In addition, the court noted that “the challeng ed
conduct in Patel involved acts that directly injured, rather than collaterally impacted,
plaintiff’s relationship with his family.” Id. at 213. The court in Pizzuto therefore rejected
plaintiffs’ intimate association claim, finding that “Patel represents a category of cases that
involves intentional and direct government interference with family relationships.” Id.
Since “no evidence” existed “that the Defendants in this case took acts that purposely and
directly affected Plaintiffs’ relationship with [decedent],” they found no support for their
claim in Patel. Id.
The same situation applies here. As in Pizzuto, plaintiffs’ decedent died due to
21
events that occurred at jail, allegedly due to the conduct of the defendant jail guards and
officials. Like the parents in Pizzuto, plaintiffs here seek recovery on the basis that
Defendants’ conduct deprived them of a relationship with their son/father. In Pizzuto, the
defendants’ conduct included beating the decedent and then attempting to cover up their
crime. Here, the conduct alleged is failing to prevent or intercede in a beating
administered by another jail inmate, arguably conduct less directly connected to animus to
the decedent. In any case, there are no allegations in this case of any contact between
defendants and plaintiffs. Their injuries are a collateral consequence of the violations of
the decedent’s constitutional rights.3 This court agrees with the court in Pizzuto that such
injuries cannot be the source of an independent constitutional claim.4 To decide otherwise
under these circumstances would be to conclude that every family member of a person
killed by state action has a constitutional claim, no matter how remote from the family
relationship the conduct of the defendants was.
3
Indeed, if this case were a torts action, the claims and damages asserted by the
Plaintiffs would be loss-of-consortium claims. In New York, such claims are “derivative
action[s],” which have “no existence separate and distinct from” the claim of the party
injured by defendants’ conduct. Cody v. Lake George, 177 A.D.2d 921, 923 (3d Dept.
1991). “Both in a literal and legal sense the husband’s claim is derived from the injuries
sustained by plaintiff.” Id.
4
In a different context, Courts have concluded that “Section 1983 does not
recognize a claim on behalf of one person arising from a violation of another person’s
rights.” T.P. ex rel. Patterson v. Elmsford Union Free School Dist., 2012 W L 860367 at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2012); see also, TC v. Valley Cent. School Dist., 777 F.Supp.2d 577,
589 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (“Jurisdiction cannot be invoked solely on the basis of harms to a
member of plaintiffs’ family.”). Plaintiffs in those cases did not attempt to bring an
associational claim, and Defendants here have not invoked a standing argument. Still, the
Court finds the situation here similar: plaintiffs here allege no knowing effort or reckless
conduct aimed at interfering with any rights that defendants knew they possessed. The
constitutionally culpable conduct was aimed at the decedent.
22
Claims 4-9 are raised on behalf of parties other than the Decedent. Because the
Court has concluded that plaintiffs may not asset a claim for interference with familial
relationships under these circumstances, the motion will be granted with respect to all
those claims, which will be dismissed.5
IV. CONCLUSION
In the end, the Court finds that this matter is about whether the Defendants are
liable to the Decedent for violating the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect him and for
failing to intervene when he was attacked by a fellow inmate. Claims addressing this
issue will remain in the case. As such, the Court will GRANT the Defendants’ motion to
dismiss, dkt. # 58, in part and DENY the motion in part. The motion is GRANTED with
respect to Plaintiffs’ claims brought pursuant to the 14 th Amendment and with respect by
any claims brought by the Plaintiffs on their own behalf, rather than on behalf of the
Decedent’s estate. As such, Count 1 is hereby DISMISSED to the extent that it raises a
Fourteenth-Amendment claim. Counts 4-9 of the Second Amended Complaint are also
hereby DISMISSED. The motion is DENIED in all other respects.
Dated:July 18, 2018
IT IS SO ORDERED.
5
Claims 5, 6, 8, and 9 are labeled as “failure to intervene” and “supervisory liability.”
Such claims sound as 8th Amendment claims, and would be dismissed even if the Court
concluded that these Plaintiffs could raise claims based on decedent’s death. None of
these Plaintiffs were or are prisoners, and could not bring such claims.
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