Homesite Insurance Company v. Amazon.com, Inc., et al.
Filing
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DECISION and ORDER: It is ORDERED that 1. Defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED; 2. Plaintiff's amended complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend;3. Plaintiff shall have thirty days in which to file and serve an amended pleading that co mplies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this District's Local Rules; and 4. If plaintiff does not amend its pleading within this time period the Clerk of the Court shall close the file without further Order of this Court. Signed by Judge David N. Hurd on February 8, 2024. (ztc)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-------------------------------HOMESITE INSURANCE COMPANY
A/S/O ADAM LONG,
Plaintiff,
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6:23-CV-981
SHENZHEN LEPOWER
INTERNATIONAL ELECTRONICS
CO., LTD.,
Defendant.
-------------------------------APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
METHFESSEL & WERBEL
Attorneys for Plaintiff
112 West 34th Street, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10120
FREDRIC P. GALLIN, ESQ
HENG WANG & ASSOCIATES, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
305 Broadway, 7th Floor
New York, NY 10007
HENG WENG, ESQ.
DAVID N. HURD
United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On August 11, 2023, Homesite Insurance Company (“Homesite” or
“plaintiff”) filed this action in Supreme Court, Oneida County, against
Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon”). See Dkt. No. 2. Thereafter, Amazon removed
the action to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b), which authorizes
removal of a civil action from state to federal court if diversity of citizenship
exists. Dkt. No. 1.
On September 14, 2023, Homesite and Amazon filed a joint stipulation,
agreeing to discontinue the claims against Amazon without prejudice and
substitute Shenzhen Lepower International Electronics Co., Ltd. (“Lepower”
or “defendant”) as the party defendant. Dkt. No. 12. In accordance with the
parties’ joint stipulation, plaintiff filed an amended complaint reflecting the
terms of the stipulation. Dkt. No. 13. On September 15, 2023, the parties’
joint stipulation was adopted, and plaintiff’s amended complaint was
accepted. Dkt. Nos. 15, 16. Pursuant to the joint stipulation, defendant was
allowed sixty days “to answer or otherwise move.” Dkt. No. 12.
On November 11, 2023, Lepower moved to dismiss the amended complaint
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6). Dkt. No. 19. The
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motion has been fully briefed and will be considered on the basis of the
submissions without oral argument.
II. BACKGROUND
Homesite is an insurance company duly authorized to issue insurance
policies in New York State. Compl. ¶ 1. Adam Long (“Long”) is the owner of
property located at 1605 Carroll Street, Rome, New York (the “Long
property”). Id. ¶ 2. Homesite insured the Long property. Id. ¶ 3.
Long purchased a First Power replacement battery (the “battery”) from
Amazon. Compl. ¶ 7. Lepower, a business entity based in Shenzhen, China,
manufactured and/or distributed the battery. Id. ¶ 9.
On September 18, 2022, the battery caught fire at the Long property.
Compl. ¶¶ 4, 12–13. As a result of the fire, a claim was made to Homesite.
Id. ¶ 5. By virtue of payments made, plaintiff has become subrogated to the
rights of its insured. Id. ¶ 6.
III. LEGAL STANDARD
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the complaint’s factual
allegations must be enough to elevate the plaintiff’s right to relief above the
level of speculation. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). So,
while legal conclusions can provide a framework for the complaint, they must
be supported with meaningful allegations of fact. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
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662, 679 (2009). In short, a complaint must contain “enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
IV. DISCUSSION
Homesite’s amended complaint sets forth one cause of action for strict
products liability. See Compl. ¶ 10–17.
Lepower argues for dismissal of Homesite’s amended complaint on the
basis that the amended complaint: (1) is vague and does not clearly set forth
what theory of liability plaintiff’s strict liability claim relies on; and (2) does
not sufficiently allege any of the three available theories of strict products
liability—design defect, manufacturing defect, or failure to warn. Def.’s
Mem., Dkt. No. 19-4 at 7–10. 1 In opposition, plaintiff maintains that the
amended complaint should not be dismissed because it sets forth a
circumstantial case of a products defect claim under the theory that the
battery, “while being charged in the course of regular use, caught fire.” Pl.’s
Opp’n, Dkt. No. 20 at 4–5.
“Under New York law, a manufacturer who places into the stream of
commerce a defective product which causes injury may be held strictly
liable.” Reynolds-Sitzer v. EISAI, Inc., 586 F. Supp. 3d 123, 129 (N.D.N.Y.
2022) (cleaned up). New York law recognizes three distinct theories of strict
1 Pagination corresponds to CM/ECF.
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products liability: (1) a manufacturing defect, which results when a mistake
in manufacturing renders a product that is ordinarily safe dangerous so that
it causes harm; (2) a design defect, which results when the product as
designed is unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; and (3) a warning
defect, which occurs when the inadequacy or failure to warn of a reasonably
foreseeable risk accompanying a product causes harm. Id. (citing McCarthy
v. Olin Corp., 119 F.3d 148, 154–55 (2d Cir. 1997)).
For the following reasons, Homesite has failed to sufficiently plead a strict
products liability claim under any of the three available theories of liability.
A. Manufacturing Defect
To state a claim for strict products liability based on a manufacturing
defect, “the plaintiff must allege that (1) the product was defective due to an
error in the manufacturing process and (2) the defect was the proximate
cause of plaintiff’s injury.” Hunter v. Shanghai Huangzhou Elec. Appliance
Mfg. Co., 505 F. Supp. 3d 137, 154 (N.D.N.Y. 2020) (cleaned up). “[A]
manufacturing flaw exists when the unit in question deviates in quality and
other performance standards from all of the other identical units.” Trask v.
Carbon Prod., Inc., --F. Supp. 3d--, 2023 WL 4107967, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. June
21, 2023) (citing Colon ex rel. Molina v. BIC USA, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 2d 53, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)). “By extension, of course, ‘a claim devoid of allegations that
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a particular unit differed when compared to others in the same product line
will be dismissed.’” Scism v. Ethicon, Inc., 2020 WL 1245349, at *4 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 16, 2020) (quoting Oden v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 330 F. Supp. 3d 877, 890
(E.D.N.Y. 2018)).
Upon review, Homesite has failed to sufficiently allege a manufacturing
defect. Critically, plaintiff has not alleged that the battery differed in any
way from its design due to an error in the manufacturing process. As a
result, plaintiff’s allegations are inadequate. See Krulewich v. Covidien, LP,
498 F. Supp. 3d 566, 574–75 (S.D.N.Y. 2020) (dismissing manufacturing
defect theory of liability where the plaintiff failed to allege that the product
was defective due to a specific problem in the manufacturing process that
rendered the product different from all other products manufactured by the
defendant). Thus, plaintiff’s strict products liability claim, to the extent it is
based on a manufacturing defect, shall be dismissed. 2
2 To be clear, “[i]dentifying a specific manufacturing defect . . . is not always required: ‘it is well-
settled that a plaintiff may rely upon the circumstances of an accident to prove the existence of a
manufacturing defect if the product did not perform as intended and the possibility of other causes
has been excluded.’” Hunter, 505 F. Supp. 3d at 154 (quoting Williamson v. Stryker Corp., 2013 WL
3833081, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013)). Nevertheless, Homesite’s conclusory allegations are
insufficient to amount to circumstantial evidence of a manufacturing defect. See Krulewich, 498 F.
Supp. 3d at 574–75.
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B. Design Defect
“A defectively designed product is one which, at the time it leaves the
seller’s hands, is in a condition not reasonably contemplated by the ultimate
consumer and is unreasonably dangerous for its intended use; that is one
whose utility does not outweigh the danger inherent in its introduction into
the stream of commerce.” Bausenwein v. Snap-On Inc., 529 F. Supp. 3d 31,
38 (N.D.N.Y. 2021). “To adequately plead a design defect, a plaintiff must
show: (1) the product as designed posed a substantial likelihood of harm; (2)
it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner; and (3) the defective
design was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury.” ReynoldsSitzer, 586 F. Supp. 3d at 129–30 (citing Scism, 2020 WL 1245349, at *4).
Measured against this standard, Homesite has failed to plausibly allege a
design defect. Plaintiff has not alleged how the battery was defective in its
design. Nor has plaintiff alleged the existence of a feasible alternative
design. Absent more specific allegations, plaintiff has failed to sufficiently
plead a defective design. See Oden, 330 F. Supp. 3d at 888–89 (dismissing
design defect theory of liability where the plaintiff failed to identify “a specific
component or particularized issue with the design itself,” and “plead the
existence of a feasible alternative design”). Accordingly, plaintiff’s strict
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products liability claim, to the extent it relies on a design defect, shall be
dismissed.
C. Failure to Warn
To state a claim for a strict product liability claim based on a failure to
warn, a plaintiff must allege plausibly that “(1) a manufacturer has a duty to
warn (2) against dangers resulting from foreseeable uses about which it knew
of should have known, and (3) that failure to do so was the proximate cause of
the harm.’” State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Nutone, Inc., 426 F. App’x 8, 10 (2d
Cir. 2011) (summary order). “At the motion to dismiss phase, a plaintiff must
plead facts that show how the warning was inadequate or insufficient.”
Krulewich, 498 F. Supp. 3d at 576 (citing Reed v. Pfizer, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 2d
571, 575 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)).
Upon review, Homesite has failed to plausibly allege a failure to warn.
Plaintiff’s amended complaint is devoid of any allegations referring to the
inadequacy or absence of warnings. As a result, plaintiff has not sufficiently
alleged a failure to warn. See Hunter, 505 F. Supp. 3d at 156–57 (dismissing
failure to warn theory of liability where the plaintiff failed to “allege any
specific facts regarding what warnings, if any, were provided with the
[product], and why such warnings were inadequate”). Thus, plaintiff’s strict
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products liability claim, to the extent it relies on a failure to warn, shall be
dismissed.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, Homesite has failed to plausibly allege a strict products liability
claim under any of the three available theories of liability. Consequently,
dismissal of plaintiff’s amended complaint is warranted. Nevertheless,
plaintiff will be granted thirty days to amend. Generally speaking, an
opportunity to amend should be granted absent a showing of, inter alia, bad
faith or undue prejudice. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). It is not
uncommon for removed state-court pleadings—which are often light on detail
and phrased in conclusory terms—to fail to pass muster under Rule 12(b)(6).
As relevant here, it is not clear that permitting amendment would be futile,
and there is no indication that Lepower will suffer undue prejudice at this
early stage of the litigation. As a result, an opportunity to amend will be
granted. 3
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that
3 It is worth noting that Homesite’s opposition to Lepower’s motion to dismiss does not comply
with Local Rule 7.1(b). If plaintiff seeks to amend its complaint and thereafter engages in motion
practice, plaintiff is advised to adhere to this District’s Local Rules regarding filing and responding
to motion papers.
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1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED;
2. Plaintiff’s amended complaint is DISMISSED with leave to amend;
3. Plaintiff shall have thirty days in which to file and serve an amended
pleading that complies with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this
District’s Local Rules; and
4. If plaintiff does not amend its pleading within this time period the
Clerk of the Court shall close the file without further Order of this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: February 8, 2024
Utica, New York.
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