Woodside v. Commissioner of Social Security

Filing 13

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - That the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and Woodside's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED. Signed by Senior Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 2/23/2016. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
HAROLD D. WOODSIDE, JR.,

Plaintiff,

7:14-cv-1234
(GLS)

v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY,
Defendant.
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Conboy, McKay Law Firm
407 Sherman Street
Watertown, NY 13601-9990
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
HON. RICHARD S. HARTUNIAN
United States Attorney
100 South Clinton Street
Syracuse, NY 13261
Steven P. Conte
Regional Chief Counsel
Social Security Administration
Office of General Counsel, Region II
26 Federal Plaza, Room 3904
New York, NY 10278
Gary L. Sharpe
Senior District Judge

PETER L. WALTON, ESQ.

SIXTINA FERNANDEZ
Special Assistant U.S. Attorney

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Harold D. Woodside, Jr. challenges the Commissioner of
Social Security’s denial of Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB), seeking
judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.) After
reviewing the administrative record and carefully considering Woodside’s
arguments, the court affirms the Commissioner’s decision and dismisses
the complaint.
II. Background
On July 1, 2011, Woodside filed an application for DIB under the
Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability since January 22, 2011.
(Tr.1 at 63-69, 147-53.) After his application was denied, (id. at 72-79),
Woodside requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),
which was held on December 13, 2012, (id. at 35-62, 87-88). On January
9, 2013, the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision denying the requested
benefits, (id. at 17-34), which became the Commissioner’s final
determination upon the Appeals Council’s denial of review, (id. at 1-6).
Woodside commenced the present action by filing his complaint on
1

Page references preceded by “Tr.” are to the Administrative Transcript. (Dkt. No. 7.)

2

October 9, 2014 wherein he sought review of the Commissioner’s
determination. (Compl.) The Commissioner filed an answer and a certified
copy of the administrative transcript. (Dkt. Nos. 6, 7.) Each party, seeking
judgment on the pleadings, filed a brief. (Dkt. Nos. 8, 10.)
III. Contentions
Woodside contends that the Commissioner’s decision is tainted by
legal error and is not supported by substantial evidence.2 (Dkt. No. 8 at
12-25.) Specifically, Woodside claims that the ALJ erred in : (1) evaluating
the severity of Woodside’s impairments; (2) weighing the medical opinion
evidence; (3) rendering his residual functional capacity (RFC)
determination; and (4) assessing Woodside’s credibility. (Id.) The
Commissioner counters that the appropriate legal standards were used by
the ALJ and his decision is also supported by substantial evidence. (Dkt.
No. 10 at 4-16.)
IV. Facts
The court adopts the undisputed factual recitations of the parties and
the ALJ. (Dkt. No. 8 at 1-11; Dkt. No. 10 at 1; Tr. at 22-29.)
2

“Substantial evidence is defined as more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.” Alston v.
Sullivan, 904 F.2d 122, 126 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

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V. Standard of Review
The standard for reviewing the Commissioner’s final decision under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) is well established and will not be repeated here. For a
full discussion of the standard and the five-step process by which the
Commissioner evaluates whether a claimant is disabled under the Act, the
court refers the parties to its previous decision in Christiana v. Comm’r of
Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:05-CV-932, 2008 WL 759076, at *1-2 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 19, 2008).
VI. Discussion
A.

Severity Determination
First, Woodside contends that the ALJ erred in failing to find his

lumbar myxopapillary ependymoma and bilateral lower extremity pain and
numbness “severe.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 12-17.)3 The court agrees with the
Commissioner that remand is not required here because the ALJ properly
evaluated the severity of these impairments, and, in any event, he
considered the functional limitations caused by these impairments in
3

Woodside’s first argument states that “[t]he Commissioner failed to properly assess
the severity of [Woodside]’s lumbar myxopapillary ependymoma, bilateral lower extremity pain
and numbness, diverticulitis, diabetes and obesity.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 12.) However, the
discussion that follows makes no mention of diverticulitis, diabetes, or obesity. (Id. at 12-15.)
As such, the court limits its discussion to Woodside’s lumbar myxopapillary ependymoma and
bilateral lower extremity pain and numbness.

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determining Woodside’s RFC. (Dkt. No. 10 at 4-8.)
At step two of the sequential analysis, the ALJ must determine
whether the claimant has a “severe medically determinable physical or
mental impairment.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(ii). A finding of not
severe is appropriate when an impairment, or combination of those
impairments, “does not significantly limit [the claimant’s] physical or mental
ability to do basic work activities.” Id. § 404.1521(a). Basic work activities
are “the abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs,” including:
“[p]hysical functions such as walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing,
pulling, reaching, carrying, or handling.” Id. § 404.1521(b). “The ‘mere
presence of a disease or impairment, or establishing that a person has
been diagnosed or treated for a disease or impairment’ is not, itself,
sufficient to deem a condition severe.” Bergeron v. Astrue, No. 09-CV1219, 2011 WL 6255372, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2011) (quoting
McConnell v. Astrue, No. 6:03-CV-0521, 2008 WL 833968, at *2 (N.D.N.Y.
Mar. 27, 2008)). The failure to find an impairment severe at step two may
be deemed harmless error, particularly where the disability analysis
continues and the ALJ later considers the impairment in his RFC
determination. See Tryon v. Astrue, No. 5:10-CV-537, 2012 WL 398952,
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at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2012); see also Plante v. Astrue, No. 2:11-CV-77,
2011 WL 6180049, at *4 (D. Vt. Dec. 13, 2011).
In this case, at step two, the ALJ determined that Woodside’s low
back pain and lumbar degenerative disc disease were severe impairments.
(Tr. at 23-24.) The ALJ noted that a February 2010 MRI of Woodside’s
lumbar spine revealed a myxopapillary ependymoma, or a slow growing
tumor in his spinal column. (Id. at 23); see Nat’l Ctr. for Advancing
Translational Scis., Genetic and Rare Diseases Info. Ctr., Myxopapillary
ependymoma, https://rarediseases.info.nih.gov/gard/10633/myxopapillary
-ependymoma/resources/1 (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). The ALJ concluded
that the tumor was not a severe impairment under the regulations because
it had not grown in size, no surgery had been performed to remove it, and
Woodside had not sought any medical treatment for it since his alleged
onset date. (Tr. at 23.) Despite Woodside’s claims to the contrary, (Dkt.
No. 8 at 13-17), the ALJ’s reasoning is supported by substantial evidence.
In March 2010, treating neurosurgeon David Carter reviewed an MRI from
2008 and opined that the tumor was “probably unchanged in size.” (Tr. at
264.) Moreover, in May 2012, treating physician Neel Shah noted that the
tumor was stable. (Id. at 447.) Although Woodside argues that surgical
6

intervention has not been ruled out, (Dkt. No. 8 at 13), the ALJ merely
noted that Woodside has not yet had surgery, (Tr. at 23). Further, while
the ALJ used the word “questionable” to describe the tumor, he concluded
that it was a medically determinable impairment and only found that it was
not severe due to the lack of medical evidence supporting any limitations in
Woodside’s ability to function caused by the tumor. (Id.) Indeed, the
treatment notes of record reveal that Woodside has not seen Dr. Carter
since his alleged onset date, nor received any treatment for the tumor
itself. (Id. at 54, 327.)
Woodside argues that the tumor may be causing or contributing to
his back pain and numbness. (Dkt. No. 8 at 16-17.) However, the ALJ
found Woodside’s back pain to be a severe impairment, and included
functional limitations resulting therefrom in his RFC determination. (Tr. at
22-23, 25-28.) Thus, the court sees no reason to remand on this basis.
Similarly, with respect to his lower extremity pain and numbness,
Woodside argues that these impairments “all relate to [his] complaints of
low back pain and other symptoms in his lower back.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 14.)
For that exact reason, Woodside’s argument that remand is required due
to errors in the ALJ’s severity determination must fail. When rendering his
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RFC determination, the ALJ explicitly considered Woodside’s complaints of
lower extremity numbness and pain as part of the signs and symptoms of
his back impairment. (Tr. at 25.) Thus, although the ALJ did not discuss
Woodside’s lower extremity pain and numbness at step two of the
sequential evaluation, he did not err and remand is not required here. See
Oot v. Astrue, 5:11-cv-342, 2012 WL 12518632, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 24,
2012) (holding that an ALJ did not err at step two when he failed to
evaluate the severity of the symptoms and signs of a claimant’s impairment
separately from the impairment itself); see also Tryon, 2012 WL 398952, at
*4 (explaining that the failure to find an impairment severe may be deemed
harmless error, particularly where the disability analysis continues and the
ALJ later considers the impairment in his RFC determination).
B.

Treating Physician Rule
Next, Woodside argues that the ALJ failed to properly follow the

treating physician rule. (Dkt. No. 8 at 17-20.) According to Woodside, the
ALJ erred in giving “little weight” to the opinion of treating anesthesiologist
Robert Martinucci. (Id.) The court disagrees.
Medical opinions, regardless of the source, are evaluated by
considering several factors outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c).
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Controlling weight will be given to a treating physician’s opinion that is
“well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic
techniques and is not inconsistent with the other substantial evidence.” Id.
§ 404.1527(c)(2); see Halloran v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 28, 32 (2d Cir. 2004).
Unless controlling weight is given to a treating source’s opinion, the ALJ is
required to consider the following factors in determining the weight
assigned to a medical opinion: whether or not the source examined the
claimant; the existence, length and nature of a treatment relationship; the
frequency of examination; evidentiary support offered; consistency with the
record as a whole; and specialization of the examiner. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c). The ALJ must provide “‘good reasons’ for the weight given
to the treating source’s opinion.” Petrie v. Astrue, 412 F. App’x 401, 407
(2d Cir. 2011) (citations omitted). “Nevertheless, where ‘the evidence of
record permits [the court] to glean the rationale of an ALJ’s decision,’” it is
not necessary that the ALJ “‘have mentioned every item of testimony
presented to him or have explained why he considered particular evidence
unpersuasive or insufficient to lead him to a conclusion of disability.’” Id.
(citation omitted).
In December 2012, Dr. Martinucci opined that Woodside could lift
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and carry less than ten pounds only occasionally, stand and walk for less
than two hours in a workday, and sit for less than six hours in a work day.
(Tr. at 461-62.) Further, his opinion states that Woodside is limited in his
ability to push and pull and reach in all directions, and can never perform
any postural movements, including climbing, balancing, and stooping. (Id.
at 462-63.) The ALJ gave little weight to Dr. Martinucci’s restrictive opinion
because it was not supported by the clinical findings in his treatment notes,
he treated Woodside on only two occasions, only one of which included an
examination, he is not a specialist in back impairments, and his opinion is
inconsistent with the remainder of the medical opinions of record. (Id. at
27-28.) Clearly, this analysis is legally sufficient. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1527(c). However, Woodside asserts that the ALJ’s decision is not
sufficiently supported by the record because it discounts the clinical
findings found by Dr. Martinucci and the Social Security Administration’s
own consultative examiners, and only non-treating and non-examining
physicians authored contrary opinions to that of Dr. Martinucci. (Dkt. No. 8
at 18-20.) Woodside also contends that there was no basis in the record
for the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Martinucci’s opinion was based wholly on
Woodside’s subjective complaints. (Id. at 18-19.) Notwithstanding
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Woodside’s arguments, the court’s review of the administrative record
reveals that the ALJ’s reasons for discounting Dr. Martinucci’s opinion are
amply supported by substantial evidence.
First, while clinical findings on examinations of Woodside’s back
throughout the record, such as tenderness, reduced range of motion, and
positive straight leg raises bilaterally, (Tr. at 279-80, 307-08, 310-11, 344,
446-47, 452-53), support his subjective complaints, they do not compel the
conclusion of disability. See Bonet ex rel. T.B. v. Colvin, 523 F. App’x 58,
59 (2d. Cir. 2013) (“[W]hether there is substantial evidence supporting the
[claimant]’s view is not the question[,] rather, [the court] must decide
whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s decision.”). Indeed,
Woodside points out that, on examination in October 2011 by consultative
examiner Sandra Boehlert, walking on his heels and toes caused “pulling in
his back” and squatting fully required a “two-hand assist” and caused
“pulling in his back.” (Tr. at 310, Dkt. No. 8 at 19.) However, based on the
entirety of her examination,4 Dr. Boehlert concluded that Woodside’s only
4

At this examination, Woodside’s gait and stance were normal, he used no assistive
devices, he was able to change for the exam and get on and off the exam table without help,
and he was able to rise from a chair without difficulty. (Tr. at 310.) While he had tenderness
and reduced range of motion in his back, sensory deficit in his left leg, and straight leg raising
was positive, the exam also revealed full range of motion in his hips, knees, and ankles, 5/5
strength and no muscle atrophy in his lower extremities, and physiologic and equal reflexes.

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limitations were for “heavy lifting and heavy bending and twisting.” (Tr. at
311.) This opinion is far less restrictive than that of Dr. Martinucci. (Id. at
461-64.) With respect to consultative examiner Roberto Rivera, although
the ALJ did not explicitly discuss all of Dr. Rivera’s notations, such as
Woodside’s slow measured steps or slow and deliberate movements
getting on and off of the exam table, he clearly considered all of Dr.
Rivera’s findings, as well as Dr. Rivera’s far less restrictive functional
assessment. (Tr. at 25, 27.) Woodside cites no legal authority that
requires an ALJ to discuss each of the positive clinical findings indicated in
a claimant’s medical record, and, in fact, the Second Circuit has stated that
it is not necessary that the ALJ “have mentioned every item of testimony
presented to him or have explained why he considered particular evidence
unpersuasive or insufficient to lead him to a conclusion of disability.” See
Petrie, 412 F. App’x at 407 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In addition to the opinions of these one-time examiners, the ALJ had
before him the opinions of two non-examining impartial medical experts.
Orthopedic surgeon Charles Hancock reviewed the medical evidence of
record on August 14, 2012, and opined that Woodside was able to lift and
(Id. at 310-11.)

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carry up to twenty pounds frequently, sit, stand, and walk for up to six
hours at a time, and occasionally reach overhead, stoop, and crouch. (Id.
at 397-405.) Neurosurgeon Woodrow Janese also reviewed Woodside’s
medical records in August 2012 and opined that he was capable of
frequently lifting and carrying twenty pounds, sitting, standing, and walking
for up to four hours at a time and six hours total in a workday, reaching in
all directions, and performing all postural movements. (Id. at 413-18.)
“[A]n ALJ is entitled to rely upon the opinions of both examining and
non-examining State agency medical consultants, since such consultants
are deemed to be qualified experts in the field of social security disability.”
Baszto v. Astrue, 700 F. Supp. 2d 242, 249 (N.D.N.Y. 2010).
Woodside asserts that “Drs. Hancock and Janese did not review all
available medical records prior to rendering their opinions.” (Dkt. No. 8 at
18.) He bases this assertion on the fact that “Dr. Hancock only referenced
reviewing the consultative [examiners’] reports, and only one MRI report”
from his treatment records. (Id.) Further, he claims that “Dr. Janese did
not reference reviewing or considering any information as the basis for his
Medical Source Statement.” (Id.) It is true that Dr. Hancock cited specific
findings from Woodside’s consultative examinations as well as the
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February 2010 MRI which revealed Woodside’s spinal tumor as support for
his medical opinion. (Tr. at 398, 400-01.) Nevertheless, Woodside’s
reasoning is flawed. That certain evidence was highlighted by Dr. Hancock
as support for his opinion does not necessarily mean that he failed to
review all the other available medical evidence. Further, Dr. Janese cited
various medical records which he considered in forming his opinion,
including treatment notes and MRIs, (Tr. at 410), and Woodside’s claims to
the contrary are false. Because these opinions were supported by specific
medical findings, the ALJ properly exercised his discretion to rely on them.
(Tr. at 26-27.)
Lastly, Dr. Martinucci examined Woodside on only one occasion. (Id.
at 452-53.) Although this examination revealed some clinical findings,
including reduced sensation in Woodside’s left thigh and reduced range of
motion in his thoracolumbar spine, Dr. Martinucci noted that Woodside was
in no apparent distress while seated, walked with a normal gait, and had
no areas of atrophy in his lumbrosacral spinal region. (Id.) Accordingly,
the ALJ’s conclusion that Dr. Martinucci’s highly restrictive opinion
appeared to be based on Woodside’s subjective complaints is supported
by substantial evidence. (Id. at 28.)
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Ultimately, the ALJ provided sufficient reasons for discounting Dr.
Martinucci’s opinion, and his decision to do so is supported by substantial
evidence.
C.

RFC Determination
Woodside also contends that the ALJ’s RFC finding is legally

insufficient because it “neglects to properly represent the evidence
regarding the nature and extent of [his] limitations, which supports the
conclusion that he cannot perform the demands of . . . even sedentary
work.” (Dkt. No. 8 at 22.) Specifically, Woodside complains that the ALJ
failed to relate the limitations in his daily activities that he testified to, which
are supported by his medical records, doctors’ observations, and Dr.
Martinucci’s assessment. (Id. at 20-22.) Again, the court disagrees.
A claimant’s RFC “is the most [he] can still do despite [his]
limitations.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); see also id. § 404.1594(b)(4). In
assessing a claimant’s RFC, an ALJ must consider “all of the relevant
medical and other evidence,” including a claimant’s subjective complaints
of pain. Id. § 404.1545(a)(3). An ALJ’s RFC determination must be
supported by substantial evidence in the record. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
If it is, that determination is conclusive and must be affirmed upon judicial
15

review. See id.; Perez v. Chater, 77 F.3d 41, 46 (2d Cir. 1996).
Here, the ALJ determined that Woodside has the RFC to lift and
carry twenty-five pounds occasionally and twenty pounds frequently, and,
in an eight-hour workday, sit for six hours, stand for six hours, and walk for
six hours. (Tr. at 24.) In making this determination, the ALJ considered
Woodside’s subjective complaints and treatment records, and relied on the
medical opinions of Drs. Hancock, Janese, Boehlert, and Rivera. (Id. at
25-28.) The ALJ noted Woodside’s testimony that, “due to his
impairments, his ability to function has been substantially diminished and
his activities of daily living have been significantly reduced.” (Id. at 25.)
Woodside argues that his testimony proves that he cannot stoop at all or
sit, stand, and walk for the requisite length of time to perform even
sedentary work. (Dkt. No. 8 at 22.) However, the ALJ determined that
Woodside’s testimony was only partially credible, which determination, as
discussed below, see infra Part VI.D, is supported by substantial evidence.
Because the ALJ considered Woodside’s subjective testimony, the
objective medical evidence, and other relevant factors, he was free to
reject Woodside’s testimony. See Martone v. Apfel, 70 F. Supp. 2d 145,
151 (N.D.N.Y. 1999); see also Williams ex rel. Williams v. Bowen, 859
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F.2d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 1988) (“As a fact-finder, an ALJ is free to accept or
reject testimony.”).
D.

Credibility Determination
Finally, Woodside asserts that the ALJ’s credibility determination was

legally insufficient and unsupported by substantial evidence. (Dkt. No. 8 at
22-25.) To that end, Woodside argues that none of his treating physicians
doubted the veracity of his symptoms, objective evidence and clinical
observations show that his back condition was disabling, and the ALJ
improperly relied on Woodside’s poor work history to discount his credibility
without questioning if his absences from the work place stem from his
inability to work. (Dkt. No. 8 at 23-24.) Woodside also claims that the ALJ
failed to make a sufficiently specific credibility finding. (Id. at 24-25.) The
Commissioner responds that the ALJ properly evaluated all the evidence of
record, which supports his credibility determination. (Dkt. No. 10 at 13-16.)
Once again, the court agrees with the Commissioner.
Once the ALJ determines that the claimant suffers from a “medically
determinable impairment[] that could reasonably be expected to produce
the [symptoms] alleged,” he “must evaluate the intensity and persistence of
those symptoms considering all of the available evidence; and, to the
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extent that the claimant’s [subjective] contentions are not substantiated by
the objective medical evidence, the ALJ must engage in a credibility
inquiry.” Meadors v. Astrue, 370 F. App’x 179, 183 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). In performing this analysis, the
ALJ “must consider the entire case record and give specific reasons for the
weight given to the [claimant’s] statements.” SSR 96-7p, 61 Fed. Reg.
34,483, 34,485 (July 2, 1996). Specifically, in addition to the objective
medical evidence, the ALJ must consider the following factors: “1) daily
activities; 2) location, duration, frequency and intensity of any symptoms; 3)
precipitating and aggravating factors; 4) type, dosage, effectiveness, and
side effects of any medications taken; 5) other treatment received; and 6)
other measures taken to relieve symptoms.” F.S. v. Astrue, No. 1:10-CV444, 2012 WL 514944, at *19 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2012) (citing 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.1529(c)(3)(i)-(vi)).
Relying principally on inconsistencies between Woodside’s subjective
complaints and the objective medical evidence, the ALJ determined that
those complaints were only partially credible. (Tr. at 25.) Specifically, the
ALJ noted that x-rays of Woodside’s lumbrosacral spine in December 2010
and March 2011 revealed only mild degenerative disc disease. (Id. at 280,
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289.) Thereafter, in August 2011, Woodside complained of worsening
lower back pain, but an x-ray showed only L5-S1 disc space narrowing,
unchanged from the March 2011 films. (Id. at 337-38.) In October 2011,
Dr. Boehlert’s examination findings indicated that Woodside had good
strength and stability. (Id. at 309-12, see id. at 401 (impartial medical
expert Hancock’s report, explaining that the results of Dr. Boehlert’s exam
revealed “good strength [and] stability”).) The ALJ also noted that
Woodside’s complaints were contradicted by the opinions of the impartial
medical experts, as well as both consultative examiners. (Id. at 26-27.) In
addition, the ALJ considered Woodside’s poor work history. (Id. at 26.)
Woodside does not dispute the veracity of these facts, but argues
that the ALJ erred by failing to ask him “any questions during the hearing”
about his absence from the work place. (Dkt. No. 8 at 24.) It is true that a
poor work history may either indicate a weak attachment to the work force
and, thus, detract from a claimant’s credibility, or “support an inference that
a claimant’s testimony of disability is truthful.” Schaal v. Apfel, 134 F.3d
496, 502 (2d Cir. 1998). In Schaal, the Second Circuit advised ALJs to
“explore a claimant’s poor work history to determine whether [his] absence
from the workplace cannot be explained adequately (making appropriate a
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negative inference).” Id. With that in mind, a review of the record in this
case demonstrates that remand is not required here. At the administrative
hearing, Woodside was questioned by his attorney regarding his work
history and explained that he changed jobs in 2008 due to his back pain
and the limitations it caused, and stopped working all together in 2009 for
the same reason. (Tr. at 42-46.) Woodside further testified that he owned
a logging business from 1994-2005, during which time he also worked at
Gitano Transportation “[i]n the down times” to supplement his business.
(Id. at 44, 45-46.) However, earnings records show that Woodside earned
no income from 1995 through 1997 as well as 2001. (Id. at 161.)
Woodside offers no explanation as to how such evidence could be
adequately explained by his claims. Rather, the court finds that the ALJ’s
conclusion that such evidence detracts from Woodside’s credibility is
reasonable. See Pietrunti v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 119
F.3d 1035, 1042 (2d Cir. 1997) (“Credibility findings of an ALJ are entitled
to great deference and therefore can be reversed only if they are patently
unreasonable.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Additionally, although the ALJ did not undertake a step-by-step
exposition of the factors articulated in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c), “[f]ailure to
20

expressly consider every factor set forth in the regulations is not grounds
for remand where the reasons for the ALJ’s determination of credibility are
sufficiently specific to conclude that he considered the entire evidentiary
record.” Judelsohn v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-388S, 2012 WL 2401587, at *6
(W.D.N.Y. June 25, 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted);
see Oliphant v. Astrue, No. 11-CV-2431, 2012 WL 3541820, at *22
(E.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2012) (stating that the 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)
factors are included as “‘examples of alternative evidence that may be
useful [to the credibility inquiry], and not as a rigid, seven-step prerequisite
to the ALJ’s finding’” (quoting Snyder v. Barnhart, 323 F. Supp. 2d 542,
546 (S.D.N.Y. 2004))). Here, the ALJ explicitly acknowledged
consideration of the 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 factors, (Tr. at 24), and it is
evident from his thorough discussion that his credibility determination was
legally sound. See Britt v. Astrue, 486 F. App’x 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2012)
(finding explicit mention of 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529 and SSR 96-7p as
evidence that the ALJ used the proper legal standard in assessing the
claimant’s credibility). Moreover, the ALJ’s determination that Woodside’s
subjective complaints were not credible to the extent that they suggested
impairment greater than the ability to lift and carry twenty pounds or sit,
21

stand, and walk for six hours a day is supported by substantial evidence.
(Tr. at 24, 25.)
E.

Remaining Findings and Conclusions
After careful review of the record, the court affirms the remainder of

the ALJ’s decision as it is supported by substantial evidence.
VII. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the decision of the Commissioner is AFFIRMED and
Woodside’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case and provide a copy of this
Memorandum-Decision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
February 23, 2016
Albany, New York

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