Loyd v. Cuomo et al

Filing 11

MEMORANDUM-DECISION and ORDER - That Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel's 7 Report-Recommendation and Order is ADOPTED. That Loyd's complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 6/10/2015. (jel, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
DAVID LOYD,
Plaintiff,

8:14-cv-829
(GLS/CFH)

v.
ANDREW M. CUOMO et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
David Loyd
Pro Se
15 Backman Avenue, Apt. 1B
Ellenville, NY 12428
Gary L. Sharpe
Chief Judge
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff pro se David Loyd commenced this action against
defendants Andrew M. Cuomo, George E. Pataki, Anthony J. Annucci, and
Tina M. Stanford pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Compl., Dkt. No. 1.)
Loyd’s complaint alleges that the imposition of post-release supervision
(PRS) and the holding of his parole hearing in his absence violated his

rights under the Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United
States Constitution. (Id. at 6-15.) Loyd seeks declaratory and injunctive
relief, as well as damages in the amount of $100,000,000. (Id. at 16.)
In a Report-Recommendation and Order (R&R) dated August 8,
2014, Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel, upon an initial review of
Loyd’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), recommended that
Loyd’s complaint be dismissed without leave to amend. (Dkt. No. 7.)
Pending are Loyd’s objections to the R&R. (Dkt. No. 8.) For the reasons
that follow, the R&R is adopted in its entirety.
II. Background
In September 2004, pursuant to a plea, Loyd was sentenced to three
years to life on one count of criminal sale of a controlled substance in the
second degree, and seven years to life on another count of the same crime
to run concurrently. (Compl. at 6.) Loyd’s conviction was subsequently
affirmed by the Appellate Division, Third Judicial Department. (Id.)
Sometime in 2005, drug reform laws were passed, and, in September
2008, Loyd was resentenced to two concurrent terms of seven years
imprisonment, and five years of PRS. (Id.; Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1 at 32-33.)
Accordingly, the New York State Department of Corrections and
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Community Supervision calculated that May 31, 2011 was the new
maximum expiration date of Loyd’s sentence and indicated that Loyd was
to serve a five-year period of PRS. (Compl. at 6; Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1 at
34.)
On March 23, 2010, a parole hearing was conducted in Loyd’s
absence. (Compl. at 7.) At the hearing, Loyd “was subject to [five] years
of PRS and PRS conditions and special conditions were imposed by the
Parole Board Commissioners.” (Id.) After the hearing, Loyd was sent a
copy of the Parole Board Release Decision Notice, which failed to indicate
any term of PRS. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Loyd was released from prison.
(Id.) The Certificate of Release indicated five years of PRS. (Id. at 7-8;
Dkt. No. 1, Attach. 1 at 35.)
In August 2011, a parole warrant was issued, charging Loyd with
various PRS violations. (Compl. at 10.) Subsequent to his guilty plea for
supervised release violations, Loyd was sent to a drug treatment program.
(Id. at 11.) Loyd was released on March 13, 2012 to serve the remainder
of his PRS. (Id.) In November 2012, a second parole warrant was issued,
and Loyd was taken into custody and released on March 8, 2013. (Id.)
Finally, in November 2013, a third parole warrant was issued. (Id.) Loyd
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was again found guilty of supervised release violations and a twelve-month
sentence was imposed. (Id.) Loyd’s new PRS maximum expiration date is
July 30, 2016. (Id. at 14.)
Beginning in March 2014, Loyd filed four petitions for habeas corpus.
(Id. at 11-13.) Loyd’s complaint indicates that one such petition was
dismissed, while the others remain pending. (Id. at 12-14.)
III. Standard of Review
Before entering final judgment, this court reviews report and
recommendation orders in cases it has referred to a magistrate judge. If a
party properly objects to a specific element of the magistrate judge’s
findings and recommendations, this court reviews those findings and
recommendations de novo. See Almonte v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No.
Civ. 904CV484GLS, 2006 WL 149049, at *3, *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2006).
In those cases where no party has filed an objection, only vague or general
objections are made, or a party resubmits the same papers and arguments
already considered by the magistrate judge, this court reviews the findings
and recommendations of the magistrate judge for clear error. See id. at *45.
IV. Discussion
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Loyd’s complaint alleges that his constitutional rights were violated
when a term of PRS was administratively imposed and his parole hearing
was held in his absence. (See generally Compl.) In the R&R, Judge
Hummel recommended dismissal of Loyd’s claims arising from the
imposition of his PRS, and the parole warrants and further incarcerations
that stemmed from it, based on the doctrine espoused in Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). (Dkt. No. 7 at 4-5.) Further, Judge
Hummel recommended that, because Loyd did not have a due process
liberty interest in his parole, he cannot state a due process claim based on
his absence from his parole hearing. (Id. at 5-6.) Loyd’s objections to
Judge Hummel’s R&R are difficult to decipher and largely repeat the
allegations contained in his complaint. (See generally Dkt. No. 8.) As far
as the court can discern, Loyd’s only specific objections to the R&R are
that: 1) because he is seeking injunctive relief, Heck does not apply here;
and 2) although he did not have a due process interest in parole, he “ha[d]
a constitutional right to be present at a hearing when punishment[, in the
from of PRS, was] being inflicted upon him.” (Id. at 5-6.) As the court
construes these as specific objections, de novo review is triggered as to
these arguments. See Almonte, 2006 WL 149049, at *3, *5. The
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remainder of Loyd’s objections are general, and merit only clear error
review. Id. at *4-5.
A.

Imposition of PRS
In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a state prisoner’s claim for

damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is precluded if “a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence”
absent proof that the inmate has already secured invalidation of that
conviction or sentence. 512 U.S. at 487. Loyd argues that, as he is
seeking injunctive and declaratory relief1 in addition to compensatory and
punitive damages, Heck does not apply to bar his complaint. (Dkt. No. 8 at
5.) However, the Supreme Court has explained that the Heck rule applies
“no matter the relief sought (damages or equitable relief).” Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005); see Caswell v. Green, 424 F. App’x 44, 45
(2d Cir. 2011). “[T]he governing standard for application of [Heck] . . . is
whether a prisoner’s victory in a § 1983 suit would necessarily demonstrate
the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Caswell, 424 F. App’x at 45
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here, Loyd’s challenge

1

Loyd seeks “an order declaring that [PRS] is [u]nconstitutional,” as well as “an
injunction . . . order[ing] the defendants to stop and eliminate PRS.” (Compl. at 16.)

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would necessarily call into question the validity of his sentence. See Price
v. Goord, No. 9:10-CV-00181, 2011 WL 1630727, at *5 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 10,
2011) (“PRS is a part of a prisoner’s sentence and [t]he fact that [the] term
was added administratively, rather than judicially, does not render it a
separate component from plaintiff’s sentence and thus beyond the reach of
Heck.” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, all of Loyd’s
claims relating to the imposition of his period of PRS are barred because
he has failed to show that his sentence has been invalidated.
Judge Hummel also recommended that Loyd’s claim arising out of his
absence from his parole hearing be denied, because he does not have a
due process interest in parole. (Dkt. No. 7 at 6.) In his objections, Loyd
makes clear that he was not asserting a due process interest in parole, but,
rather, a due process interest in his sentence. (Dkt. No. 8 at 6.) In other
words, Loyd is arguing that his absence from a hearing when PRS was
imposed violated his due process rights. (Id.) However, like all of Loyd’s
claims with respect to the imposition of his PRS, this due process claim is
barred by Heck. See Price, 2011 WL 1630727, at *5 (concluding that a
plaintiff’s 1983 cause of action for the violation of his due process rights by
the administrative addition of PRS to his sentence accrues when the
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sentence has been invalidated); Albergottie v. New York City, No. 08 Civ.
8331, 2011 WL 519296, at *1, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2011) (holding that a
plaintiff’s § 1983 claim “that the imposition of PRS by anyone other than a
judge violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment”
accrues when the underlying sentence is invalidated or the plaintiff’s
petition for writ of habeas corpus is granted).
B.

Remaining Findings
As to the remaining portions of the R&R, the court has reviewed them

for clear error and found none. Therefore, for the reasons articulated in the
R&R, this court adopts Judge Hummel’s recommendations, and dismisses
Loyd’s complaint.
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel’s August 8,
2014 Report-Recommendation and Order (Dkt. No. 7) is ADOPTED in its
entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that Loyd’s complaint (Dkt. No. 1) is DISMISSED; and it
is further
ORDERED that the Clerk close this case; and it is further
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ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
June 10, 2015
Albany, New York

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