Rock v. Blaine et al
Filing
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MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER denying 8 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim: The Court hereby ORDERS that Defendant State of New York's motion to dismiss is DENIED; and the Court further ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on 6/17/2015. (ban)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
PENNY ROCK,
Plaintiff,
vs.
8:14-CV-1421
(MAD/CFH)
MICHAEL BLAINE, THOMAS LAVALLEY,
DANIEL HOLDRIGE, THE STATE OF NEW
YORK, and THE NEW YORK STATE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND
COMMUNITY SUPERVISION,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
ELMER ROBERT KEACH, III, P.C.
One Pine West Plaza, Suite 109
Albany, New York 12205
Attorneys for Plaintiff
ELMER ROBERT KEACH, III, ESQ.
MARIA K. DYSON, ESQ.
NEW YORK STATE ATTORNEY
GENERAL - ALBANY
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
Attorneys for Defendants
State of New York and New York State
Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision
CATHY Y. SHEEHAN, ESQ.
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
On November 11, 2015, Plaintiff Penny Rock commenced this action against Defendants
State of New York and three individuals (Blaine, LaValley, and Holdrige) pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
alleging retaliatory conduct for making a formal complaint of gender discrimination. See Dkt.
No. 1. In response to Defendants' motion to dismiss the original complaint, Plaintiff filed an
amended complaint, naming the New York State Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision ("DOCCS") as an additional defendant. See Dkt. No. 6.
Presently before the Court is Defendant State of New York's motion to dismiss the claims
against it, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Dkt. Nos. 8-1.
II. BACKGROUND
A.
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
1. Factual Allegations Pleaded
In February 2013, Plaintiff was involved in an incident with another corrections officer
who "flew into a rage" and threatened Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 6 at ¶ 11. Plaintiff submitted a
written, informal complaint to her captain, Defendant Holdrige, who then invited Plaintiff to his
office to discuss the incident. See id. at ¶ 12. During this discussion — but following resolution
of the issue between Plaintiff and the involved corrections officer — Defendant Holdrige asked
Defendant Blaine, Plaintiff's supervisor, whether he had anything to add to the discussion. See id.
Defendant Blaine, who had "a known and documented history of . . . disdain for women who
work in correctional facilities," refused to discuss the incident while Plaintiff was present and
"slammed [the] door."1 See id. Plaintiff then expressed to Defendant Holdrige her belief that
Defendant Blaine would "come after" her because of the incident. See id.
Plaintiff consequently suffered harassment at work "almost every day" for the next year.
See id. at ¶ 13. Defendant Blaine would "come into her work area, often at night when [Plaintiff]
was alone, and stare at her[,]" and "laugh and smirk at her" when she walked by. Id. After
Plaintiff's amended complaint implies but does not state that Blaine slammed the door on
his way out of the office. See Dkt. No. 6 at ¶ 12 (describing Plaintiff's subsequent statement as
"in response" to the slamming of the door).
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Plaintiff's coworker stated to Defendant Blaine that Plaintiff had no intention of "bid[ding] out of
her job in [Blaine's] location[,]" he remarked that he would "continue to apply pressure on
[Plaintiff]" to request a work assignment at a different location. Id. During this time, Plaintiff
informally complained to her superiors — including Defendant Holdrige and Assemblywoman
Janet Duprey2 — but Defendant Blaine's conduct was not remedied. See id.
On July 22, 2013, Plaintiff filed a formal complaint with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that Defendant Blaine was discriminating against
her based on her sex. See id. at ¶ 15. Plaintiff's complaint also detailed the alleged discrimination
of five other women — most of whom had requested reassignment to a different location after
being sexually harassed by Defendant Blaine. Id. The EEOC's findings were ultimately
inconclusive, and Plaintiff was issued a Right to Sue letter. See Dkt. No. 6, Exhibit A.
Defendant Blaine thereafter began to stalk Plaintiff outside of the workplace; and in one
instance on October 15, 2013, he pushed a shopping cart in front of Plaintiff's cart and made
vulgar statements at her when she greeted him. See id. at ¶ 18. Immediately following this
incident, Plaintiff made a statement to the New York State Police detailing Defendant Blaine's
harassment at work and noting that he was "now following her outside the facility." See id.
Plaintiff provided a copy of the police report to Defendant Holdrige and informed him that the
"escalating harassment was causing her to fear for her physical safety and was also causing her
severe stress for which she was seeking medical help." Id. The following day, October 31, 2013,
Plaintiff received a workplace evaluation from her supervisor with a negative comment regarding
her ability to "get along with others," which her supervisor stated he had to include otherwise "he
Duprey, of Assembly District 115, informed Plaintiff that she had spoken with
supervisors at Plaintiff's place-of-work who promised to address the situation. See Dkt. No. 6 at ¶
14.
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would get in trouble."3 Id. Plaintiff again complained to her superiors, but no corrective action
was taken. See id.
On November 4, 2013, Plaintiff met with the director of EAP and complained of severe
chest pains. See id. at ¶ 21. The director instructed Plaintiff to seek immediate medical attention
because she "appeared to be in such a state of distress[.]" See id.
In early December 2013, Plaintiff contacted Governor Cuomo by email "and was assured
that her concerns would be forwarded to the appropriate supervisory officials." Id. at ¶ 22. On
December 7, 2013, Plaintiff wrote to the Acting Commissioner of DOCCS who then contacted
the Office of Diversity Management on Plaintiff's behalf. See id. On January 1, 2014, Defendant
Holdrige warned Plaintiff to "be careful" because Defendant Blaine was soon to receive a "Notice
of Discipline" towards the middle of the month. Id. at ¶ 23.
Defendant Holdrige indeed gave Defendant Blaine two Notices of Discipline, one of
which was for insubordination regarding his conduct towards Plaintiff. See id. at ¶ 24. Based
upon these notices, the superintendent of the correctional facility, Defendant LaValley, received
a recommendation from the relevant DOCCS office that Defendant Blaine should be suspended
for a year without pay. See id. Defendant LaValley instead rejected the recommendation and
offered Defendant Blaine forty-five days of suspension or the option to retire without penalty.
See id. Defendant Blaine chose to retire, but was not required to do so for "several months,"
during which time he was still permitted contact with Plaintiff and continued his retaliatory
conduct. See id. Defendant LaValley was "forced to retire shortly thereafter . . . because of his
failure to address [Plaintiff]'s situation."
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that her supervisor reported directly to Defendant
Blaine who instructed him to write the negative comment in Plaintiff's evaluation. See Dkt. No. 6
at ¶ 20.
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The Office of Diversity Management determined Plaintiff's allegations were substantiated,
and upon further harassment, Plaintiff "reached out to her union president who, in turn, contacted
the Superintendent Deputy[,] Stephen Brown." Id. at ¶ 27. Shortly afer retiring, Defendant
Blaine filed an internal complaint4 against Plaintiff and Defendant Holdrige claiming they were
trying to destroy his career. See id. at ¶ 28.
2. Causes of Action Asserted
Plaintiff's amended complaint seeks compensatory damages from all Defendants; punitive
damages from Defendant Blaine; and statutory damages pursuant to Title VII and the New York
State Human Rights Law from Defendants State of New York and DOCCS. See Dkt. No. 6 at
¶¶ 37-51. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts four causes of action in her amended complaint, two of
which are asserted against the State and are currently before the Court in light of Defendants'
motion. First, in violation of Plaintiff's rights under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
Defendants State of New York and DOCCS retaliated against Plaintiff for filing formal
complaints of gender discrimination with the EEOC and harassment with the New York State
Police. See Dkt. No. 6 at ¶¶ 32-36. Plaintiff claims that these Defendants failed to take corrective
action with malice and reckless indifference towards Plaintiff. See Dkt. No. 6 at ¶¶ 32-36.
Second, in violation of Plaintiff's rights under New York State Human Rights Law, Defendants
State of New York, DOCCS, and Michael Blaine discriminated against Plaintiff on the basis of
sex and retaliated against Plaintiff as claimed in the aforementioned second cause of action. See
Dkt. No. 6 at ¶¶ 32-51; N.Y. Exec. Law § 296(1)(e), (7) (2015).
B.
Defendant State of New York's Motion to Dismiss
On February 20, 2015, Defendant State of New York filed a motion to dismiss, pursuant
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This internal complaint is currently pending. See Dkt. No. 6 at ¶ 28.
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to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, contending solely that because the State
is not the bona fide employer of any individual employed by a state agency, it is therefore an
improper defendant in a Title VII action brought by a plaintiff employed by a state agency. See
Dkt. No. 8-1 at 55 (citing La Martina v. Fischer, No. 12-CV-308A, 2013 WL 1682603, *4-*5
(W.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2013)). The State argues that because Plaintiff was employed by DOCCS,
which is a state agency, the State is not a proper defendant in this action. Dkt. No. 8-1 at 5 (citing
Dkt. No. 6 at ¶ 10); see also Wilson v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., No. 98 Civ. 1750 (AGS),
1998 WL 770555 at *8 (citing Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1313 (2d Cir. 1995))
("[O]nly employers, not individual defendants, are subject to suit under Title VII."). Furthermore,
in accordance with this motion to dismiss, the State also asks that this Court relinquish
supplemental jurisdiction over the related state-law claims joined in this action. See Dkt. No. 8-1.
C.
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion
Plaintiff contends that the State is, along with DOCCS, her co-employer because, in
addition to the factual allegations set forth above, the State is responsible for paying her salary,
supervising her employment benefits and civil-service status, and the collective-bargaining
agreement signed by Plaintiff's union is between the union and the State. See Dkt. No. 20-1 at 6
(citing Dkt. No. 6 at ¶¶ 8-9). Plaintiff maintains that since her amended complaint explicitly
alleges that Defendants State of New York and DOCCS are jointly her co-employers, a
determination regarding the appropriate bearer of liability is sufficiently in dispute to warrant
discovery and the denial of the State's motion. See id. at 4. Plaintiff also argues that Defendant
misstates the conclusions of the authority cited in its memorandum.
III. DISCUSSION
To avoid confusion, whenever the Court references a specific page number for an entry
on the docket, it will cite to the page number assigned by the Court's electronic filing system.
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A.
Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure challenges the legal sufficiency of the non-movant's claim for relief,
without regard to the merits of the claim. See Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 111-12 (2d Cir.
2007); Global Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 155 (2d Cir. 2006).
When determining the legal sufficiency of a claim, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded
allegations contained within the complaint as construed most favorably to the claimant. See ATSI
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Shaar Fund, Ltd., 493 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation omitted). This
presumption of truth does not extend to "mere conclusory" legal statements. See Ashcroft v.
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted).
To withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a pleading must contain "a short and
plain statement of the claim," with sufficient factual "heft to 'sho[w] that the pleader is entitled to
relief.'" Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2)).
"Factual allegations [contained in the pleading] must be enough to raise a right of relief above the
speculative level." Id. at 555. But this standard does not call for a determination of probability
and may indeed be satisfied even if "actual proof of those facts" alleged is improbable. Id. at 570.
"A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
678 (emphasis added). Ultimately, "when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not
raise a claim of entitlement to relief," Twombly, 550 U.S. at 558, or where a plaintiff has "not
nudged [its] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be
dismissed[,]" id. at 570.
B.
Plaintiff's Retaliation Claim Under Title VII
1. Sufficiency of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint
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To establish a prima facie case for retaliation under Title VII, an employee-plaintiff must
first demonstrate (1) participation in a protected activity known to the defendant; (2) an
employment action disadvantaging the plaintiff; and (3) a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Terry v. Ashcroft, 336 F.3d 128, 141
(2d Cir 2003) (citing Quinn v. Green Tree Credit Corp., 159 F.3d 759, 769 (2d Cir. 1998)). Once
a plaintiff meets this burden, the defendant then has the burden of production to "articulate a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for its actions." Tomka v. Seiler Corp., 66 F.3d 1295, 1308
(2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted).
Title VII provides that it is "an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to
discriminate against any individual with respect to [his or her] compensation, terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or natural
origin." Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a)). Title VII does not limit employers' liability to only "economic" or "tangible"
damages resulting from such discrimination, but also allows for psychological damages. Id. at 64.
Title VII further makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because
[he or she] has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing . . . ." Terry, 336 F.3d at 140.
Furthermore, violation of Title VII occurs when "a retaliatory motive plays a part in
adverse employment action toward an employee, whether or not it was the sole cause." Id. at
140-41 (quoting Cosgrove v. Sears, Roebuck &Co., 9 F.3d 1033, 1039 (2d Cir. 1993)). "[A]
plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by proving that discrimination based on sex has
created a hostile or abusive work environment." Meritor, 447 U.S. at 66. "Without question,
when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the subordinate's sex, that
supervisor discriminates on the basis of sex." Id. at 64 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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There is no question in this case that the first prong of the analysis has been satisfied.
Plaintiff engaged in protected activity by filing complaints with DOCCS supervisors, the EEOC,
State Police, and other officials as detailed above, and all Defendants were aware of this activity.
See Tomka, 66 F.3d at 1308 (holding that "complaints to company management about sexual
harassment constitute protected activity") (citation omitted). Under the standard of pleading
required by Twombly and Iqbal, Plaintiff has sufficiently pleaded allegations of discriminatory
conduct by her supervisor, Defendant Blaine, that, if proven, could allow the Court to determine
that adverse action was taken against Plaintiff in retaliation for filing the complaints. In
satisfaction of the second and third prongs of the analysis are Plaintiff's allegations that Defendant
Blaine induced Plaintiff's immediate superior to include a negative comment on Plaintiff's
evaluation and attempted to change Plaintiff's job description to include more duties. See Dkt.
No. 6 at ¶ 13. The State does not contest the legal sufficiency of Plaintiff's claims against its coDefendants but rather only argues that it should not be held vicariously liable because it is not
Plaintiff's employer. See Dkt. No. 8-1 at 5.
2. Whether Liability is Imputed to the State of New York
Plaintiff is correct that no court in this jurisdiction has explicitly held that the State is per
se an improper defendant in Title VII actions. See, e.g., Palmer v. New York State Office of
Court, 526 Fed. Appx. 97, 100 (2d Cir. 2013) (dismissing claim because the plaintiff did not
actually allege discrimination on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin"); La
Martina, 2013 WL 1682603 at *3 (noting determinations of employer–employee relationships
involve an intensive agency analysis).
When the alleged discriminatory conduct is effectuated by an employee's supervisor,
liability will generally be imputed to the employer. See Richardson v. New York State Dep't of
Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426, 441 (2d Cir. 1999); but see Meritor, 477 U.S. at 73-74 (concluding that
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employers are not automatically liable for their supervisors' sexual harassment, and a court must
look to agency principles in light of particular circumstances). An employer will, however,
always be vicariously liable when its negligence perpetuates a hostile work environment, and
accordingly, "[e]vidence that an employer did not monitor the workplace, failed to respond to
complaints, failed to provide a system for registering complaints, or effectively discouraged
complaints from being filed would be relevant." Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2453
(2013). When an employer has effectively delegated the power to take "tangible employment
actions against employees to "a few individuals," it will not succeed in isolating itself from
liability. See id. at 2452; see also Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n Compliance Manual
§ 2-III(B)(1)(a)(iii)(a) (outlining factors to be considered in determining whether separate entities
are an integrated enterprise).
Plaintiff has alleged in her amended complaint that both the State of New York and
DOCCS retaliated against her by failing to take corrective action in response to her complaints; in
effect condoning the discrimination against her by her supervisor for which liability may be
imputed to her employer. Defendant Blaine's supervisory status is not contested by the State.
Furthermore, Plaintiff alleges that both entities bear responsibility as her joint employers because
various supervisory responsibilities and policy decisions regarding Plaintiff's employment are
divided between DOCCS as an agency, and the State of New York directly. See Dkt. No. 6 at ¶¶
8-9. Plaintiff finally contends that these failures were effectuated recklessly by both DOCCS and
the State. In light of these allegations and the fact intensive inquiry necessary to determine the
extent of the State's involvement in relevant DOCCS' activities and policies, the Court finds that
factual discovery is appropriate under Vance prior to any conclusive finding of liability.
Accepted as true and construed in Plaintiff's favor, these facts indeed allow the Court to
draw the reasonable inference that the State is Plaintiff's employer and is therefore potentially
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liable under Title VII. Since the State's argument for dismissal of Plaintiff's claims under section
296 of the New York Human Rights Law involves the same factual inquiry into its employerstatus, the Court need not separately address the matter.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendant's motion to dismiss.
C.
Plaintiff's Claim Under New York State Human Rights Law
In accordance with this denial of the State's motion, the Court will continue to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, over Plaintiff's claims arising under
section 296 of the New York State Human Rights Law.
IV. CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions and the
applicable law, and for the above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Defendant State of New York's motion to dismiss is DENIED; and the
Court further
ORDERS that the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision
and Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: June 17, 2015
Albany, New York
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