Hatzfeld v. Goord et al
Filing
122
MEMORANDUM OPINION: Granting 114 Motion for Summary Judgment. All of plaintiffs' claims under the First and Fourteenth Amendment will be dismissed, and all defendants are entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiffs remaining Eighth Amendme nt claims. Thus, defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted and judgment will be entered in favor of all defendants on all claims. DATED this 16th day of November, 2011, BY THE COURT, LYLE E. STROM, Senior Judge United States District Court (ptm) (Copy of Memorandum Opinion served on plaintiff by regular mail)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOHN HATZFELD,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
GLENN S. GOORD; LESTER
)
WRIGHT; FRANK HEADLY; MARK
)
RABIDEAU; D. McCLENDON; W.
)
ROBINSON; S. AHSAN; and
)
ANTHONY GRACEFFO
)
)
Defendants.
)
______________________________)
9:04CV0159
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter is before the Court upon defendants’ motion
for summary judgment (Filing No. 114).
defendants’ motion.
Plaintiff objects to
Upon review of the motion, the supporting
and opposing briefs, and the relevant law, the Court finds that
defendants’ motion should be granted.
I. BACKGROUND
This action was brought pro se under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
by John Hatzfeld, an inmate in the custody of the New York State
Department of Correctional Services (“DOCS”), who at the time of
filing his complaint, was housed in the Auburn Correctional
Facility, 135 State Street, Auburn, New York, 13024 (Filing No. 1
at 1).
Plaintiff alleges that defendants violated his rights
under the First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
States Constitution.
Id.
The defendants in this action are
Glenn S. Goord, Commissioner of New York State DOCS; Lester
Wright, Deputy Commissioner/Chief Medical Officer for New York
State DOCS; Frank R. Headly, Deputy Commissioner of New York
State DOCS; Mark Rabideau, Deputy Superintendent of Auburn
Correctional Facility; D. McClendon, RSAT/ASAT Coordinator at
Auburn Correctional Facility; W. Robinson, Nurse Administrator at
Auburn Correctional Facility; S. Ahsan, Medical Director At
Auburn Correctional Facility; and Anthony Graceffo, Medical
Doctor at Auburn Correctional Facility.
In April of 2000, plaintiff was notified that he had
tested positive for Hepatitis C Virus (“HCV”), an infectious
disease affecting the liver, while in custody of the DOCS.
at 4.
Id.
Defendant Graceffo, a physician at Auburn Correctional
Facility, began monitoring plaintiff’s blood for the HCV, for a
period of at least six months to two years, before pursuing any
further course of treatment.
Id. at 5.
blood tests every three to four months.
Dr. Graceffo scheduled
Id. at 5.
Plaintiff was notified that he would be required to
complete the Resident Substance Abuse Treatment and Alcohol
Substance Abuse Treatment (“RSAT/ASAT”) Program as a condition of
any medical treatment for his HCV.
Id. at 6.
Plaintiff objected
to participating in RSAT/ASAT because he is an atheist and
rejected the religious aspect of the program.
Id.
On September 30, 2002, after regular blood monitoring
by Dr. Graceffo, a liver biopsy was performed on plaintiff at
University Hospital in Syracuse.
Id.
Plaintiff’s
gastroenterologist, Dr. Holtzapple, concluded that plaintiff met
the requirements for HCV therapy, and recommended that plaintiff
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begin receiving a course of treatment including pegylated
interferon therapy and ribaviron.
Id.
Defendants claim that in October 2002, DOCS
substantially revised its approach to alcohol and substance abuse
treatment in correctional facilities -- most notably by removing
all arguably religious content from program requirements
(including but not limited to any references to God,
spirituality, religion, and Twelve Step meeting requirements).
See D. Bradford Dec., Filing No. 114-4 at para. 8.
however, disagrees with this contention.
Plaintiff,
See Filing No. 116 at
pg. 2.
On December 26, 2002, defendant Graceffo informed
plaintiff of the results of the liver biopsy and requested that
plaintiff participate in the revised RSAT/ASAT program as an
element of treatment (Filing No. 1 at 6).
Plaintiff refused to
participate because of his belief that the program still had a
religious component, and claims he was not informed the program
was so revised to remove all religious content.
Id.; Filing No.
116 at 2.
On December 27, 2002, plaintiff wrote letters to
defendants Robinson, Dr. Wright, and Dr. Ahsan to address his
concerns with Dr. Graceffo’s refusal to treat him absent
participation in RSAT/ASAT (Filing No. 1 at 6-7).
These three
defendants responded to plaintiff’s letters, informing him that
it was DOCS’ policy for HCV patients to participate in RSAT/ASAT
prior to medical treatment.
Id. at 7.
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Plaintiff contacted
defendant McClendon, the RSAT/ASAT Coordinator, who also
reiterated to plaintiff that it was a DOCS’ policy requirement
for HCV patients to participate in the RSAT/ASAT program prior to
treatment.
Id.
On January 15, 2003, plaintiff filed a grievance about
the RSAT/ASAT requirement for HCV treatment.
The grievance was
reviewed by defendant Rabideau, who subsequently denied the
grievance.
Id. at 8.
On February 25, 2003, plaintiff appealed
the decision to the Central Office Review Committee, but was
never given a response.
Id. at 9.
Plaintiff filed this Inmate
Civil Rights Complaint on February 12, 2004.
Id. at 1.
By an order dated September 23, 2005, plaintiff’s
application for an injunction prohibiting DOCS from conditioning
his HCV treatment upon his participation in the RSAT/ASAT program
was granted.
See Filing No. 57 at 10-11.
On February 28, 2007,
defendants’ motion for partial judgment on the pleadings was
denied in part, and granted in part as to former defendant John
Burge, and as to plaintiff’s claims against all defendants in
their official capacities.
See Filing Nos. 72 and 73.
Also,
plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment claims were dismissed, and some of
plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment claims were deemed more properly
addressed as Eighth Amendment violations.
See Filing Nos. 72 and
73.
On March 12, 2008, plaintiff filed another Inmate Civil
Rights Complaint.
This complaint was based upon a renewed,
second request for treatment that plaintiff made on June 30,
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2005, and Dr. Graceffo’s continued refusal to treat plaintiff
unless plaintiff either enrolled in or completed RSAT/ASAT.
Hatzfeld II, 9:08-cv-00283, Filing No. 1.
case were consolidated for all purposes.
Hatzfeld II, Filing No. 38.
See
Hatzfeld II and this
See Filing No. 98;
On January 14, 2011, summary
judgment was granted in favor of all defendants in Hatzfeld II,
and plaintiff’s complaint was dismissed.
Nos. 54, 58 and 59.
See Hatzfeld II, Filing
Defendants’ request for leave to move for
summary judgment in this case was granted on January 25, 2011
(Filing No. 109).
Although plaintiff’s two lawsuits were filed against
different sets of defendants (except for Dr. Graceffo and former
defendant Burge who are named defendants in both cases), this
case and Hatzfeld II address similar issues.
The Court adopts
the legal and factual findings of the Hatzfeld II ReportRecommendation and Order on the Hatzfeld II defendants’ motion
for summary judgment that are relevant to the summary judgement
issues of this case.
See Hatzfeld II, Filing No. 54.
II. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges his constitutional rights under the
First, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments have been violated by
all named defendants.
These allegations are premised upon
plaintiff’s request for treatment in December, 2002.
Plaintiff
seeks compensatory and punitive damages.
Defendants claim that (1) defendants Robinson and
McClendon were not personally involved in the alleged
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constitutional violations; (2) no rational jury could find in
favor of plaintiff on his claims under the Eighth Amendment for
deliberate indifference to medical needs; (3) the alcohol and
substance abuse programming requirements did not infringe upon
any First Amendment rights of the plaintiff as an atheist; (4)
the DOCS’ treatment guidelines regarding HCV are rationally based
and do not violate plaintiff’s equal protection rights under the
Fourteenth Amendment; (5) defendants are entitled to dismissal of
plaintiff’s claim for money damages -- the only relief sought
herein -- on grounds of qualified immunity; and (6) the
undisputed facts cannot support a claim for compensatory damages,
nor punitive damages, such that only a claim for nominal damages
could survive this motion.
Filing No. 114-6.
A. LEGAL STANDARD
A motion for summary judgment may be granted if there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56.
The moving party has the burden to show the absence of disputed
material facts by informing the court of portions of pleadings,
depositions, and affidavits which support the motion.
Id.; see
also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Facts
are material if they may affect the outcome of the case as
determined by substantive law.
U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477
All ambiguities are resolved and all
reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the non-moving party.
Skubel v. Fuoroli, 113 F.3d 330, 334 (2d Cir. 1997).
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The party opposing the motion must set forth facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-86
(1986).
The non-moving party must do more than merely show that
there is some doubt or speculation as to the true nature of the
facts.
Id. at 586.
It must be apparent that no rational finder
of fact could find in favor of the non-moving party for a court
to grant a motion for summary judgment.
Gallo v. Prudential
Residential Servs., 22 F.3d 1219, 1223-24 (2d Cir. 1994); Graham
v. Lewinski, 848 F.2d 342, 344 (2d Cir. 1988).
When, as here, a party seeks judgment against a pro se
litigant, a court must afford the non-moving party special
solicitude.
See Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d
471, 477 (2d Cir. 2006).
As the Second Circuit has stated,
[t]here are many cases in which we have said
that a pro se litigant is entitled to
“special solicitude,”; that a pro se
litigant’s submissions must be construed
“liberally,”; and that such submission must
be read to raise the strongest arguments that
they “suggest[.]” At the same time, our
cases have also indicated that we cannot read
into pro se submissions claims that are not
“consistent” with the pro se litigant’s
allegations, or arguments that the
submissions themselves do not “suggest,”;
that we should not “excuse frivolous or
vexatious filings by pro se litigants,” and
that pro se status “does not exempt a party
from compliance with relevant rules of
procedural and substantive law.”
Id.
(internal citations and footnote omitted); see also Sealed
Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant #1, 537 F.3d 185, 191-92 (2d Cir.
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2008) (“On occasions too numerous to count, we have reminded
district courts that ‘when [a] plaintiff proceeds pro se, . . . a
court is obliged to construe his pleadings liberally.”)
(citations omitted).
B. Personal Involvement of Defendants Robinson and
McClendon
Defendants Robinson and McClendon argue that they were
not personally involved in any alleged constitutional violations.
As the Court has found infra in Section II.F. that all defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claims, and in Section II.D. and E. that plaintiff’s
First and Fourteenth Amendment claims should be dismissed,
further review by the Court of these two defendants’ personal
involvement in plaintiff’s claims is unnecessary.
C. Eighth Amendment
Defendants claim no rational jury could find in favor
of plaintiff under either the objective or subjective prong of a
deliberate indifference claim of the Eighth Amendment.
For
prison medical care to the rise to the level of “cruel and
unusual punishment” that is prohibited by the Eighth Amendment,
plaintiff must establish, objectively, that he suffered a
“serious medical need” and, subjectively, that defendants were
“deliberately indifferent” to that need.
Martino v. Miller, 318
F.Supp. 2d 63, 65-66 (W.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)).
Pursuant to the previous findings of
this Court in Hatzfeld II, the Court finds plaintiff has raised a
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question of fact as to both the objective and subjective prongs
of the deliberate indifference standard and defendants’ motion
based on this ground should be denied.
See Hatzfeld II, Filing
No. 54 at 19-25.
D. First Amendment
Plaintiff claims that enrolling in the RSAT/ASAT
programs or participating in a similar workbook cell study
program would have infringed upon his religious beliefs as an
atheist.
Defendants claim the indisputable facts show that prior
to the time plaintiff refused to participate in such programs,
DOCS had revised the RSAT/ASAT programs to ensure that they did
not offend First Amendment jurisprudence.
The Court previously
addressed this issue in Hatzfeld II and found that plaintiff’s
First Amendment claim must fail as a matter of law because there
is no basis to conclude that plaintiff’s required participation
in the program would violate his religiously held beliefs because
the RSAT/ASAT programs had been revised as defendants’ claim.
Thus, the Court will grant defendants’ motion as to plaintiff’s
First Amendment claim.
See Hatzfeld II, Filing No. 54 at 12-16.
E. Equal Protection
Plaintiff claims that the DOCS’ policy of requiring
inmates to participate in RSAT/ASAT prior to receiving drug
treatment for HCV violated the equal protection provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Defendants claim the DOCS’ treatment
guidelines regarding HCV are rationally based and do not violate
plaintiff’s equal protection rights under the Fourteenth
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Amendment.
Plaintiff contends the alleged discrimination
occurred because of both his religious beliefs and handicap of
HCV disease, and he is ultimately being held to a higher standard
of approval to gain medical treatment than others in similar
circumstances, specially those inmates suffering from HIV/AIDS or
cancer.
In equal protection claims, prison administrators
making classifications, “need only demonstrate a rational basis
for their distinction,’ . . . or that [the classifications] are
‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”
Doe
v. Goord, No. 04 Civ. 0570, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28850 (GBD)
(AJP) at *61 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2005) (Peck, M.J.) (quoting
Isaraphanich v. Coughlin, 716 F. Supp. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)).
The “burden is upon the challenging party to negate ‘any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.’”
Doe, 2005 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28850 at *59 (quoting Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala.
v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367 (2001) (internal citations
omitted)).
This Court previously found in Hatzfeld II that “the
record is devoid of any indication that plaintiff was treated
differently due to any discriminatory animus on the part of any
of the defendants.”
See Hatzfeld II, Filing No. 54 at 18.
The
same holds true in this case; plaintiff has failed to negate the
conceivable statements of facts defendants have provided in their
brief showing a rational basis for the RSAT/ASAT requirement for
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HCV patients as compared to HIV/AIDS or cancer patients.
See
Filing No. at 16-21.
Plaintiff further argues in his reply brief he was
discriminated because of his religion.
As indicated in Section
II.D. supra, as the RSAT/ASAT program did not infringe upon
plaintiff’s beliefs as an atheist, there can be no claim of
discrimination based upon plaintiff’s religious status.
Plaintiff also advances a “class of one” claim in his
reply brief and supplemental brief that he was specifically
treated differently from inmate Pelkey, who received HCV
treatment despite Pelkey’s refusal to participate in RSAT/ASAT.
This issue was also addressed in Hatzfeld II, and the Court found
that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that the treatment of
plaintiff as compared to the treatment of Pelkey was based upon
discriminatory animus.
See Hatzfeld II, Filing No. 54, at 16-19.
Thus, defendants’ motion will be granted as to plaintiffs’
Fourteenth Amendment claims.
F. Qualified Immunity
Defendants further claim they are entitled to dismissal
of plaintiff’s claims for money damages -- the only relief sought
herein -- on grounds of qualified immunity because, in the
absence of law to the contrary, it was reasonable for defendants
to believe that the RSAT/ASAT requirement did not violate
plaintiff’s constitutional rights.
Qualified immunity generally
protects governmental officials from civil liability “insofar as
their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
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constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); Aiken v.
Nixon, 236 F. Supp. 2d 211, 229-30 (N.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d 80 F.
App’x 146 (2d Cir. Nov. 10, 2003).
The Court previously addressed this issue in Hatzfeld
II.
As discussed in Section II.C. supra, a reasonable jury could
find that defendants violated plaintiff’s Eighth Amendment
rights.
However, as the defendants in Hatzfeld II, the
defendants here relied on DOCS’ guidelines when they refused to
provide plaintiff with treatment.
The Court previously held such
reliance entitled the Hatzfeld II defendants to qualified
immunity because:
The Guideline is constantly
developed and revised based upon
information from a number of
independent medical sources . . . .
DOCS relied on those independent
sources when it established the
[RSAT/ASAT] prerequisite . . . .
The medical community recognized
that alcohol or drug use could
prevent the successful completion
of [HCV] treatment, and DOCS
promulgated rules in accordance
with recommendation from the
medical community.
See Hatzfeld II, Filing No. 54 at 27 (citations omitted).
The
Court finds the same for defendants here and their motion will be
granted on the ground of qualified immunity.
G. Damages
In light of the Court’s findings, the Court will not
address defendants’ remaining arguments regarding damages.
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III. CONCLUSION
All of plaintiffs’ claims under the First and
Fourteenth Amendment will be dismissed, and all defendants are
entitled to qualified immunity as to plaintiff’s remaining Eighth
Amendment claims.
Thus, defendants’ motion for summary judgment
is granted and judgment will be entered in favor of all
defendants on all claims.
DATED this 16th day of November, 2011.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Lyle E. Strom
____________________________
LYLE E. STROM, Senior Judge
United States District Court
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