-RFT Robinson v. City of New York et al

Filing 54

DECISION & ORDER accepting and adopting # 53 Magistrate Judge Treece's Report and Recommendation and denying # 43 Motion for Summary Judgment without prejudice to renewal within thirty (30) days of the date of this Decision & Order. Should De fendants file such a renewed motion within that time period, the motion is respectfully referred to Magistrate Judge Treece for a second Report-Recommendation. Should Defendant not file such a renewed motion within that time period, the file in this action shall be returned to the undersigned for the scheduling of trial. Signed by Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 3/8/13. (lmw) (Copy served upon pro se plaintiff via regular mail)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
______________________________________________
RENDELL ROBINSON,
Plaintiff,
9:10-CV-1442
(GTS/RFT)

v.
DR. KRISHNA VALDAMUDI, Physician, Marcy C.F.;
and DR. SAED HAIDER-SHAH, Physician, Marcy C.F.;
Defendants.
______________________________________________
APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

RENDELL ROBINSON, 07-A-6175
Plaintiff, Pro Se
Great Meadow Correctional Facility
Box 51
Comstock, New York 12821
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
Attorney General for the State of New York
Counsel for Defendants
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224

ROGER W. KINSEY, ESQ.
Assistant Attorney General

GLENN T. SUDDABY, United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
Currently before the Court, in this pro se prisoner civil rights action filed by Rendell
Robinson (“Plaintiff”) against the two above-captioned state correctional employees
(“Defendants”), are Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 43), and United States
Magistrate Judge Randolph F. Treece’s Report-Recommendation recommending that
Defendants’ motion be denied (Dkt. No. 53). No objections have been filed, and the deadline by
which to do so has expired. (See generally Docket Sheet.) For the reasons set forth below, the
Report-Recommendation is accepted, and Defendants’ motion is denied.

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed his Complaint in this action on July 12, 2010. (Dkt. No. 1.) Plaintiff filed

an Amended and Supplemental Complaint in this action on November 30, 2010. (Dkt. No. 11.)1
Generally, in his Amended and Supplemental Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
violated his constitutional rights under the Eighth Amendment while he was an inmate at Mary
Correctional Facility during the period of December 24, 2009 to October 14, 2010, by recklessly
failing to properly treat his chronic lower back pain (caused by injuries sustained in a car
accident that occurred while he was being transported by the City of New York Department of
Correction in 2007). (Id.)2
On March 27, 2012, Defendants filed motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 43.)
Generally, in their motion, Defendants assert the following arguments regarding the medical care
that Plaintiff received at Marcy Correctional Facility between his arrival there on December 24,
2009, and his purported departure from there on March 3, 2010: (1) based on the admissible
record evidence, no rational fact finder could conclude that Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to Plaintiff’s serious medical needs; (2) to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims are
asserted against Defendants (who are state officials) in their official capacities, those claims must

1

Although the second pleading filed by Plaintiff is labeled and docketed as an
“Amended Complaint,” in actuality that second pleading is an Amended and Supplemental
Pleading, because it (1) amends the allegations and claims arising from events occurring before
the date of his original Complaint, and (2) asserts new allegations and claims arising from events
occurring after the date of his original Complaint. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(d) (defining the nature
of a “supplemental pleading”).
2

The Court notes that Plaintiff’s Amended and Supplemental Complaint’s
mentions dates from April to September of 2010, is dated October 14, 2010, and alleges that his
institute of incarceration as of that date was Marcy Correctional Facility. (Dkt. No. 11, at 3, 42,
43, 46, 53.)
2

be dismissed as barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment;
and (3) based on the admissible record evidence, Defendants are protected from liability as a
matter of law by the doctrine of qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 43, Attach. 1.)
In opposition to Defendants’ motion, Plaintiff has filed a response on September 12, 2012
(Dkt. No. 50), a supplemental response on September 17, 2012 (Dkt. No. 51), and a second
supplemental response on January 30, 2013 (Dkt. No. 52). Generally, in those papers, Plaintiff
asserts the following three arguments: (1) the record does contain admissible evidence from
which a rational fact finder could conclude that Defendants were deliberately indifferent to
Plaintiff’s serious medical needs; (2) to the extent that Plaintiff’s claims are asserted against
Defendants in their individual capacities, those claims are not barred by the doctrine of sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; (3) based on the admissible record evidence, a
genuine dispute of material fact exists regarding whether Defendants are protected from liability
by the doctrine of qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 50, Attach. 3.)
On January 31, 2013, Magistrate Judge Treece issued a Report-Recommendation
recommending that Defendants’ motion be denied. (Dkt. No. 53.) Generally, in his ReportRecommendation, Magistrate Judge Treece found that, because Defendants have misconstrued
Plaintiff’s claims as being based only on events occurring between December of 2009 and March
of 2010, they have neglected to adduce arguments or evidence regarding events occurring
between March of 2010 and October of 2010, thus precluding the Court from being able to make
a determination as to the constitutional sufficiency of Plaintiff’s medical treatment. (Id. at Part
II.) Familiarity with the findings of Magistrate Judge Treece’s Report-Recommendation is
assumed in this Decision and Order, which is intended primarily for the review of the parties.

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II.

APPLICABLE LEGAL STANDARDS
A.

Standard Governing Review of a Report-Recommendation

When a specific objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's reportrecommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to a de novo
review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). To be “specific,” the objection
must, with particularity, “identify [1] the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations,
or report to which it has an objection and [2] the basis for the objection.” N.D.N.Y. L.R.
72.1(c).3 When performing such a de novo review, “[t]he judge may . . . receive further
evidence. . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court will ordinarily refuse to consider
evidentiary material that could have been, but was not, presented to the magistrate judge in the
first instance.4

3

See also Mario v. P&C Food Markets, Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002)
(“Although Mario filed objections to the magistrate's report and recommendation, the statement
with respect to his Title VII claim was not specific enough to preserve this claim for review. The
only reference made to the Title VII claim was one sentence on the last page of his objections,
where he stated that it was error to deny his motion on the Title VII claim ‘[f]or the reasons set
forth in Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.’
This bare statement, devoid of any reference to specific findings or recommendations to which
he objected and why, and unsupported by legal authority, was not sufficient to preserve the Title
VII claim.”).
4

See Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1137-38 (2d Cir. 1994) (“In
objecting to a magistrate's report before the district court, a party has no right to present further
testimony when it offers no justification for not offering the testimony at the hearing before the
magistrate.”) [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 894 F.2d 36, 40, n.3 (2d Cir. 1990) (district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying plaintiff's request to present additional testimony where plaintiff “offered
no justification for not offering the testimony at the hearing before the magistrate”); cf. U. S. v.
Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, n.3 (1980) (“We conclude that to construe § 636(b)(1) to require the
district court to conduct a second hearing whenever either party objected to the magistrate's
credibility findings would largely frustrate the plain objective of Congress to alleviate the
increasing congestion of litigation in the district courts.”); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory
Committee Notes: 1983 Addition (“The term ‘de novo’ does not indicate that a secondary
4

When only a general objection is made to a portion of a magistrate judge's
report-recommendation, the Court subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a
clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2),(3); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee
Notes: 1983 Addition.5 Similarly, when an objection merely reiterates the same arguments made
by the objecting party in its original papers submitted to the magistrate judge, the Court subjects
that portion of the report-recommendation challenged by those arguments to only a clear error
review.6 Finally, when no objection is made to a portion of a report-recommendation, the Court
subjects that portion of the report-recommendation to only a clear error review. Fed. R. Civ. P.
72(b), Advisory Committee Notes: 1983 Addition. When performing such a “clear error”
review, “the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in
order to accept the recommendation.” Id.7

evidentiary hearing is required.”).
5

See also Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y.
Sept. 22, 1997) (Pooler, J.) [collecting cases], aff'd without opinion, 175 F.3d 1007 (2d Cir.
1999).
6

See Mario, 313 F.3d at 766 (“Merely referring the court to previously filed papers
or arguments does not constitute an adequate objection under either Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b) or
Local Civil Rule 72.3(a)(3).”); Camardo v. Gen. Motors Hourly-Rate Emp. Pension Plan, 806 F.
Supp. 380, 382 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (explaining that court need not consider objections that merely
constitute a "rehashing" of the same arguments and positions taken in original papers submitted
to the magistrate judge); accord, Praileau v. Cnty. of Schenectady, 09-CV-0924, 2010 WL
3761902, at *1, n.1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2010) (McAvoy, J.); Hickman ex rel. M.A.H. v. Astrue,
07-CV-1077, 2010 WL 2985968, at *3 & n.3 (N.D.N.Y. July 27, 2010) (Mordue, C.J.); Almonte
v. N.Y.S. Div. of Parole, 04-CV-0484, 2006 WL 149049, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2006) (Sharpe,
J.).
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See also Batista v. Walker, 94-CV-2826, 1995 WL 453299, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July
31, 1995) (Sotomayor, J.) (“I am permitted to adopt those sections of [a magistrate judge's]
report to which no specific objection is made, so long as those sections are not facially
erroneous.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
5

After conducting the appropriate review, the Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C).
B.

Standard Governing a Motion for Summary Judgment

Magistrate Judge Treece correctly recited the legal standard governing a motion for
summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 53, at Part I.) As a result, this standard is incorporated herein by
reference in this Decision and Order, which (again) is intended primarily for the review of the
parties.
III.

ANALYSIS
After carefully reviewing all of the papers in this action, the Court concludes that the

Report-Recommendation is well-reasoned and not clearly erroneous. Magistrate Judge Treece
employed the proper standards, accurately recited the facts, and reasonably applied the law to
those facts. As a result, the Court accepts and adopts the Report-Recommendation for the
reasons stated therein.
The Court would add only the following point: given the rationale for Magistrate Judge
Treece’s Report-Recommendation, Defendants’ motion is denied only without prejudice. The
Court has declined to grant summary judgment to Defendants with regard to the medical care
they provided Plaintiff between December 2009 and March 2010 only because it has found that,
under the circumstances, that care should be considered together with the care provided to
Plaintiff between March 2010 and October 2010. The same is true with regard to any claims
asserted against Defendants in their official capacities (assuming that Plaintiff’s Amended and
Supplemental Complaint can be liberally construed as attempting to assert such claims). As a
result, in the interest of judicial efficiency and the possibility of avoiding an unnecessary and

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time-consuming trial, Defendants are free to reassert the above-described arguments in a
renewed motion for summary judgment.
ACCORDINGLY, it is
ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Treece’s Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 53) is
ACCEPTED and ADOPTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 43) is DENIED
without prejudice to renewal within THIRTY (30) DAYS of the date of this Decision and
Order. Should Defendants file such a renewed motion within that time period, the motion is
respectfully referred to Magistrate Judge Treece for a second Report-Recommendation. Should
Defendant not file such a renewed motion within that time period, the file in this action shall be
returned to the undersigned for the scheduling of trial.
Dated: March 8, 2013
Syracuse, New York

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