Rahman v. Fischer et al

Filing 73

ORDER: ORDERED, that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 68 ) is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED in its entirety. ORDERED, that the following claims are DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave to amend: (1) the claim regarding Shiite classes, books an d a locker to the extent that it seeks relief on First Amendment grounds; (2) the claim regarding denial of non-religious programming to the extent that it claims on grounds other than breach of the settlement agreement; (3) the claim regarding Plain tiff's transfer from Mid-State Correctional Facility to Oneida Correctional Facility to the extent that it claims on grounds other than breach of the settlement agreement; (4) the claims regarding the cell search, misbehavior report, and disc iplinary hearing to the extent that they seek relief on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds; and (5) the claim regarding the use of the sink to the extent that it claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act. ORDERED, that to the extent that Amended Complaint attempted to re-allege claims for (1) breach of the settlement agreement; and (2) violation of state regulations governing cell searches, misbehavior reports, and disciplinary hearings, those claims are DIS MISSED without prejudice and without leave to amend. ORDERED, that Plaintiff's First Amendment claim regarding his use of the sink to make ablution may proceed. Defendants Connell and Joslyn shall respond to this claim in accordance with the Lo cal Rules. ORDERED, that Defendants Brian Fischer, Kenneth S. Perlman, Hulihan, K. Phillips, Imam Monteiro, Adamik, Sharrow, and Albert Prack are DISMISSED from this action. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on 2/20/14. {order served via regular mail on plaintiff}(nas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
SHA-HEED RAHMAN,
Plaintiff,
-against-

9:10-cv-1496 (LEK/TWD)

BRIAN FISCHER, et al.,
Defendants.
___________________________________
DECISION and ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
This matter comes before the Court following a Report-Recommendation filed on November

4, 2013, by the Honorable Thérèse Wiley Dancks, U.S. Magistrate Judge, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3. Dkt. No. 68 (“Report-Recommendation”). Judge Dancks reviewed
Plaintiff Sha-Heed Rahman’s (“Plaintiff”) Amended Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and
recommended that the Court dismiss Plaintiff’s claims, excepting the claim that Defendants Connell
and Joslyn prevented Plaintiff from accessing water to make ablution in contravention of Plaintiff’s
First Amendment free exercise rights. See Dkt. Nos. 56 (“Amended Complaint”); Report-Rec.
Plaintiff has filed Objections to the Report-Recommendation. Dkt. Nos. 70, 72 (collectively,
“Objections”). For the following reasons, the Court accepts and adopts the ReportRecommendation.
II.

BACKGROUND
The Court presumes the parties’ familiarity with the facts of this case. For a complete

statement of facts, reference is made to the Complaint, the Report-Recommendation, and the
Court’s September 2013 Order granting Defendants’ Motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 50 (“September

Order”).
Plaintiff filed a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that corrections officers at
Mid-State and Oneida Correctional Facilities violated his constitutional rights. See Dkt. No. 1
(“Complaint”). Defendants moved to dismiss; the Court granted the Motion, but allowed Plaintiff
leave to amend the Complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 27; Sept. Order. Plaintiff filed an Amended
Complaint. The Report-Recommendation recommended that the Court dismiss all but one of
Plaintiff’s claims—that corrections officers at Oneida Correctional Facility prevented Plaintiff from
accessing water to make ablution in the mornings, thereby abridging his right to free exercise of
religion under the First Amendment—without leave to amend. See Report-Rec. at 31.
Plaintiff objects to the Report-Recommendation on the following grounds: (1) Defendants
violated the terms of a settlement agreement from Rahman v. Goord, No. 04-CV-6368, 2007 WL
1299408 (W.D.N.Y. May 3, 2007); and (2) Defendants’ searches of Plaintiff’s cell violated state
law. See Objs. Although both of Plaintiff’s arguments are restatements of previous arguments in
his Response to Defendants’ Motion to dismiss and his Amended Complaint, and thus do not
require the Court to review sections of the Report-Recommendation de novo, in light of Plaintiff’s
pro se status the Court will construe them as a motion to reconsider the Court’s September Order
and review them accordingly. See Dkt. Nos. 30, 56.
II.

LEGAL STANDARD
A. Review of Report-Recommendation
A district court must review de novo any objected-to portions of a magistrate judge’s report-

recommendation or specific proposed findings or recommendations therein and “may accept, reject,
or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28
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U.S.C. § 636(b); accord FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b); see also Morris v. Local 804, Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters,
167 F. App’x 230, 232 (2d Cir. 2006); Barnes v. Prack, No. 11-CV-0857, 2013 WL 1121353, at *1
(N.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2013). If no objections are made, or if an objection is general, conclusory,
perfunctory, or a mere reiteration of an argument made to the magistrate judge, a district court need
review that aspect of a report-recommendation only for clear error. Chylinski v. Bank of Am., N.A.,
434 F. App’x 47, 48 (2d Cir. 2011); Barnes, 2013 WL 1121353, at *1; Farid v. Bouey, 554 F. Supp.
2d 301, 306-07 & n.2 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); see also Machicote v. Ercole, No. 06 Civ. 13320, 2011 WL
3809920, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2011) (“[E]ven a pro se party’s objections to a Report and
Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at particular findings in the magistrate’s
proposal, such that no party be allowed a second bite at the apple by simply relitigating a prior
argument.”).
B. Motion for Reconsideration
The standard for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict. Shrader v. CSX Transp.,
Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). A motion for reconsideration “should not be granted where
the moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided.” Id. Furthermore, a motion for
reconsideration is not to be used for “presenting the case under new theories, securing a rehearing
on the merits, or otherwise taking a ‘second bite at the apple.’” Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d
136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998). “Generally, the prevailing rule in the Northern District ‘recognizes only
three possible grounds upon which motions for reconsideration may be granted; they are (1) an
intervening change in controlling law, (2) the availability of new evidence not previously available,
or (3) the need to correct a clear error of law or prevent manifest injustice.’” Sumner v. McCall,
103 F. Supp. 2d 555, 558 (N.D.N.Y. 2000) (Kahn, J.) (quoting In re C-TC 9th Ave. P’ship, 182 B.R.
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1, 3 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)).
IV.

DISCUSSION
A. Report-Recommendation
Because Plaintiff’s Objections challenge the Report-Recommendation only on grounds

previously addressed in the Court’s September Order, the Court reviews the ReportRecommendation for clear error and finds none. Accordingly, the Court adopts and accepts the
Report-Recommendation.
B. Motion for Reconsideration
Courts dismiss claims for several reasons. Sometimes, a claim is dismissed because the
Court finds that the stated facts provide no basis for recovery under the law. Other times, even
though a claim might be meritorious, a court must dismiss a claim because it lacks jurisdiction—for
example, when the Plaintiff files a claim in a federal court instead of a state court. When a court
dismisses a claim on jurisdictional grounds, it does so without prejudice, meaning that the plaintiff
can re-file her claims in a court with jurisdiction.
In the September Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims on jurisdictional grounds. A
settlement agreement is a contract, see Collins v. Harrison-Bode, 303 F.3d 429, 433 (2d Cir. 2002),
and therefore must be enforced in a state-law breach of contract action unless there is a separate
ground for federal jurisdiction; the fact that the agreement was made to end a federal-court lawsuit
is not enough. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S. 375, 377, 381-82
(1994). There is no indication in the record that the Rahman v. Goord settlement agreement
contained a term that would allow a federal court to enforce it, nor is there any other grant of
federal-court jurisdiction. Because federal courts may decide cases only when there is a specific
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grant of jurisdiction, see U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, the Court necessarily dismissed the claims arising
out of the interpretation of the settlement agreement. See Sept. Order. If Plaintiff wishes to
adjudicate an alleged violation of the settlement agreement, he should instead file a claim in state
court.
Likewise, for all of the reasons explained in the September Order and the ReportRecommendation, the Court lacks jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claim that the search of his cell
violated state law. See Report-Rec.; Sept. Order. In an attempt to maintain jurisdiction, the
September Order and the Report-Recommendation examined whether there was a separate
constitutional basis for the alleged state-law violation, and found none. Therefore, the Court
dismissed the claims in the Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and Magistrate Judge
Dancks again recommended dismissal of the claims in the Amended Complaint.1
Neither does supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367 provide any basis for
maintaining jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s claims. Supplemental jurisdiction requires that the
anchoring federal claim and the pendent state-law claims “form part of the same case or
controversy.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367. In other words, the claims must “derive from a common nucleus
of operative fact.” United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Here, the
surviving federal claim, the denial of access to water at Oneida Correctional Facility, and the
additional state-law claims, the search of Plaintiff’s cell in contravention of state regulations and the
breach of the settlement agreement at Mid-State Correctional Facility, do not arise from a common
nucleus of operative fact. They occurred in different locations, involved different Defendants, and
1

The Court makes no determination as to the merits of Plaintiffs’ state law claims. The
Court only seeks to resolve Plaintiff’s apparent confusion as to why the Court will not decide the
claims on the merits.
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require litigation of non-overlapping facts. Therefore, there is no basis for the Court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction.
For the above reasons, the Court denies the relief requested in the Objections to the extent
that they seek reconsideration of the September Order.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 68) is ACCEPTED and

ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED, that the following claims are DISMISSED with prejudice and without leave
to amend: (1) the claim regarding Shiite classes, books and a locker to the extent that it seeks relief
on First Amendment grounds; (2) the claim regarding denial of non-religious programming to the
extent that it claims on grounds other than breach of the settlement agreement; (3) the claim
regarding Plaintiff’s transfer from Mid-State Correctional Facility to Oneida Correctional Facility
to the extent that it claims on grounds other than breach of the settlement agreement; (4) the claims
regarding the cell search, misbehavior report, and disciplinary hearing to the extent that they seek
relief on Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds; and (5) the claim regarding the use of the sink
to the extent that it claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act; and it is
further
ORDERED, that to the extent that Amended Complaint attempted to re-allege claims for (1)
breach of the settlement agreement; and (2) violation of state regulations governing cell searches,
misbehavior reports, and disciplinary hearings, those claims are DISMISSED without prejudice
and without leave to amend; and it is further
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ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim regarding his use of the sink to make
ablution may proceed. Defendants Connell and Joslyn shall respond to this claim in accordance
with the Local Rules; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendants Brian Fischer, Kenneth S. Perlman, Hulihan, K. Phillips,
Imam Monteiro, Adamik, Sharrow, and Albert Prack are DISMISSED from this action; and it is
further
ORDERED, that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on all parties in
accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

February 20, 2014
Albany, New York

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