Walker v. Schult et al
Filing
77
DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERED, that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 72 ) is APPROVED and ADOPTED in its entirety. ORDERED, that Defendants' Motion (Dkt. No. 67 ) for partial summary judgment is DENIED. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on 12/11/14. (alh, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
ELLIS WALKER,
Plaintiff,
-against-
9:11-CV-0287 (LEK/RFT)
DEBORAH G. SCHULT, et al.,
Defendants.
DECISION and ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
This civil rights action comes before the Court following a Report-Recommendation filed on
October 15, 2014, by United States Magistrate Judge Randolph F. Treece, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(d). Dkt. No. 72 (“Report-Recommendation”). Judge Treece
recommends that Defendants’ Motion for partial summary judgement be denied. Report-Rec. at 11;
Dkt. No. 67 (“Motion”). Defendants timely filed Objections. Dkt. Nos. 73 (“Objections”).1 For the
following reasons, the Report-Recommendation is adopted in its entirety.
II.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party makes a timely objection to a Report-Recommendation, it is the duty of the
Court to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
1
Plaintiffs filed a “Response to Defendants’ Objections.” Dkt. No. 76. However, 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) only authorizes the parties to file objections within fourteen days of the reportrecommendation. Here, the Response was not an objection to the Report-Recommendation, but
rather a response to Defendants’ Objections. See generally Resp. Additionally, Plaintiff’s Response
was filed on November 20, 2014, approximately thirty-five days after the Report-Recommendation
was issued. See Docket. Because Plaintiff’s Response was filed well beyond the fourteen-day
deadline, and was an impermissible response to the opposing party’s objections, the Court will not
consider its contents pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Where, however,
an objecting “party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original
arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error.” Farid v.
Bouey, 554 F. Supp. 2d 301, 307 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting McAllan v. Von Essen, 517 F. Supp. 2d
672, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)) (citations omitted); see also Brown v. Peters, No. 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL
599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997). “A [district] judge . . . may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b).
III.
DISCUSSION
The central issue raised in Defendants’ Objections is whether the Complaint asserts one
overarching conditions-of-confinement claim—which includes facts not previously mentioned in
Plaintiff’s administrative grievances—or whether Plaintiff has alleged several, discrete allegations
that were not properly exhausted at the administrative level, and thus are subject to dismissal. See
generally Objs. Judge Treece found that “the Second Circuit plainly concluded—based on the
overcrowded cell allegation—that [Plaintiff] is asserting one overarching Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claim.” Report-Rec. at 9 (citing Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 126-29
(2d Cir. 2013)). Accordingly, Judge Treece rejected Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff had raised
new allegations for which he failed to exhaust administrative remedies. See Report-Rec. at 9.
Defendants first object to Judge Treece’s finding that the Second Circuit “plainly concluded”
that Plaintiff is asserting only one overarching conditions-of-confinement claim. Objs. at 3-4. In
support, Defendants assert that the Second Circuit treated Plaintiff’s allegations as separate, discrete
claims because the court discussed Plaintiff’s “claims” in individualized paragraphs. Id. (noting that
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the Second Circuit addressed allegations regarding, inter alia, temperature, sleep, and unsanitary
conditions in separate paragraphs). However, a careful reading of the Second Circuit’s opinion
reveals that Defendants’ argument is without merit. Although the Second Circuit considered claims,
such as temperature and unsanitary conditions, in separate paragraphs, each paragraph was included
under a single heading titled “The Conditions of Confinement.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 126-29.
Moreover, the Second Circuit found that “[h]ere, [Plaintiff] plausibly alleged that the overcrowding
and lack of living space in his cell were exacerbated by the ventilation, noise, sanitation, and safety
issues, leading to deprivations of specific life necessities.” Id. at 126 (emphasis added). Thus, the
Second Circuit clearly considered Plaintiff’s allegations regarding temperature, sleeping, and
unsanitary conditions as part of Plaintiff’s overarching conditions-of-confinement claim, rather than
as several, discrete claims.
Defendants next argue that the Court must separate Plaintiff’s “good” exhausted claims from
his “bad” unexhausted claims, and proceed only with the exhausted claims. Objs. at 4 (citing Jones
v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 221 (2007)). While Jones is good law, it addressed an entirely separate issue
from the one before the Court. In Jones, the Supreme Court rejected the “total exhaustion” rule,
finding that where an inmate has pled both exhausted and unexhausted claims, the entire complaint
need not be dismissed; rather, the unexhausted claims should be dismissed, and the remaining
claims could proceed. 549 U.S. at 221. Here, a different issue is presented—whether Plaintiff has
in fact pled separate claims, in which case the unexhausted claims would be subject to dismissal, or
if he has merely pled one overarching claim. As stated supra, the Second Circuit found that
Plaintiff has pled a single, overarching Eighth Amendment conditions-of-confinement claim, and
therefore the “total exhaustion” rule announced in Jones is inapplicable to this case.
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Finally, Defendants argue that permitting Plaintiff to proceed with newly raised allegations
concerning his conditions of confinement would be inconsistent with other decisions in this Circuit.
Objs. at 5. In support, Defendants rely on Gay v. Terrell, No. 12-CV-2925, 2013 WL 5437045, at
*1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2013). In that case, the plaintiff asserted, inter alia, five claims for
administrative remedies: additional medical testing and care; no ladders in Special Housing Unit
(“SHU”); no working distress signals in SHU; unprofessional conduct by two lieutenants; and
plaintiff’s request for medical records. Id. at *13-16. The court held that only the “additional
medical testing and care” claim had been properly exhausted at the administrative level, and
therefore dismissed the other claims accordingly. Id. at *1. Defendants argue that the Gay court
treated each claim separately, even though “all ha[d] potential overarching medical concerns,” and,
similarly, here, the Court should view each of Plaintiff’s allegations individually for purposes of
exhaustion. See Objs. at 6.
Defendants’ reliance on Gay is misplaced. As an initial matter, the absence of ladders and
distress signals in the SHU, and unprofessional conduct by two lieutenants, share no commonality
and certainly do not have “potential overarching medical concerns.” Thus, the only unexhausted
claim even remotely related to medical care was the plaintiff’s request for medical records.
However, a prison’s administrative process for providing medical records is an entirely distinct
issue from the actual provision of medical care. Indeed, the plaintiff in Gay did not even attempt to
assert that the claims were related, nor did the court consider whether the allegations were part of a
single claim. See Gay, 2013 WL 5437045, at *13-16. In contrast, here, Plaintiff asserts—and the
Second Circuit agrees—that his allegations concerning, inter alia, extreme temperatures and
unsanitary conditions, are all part of his conditions-of-confinement claim. See Walker, 717 F.3d
4
at126-29. Therefore, Gay is distinguishable from this case, and Defendants have failed to otherwise
demonstrate that Plaintiff has raised new, unexhausted claims.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 72) is APPROVED and
ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. No. 67) for partial summary judgment is
DENIED; and it is further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Decision and Order on all
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:
December 11, 2014
Albany, NY
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