Hurley v. Fischer et al
Filing
19
DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERED that plaintiff's motion (Dkt. No. 17 ) is GRANTED in part and DENIED inpart as follows: (1) Plaintiff's request for reconsideration of the February Order is DENIED; (2) Plaintiff's request (Dkt. No. 17 at 4) for an extension of time to submit an amended complaint is granted. If plaintiff wishes to avoid dismissal of this action, he must, within forty-five (45) days of the filing date of this Decision and Order, submit either (a) an amended complain t demonstrating that he qualifies for the imminent danger exception to Section 1915(g) and a renewed application to proceed in forma pauperis; or, in the alternative, (b) an amended complaint and the $350.00 statutory filing fee, in full. Pl aintiff's failure to timely comply with the terms of this Decision and Order will result in dismissal of this action without further Order of the Court; (3) Plaintiff's request for production of documents (Dkt. No. 17 at 3-4) is denied as premature; (4) The Clerk is directed to send plaintiff copies of the following: (a) this District's Prisoner Pro Se Manual; (b) the Local Rules relevant to prisoner actions; (c) the docket sheet for this action and for 9:11-CV-0962, together with a copy of all submissions filed in both of those actions to date; and (4) each of the unreported Westlaw cases cited in the February Order; and(5) Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. No. 17 ) is DENIED in all other respects. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas J. McAvoy on 8/7/2012. (ptm) (Copy of Decision and Order served on plaintiff, with copies of documents as directed above, by regular mail)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MICHAEL AZIZ ZARIF SHABAZZ
aka MICHAEL A. HURLEY,
Plaintiff,
9:11-CV-0916
(TJM/ATB)
v.
BRIAN FISCHER, et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
MICHAEL AZIZ ZARIF SHABAZZ
aka MICHAEL A. HURLEY
72-B-0089
Plaintiff, pro se
Upstate Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 2001
Malone, NY 12953
THOMAS J. McAVOY
Senior U.S. District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Michael Aziz Zarif Shabazz commenced this action by filing a pro se civil
rights complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dkt. No. 1 ("Compl."). By Decision and Order
of this Court filed on February 10, 2012, plaintiff's in forma pauperis application was denied,
without prejudice to renew, because the Court found that plaintiff had accumulated three
strikes as defined in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) ("Section 1915(g)), and had not alleged that he met
the imminent danger exception set forth in Section 1915(g). Dkt. No. 16 at 18 (the "February
Order"). The February Order also denied plaintiff's motions for preliminary injunctive relief
without prejudice. Id. at 16-18. Presently before the Court is plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration of the February Order. Dkt. No. 17. Plaintiff's motion also includes requests
for miscellaneous relief. Id.
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Motion for Reconsideration
A court may justifiably reconsider its previous ruling if: (1) there is an intervening
change in the controlling law; (2) new evidence not previously available comes to light; or (3)
it becomes necessary to remedy a clear error of law or to prevent manifest injustice.
Delaney v. Selsky, 899 F. Supp. 923, 925 (N.Y.N.D. 1995) (citing Doe v. New York City Dep't
of Soc. Servs., 709 F.2d 782, 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 864 (1983)). The standard
for granting a motion for reconsideration is strict. Shrader v. CSX Transportation, Inc., 70
F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir. 1995). A motion for reconsideration "should not be granted where the
moving party seeks solely to relitigate an issue already decided." Id. Furthermore, a motion
for reconsideration is not to be used for "presenting the case under new theories, securing a
rehearing on the merits, or otherwise taking a 'second bite at the apple.'" Sequa Corp. v.
GBJ Corp., 156 F.3d 136, 144 (2d Cir. 1998).
Plaintiff contends that the February Order should be reconsidered to the extent that it
found that plaintiff had accumulated three strikes pursuant to Section 1915(g). Dkt. No. 17 at
5; see also Dkt. No. 17-1 at 11-23.
First, plaintiff states that "no other court or Judge has determined and entered a strike
against [him], let alone the three strikes that this court has imposed," and this Court did not
personally "sit[ ] in person and determin[e] the facts of those three cases." Dkt. No. 17 at 5.
Plaintiff seems to argue that because this Court did not preside over those cases previously
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dismissed, it is not in a position to decide that those dismissals constitute strikes. Id. Plaintiff
seems to suggest that only the Judge who dismisses an action may assign a strike.
However, Second Circuit case law holds to the contrary. Indeed, in DeLeon v. Doe, the
Second Circuit held that "district courts should not issue these strikes one by one, in their
orders of judgment, as they dispose of suits that may ultimately-upon determination at a
proper time-qualify as strikes under the terms of § 1915(g)." DeLeon v. Doe, 361 F.3d 93, 95
(2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam).1 In other words, a strike may not be assessed at the same time
that the action or appeal is dismissed. Instead, it is up to a later judge to determine, when
the time is right, whether three previously dismissed actions or appeals might constitute
strikes. Id. Therefore, this aspect of plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is denied.
Plaintiff also asserts that denial of IFP status denies him access to the courts. Dkt.
No. 17 at 5. However, the Second Circuit has clearly held that the fee requirements set forth
in 28 U.S.C. § 1915, do not violate a prisoner's right of access to the courts. See Nicholas v.
Tucker 114 F.3d 17, 21 (2d Cir. 1997) (requiring prisoners to pay fees does not violate a
prisoner's access to the courts); accord Tucker v. Branker, 142 F.3d 1294, 1297 (D.C.Cir.
1998); Lucien v. DeTella, 141 F.3d 773 (7th Cir. 1998); Shabazz v. Parsons, 127 F.3d 1246,
1248-49 (10th Cir. 1997); Norton v. Dimazana, 122 F.3d 286, 289-91 (5th Cir. 1997); Roller
v. Gunn, 107 F.3d 227, 231-33 (4th Cir. 1997); Hampton v. Hobbs, 106 F.3d 1281, 1284-86
(6th Cir. 1997); see also Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1999) (Section
1
The Second Circuit in DeLeon referred to its previous decision in Snider v. Melindez, wherein it noted
in dicta that the "[c]ontem poraneous classification of dism issals as strikes or non-strikes at a tim e when the
ruling has no im m ediate consequences m ay also lead district courts to undertake such classifications carelessly,
and with inadequate explanation of why a given dism issal falls into one category and not the other." DeLeon,
361 F.3d at 95, n.1 (quoting Snider v. Melindez, 199 F.3d 93, 115, n.4 (2d Cir. 2004)).
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1915(g) does violate prisoner's right of access to the courts). Plaintiff's motion for
reconsideration in this regard is denied.
Plaintiff also argues that the Court incorrectly concluded that three prior dismissals
constitute strikes for purposes of Section 1915(g). Dkt. No. 17-1 at 11-23. Plaintiff presents
no basis for reconsideration of this Court's determination that plaintiff had accumulated three
strikes for purposes of Section 1915(g) prior to the date that he filed this action. See
Shabazz v. Coombe, 1:95-CV-4144 (S.D.N.Y.) (Dkt. No. 12, Mandate issued by the Second
Circuit on June 13, 1996) (dismissing plaintiff's appeal to the Second Circuit "as frivolous
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915"); Shabazz v. Bloomberg, 1:08-CV-1789 (E.D.N.Y.)
(Dkt. No. 5, Memorandum and Order filed May 12, 2008) (dismissing complaint in its entirety
for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) and certifying that appeal would
not be taken in good faith);2 Shabazz v. Pataki, 1:08-CV-5961 (S.D.N.Y.) (Dkt. No. 14,
Mandate issued by the Second Circuit on November 10, 2010) (dismissing plaintiff's appeal
to the Second Circuit "because it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact").
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Plaintiff argues, in part, that the dism issal of Shabazz v. Bloomberg, No. 1:08–CV-1789 (E.D.N.Y.),
should not constitute a strike because the Eastern District of New York never properly addressed his "Rule 60
Motion" challenging the Judgm ent of dism issal in that action. Dkt. No. 17 at 18-19. The Court has reviewed the
publicly available docum ents for plaintiff's cases on the U.S. Party/Case Index ("PACER") (see <
http://pacer.uspci.uscourts.gov/cgi-bin/dquery.pl >, and based upon that review, finds that plaintiff's argum ent is
without m erit. First, a review of the docket for Shabazz v. Bloomberg reflects that plaintiff's Rule 60 m otion was
denied by Order of United States District Judge Nicholas G. Garaufis by Order filed October 17, 2008. See
Shabazz v. Fischer, Dkt. No. 11. That Order was returned to the Eastern District of New York Clerk's Office on
October 31, 2008 as undeliverable. See id., Dkt. No. 12. Moreover, in 2010, plaintiff filed a subm ission with the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals, specifically referencing Shabazz v. Bloomberg, wherein he asked the Circuit to
issue a writ of m andam us to, am ong other things, "vacat[e] the dism issal of Shabazz v. Bloomberg." See In Re:
Michael Aziz Zarif Shabazz, 10-1978-op (Second Circuit filed May 19, 2010). The sam e subm ission was also
construed by the Circuit to be an appeal from plaintiff's Southern District of New York action, No. 1:08-CV-5961.
See Shabazz v. Pataki, 10-1899-pr (Second Circuit filed May 7, 2010). The Circuit issued a joint m andate on
Novem ber 9, 2010, dism issing plaintiff's appeal "because it lack[ed] an arguable basis in law or fact" and denying
his m andam us petition because he "had not dem onstrated that exceptional circum stances warrant the requested
relief." See Shabazz v. Bloomberg, No. 1:08-CV-1789, Dkt. No. 13. See also Kotlicky v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co., 817 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1987) (The Court m ust strike a balance between hearing a litigant's claim s on
the m erits against the policy in favor of finality).
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Additionally, plaintiff asks the Court to reconsider its conclusion that plaintiff's
complaint failed to provide sufficient allegations against specific defendants to qualify plaintiff
for the imminent danger exception set forth in Section 1915(g). Dkt. No. 17 at 6-7. Plaintiff
has presented nothing to warrant reconsideration of that portion of the February Order.
Moreover, if plaintiff believes that he can demonstrate that he qualifies for the imminent
danger exception to Section 1915(g), the February Order provided plaintiff the opportunity to
submit an amended complaint setting forth facts plausibly suggesting that, on the date that
he filed this action, he was in imminent danger of serious physical injury, and that the alleged
imminent danger was fairly traceable to the wrongdoing of one or more of the named
defendants. February Order at 18. Indeed, as part of his motion, plaintiff requests an
extension of time to submit "a proper and formal [amended] complaint pursuant to and in
compliance with the Court's orders."3 Dkt. No. 17 at 4. Although the Court denies plaintiff's
request for reconsideration of the February Order's conclusion that plaintiff had not alleged
imminent danger, the Court grants plaintiff's request for an extension of time to file an
amended complaint. Plaintiff may submit an amended complaint within forty-five (45) days of
the filing date of this Decision and Order.
The Court has thoroughly reviewed plaintiff's remaining arguments for reconsideration
and finds that plaintiff presents no basis for reconsideration of the February Order. Thus,
plaintiff's motion for reconsideration of the February Order is denied in its entirety.
B.
Motion for Miscellaneous Relief
Plaintiff requests an order directing defendant Fischer to provide plaintiff with a
3
Plaintiff actually requests a sixty day extension of tim e to subm it an am ended com plaint, m easured
from the date that defendant Fischer produces certain docum ents to plaintiff. As discussed below, plaintiff's
request for production of docum ents is denied as prem ature. See infra, Part II.B.
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"computer print out" of documents including, but not limited to, plaintiff's disciplinary reports,
medical records, and various Department of Corrections and Community Supervision policies
and procedures. Dkt. No. 17 at 4. Plaintiff claims that he need these documents in order to
prepare his amended complaint. Id. Plaintiff's request for production of documents is denied
as premature. Plaintiff may request copies of such documents through proper channels at
his facility.
Plaintiff also request copies of various documents from the Court. Dkt. No. 17 at 8
(copies of docket reports and court filings for this action and civil action No. 9:11-CV-0962);
Dkt. No. 17 at 9 (copies of electronically reported cases cited in the February Order, this
District's Pro Se Handbook and Local Rules). This portion of plaintiff's motion is granted to
the limited extent detailed below.
III.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff's motion (Dkt. No. 17) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in
part as follows:
(1) Plaintiff's request for reconsideration of the February Order is DENIED;
(2) Plaintiff's request (Dkt. No. 17 at 4) for an extension of time to submit an
amended complaint is granted. If plaintiff wishes to avoid dismissal of this action, he
must, within forty-five (45) days of the filing date of this Decision and Order, submit
either (a) an amended complaint demonstrating that he qualifies for the imminent
danger exception to Section 1915(g) and a renewed application to proceed in forma
pauperis; or, in the alternative, (b) an amended complaint and the $350.00 statutory
filing fee, in full. Plaintiff's failure to timely comply with the terms of this Decision and
Order will result in dismissal of this action without further Order of the Court;
(3) Plaintiff's request for production of documents (Dkt. No. 17 at 3-4) is denied as
premature;
(4) The Clerk is directed to send plaintiff copies of the following: (a) this District's
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Prisoner Pro Se Manual; (b) the Local Rules relevant to prisoner actions; (c) the
docket sheet for this action and for 9:11-CV-0962, together with a copy of all
submissions filed in both of those actions to date; and (4) each of the
unreported Westlaw cases cited in the February Order;4 and
(5) Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. No. 17) is DENIED in all other respects; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 7, 2012
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The Clerk shall send plaintiff a copy of each of the following: W elch v. Charlan, 2008 W L 5382353,
Hudson v. Artuz, 1998 W L 832708, Crown v. W agenstein, 1998 W L 118169, Flores v. Levy, 2008 W L 4394681,
Davis v. Buffardi, 2005 W L 1174088, Cancel v. Goord, 2001 W L 303713, McCorkle v. Juchenwicz, 1999 W L
163205, Gadson v. Goord, 1997 W L 714878, and Ifill v. Goord, 2005 W L 2126403.
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