Young v. Fischer et al
Filing
156
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Dancks' Order and Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 154 ) is ADOPTED in its entirety. ORDERS that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 139 ) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on 3/27/17. {order served via regular mail and certified mail on plaintiff}(nas, )
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
____________________________________________
PETER YOUNG,
Plaintiff,
vs.
9:12-CV-1642
(MAD/TWD)
GRAHAM, Superintendent; BROWER; SGT.
CHANDLER; OFFICER CASLER; HEATH;
OFFICER FAGEN; VASILE; and BRIAN
FISCHER,
Defendants.
____________________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
PETER YOUNG
3225 Burnet Avenue
Apt. #5
Syracuse, New York 13206
Plaintiff pro se
OFFICE OF THE NEW YORK
STATE ATTORNEY GENERAL
Syracuse Regional Office
615 Erie Boulevard West, Suite 102
Syracuse, New York 13204-2465
Attorneys for Defendants
AIMEE M. PAQUETTE, AAG
Mae A. D'Agostino, U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Pro se Plaintiff Peter Young, formerly an inmate in the custody of the New York State
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, commenced this civil rights action
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on September 13, 2012, asserting claims arising out of his
confinement at Auburn Correctional Facility ("Auburn C.F."). See Dkt. No. 1. After the Court
dismissed the original complaint on initial review, Plaintiff timely filed an amended complaint.
See Dkt. Nos. 26 & 30. Following initial review of the amended complaint, the Court found that
the following claims survived initial review and required a response: (1) First Amendment
retaliation claim against Defendants Fischer, Graham, Brower, Chandler, Casler, Heath, and
Fagen; (2) First Amendment legal mail interference claim against Defendants Fischer, Graham,
Chandler, Casler, and Heath; (3) First Amendment denial of access to the court claim against
Defendants Graham, Chandler, Casler, and Heath; (4) Eighth Amendment conditions of
confinement claim against Defendants Fischer, Brower, and Chandler; (5) Eighth Amendment
excessive force claim against Defendants Fischer, Graham, and Vasile; (6) Fourteenth
Amendment forced medical care claim against Defendant Graham; and (7) Fourteenth
Amendment deprivation of personal property claim against Defendant Graham. See Dkt. No. 44
at 29-30.
On June 3, 2016, Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff's
claims are meritless and that Plaintiff has failed to establish the personal involvement of
Defendants Fischer, Graham, Chandler, and Vasile. See Dkt. No. 139. In an Order and ReportRecommendation dated March 6, 2017, Magistrate Judge Dancks recommended that the Court
grant in part and deny in part Defendants' motion. See Dkt. No. 154. Specifically, Magistrate
Judge Dancks recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
all claims with the exception of the Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against
Defendants Chandler and Brower, and the Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure to
intervene claim against Defendants Graham, Vasile, Brower, Heath, and Casler. See id. at 36.
II. BACKGROUND
2
Since neither party objected to Magistrate Judge Dancks' recitation of the relevant
background facts, and because it is consistent with the record, the Court adopts the factual
background set forth in Magistrate Judge Dancks' Order and Report-Recommendation. See Dkt.
No. 154 at 3-7.
III. DISCUSSION
A.
Standard
A court may grant a motion for summary judgment only if it determines that there is no
genuine issue of material fact to be tried and that the facts as to which there is no such issue
warrant judgment for the movant as a matter of law. See Chambers v. TRM Copy Ctrs. Corp., 43
F.3d 29, 36 (2d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted). When analyzing a summary judgment motion, the
court "cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried." Id. at
36-37 (quotation and other citation omitted). Moreover, it is well-settled that a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment may not simply rely on the assertions in its pleadings. See Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (e)).
In assessing the record to determine whether any such issues of material fact exist, the
court is required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party. See Chambers, 43 F.3d at 36 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255, 106 S. Ct. 2502, 2513-14, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)) (other citations omitted). Where
the non-movant either does not respond to the motion or fails to dispute the movant's statement of
material facts, the court may not rely solely on the moving party's Rule 56.1 statement; rather the
court must be satisfied that the citations to evidence in the record support the movant's assertions.
See Giannullo v. City of N.Y., 322 F.3d 139, 143 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that not verifying in
3
the record the assertions in the motion for summary judgment "would derogate the truth-finding
functions of the judicial process by substituting convenience for facts").
"[I]n a pro se case, the court must view the submissions by a more lenient standard than
that accorded to 'formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.'" Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289,
295 (N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 30 L. Ed. 2d
652 (1972)) (other citations omitted). The Second Circuit has opined that the court is obligated to
"make reasonable allowances to protect pro se litigants" from inadvertently forfeiting legal rights
merely because they lack a legal education. Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295
(N.D.N.Y. 2007) (quoting Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)). "However, this does
not mean that a pro se litigant is excused from following the procedural requirements of
summary judgment. See id. at 295 (citing Showers v. Eastmond, 00 CIV. 3725, 2001 WL 527484,
*1 (S.D.N.Y. May 16, 2001)). Specifically, "a pro se party's 'bald assertion,' completely
unsupported by evidence" is not sufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment." Lee v.
Coughlin, 902 F. Supp. 424, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (citing Cary v. Crescenzi, 923 F.2d 18, 21 (2d
Cir. 1991)).
When a party files specific objections to a magistrate judge's report-recommendation, the
district court makes a "de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However,
when a party files "[g]eneral or conclusory objections or objections which merely recite the same
arguments [that he presented] to the magistrate judge," the court reviews those recommendations
for clear error. O'Diah v. Mawhir, No. 9:08-CV-322, 2011 WL 933846, *1 (N.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,
2011) (citations and footnote omitted). After the appropriate review, "the court may accept,
4
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
A litigant's failure to file objections to a magistrate judge's report and recommendation,
even when that litigant is proceeding pro se, waives any challenge to the report on appeal. See
Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding that, "[a]s a rule, a party's failure to
object to any purported error or omission in a magistrate judge's report waives further judicial
review of the point" (citation omitted)). A pro se litigant must be given notice of this rule; notice
is sufficient if it informs the litigant that the failure to timely object will result in the waiver of
further judicial review and cites pertinent statutory and civil rules authority. See Frank v.
Johnson, 968 F.2d 298, 299 (2d Cir. 1992); Small v. Sec'y of Health and Human Servs., 892 F.2d
15, 16 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that a pro se party's failure to object to a report and
recommendation does not waive his right to appellate review unless the report explicitly states
that failure to object will preclude appellate review and specifically cites 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
and Rules 72, 6(a), and former 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
B.
Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff sued all Defendants for money damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in both
their individual and official capacities. See Dkt. No. 30 at 1-5. As Magistrate Judge Dancks
correctly determined, the Eleventh Amendment precludes Plaintiffs from recovering money
damages from Defendants in their official capacities. See Woods v. Rondout Valley Cent. Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ., 4666 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 2006). As such, although not raised in their
motion for summary judgment, the Court sua sponte dismisses Plaintiff's official capacity claims.
See id.
C.
Retaliation
5
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff claims that Defendants Fischer, Graham, Brower,
Chandler, Casler, Heath, and Fagen retaliated against him for filing lawsuits and grievances, and
for his religious beliefs. Defendants argue that the Court should grant summary judgment as to
these claims because the claims are legally deficient and the record contains no evidence upon
which a factfinder could conclude that unlawful retaliation occurred. See Dkt. No. 139-7 at 1519.
Having reviewed the parties' submissions, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Dancks
correctly determined that Defendants are entitled to summary judgment as to Plaintiff's retaliation
claims. See Dkt. No. 154 at 13-16. Aside from his own conclusory allegations in the amended
complaint and one instance during his deposition, nothing in the record supports the alleged
retaliation claims. Now that this matter has progressed to summary judgment, Plaintiff's
conclusory allegations are no longer sufficient. See Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 85
(2d Cir. 2000). In response to Defendants' motion, Plaintiff needed to come forward with
evidence from which a reasonable factfinder could find the requisite nexus between his protected
activity and the adverse actions taken against him. See Flaherty v. Coughlin, 713 F.2d 10, 13 (2d
Cir. 1983). Even assuming Plaintiff engaged in protected conduct, Plaintiff failed to present any
evidence, admissible or otherwise, supporting any causal connection between the alleged
protected conduct and any adverse action. See Roseboro v. Gillespie, 791 F. Supp. 2d 353, 36869 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly
recommended that the Court grant Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff's
retaliation claims.
D.
Supervisor Liability
6
In his deposition, Plaintiff testified that he sued Defendant Fischer because "he was the
top man, C.E.O. of the Department of Corrections." Dkt. No. 139-3 at 25. Plaintiff claims that he
wrote letters to Defendant Fischer complaining about the alleged constitutional violations he was
subjected to, but complains that Defendant Fischer merely delegated these letters to his deputy
commissioners. See id. at 34, 37-38.
As Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly determined, Plaintiff's conclusory claims that
Defendant Fischer did not respond to letters or grievances, or that he referred these letters to
subordinates is insufficient to establish personal involvement. See Vega v. Artus, 610 F. Supp. 2d
185, 199 (N.D.N.Y. 2009). Moreover, Plaintiff's allegation that Defendant Fischer authorized
Defendant Graham to use excessive force and chemical agents during cell extractions at Auburn
C.F. is insufficient to establish Defendant Fischer's personal involvement in the alleged Eighth
Amendment violation. See Scarbrough v. Thompson, No. 10-cv-901, 2012 WL 7761439, *10
(N.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2012). The record is devoid of any evidence to support a finding of
supervisory liability against Defendant Fischer.
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
the supervisory liability claims against Defendant Fischer.
E.
Interference with Legal Mail and Access to the Courts
In their motion, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's legal mail and access to the court claims
against Defendants Fischer, Graham, Chandler, Heath, and Casler fail as a matter of law because
Plaintiff failed to establish that he suffered any actual injury from the alleged misconduct. See
Dkt. No. 139-7 at 23. The Court agrees.
Plaintiff claimed that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus was dismissed in the Eastern
District of New York for his failure to timely file a memorandum of law. See Dkt. No. 30 at 12.
7
Contrary to Plaintiff's allegations, the record makes clear that his petition was dismissed on the
merits on December 20, 2012. See Young v. New York, No. 2:11-cv-110, Dkt. Nos. 17 & 18
(E.D.N.Y.).
Moreover, in his first action filed in the Western District of New York, the court
appointed pro bono counsel and the case went to trial on August 26, 2013. See Young v. Kadien,
No. 6:09-cv-6639 (W.D.N.Y.). After Plaintiff presented his case, defense counsel made a Rule 50
motion, which the court granted and judgment was entered on September 10, 2013. See id., Dkt.
Nos. 137 & 138. Finally, in the second action Plaintiff commenced in the Western District of
New York, Plaintiff was again represented by counsel and, after oral argument, the court granted
the defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissed Plaintiff's amended complaint on the merits. See
Young v. Canfield, No. 6:11-cv-6007, 2014 WL 3385186 (W.D.N.Y. July 9, 2014).
Contrary to Plaintiff's conclusory allegations, all of the legal actions that have been
identified were dismissed on the merits and not due to any alleged interference with Plaintiff's
ability to access the courts or with his legal mail. Absent any actual injury to Plaintiff, Magistrate
Judge Dancks correctly determined that the Court should grant Defendants' motion for summary
judgment as to these claims. See Collins v. Goord, 581 F. Supp. 2d 563, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
F.
Forced Medical Care
Plaintiff alleged that Defendant Graham ordered that Plaintiff be taken to the infirmary for
medical treatment "against [his] religious belief." Dkt. No. 44 at 14-15. As Magistrate Judge
Dancks noted, at his deposition, Plaintiff clarified that, "although he was taken to the infirmary,
'where they tried to give [him] medical treatment,' Plaintiff successfully refused the medical
treatment, having only been forced to have his vital signs monitored." Dkt. No. 154 at 24
(quoting Dkt. No. 139-3 at 53-54). Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that any of the Defendants
8
actually provided him with medical treatment, or that Defendant Graham violated his limited right
to refuse medical treatment.
Since the summary judgment record is devoid of any evidence supporting Plaintiff's claim
that Defendant Graham violated Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment right to refuse medical
treatment, Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly determined that this claim should be dismissed.
G.
Conditions of Confinement
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff has alleged two separate Eighth Amendment
conditions of confinement claims. See Dkt. No. 30 at 15. First, Plaintiff claims that Defendant
Brower turned off the water in his cell for thirty (30) days, limiting him to two buckets of hot
water a day for drinking, bathing, and laundry. See id. As Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly
determined, although it has never been held that prisoners are entitled to complete and unfettered
access to water or showers, see Beckford v. Portuondo, 151 F. Supp. 2d 204, 211 (N.D.N.Y.
2001), Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to this claim must be denied because
weighing the conflicting evidence and assessing the credibility of the parties is within the sole
province of the jury. See Dkt. No. 154 at 28.
Plaintiff has also alleged that Defendant Chandler violated his Eighth Amendment rights
by tampering with his food. Although Defendants identified this claim in their motion for
summary judgment, they failed to address the merits of this claim in their memorandum of law.
As such, Magistrate Judge Dancks did not consider this claim to be a part of Defendants' motion
for summary judgment. See Dkt. No. 154 at 29-30. Further, Magistrate Judge Dancks concluded
that, based on the record, "[e]ven if Defendants had addressed the merits, the Court would have
been constrained to deny summary judgment based on the current record." Id. at 30. The Court
agrees with Magistrate Judge Dancks that, since Defendants failed to address the merits of this
9
claim in their memorandum of law, it was not properly before the Court. Moreover, even if it had
been addressed, questions of fact would preclude the Court from granting Defendants' motion as
to this claim.
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claims.
H.
Excessive Force
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was subjected to excessive force and
chemical agents during several cell extractions. As acknowledged in Magistrate Judge Dancks'
Order and Report-Recommendation, the evidentiary record in support for Plaintiff's excessive
force claims is thin. See Dkt. No. 154 at 33. However, Magistrate Judge Dancks also noted that,
despite the thin record in support of the claim, the record is devoid of an affidavit or declaration
from any Defendant denying or disputing Plaintiff's account of the use of excessive force during
the cell extractions, or any evidence demonstrating that any force used was necessary to restore
discipline and subdue Plaintiff. See id. On the record before the Court, Plaintiff testified that
Defendants Heath and Casler were members of the extraction team when he was subjected to
excessive force. Since Plaintiff's "allegations and evidentiary proffers could reasonably, if
credited, allow a rational factfinder to find that corrections officers used force maliciously and
sadistically," summary judgment is inappropriate. See Wright v. Goord, 554 F.3d 255, 269 (2d
Cir. 2009). Further, Plaintiff's testimony creates an issue of fact as to whether Defendants
Graham, Vasile, and Brower were present when they ordered these cell extractions and, therefore,
failed to intervene in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
10
Based on the foregoing, the Court denies Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
Plaintiff's excessive force and failure to intervene claims against Defendants Graham, Vasile,
Brower, Heath, and Casler.
I.
Deprivation of Personal Property
After the Court's initial review, Plaintiff's only remaining claim for deprivation of property
is against Defendant Graham. See Dkt. No. 44 at 14-15. At his deposition, Plaintiff testified that
Defendant Graham does not personally take his property. See Dkt. No. 139-3 at 56. Rather, in an
entirely conclusory fashion, Plaintiff claims that Defendant Graham orders subordinates to "take
all my personal property, legal word, and carbon copies[.]" Dkt. No. 142 at ¶ 12. In his reply
declaration, Defendant Graham specifically denies Plaintiff's conclusory allegations. See Dkt.
No. 144-1 at ¶ 6.
As Magistrate Judge Dancks correctly determined, Plaintiff's conclusory allegations are
insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact. See Kerzer, 156 F.3d at 400. Plaintiff's
bald speculation that Defendant Graham ordered the confiscation of his personal belongings,
including his underwear and socks, is not based on personal knowledge and is insufficient to
withstand Defendants' motion for summary judgment. See Patterson v. Cnty. of Oneida, 375 F.3d
206, 219 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that evidence must be based on personal knowledge) (citations
omitted).
Based on the foregoing, the Court grants Defendants' motion for summary judgment as to
Plaintiff's deprivation of personal property claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
11
After carefully reviewing the entire record in this matter, the parties' submissions,
Magistrate Judge Dancks' Order and Report-Recommendation and the applicable law, and for the
above-stated reasons, the Court hereby
ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Dancks' Order and Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No.
154) is ADOPTED in its entirety; and the Court further
ORDERS that Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 139) is GRANTED
in part and DENIED in part;1 and the Court further
ORDERS the Clerk of the Court shall serve a copy of this Memorandum-Decision and
Order on the parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 27, 2017
Albany, New York
As a result of this Memorandum-Decision and Order, the only remaining claims are
Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment conditions of confinement claim against Defendants Chandler and
Brower, and the Eighth Amendment excessive force and failure to intervene claim against
Defendants Graham, Vasile, Brower, Heath, and Casler.
1
12
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?