Justice v. Hogan et al

Filing 40

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERED that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 37 ) is accepted in all respects, except for the Younger analysis. ORDERED that the dismissal motion (Dkt. No. 21 ) by defendants Woodlock and Belfi is granted in part and denied in part. ORDERED that this Court abstains under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 36 (1971), and Sprint Commc'ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S.Ct. 584, 591-92 (2013), from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's claims for declarat ory and injunctive relief against defendants Woodlock and Belfi; accordingly, all claims in the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 12) against defendant Woodlock, sued only in her official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief, are dismissed withou t prejudice; and all claims in the amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant Belfi in his official capacity are dismissed without prejudice. ORDERED that the claims in the amended complaint for Eighth Amendment cr uel and unusual punishment and First Amendment retaliation against defendant Belfi in his individual capacity are dismissed with prejudice. ORDERED that the claims in the amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money damages against defe ndant Belfi in his individual capacity for Fourteenth Amendment due process and equal protection violations are stayed pending the determination of the CPL § 330.20(14) recommitment application proceeding now pending in New York State Supreme Court. Signed by Senior Judge Norman A. Mordue on 1/12/15. {order served via regular mail on plaintiff}(nas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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JOHN D. JUSTICE,
Plaintiff,

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-vKRISTEN M. WOODLOCK, as Acting Commissioner
of the New York State Office of Mental Health;
DR. BRIAN BELFI; and BRIAN FISCHER, as
Commissioner of the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision,

9:13-CV-252 (NAM/TWD)

Defendants.
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APPEARANCES:

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JOHN D. JUSTICE
87-B-0385
Great Meadow Correctional Facility
Box 51
Comstock, New York 12821
Plaintiff, pro se
Hon. Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General of the State of New York
Kevin M. Hayden, Esq., Assistant Attorney General
Syracuse Regional Office
615 Erie Boulevard West, Suite 102
Syracuse, New York 13204-2465
Attorney for Defendants

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Hon. Norman A. Mordue, Senior U.S. District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
Defendants Woodlock and Belfi move (Dkt. No. 21) to dismiss the claims against them in
the pro se amended complaint (Dkt. No. 12). Upon referral pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)
and Local Rule 72.3(c), United States Magistrate Judge Thérèse Wiley Dancks issued an Order
and Report-Recommendation, filed November 7, 2014 (Dkt. No. 37), recommending that the
motion be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff John D. Justice objects (Dkt. No. 39).

Among other matters, Justice objects to Magistrate Judge Dancks’ recommendation to apply the
abstention doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), to dismiss without prejudice his
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants Woodlock and Belfi in their
official capacities. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court reviews the ReportRecommendation de novo.
The Court adopts the factual and procedural recitations in Magistrate Judge Dancks’
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Order and Report-Recommendation, and does not repeat them here.1 On de novo review, the
Court accepts all of Magistrate Judge Dancks’ recommendations, and adopts her underlying
analysis regarding all issues except the Younger abstention doctrine. With respect to Younger
abstention, the Court’s analysis is as follows.
Where a federal court has jurisdiction, it has a “virtually unflagging obligation” to hear

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and decide the case. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
817 (1976). Generally, therefore, “the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to
proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court having jurisdiction[.]” Id. (quoting

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Very briefly, the Court notes that, according to the application for a recommitment order filed
by the New York State Office of Mental Health dated February 14, 2013 (attached to Justice’s temporary
restraining order application, Dkt. No. 5), after a jury verdict on February 20, 1987 convicting Justice on
certain charges and finding him not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect on others, he was
found to have a dangerous mental disorder and committed to the custody of the State Commissioner of
Mental Health for confinement in a secure psychiatric center for care and treatment under section
330.20(6) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”). Meanwhile, he was incarcerated on the
charges for which he was convicted (after retrial). On September 8, 2005, a day before his scheduled
release on parole, the Office of Mental Health filed an application for a release order and order of
conditions. See CPL 330.20(12). Erie County Supreme Court granted the release order and order of
conditions on January 3, 2006, and extended the order of conditions on February 23, 2011. Issues
concerning the propriety of Justice’s CPL 330.20 status and order of conditions are not before this Court,
but rather are the subject of Justice v. King, 6:08-CV-6417 (W.D.N.Y. FPG-MWP). The case at bar
challenges the recommitment proceeding initiated by the February 14, 2013 application by the Office of
Mental Health.

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McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)). In Younger v. Harris, the Supreme Court
articulated an exception to this general principle, holding that where the plaintiff mounted a
federal-court challenge to the constitutionality of a state criminal statute underlying a criminal
prosecution pending against him in state court, “the federal court should decline to enjoin the
prosecution, absent bad faith, harassment, or a patently invalid state statute.” 401 U.S. 37, 53-54
(1971). The Younger court explained that abstention in that case was appropriate under “the basic
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doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act ... to restrain a criminal
prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable
injury if denied equitable relief.” Id. at 43-44. Subsequently, courts applied Younger to other
types of proceedings. In the Second Circuit, Younger abstention was held to be mandatory
whenever three elements were met: “(1) there is a pending state proceeding, (2) that implicates an

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important state interest, and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiff an adequate
opportunity for judicial review of his or her federal constitutional claims.” Spargo v. New York
State Comm'n on Judicial Conduct, 351 F.3d 65, 75 (2d Cir. 2003); accord Diamond “D” Constr.
Corp. v. McGowan, 282 F.3d 191, 198 (2d Cir. 2002).
Recently, in Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S.Ct. 584, 591-92 (2013), “the Supreme
Court rejected this three-part test in favor of a so-called categorical approach.” Mir v. Shah, 569

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Fed.Appx. 48, 50 (2d Cir. 2014). The Sprint court explained:
Younger exemplifies one class of cases in which federal-court abstention is
required: When there is a parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal
courts must refrain from enjoining the state prosecution. This Court has
extended Younger abstention to particular state civil proceedings that are akin
to criminal prosecutions, or that implicate a State’s interest in enforcing the
orders and judgments of its courts. We have cautioned, however, that federal
courts ordinarily should entertain and resolve on the merits an action within
the scope of a jurisdictional grant, and should not refuse to decide a case in
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deference to the States.
134 S.Ct. at 588 (citations, brackets, and quotation marks omitted); see Mir, 569 Fed.Appx. at 5051. The Sprint court commented that the “pathmarking decision” regarding the second category –
state civil proceedings that are akin to criminal prosecutions – was Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975), in which Ohio officials brought a civil action in state court to abate the showing
of obscene movies in defendant’s theater. “Because the State was a party and the proceeding was
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‘in aid of and closely related to [the State’s] criminal statutes,’ the [Huffman] Court held Younger
abstention appropriate.” Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 591 (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604).
Applying Sprint to the case at bar, the Court holds that the recommitment proceeding in
issue, initiated by the filing of a recommitment application by the New York State Office of
Mental Health under section 330.20(14) of the New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”), falls

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within the second category of cases in which federal-court abstention is required. See Sprint, 134
S.Ct. at 588. It is true that CPL 330.20 proceedings are civil in nature. See People v. Escobar, 61
N.Y.2d 431, 438 (1984). Like the proceeding in issue in Huffman, however, in important respects
they are more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil cases. Section 330.20 applies
only to those who have been found to be not responsible of a crime by reason of mental disease or
defect. 2 See Matter of George L., 85 N.Y.2d 295, 305 (1995). The CPL 330.20 process begins

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New York State has found that “persons found not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect
are an exceptional class of individuals who may properly be treated somewhat differently from persons
subject to civil commitment.” People ex rel. Thorpe v. Von Holden, 63 N.Y.2d 546, 555 (1984) (citations
and quotation marks omitted); see Frances S. v. Stone, 221 F.3d 100, 101 (2d Cir. 2000). For example, a
preponderance of the evidence standard applies to CPL 330.20 commitment and retention proceedings,
see Escobar, 61 N.Y.2d at 440, whereas, before a court may commit a person who has not been
criminally prosecuted and acquitted by reason of mental disease or defect, the State must prove by clear
and convincing evidence that he is insane[.]” Id. at 441 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979)).
Regarding the standard of proof in a recommitment proceeding, see the discussion in Ernst J. v. Stone,
452 F.3d 186, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2006).

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when a state criminal prosecution concludes with a verdict or plea of not responsible by reason of
mental disease or defect, whereupon the court must immediately issue an examination order, and
the commissioner must designate psychiatric examiners to examine the defendant. See CPL
330.20(2). At the initial CPL 330.20 hearing, the district attorney has the burden to establish that
the defendant has a dangerous mental disorder or is mentally ill. See CPL 330.20(6). If a
dangerous mental disorder is established, the court must commit the defendant to the custody of
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the commissioner for confinement in a secure facility. See id. In such cases, the commissioner is
responsible to apply for retention, transfer, release, or other subsequent orders affecting the
defendant’s custody. See CPL 330.20(8)-(13). If the court finds that the defendant is mentally ill
but does not have a dangerous mental disorder, the court must issue an order of conditions and an
order committing him to the custody of the commissioner; the commitment is then governed by

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the civil commitment provisions of the New York Mental Hygiene Law. See CPL 330.20(7). If
the court finds that the defendant does not have a dangerous mental disorder and is not mentally
ill, the court must discharge him either unconditionally or subject to an order of conditions. See
id. When a defendant is in the commissioner’s custody pursuant to a retention order or
recommitment order, and the commissioner is of the view that the defendant no longer has a
dangerous mental disorder and is no longer mentally ill, the commissioner may apply for a release

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order; whenever a court issues a release order it must also issue an order of conditions. See CPL
330.20(12). At any time during the period covered by an order of conditions, either the
commissioner or the district attorney may bring a recommitment proceeding under CPL
330.20(14). If the defendant fails to appear at the recommitment proceeding, the court may issue
a warrant directing that he be taken into custody and brought before the court; the court must then

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conduct a hearing to determine whether the defendant has a dangerous mental disorder; and if the
court finds that he does, it must issue a recommitment order. See id. Thus, under the CPL 330.20
scheme, the State in its sovereign capacity – represented by either the commissioner or the district
attorney – is responsible to “prosecute” the proceedings before the court, and the court has the
power to issue orders affecting the insanity acquittee’s liberty, including commitment to the
custody of the commissioner for confinement in a secure facility operated by the commissioner,
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or release to the commissioner’s supervision. As such, a CPL 330.20 proceeding is akin to a
criminal prosecution in important respects.
In addition, a CPL 330.20 proceeding is an essential part of New York State’s criminal
statutory scheme. Where the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant
committed a crime but has not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he was criminally

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responsible when he did so, the State may not punish him. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S.
354, 369 (1983). Nevertheless, the fact that an insanity acquittee was found beyond a reasonable
doubt to have committed a criminal act “certainly indicates dangerousness,” id. at 364, and the
purpose of the CPL 330.20 process is to protect the public and the insanity acquittee from such
danger. See Escobar, 61 N.Y.2d at 440 (noting the “risk that a person suffering from a mental
disorder who had previously engaged in criminal behavior will be released from custody

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prematurely.”). “By securing a judgment of not responsible [by reason of mental disease or
defect], defendant avoids criminal penalties and, instead, becomes subject to the CPL 330.20
scheme.” Jamie R. v. Consilvio, 6 N.Y.3d 138, 141 n.2 (2006). Therefore, a CPL 330.20
proceeding is inseparable from the insanity acquittee’s criminal prosecution and springs from the
State’s efforts “to protect the very interests which underlie its criminal laws[.]” Huffman, 420

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U.S. at 606. Such a proceeding is clearly in aid of and closely related to New York’s criminal
statutes.
Accordingly, the Court finds that Justice’s recommitment proceeding under CPL
330.20(14) falls within the category of civil enforcement proceedings for which abstention is
mandatory. See Sprint, 134 S.Ct. at 588, 591. Therefore, the Court abstains under the Younger
doctrine from exercising jurisdiction over the claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against
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Woodlock and Belfi, and such claims are dismissed without prejudice. The Court has reviewed
Justice’s objections and finds that they lack merit. On de novo review, the Court accepts the
Report and Recommendation regarding all other issues and does not discuss them further.
It is therefore
ORDERED that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 37) is accepted in all respects,

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except for the Younger analysis, as discussed above; and it is further
ORDERED that the dismissal motion (Dkt. No. 21) by defendants Woodlock and Belfi is
granted in part and denied in part; and it is further
ORDERED that this Court abstains under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 36 (1971), and
Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S.Ct. 584, 591-92 (2013), from exercising jurisdiction over
plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendants Woodlock and Belfi;

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accordingly, all claims in the amended complaint (Dkt. No. 12) against defendant Woodlock, sued
only in her official capacity for declaratory and injunctive relief, are dismissed without prejudice;
and all claims in the amended complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief against defendant
Belfi in his official capacity are dismissed without prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that the claims in the amended complaint for Eighth Amendment cruel and

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unusual punishment and First Amendment retaliation against defendant Belfi in his individual
capacity are dismissed with prejudice; and it is further
ORDERED that the claims in the amended complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for money
damages against defendant Belfi in his individual capacity for Fourteenth Amendment due
process and equal protection violations are stayed pending the determination of the CPL §
330.20(14) recommitment application proceeding now pending in New York State Supreme
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Court; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to serve copies of this MemorandumDecision and Order in accordance with the Local Rules of the Northern District of New York.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Date: January 12, 2015
Syracuse, New York

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