Brandon v. Schroyer et al

Filing 162

DECISION AND ORDER: For the reasons discussed herein, the Court accepts and adopts Magistrate Judge Peebles's July 13, 2016 Report and Recommendation, Dkt. No. 136 . Accordingly, defendant Schroyer's second motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 100 ) is GRANTED, and plaintiff's remaining retaliation claim asserted against defendant Schroyer is DISMISSED. Signed by Senior Judge Thomas J. McAvoy on 3/21/17. (served on plaintiff by regular mail) (alh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________________
CHAMMA K. BRANDON,
Plaintiff,
-v-

9:13-cv-00939

DR. GLEN SCHROYER, et al.,
Defendants.
_________________________________________
THOMAS J. McAVOY,
Senior United States District Judge

DECISION & ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
This pro se action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was referred to the Hon.

David E. Peebles, Chief United States Magistrate Judge, for a Report and Recommendation
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(c).
In his July 13, 2016 Report and Recommendation, Dkt. No. 136, Magistrate Judge
Peebles recommends that defendant Schroyer's second motion for summary judgment
(Dkt. No. 100) be granted, and that plaintiff’s remaining retaliation claim asserted against
defendant Schroyer be dismissed. Plaintiff filed objections to the recommendation. Dkt.
No. 140.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When objections to a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation are lodged, the

district court makes a “de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified
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proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” See 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1); see also United States v. Male Juvenile, 121 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 1997) (The
Court must make a de novo determination to the extent that a party makes specific
objections to a magistrate’s findings.). “[E]ven a pro se party's objections to a Report and
Recommendation must be specific and clearly aimed at particular findings in the
magistrate's proposal, such that no party be allowed a second bite at the apple by simply
relitigating a prior argument.” Machicote v. Ercole, 2011 WL 3809920, at * 2 (S.D.N.Y.,
Aug. 25, 2011)(citations and interior quotation marks omitted); DiPilato v. 7-Eleven, Inc.,
662 F. Supp.2d 333, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)(same).
General or conclusory objections, or objections which merely recite the same
arguments presented to the magistrate judge, are reviewed for clear error. Farid v. Bouey,
554 F. Supp. 2d 301, 306 n. 2 (N.D.N.Y. 2008); see Frankel v. N.Y.C., 2009 WL 465645 at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 25, 2009). After reviewing the report and recommendation, the Court
may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made
by the magistrate judge. The judge may also receive further evidence or recommit the
matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
III.

DISCUSSION
The Court has considered plaintiff’s objections and completed a de novo review of

the those portions of Magistrate Judge Peebles’s Report and Recommendation to which
specific objections are made.
Plaintiff challenges Magistrate Judge Peebles’s conclusion that “none of the
grievances that are included in the record were ever addressed specifically to or against

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defendant Schroyer” and, therefore, the retaliation claim fails on the causation element.
Rep. Rec. p. 15. On this issue, Magistrate Judge Peebles stated:
Moreover, as I noted in my prior report and recommendation, aside from
plaintiff's sheer conjecture, there exists no evidence in the record from which a
reasonable factfinder could conclude that defendant Schroyer was aware of
the existence of plaintiff's grievances. See Dkt. No. 99 at 23. This fact alone is
sufficient to warrant dismissal of plaintiff's retaliation claim. See Perez v.
Keysor, No. 10-CV-0518, 2013 WL 5493932, at *15 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013)
(finding a "failure to prove [defendants'] knowledge of [plaintiff's] grievances . .
. even in light of temporal proximity, is fatal to [plaintiff's] claim").
Id.
Plaintiff contends that this conclusion is erroneous because he f iled a grievance on
September 15, 2012 in which he complained that he was being forced to eat “what I’m
medically prescribed not to eat by the medical staff at Clinton County jail. I have high blood
pressure amongst other medical conditions which according to the doctor my diet must be
altered. A food tray containing substances which I’m not supposed to eat due to its
cholesterol contents was not substituted for another snack though my file shows I’m on
various restrictive diets. ” Pl. Obj., p. 9 (quoting Dkt. No. 17, at p. 83). Plaintiff argues that
while defendant Schroyer was not specifically named in the grievance, an inference can be
drawn that defendant Schroyer would have become aware of this grievance because
plaintiff referenced that his restricted diet is “according to the doctor” and that defendant
Schroyer was the doctor who prescribed plaintiff’s low-cholesterol diet.
Plaintiff’s contention that an inference could be drawn that defendant Schroyer
learned of the grievance because it references a medically prescribed diet ordered by “the
doctor” is wholly speculative, and provides an insufficient basis to defeat summary
judgment. On summary judgment, a court must “construe the facts in the light most
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favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve all ambiguities and draw all reasonable
inferences against the movant.” Caronia v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 715 F.3d 417, 427 (2d
Cir. 2013) (citation and quotation marks omitted). Further, pro se litigants' submissions
“must be construed liberally and interpreted ‘to raise the strongest argument they suggest.’”
Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Pabon v.
Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006)). However, “a party may not rely on mere
speculation or conjecture as to the true nature of the facts to overcome a motion for
summary judgment.” Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 166 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal citations
omitted); see Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986)(The nonmoving party cannot defeat summary judgment by “simply show[ing] that
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”); Kulak v. City of N.Y., 88 F.3d
63, 71 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[C]onclusory statements, conjecture, or speculation by the party
resisting the motion will not defeat summary judgment.”); Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979,
982 (2d Cir. 1991)(A factual argument based on “conjecture or surmise” is insufficent to
defeat summary judgment.); see also Scott v. Harris, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1776 (2007)(W hile
the Court must view all admissible facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it
need do so “only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.” ).
The grievance upon which plaintiff bases his objection did not name defendant
Schroyer or allege that defendant Schroyer took any action resulting in plaintiff receiving
improper food items on September 15, 2012. Dkt. No. 17, at pp. 83-84. Rather, the
grievance is addressed to the conduct of the Clinton County Correctional Facility’s kitchen
staff. Id. p. 83. The Facility Staff Notes on the grievance indicate that facility staff attempted
to resolve the matter by sending plaintiff’s tray back to the kitchen and talking with the
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kitchen staff about the allegedly improper food items. Id. A member of the kitchen staff
purportedly stated that “everything on inmate Brandon’s tray coincided with inmate
Brandon’s diet,” thereby indicating kitchen staff’s awareness that plaintiff was on a restricted
diet. Id.
Furthermore, the Decision of the Grievance Coordinator indicates:
Kitchen has been informed as of 9/27/12 that you are low fat, low cholesterol,
no tomatoes or tomato products, no fish or shellfish. They did not have that
you were Muslim. You will get no pork or pork products.
Id. p. 84.
There is nothing in this grievance, or in the handling of the grievance, that indicates
there was any inquiry of defendant Schroyer regarding plaintiff’s diet.1 While the inference
can be drawn that the kitchen staff was unaware of plaintiff’s religious restriction on eating
pork, there is no basis to conclude that there was a reason to contact defendant Schroyer to
confirm that plaintiff is a Muslim. Simply stated, there is no basis to infer that anyone
contacted defendant Schroyer about the grievance or that defendant Schroyer was aware of
it, and plaintiff’s speculation to the contrary is insufficient. His objection on his ground is
overruled. Accordingly, for the reasons stated in the Report and Recom mendation, the
Court accepts and adopts Magistrate Judge Peebles’s conclusion that plaintiff has failed to
present sufficient evidence to satisfy the causation element of his retaliation claim. Rep.
Rec. pp. 12-16.
The Court also considers plaintiff’s objection to Magistrate Judge Peebles’s
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The Court notes that on September 24, 2012, plaintiff filed a grievance because he was served a
“BLT sandwich,” and the summary of facility staff’s attempts to resolve the matter indicates that someone
“called the nurse to see what the inmate couldn’t eat and she stated he is on a low-fat low-sodium diet and
that the inmate is allergic to tomatoes.” Dkt. No. 17, at p. 85. There is no indication, however, that defendant
Schroyer was contacted or aware of the facility staff’s attempt to confirm plaintiff’s dietary restrictions.

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conclusion that defendant Schroyer is entitled to summary judgment because he “has
established that he would have [discontinued the plaintiff's heart-healthy diet] for legitimate,
non-retaliatory reasons even absent any allegedly retaliatory motivation, and no reasonable
factfinder could conclude otherwise.” Rep. Rec. pp. 17-18 (citing, inter alia, Mt. Healthy City
Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Scott v. Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282,
287-88 (2d Cir. 2003)). Having completed a de novo review of the issue raised by plaintiff’s
objection, the Court accepts and adopts Magistrate Judge Peebles’s recommendation for
the reasons stated in his thorough report.
V.

CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court accepts and adopts Magistrate Judge

Peebles’s July 13, 2016 Report and Recommendation, Dkt. No. 136. Accordingly,
defendant Schroyer's second motion for summary judgment [Dkt. No. 100] is GRANTED,
and plaintiff’s remaining retaliation claim asserted against defendant Schroyer is
DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 21, 2017

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