Brandon v. Schroyer et al

Filing 275

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERED that Plaintiff is entitled to a punitive damages award in the amount of $3,000 against Defendant Kevin Laurin on his First Amendment free exercise claim. ORDERED that Plaintiff is entitled to a punitiv e damages award in the amount of $3,700 against Defendant Kevin Laurin and $3,700 against Defendant Suzanne Kinter on his First Amendment retaliation claim. ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Brenda K. Sannes on May 26, 2023. (nas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
CHAMMA K. BRANDON,
Plaintiff,

9:13-cv-00939 (BKS/ATB)

v.
SUZANNE KINTER and KEVIN LAURIN,
Defendants.
Appearances:
For Plaintiff:
William S. Nolan
Gabriella R. Levine
Jennifer M. Thomas
Whiteman Osterman & Hanna LLP
One Commerce Plaza
Albany, New York 12260
For Defendants:
April J. Laws
Johnson & Laws, LLC
646 Plank Road, Suite 205
Clifton Park, New York 12065
Hon. Brenda K. Sannes, Chief United States District Judge:
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action arose from Plaintiff Chamma K. Brandon’s 2012

incarceration at the Clinton County Jail (“CCJ”) where he repeatedly received pork meals despite
his requests for a no-pork, Muslim diet. (See generally Dkt. No. 17). Following a bench trial, the
Court found Plaintiff proved that: (1) Defendant Corrections Lieutenant Kevin Laurin’s failure to
provide Plaintiff with a no-pork Muslim diet violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First

Amendment; and (2) that Lt. Laurin and Defendant Registered Nurse and Healthcare
Coordinator Suzanne Kinter retaliated against Plaintiff for his protected First Amendment
speech, i.e., filing food-related grievances, by revoking his medical diet. (See generally Dkt. No.
255). The Court awarded Plaintiff $3,000 in compensatory damages on his First Amendment free
exercise claim and $7,400 in compensatory damages on his First Amendment retaliation claim
and found punitive damages were warranted on both claims. (Id. at 58–59). On April 18, 2023,
the Court held a video hearing on punitive damages at which Lieutenant Laurin and Nurse Kinter
testified. The parties filed letter briefs following the hearing. (Dkt. Nos. 268, 270). After
carefully considering the trial record, the credibility of the testimony, and the submissions of the
parties, the Court awards Plaintiff $3,000 in punitive damages on his free exercise claim against
Lt. Laurin and $7,400 ($3,700 as to each Defendant) in punitive damages on his retaliation
claim.
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Applicable Law

An award of punitive damages is reviewed “in accordance with BMW of North America,
Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1996).” Jennings v. Yurkiw, 18 F.4th 383, 390 (2d Cir. 2021). A
court must consider: “(1) degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s conduct, (2) relationship
of the punitive damages to the compensatory damages, and (3) criminal and civil penalties
imposed by the state’s law for the misconduct in question.” Id. (quoting Payne v. Jones, 711 F.3d
85, 101 (2d Cir. 2013)).
B.

Analysis
1.

Reprehensibility

“[R]eprehensibility is ‘perhaps the most important’ consideration in assessing the
reasonableness of an award of punitive damages.” Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575). To
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evaluate reprehensibility, courts look to “certain ‘aggravating factors’ that are ‘associated with
particularly reprehensible conduct’ and contribute to the sense that ‘some wrongs are more
blameworthy than others.’” Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 575–76). Courts should consider
whether:
the harm caused was physical as opposed to economic; the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the
health or safety of others; the target of the conduct had financial
vulnerability; the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident; and the harm was the result of intentional malice,
trickery, or deceit, or mere accident.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 419 (2003); see Jennings, 18 F.4th at
390 (identifying the “aggravating factors” as including “(1) whether a defendant’s conduct was
marked by violence or presented a threat of violence, (2) whether a defendant’s conduct evinced
trickery or deceit as opposed to mere negligence, and (3) whether the record supports a finding
of intentional malice” (citing Gore, 517 U.S. at 575–76)).
a.

Lt. Laurin – Free Exercise

The $3,000 punitive damages award is justified by the reprehensibility of Lt. Laurin’s
actions in violating Plaintiff’s First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion by
failing to ensure Plaintiff received a Muslim diet. After learning that Plaintiff had been filing
grievances for months requesting a Muslim, no-pork diet, Lt. Laurin went to Plaintiff, admitted it
was wrong that Plaintiff was receiving pork meals, and assured Plaintiff he would fix the issue.
(Trial Transcript (“T.”), at 91). Indeed, fixing the issue would have been a simple task: Lt.
Laurin had only to write Plaintiff’s name on a one-page “Special Diet Notification” slip, circle
“Religious,” write “Muslim no pork or pork products,” sign his name, and forward the slip to the
kitchen. And yet, inexplicably, Lt. Laurin allowed ten days to pass before providing the slip to
the kitchen. There is no evidence that this was a “mere accident”—in not notifying the kitchen

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sooner, Lt. Laurin acted in reckless disregard of Plaintiff’s physical well-being and religious
practice, forcing Plaintiff to choose between forgoing approximately six meals during that tenday period or committing the “high sin” of eating pork. (T. 38–39). Lt. Laurin’s conduct is made
all the more reprehensible by the fact that Plaintiff, as an inmate, was wholly dependent on CCJ
for his meals and thus physically vulnerable.
b.

Lt. Laurin and Nurse Kinter – Retaliation

In awarding Plaintiff $7,400 in punitive damages on his First Amendment retaliation
claim, the Court has considered the particularly reprehensible conduct by Lt. Laurin and Nurse
Kinter in revoking Plaintiff’s medical diet. To begin, Lt. Laurin’s participation in the retaliatory
removal of Plaintiff’s medical diet was not a one-time act. After procuring the removal of
Plaintiff’s medical diet—by informing Nurse Kinter that Plaintiff was buying commissary items
that were inconsistent with his medical diet—Lt. Laurin denied approximately eighteen
grievances in which Plaintiff complained that he was receiving meals with items that would
either cause him severe acid reflux or be harmful to his cardiovascular health. (Pl.’s Exs. 22, 39–
40, 43–55, 57–59; T. 336). Nor was Nurse Kinter’s retaliation a one-time act. Following the
removal of the medical diet, Plaintiff submitted a Sick Call Request complaining that tomatoes
caused him “extreme acid reflux.” (Pl.’s Ex. 42). Rather than reinstating Plaintiff’s medical diet,
Nurse Kinter essentially informed Plaintiff that the removal of the medical diet was his own
fault. (Id. (“This was discussed at visit with M.D. You decided not to follow doctor’s
recommendations!”)). Further, as the Court previously found, Lt. Laurin and Nurse Kinter’s
removal of Plaintiff’s medical diet was a “particularly vicious action given that they were well
aware how concerned Plaintiff was about his health and diet.” (Dkt. No. 255, at 58). And like the
deprivation of proper religious meals, the revocation of Plaintiff’s medical diet impacted
Plaintiff’s physical well-being as it resulted in Plaintiff regularly receiving, over a thirty-seven4

day period, food items that presented him with the choice of eating, knowing the item would
cause severe acid reflux or possibly harm his health, or not eating, knowing there would be no
replacement. This conduct was made all the more reprehensible by the fact that Defendants
revoked Plaintiff’s medical diet knowing that he had been deprived of religiously compliant
meals for months and had only recently begun receiving a proper religious diet. 1
2.

Ratio of Actual Harm to Punitive Award

Courts must also examine the ratio of actual harm to the punitive award and “ask
‘whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the harm
likely to result from the defendant’s conduct as well as the harm that actually has occurred.’”
Jennings, 18 F.4th at 391 (quoting DiSorbo v. Hoy, 343 F.3d 172, 187 (2d Cir. 2003)). The
Second Circuit has explained that “[w]hile labeled a ratio, the reasonableness determination
‘does not entail a simple mathematical formula, as there may be cases where a particularly
egregious act has resulted in only a small amount of economic damages.’” Id. (quoting DiSorbo,
343 F.3d at 187). Similarly, “[e]ven where compensatory damages are substantial, punitive
damages awards that are a multiple higher may be warranted because of the deterrent function of
punitive damages.” Id. at 392. However, “an award should not be so high as to result in the
financial ruin of the defendant.” Vasbinder v. Scott, 976 F.2d 118, 121 (2d Cir. 1992). “Nor
should it constitute a disproportionately large percentage of a defendant’s net worth.” Id.
Here, the 1:1 ratio between actual harm and the punitive damages reflects consideration
of the reprehensible nature of Defendants’ conduct and the fact that the compensatory damage
award, while not substantial, was not insignificant. It also reflects the Court’s consideration of

1
Even if Nurse Kinter did not know when Plaintiff had received the religious diet, she was at least aware he was
having difficulty obtaining it. (Pl.’s Ex. 13).

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the Defendants’ financial conditions as testified to at the hearing. Finally, the award is intended
to serve a deterrent function to jail supervisors and medical staff.
3.

Comparison to Civil and Criminal Penalties

Courts next “compare the punitive damages to ‘civil or criminal penalties that could be
imposed for comparable misconduct.’” Jennings, 18 F.4th at 392 (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at
583). Here, neither party has identified, nor is the Court aware of, comparable civil or criminal
penalties.
4.

Punitive Damages Awards in Similar Cases

Finally, courts must review similar cases to “confirm[] that the verdict was within the
range where similar punitive damages awards were determined to be reasonable.” Id. at 393. The
1:1 ratio and award of punitive damages in the amount of $3,000 on the free exercise claim and
$7,400 on the retaliation claim is well within the range of other punitive damages awards
determined to be reasonable. In Arroyo Lopez v. Nuttall, 25 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410 (S.D.N.Y.
1998), following a bench trial, the court awarded the plaintiff prisoner punitive damages in the
amount of $5,000 for the defendant correction officer’s violation of the plaintiff’s First
Amendment right to the free exercise of religion by shoving the plaintiff, disrupting his prayer.
See id. (awarding $5,000 in punitive damages and $2,000 in compensatory damages); see also
Nolley v. Cnty. of Erie, 802 F. Supp. 898, 911 (W.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding “appropriate” an award
of $20,000 in punitive damages to inmate subjected “to near-constant emotional and
psychological trauma,” who was “deprived of access to the law library,” and who “was
prevented from attending church services”); Lowrance v. Coughlin, 862 F. Supp. 1090, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1994) (awarding $132,000 in compensatory damages and “punitive damages in the
sum of $25,000 as against Commissioner Coughlin, as well as present and former [prison]
Superintendents . . . jointly and severally for, inter alia, retaliating against the plaintiff for
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“exercising constitutionally protected rights” by subjecting the plaintiff to a cell search, transfers,
and deprivation of medical care); Brown v. Simmons, No. 89-cv-150, 1994 WL 144252, at *1,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5069, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1994) (noting that jury awarded the
plaintiff $1.00 in nominal damages against prison commander and supervisor for depriving the
incarcerated plaintiff of his First Amendment right to access the mails and $2,500 in punitive
damages against defendant commander and $1,250 in punitive damages against defendant
supervisor); see also Mackey v. Watson, No. 17-cv-01341, 2020 WL 4734339, at *1, 2020 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 146728, at *3 (D. Colo. Aug. 14, 2020) (refusing to remit jury award of $60,000 in
punitive damages and $1.00 in nominal damages to plaintiff whose prescription eyeglasses were
confiscated, against whom false incident report was issued in retaliation for complaining about
cell search).
III.

CONCLUSION
For these reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiff is entitled to a punitive damages award in the amount of $3,000

against Defendant Kevin Laurin on his First Amendment free exercise claim; and it is further
ORDERED that Plaintiff is entitled to a punitive damages award in the amount of $3,700
against Defendant Kevin Laurin and $3,700 against Defendant Suzanne Kinter on his First
Amendment retaliation claim; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 26, 2023
Syracuse, New York

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