Brooks v. Spitzer et al

Filing 50

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Andrew T. Baxter's December 3, 2014 Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 45 ) is ADOPTED to the extent that it recommended granting defendants' motion to dismiss and dismissal of Br ooks' due process claims, but REJECTED to the extent that it recommended dismissal of Brooks' complaint in its entirety. ORDERED that defendants' motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 21 ) is GRANTED. ORDERED that Brooks' only rem aining claim is a First Amendment access to the courts claim. ORDERED that defendants have fourteen (14) days from the date of this Memorandum-Decision and Order to interpose an answer or otherwise file a responsive pleading with respect to Brooks' remaining claim. Signed by Chief Judge Gary L. Sharpe on 3/24/15. {order served via regular mail on plaitniff}(nas, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
________________________________
CHARLES BROOKS,
Plaintiff,

9:13-cv-1483
(GLS/ATB)

v.
ELIOT SPITZER et al.,
Defendants.
________________________________
APPEARANCES:
OF COUNSEL:
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Charles Brooks
Pro Se
C262223
CNY PC
P.O. Box 300
Marcy, NY 13403
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
New York State Attorney General
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224

BRUCE J. BOIVIN
Assistant Attorney General

Gary L. Sharpe
Chief Judge

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
I. Introduction
Plaintiff pro se Charles Brooks commenced this action against

defendants Eliot Spitzer, Andrew M. Cuomo, Michael Hogan, Steve
Robinowitz, Richard P. Miraglia, Samuel J. Langer, and Jeffrey Jackson,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was denied due process in
conjunction with his involuntary commitment to the Central New York
Psychiatric Center (CNYPC) as a sex offender requiring civil management.
(See generally Compl., Dkt. No. 1.)
On April 18, 2014, defendants filed a pre-answer motion to dismiss.
(Dkt. No. 21.) Brooks filed a response, (Dkt. No. 32), supplemental
responses, (Dkt. No. 35, 38), and, after defendants filed their reply, a
surreply, (Dkt. No. 41). In a Report-Recommendation (R&R) issued on
December 3, 2014, Magistrate Judge Andrew T. Baxter recommended that
defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted and Brooks’ complaint be
dismissed. (Dkt. No. 45.) Pending are Brooks’ objections to the R&R.
(Dkt. No. 49.) For the reasons that follow, the R&R is adopted in part and
rejected in part.
II. Background1

1

The court incorporates Judge Baxter’s thorough recitation of the salient facts giving
rise to Brooks’ complaint, along with his discussion of the relevant state and federal case law
upon which Brooks bases his due process claims. (Dkt. No. 45 at 3-15.) Nevertheless, the
court also provides a brief overview of the facts and case law here for context. The facts
mentioned are drawn from Brooks’ complaint and presented in the light most favorable to him.

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In 2000, pursuant to a plea agreement, Brooks was convicted of one
count of sexual abuse in the first degree, one count of sexual abuse in the
second degree, and two counts of burglary in the second degree. (Compl.
¶ 17.) He was sentenced to eight years in prison, and was transferred to
the custody of the Department of Correctional Services, now known as the
Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (DOCCS). (Id.)
Before he reached his maximum release date—October 11,
2005—proceedings were initiated under § 9.27 of the New York Mental
Hygiene Law (MHL), which resulted in an order placing Brooks in the
custody of the Manhattan Psychiatric Center (MPC). 2 (Id.)
Over the next several years, a series of state and federal decisions,
along with legislative action, continuously changed the procedures for
instituting and maintaining involuntary civil confinement for recidivist sex
offenders. Each time the legal tide changed, Brooks was swept up in it.
First, in State of N.Y. ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 7 N.Y.3d 607, 614 (2006)
(Harkavy I), the New York Court of Appeals concluded that, for individuals
who were still incarcerated, such as Brooks, Corrections Law § 402, not
Article 9, governed the procedures for initiating civil confinement. The

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Brooks was later transferred to CNYPC. (Compl. ¶ 17.)

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court specifically noted, however, that it was “not propos[ing] that these
petitioners be released,” but, instead, ordered “that those petitioners
remaining in [Office of Mental Health (OMH)] custody be afforded an
immediate retention hearing pursuant to article 9 of the Mental Hygiene
Law—now controlling—since they are no longer serving a prison
sentence.” Harkavy I, 7 N.Y.3d at 614. Consistent with this order, Brooks
was afforded a retention hearing under Article 9, and the state court
concluded that Brooks should continue to be retained. See Brooks v.
Sawyer, No. 9:11-CV-248 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2003), Dkt. No. 55 at 3.
Next, in April 2007, New York’s Sex Offender Management and
Treatment Act (SOMTA), codified in Article 10 of the New York Mental
Hygiene Law, took effect. Thereafter, the New York Court of Appeals
issued another decision, State of N.Y. ex rel. Harkavy v. Consilvio, 8
N.Y.3d 645 (2007) (Harkavy II), which held that individuals such as Brooks,
who had been committed from correctional facilities to psychiatric hospitals
under Article 9, were to be afforded a hearing in compliance with the new
Article 10. See Harkavy II, 8 N.Y.3d at 652-53. Accordingly, the state then
commenced Article 10 proceedings for Brooks. (See generally Compl. at
14-16.)
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After SOMTA took effect, the Mental Hygiene Legal Service (MHLS)
filed a facial challenge to certain provisions in federal court, only one of
which is relevant here—§ 10.06(k), which mandates involuntary civil
detention, pending a commitment trial, based upon a finding at a probable
cause hearing that the individual may have a mental abnormality, without a
finding of current dangerousness. See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v.
Spitzer, No. 07 Civ. 2935, 2007 WL 4115936, at *15 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16,
2007) (MHLS I), aff’d sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Paterson,
No. 07-5548-cv, 2009 WL 579445 (2d Cir. Mar. 4, 2009). In MHLS I, the
court granted a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the enforcement of
§ 10.06(k), not in toto, but “absent a specific, individualized finding of
probable cause to believe that a person is sufficiently dangerous to require
confinement, and that lesser conditions of supervision will not suffice to
protect the public during pendency of the proceedings.” Id. A permanent
injunction to the same effect was issued in Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v.
Cuomo, 785 F. Supp. 2d 205 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (MHLS II).3

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Although the Second Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction, it later reversed the
court order granting a permanent injunction and remanded the case to the district court to
determine whether MHLS had standing to pursue the action on behalf of its clients. See
Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Schneiderman, 472 F. App’x 45 (2d Cir. 2012). On remand,
the district court concluded that MHLS did not have standing and dismissed the action. See
Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Cuomo, No. 07 Civ. 2935, 2014 WL 1345891, at *11 (S.D.N.Y.

5

In his R&R, Judge Baxter thoroughly outlined Brooks’ Article 10
process. (Dkt. No. 45 at 10-15.) Although there is no need to rehash that
history here, the court highlights that, after a probable cause hearing, New
York Supreme Court Justice Joseph Dawson issued an eleven-page
decision concluding that Brooks “lacked, and continues to lack, the ability
to control himself,” and committed Brooks to a secure treatment facility
pending a final trial, based on his finding that “there [was] probable cause
to believe that [Brooks] is a sex offender requiring civil management and
that he is sufficiently dangerous to require confinement because there are
no lesser conditions of supervision that will suffice to protect the public
during the pendency of the proceedings.” (Dkt. No. 21, Attach. 1 at 36-46.)
After a jury trial, dispositional hearing, and an appeals process,
Brooks remains confined at CNYPC. (Id. at 48-57, 59-60, 62-63, 65-67,
69-71, 73; see Compl.) The thrust of his complaint in this lawsuit is that he
was improperly held beyond his maximum release date because: (1) after
Harkavy I, the state lost jurisdiction over him, which mandated his
immediate release; and (2) defendants improperly utilized § 10.06(k) in
violation of both due process and the injunctions issued in MHLS I and

Mar. 31, 2014).

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MHLS II. (See generally Compl.)
III. Standard of Review
Before entering final judgment, this court reviews report and
recommendation orders in cases it has referred to a magistrate judge. If a
party properly objects to a specific element of the magistrate judge’s
findings and recommendations, this court reviews those findings and
recommendations de novo. See Almonte v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, No.
Civ. 904CV484GLS, 2006 WL 149049, at *3, *5 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 18, 2006).
In those cases where no party has filed an objection, only vague or general
objections are made, or a party resubmits the same papers and arguments
already considered by the magistrate judge, this court reviews the findings
and recommendations of the magistrate judge for clear error. See id. at *45.
IV. Discussion
In his R&R, Judge Baxter first recommended dismissal of Brooks’
due process claims based on the doctrine espoused in Heck v. Humphrey,
512 U.S. 477 (1994), reasoning that, “[i]f the court were to decide . . . that
the state lost jurisdiction over him after Harkavy I, in addition to reversing . .
. the state court’s judgments in Harkavy I and Harkavy II, this court would
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necessarily invalidate [Brooks]’s continued confinement.” (Dkt. No. 45 at
19-20.) Next, and alternatively, Judge Baxter recommended dismissal of
(1) Cuomo, the former Attorney General, based on absolute prosecutorial
immunity; (2) Jackson, a former Assistant Attorney General, also based on
absolute prosecutorial immunity; (3) Langer, the Chief of Psychiatry at
MPC who conducted Brooks’ mental evaluation and testified at his
probable cause hearing, based on his absolute immunity as a witness; (4)
Spitzer, the former Governor of New York, based on absolute legislative
immunity; (5) Robinowitz, the Executive Director of MPC, for lack of
personal involvement; (6) Miraglia, the former Associate Commissioner of
OMH, for lack of personal involvement; and (7) Hogan, the former
Commissioner of OMH, for lack of personal involvement. (Id. at 20-27.)
Finally, Judge Baxter also recommended dismissal of Brooks’ due process
claims on their merits. (Id. at 27-31.)
Here, Brooks raises several—often incomprehensible—objections to
the R&R. First, as far as the court can discern, Brooks objects to the R&R
to the extent that it recommended dismissal of his complaint without
considering his First Amendment access to the courts claim. (Dkt. No. 49
at 1-3.) The court construes this as a specific objection, which triggers de
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novo review. See Almonte, 2006 WL 149049, at *3, *5. In his objections,
even though he acknowledges that, “nowhere within his complaint” did he
specifically “utiliz[e] the words ‘access to the courts,’” Brooks argues that
the facts alleged on pages seven, nine, and ten of his complaint can
plausibly be read to give rise to an access to the courts claim. (Dkt. No. 49
at 1-3, 10.) After reviewing Brooks’ complaint, the court, regrettably,
agrees that there are glimmers, albeit faint, of an access to the courts
claim, such that dismissal of Brooks’ entire complaint is premature at this
juncture. Accordingly, the R&R is rejected to the extent that it
recommended dismissal of Brooks’ complaint in its entirety. Defendants
may file an appropriate responsive pleading to this cause of action within
fourteen (14) days of this Memorandum-Decision and Order.
Brooks next spends several pages—far beyond the page
limit—making a variety of general objections, which the court reviews only
for clear error. First, Brooks objects to the R&R because Judge Baxter
failed to consider that the trial judge at his probable cause hearing relied
upon an “unauthorized psychiatric evaluation.” (Id. 49 at 3-10.) Simply
because Judge Baxter did not use the words “unauthorized psychiatric
evaluation,” however, does not mean that he did not consider this issue.
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To the contrary, Judge Baxter discussed at length the evaluations that
Brooks underwent, and concluded that Brooks “received all the process
that he was due.” (Dkt. No. 45 at 10-13, 29-31.)
Second, Brooks objects to the R&R’s analysis of the New York Court
of Appeals’ decisions in Harkavy I and Harkavy II, and, seemingly, although
not at all clearly, argues that those two decisions compelled his immediate
release from civil confinement because the state “forfeited ‘jurisdiction’”
over him. (Dkt. No. 49 at 10-14, 26-30.) However, Brooks already made
these arguments in his response to defendants’ motion to dismiss. (Dkt.
No. 32 at 17-19.) In turn, Judge Baxter thoroughly reviewed the relevant
state and federal case law, considered Brooks’ contentions, and rejected
them. (Dkt. No. 45 at 3-10, 28-31.)
Third, Brooks essentially objects to one sentence of the R&R, which
simply states that “[d]efendants . . . argue that [Brooks] . . . received due
process, and that he is properly confined under the MHL,” (Dkt. No. 45 at
9), and then proceeds to re-argue the merits of his claims. (Dkt. No. 49 at
15-25.) Aside from objecting to defendants’ argument, Brooks otherwise
does not take umbrage with any specific portion of the R&R. Fourth,
Brooks objects to the R&R to the extent that it recommended dismissal of
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his complaint on the ground that the dismissal of his previous habeas
corpus petition had res judicata effect. (Dkt. No. 49 at 31.) In his R&R,
however, Judge Baxter noted that Brooks’ habeas petition was dismissed
on procedural grounds—failure to exhaust—and, therefore, would probably
not be considered a decision on the merits for res judicata or collateral
estoppel purposes. (Dkt. No. 45 at 15-19.) Judge Baxter specifically
stated that, in any event, res judicata was of no moment because “there is
an alternative basis” to dismiss the complaint, (id. at 19), and, thus, did not
recommend dismissal of Brooks’ complaint on res judicata grounds,
rendering Brooks’ objection meaningless.
Finally, Brooks objects to the portion of the R&R that recommended
dismissal of Miraglia, Hogan, Langer, Robinowitz, Cuomo, and Jackson
based on their lack of personal involvement. (Dkt. No. 49 at 32-37.) As an
initial matter, Brooks is, in part, incorrect, as Judge Baxter’s
recommendation to dismiss Langer, Cuomo, and Jackson was not based
on lack of personal involvement; instead, Judge Baxter’s recommendation
to dismiss these defendants was based on their absolute immunity. (Dkt.
No. 45 at 23-25 (noting, with respect to Jackson and Cuomo, that
“regardless of any personal involvement, these two defendants are
11

protected by absolute immunity, and any claim for damages must be
dismissed as against both . . . defendants”).) Further, assuming, without
deciding, that the additional facts set forth in Brooks’ objections are enough
to establish Miraglia, Hogan, and Robinowitz’s personal involvement,
dismissal of Brooks’ due process claims is still proper because, as Judge
Baxter properly found, these claims fail on the merits.
Thus, the court has reviewed Brooks’ general objections, along with
the remainder of the R&R, for clear error, and found none. Accordingly, the
R&R is adopted to the extent that it recommended dismissal of Brooks’ due
process claims, but, as noted above, rejected to the extent that it
recommended dismissal of Brooks’ complaint in its entirety, without
considering Brooks’ First Amendment access to the courts claim.
Regarding this remaining First Amendment claim, the court has only
determined that it has substance, not necessarily merit.
V. Conclusion
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that Magistrate Judge Andrew T. Baxter’s December 3,
2014 Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 45) is ADOPTED to the extent
that it recommended granting defendants’ motion to dismiss and dismissal
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of Brooks’ due process claims, but REJECTED to the extent that it
recommended dismissal of Brooks’ complaint in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants’ motion to dismiss (Dkt. No. 21) is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that Brooks’ only remaining claim is a First Amendment
access to the courts claim; and it is further
ORDERED that defendants have fourteen (14) days from the date of
this Memorandum-Decision and Order to interpose an answer or otherwise
file a responsive pleading with respect to Brooks’ remaining claim; and it is
further
ORDERED that the Clerk provide a copy of this MemorandumDecision and Order to the parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
March 24, 2015
Albany, New York

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