Johnson v. Gonzalez et al

Filing 25

DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERED, that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 23 ) is APPROVED and ADOPTED in its entirety. ORDERED, that Defendants' Motion (Dkt. No. 11 ) for judgment on the pleadings is GRANTED. ORDERED, that Judgment be entered in favor of Defendants on all claims. ORDERED, that Plaintiff's Motion (Dkt. No. 19) to compel is DENIED as moot. Signed by Senior Judge Lawrence E. Kahn on 3/13/15.{order served via regular mail on plaintiff} (nas)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOHNATHAN JOHNSON,
Plaintiff,
-against-

9:14-CV-0745 (LEK/CFH)

WILLIAM GONZALEZ, et al.,
Defendants.

DECISION and ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
This civil rights action comes before the Court following a Report-Recommendation filed on

February 20, 2015, by United States Magistrate Judge Christian F. Hummel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b) and Local Rule 72.3(d). Dkt. No. 23 (“Report-Recommendation”). Pro se Plaintiff
Johnathan Johnson (“Plaintiff”) timely filed Objections. Dkt. No. 24 (“Objections”). For the
following reasons, the Report-Recommendation is adopted in its entirety.
II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When a party makes a timely objection to a Report-Recommendation, it is the duty of the

Court to “make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed
findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Where, however,
an objecting “party makes only conclusory or general objections, or simply reiterates his original
arguments, the Court reviews the Report and Recommendation only for clear error.” Farid v.
Bouey, 554 F. Supp. 2d 301, 307 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (quoting McAllan v. Von Essen, 517 F. Supp. 2d
672, 679 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)) (citations omitted); see also Brown v. Peters, No. 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL
599355, at *2-3 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997). “A [district] judge . . . may accept, reject, or modify, in

whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b).
III.

DISCUSSION
Plaintiff first argues that Defendants’ Motion for judgment on the pleadings was improperly

filed, and thus Judge Hummel erred in considering the merits of the Motion. Objs. ¶¶ 9-12; see also
Dkt. No. 11. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that Defendants waived their “defense of Rule 12(c)” by
failing to include such request for relief in their Answer. Objs. ¶¶ 9-12. However, Plaintiff is
misguided. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) explicitly provides that “after the pleadings are
closed . . . a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(c) (emphasis
added). Rule 12(c) does not require a defendant to move for judgment on the pleadings in her
answer. See id. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s first objection is without merit.
Plaintiff next objects to Judge Hummel’s finding that Plaintiff has failed to state a
cognizable claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Defendants’ refusal to file Plaintiff’s grievances and
appeals. Objs. ¶¶ 13-20. In support, Plaintiff cites numerous cases where inmates brought First
Amendment claims related to issues with the Inmate Grievance Program (“IGP”). See id. However,
the cases on which Plaintiff relies all involve First Amendment retaliation claims. See Gayle v.
Gonyea, 313 F.3d 677 (2d Cir. 2002); Graham v. Henderson, 89 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1996); Scott v.
Coughlin, 344 F.3d 282 (2d Cir. 2003); Morales v. Mackalm, 278 F.3d 126 (2d Cir. 2002). Here,
Plaintiff is alleging an entirely different cause of action—denial of access to the courts. Therefore,
these cases cited in support of Plaintiff’s argument are irrelevant.
In further support, Plaintiff cites Govan v. Campbell, 289 F. Supp. 2d 289, 297 (N.D.N.Y.
2003), in which the Court held that “[p]risoners retain the constitutional right to petition the

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government for the redress of grievances.” (citing Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 137 (2003)).
However, a careful reading of Overton reveals that the Supreme Court was referring to “grievances”
only in a broad sense; the Court was not referring to the Inmate “Grievance” Program. Id. at 137.
Moreover, it is well-settled in the Second Circuit that allegations that prison officials failed to
comply with the IGP do not state a viable claim under § 1983. See Alvarado v. Westchester Cnty.,
22 F. Supp. 3d 208, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Notwithstanding the First Amendment’s guarantee of
the right to petition the government for redress, ‘inmate grievance programs created by state law are
not required by the Constitution, and consequently allegations that prison officials violated those
procedures [do] not give rise to a cognizable [Section] 1983 claim.’” (quoting Shell v. Brzezniak,
365 F. Supp. 2d 362, 369-70 (W.D.N.Y. 2005)); see also Mimms v. Carr, No. 09-CV-5740, 2011
WL 2360059, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. June 9, 2011) (“The First Amendment is not implicated . . . where
prison officials deny an inmate access to grievance procedures.”). Accordingly, Plaintiff’s second
objection is also without merit.
Plaintiff’s third objection is that Judge Hummel erroneously combined Plaintiff’s allegations
concerning filing of his grievances with his separate allegations concerning denial of access to
evidence. Objs. ¶¶ 21-26. However, a careful reading of the Report-Recommendation reveals that
Judge Hummel did not conflate Plaintiff’s allegations. Rather, Judge Hummel considered each
allegation as a separate claim of denial of access to the courts. See Report-Rec. at 7-8. Thus,
Plaintiff’s third objection is also without merit.
Finally, Plaintiff argues that his Complaint should not be dismissed because, even if his
§ 1983 claims are dismissed, he has also alleged violations of the New York Constitution. Objs.
¶¶ 27-36. Plaintiff’s argument must be rejected for two reasons. First, even liberally construed,

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Plaintiff has not asserted any claims under the New York Constitution in his Complaint. See
generally Dkt. No. 4 (“Complaint”). Second, even if Plaintiff’s claims were construed to allege
violations of the New York Constitution, it would not be proper for the Court to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction in light of dismissal of all of Plaintiff’s federal claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c)(3). Therefore, dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint is warranted.
IV.

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, it is hereby:
ORDERED, that the Report-Recommendation (Dkt. No. 23) is APPROVED and

ADOPTED in its entirety; and it is further
ORDERED, that Defendants’ Motion (Dkt. No. 11) for judgment on the pleadings is
GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED, that Judgment be entered in favor of Defendants on all claims; and it is further
ORDERED, that Plaintiff’s Motion (Dkt. No. 19) to compel is DENIED as moot; and it is
further
ORDERED, that the Clerk of the Court serve a copy of this Decision and Order on the
parties in accordance with the Local Rules.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED:

March 13, 2015
Albany, NY

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