LaPierre v. LaValley et al

Filing 31

DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Dkt. No. 28 is DENIED. Signed by U.S. District Judge Mae A. D'Agostino on 8/23/16. (served on plaintiff by regular mail) (alh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

MARK A. LAPIERRE,
Plaintiff,
v.

9:15-CV-1499
(MAD/DJS)

E. LAVALLEY, et al.,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:

OF COUNSEL:

MARK A. LAPIERRE
15-A-1283
Plaintiff, pro se
Bare Hill Correctional Facility
Caller Box 20
Malone, NY 12953
HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN
New York State Attorney General
Attorney for Defendants
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224

RYAN W. HICKEY, ESQ.
Ass't Attorney General

MAE A. D'AGOSTINO
United States District Judge
DECISION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Mark A. LaPierre commenced this action by filing a pro se civil rights complaint
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 asserting allegations of wrongdoing that occurred, if at all, while
plaintiff was incarcerated at Clinton Correctional Facility ("Clinton C.F."). Dkt. No. 1
("Compl."). Plaintiff also requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No. 2 ("IFP
Application"). By Decision and Order filed on February 2, 2016, plaintiff's IFP Application
was granted, and after screening the complaint in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)

and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, this Court dismissed several claims and defendants from this action,
and found that the following claims survived sua sponte review and required a response: (1)
the Eighth Amendment excessive force claims against defendants Guynup and Delisle; (2)
the Eighth Amendment failure-to-intervene claim against defendant La Valley; and (3) the
Eighth Amendment medical indifference claims against defendants LaValley and Vadlamudi.
Dkt. No. 6 (the "February 2016 Order"). Presently before the Court is plaintiff's motion
requesting preliminary injunctive relief. Dkt. No. 28. Defendants oppose the motion. Dkt.
No. 30.
"In general, district courts may grant a preliminary injunction where a plaintiff
demonstrates 'irreparable harm' and meets one of two related standards: 'either (a) a
likelihood of success on the merits, or (b) sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of
its claims to make them fair ground for litigation, plus a balance of the hardships tipping
decidedly in favor of the moving party.'" Otoe-Missouria Tribe of Indians v. New York State
Dep't of Fin. Servs., 769 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting Lynch v. City of N.Y., 589
F.3d 94, 98 (2d Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). However, when the moving
party seeks a "mandatory injunction that alters the status quo by commanding a positive act,"
the burden is even higher. Cacchillo v. Insmed, Inc., 638 F.3d 401, 406 (2d Cir. 2011) (citing
Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35
n.4 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted)). A mandatory preliminary injunction
"should issue only upon a clear showing that the moving party is entitled to the relief
requested, or where extreme or very serious damage will result from a denial of preliminary
relief." Cacchillo, 638 F.3d at 406 (citing Citigroup Global Mkts., 598 F.3d at 35 n.4) (internal
quotation marks omitted)); see also Tom Doherty Assocs., Inc. v. Saban Entertainment, Inc.,
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60 F.3d 27, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1995) (a plaintiff seeking a mandatory injunction must make a
"clear" or "substantial" showing of a likelihood of success on the merits of his claim). The
same standards used to review a request for a preliminary injunction govern consideration of
an application for a temporary restraining order. Local 1814, Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n,
AFL-CIO v. New York Shipping Ass'n, Inc., 965 F.2d 1224, 1228 (2d Cir. 1992); Perri v.
Bloomberg, No. 06-CV-0403, 2008 WL 2944642, at * 2 (E.D.N.Y. Jul. 31, 2008). The district
court has wide discretion in determining whether to grant preliminary injunctive relief. Moore
v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 409 F.3d 506, 511 (2d Cir. 2005). "In the prison
context, a request for injunctive relief must always be viewed with great caution so as not to
immerse the federal judiciary in the management of state prisons." Fisher v. Goord, 981 F.
Supp. 140, 167 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 846-47 (1994))
(other citations omitted).1
Plaintiff alleges that he "has recently been approved for an unwanted transfer to a
facility in the Clinton Hub area." Dkt. No. 28 at 5. Plaintiff fears that he "is in genuine fear for
his life and safety" if he is transferred to the Clinton Hub because this action is brought
against staff at Clinton C.F., which is located in that Hub.2 Id. at 5. Plaintiff alleges that "[t]he
correctional officers from the Clinton County Area are from very small-knit communities such
as Malone and Plattsburgh, New York. In many cases, they are related, oftentimes with

1

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, preliminary injunctive relief in any civil action with respect to
prison conditions must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm, and be the least
intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2). In considering an application for
prospective relief, the court is required to give substantial weight to any adverse impact such relief may have on
public safety or on the operation of the criminal justice system. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
2

See http://www.doccs.ny.gov/facilitymapcolor.pdf (indicating that the following facilities are located in
the Clinton Hub: Clinton Correctional Facility, Upstate Correctional Facility, Bare Hill Correctional Facility,
Franklin Correctional Facility, Chateaugay Correctional Facility, Adirondack Correctional Facility, and Altona
Correctional Facility).

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members from whole families working in the few facilities which are located in the Clinton
Hub. As such, the Plaintiff's eventual transfer . . . put[s] him at great risk and significantly
raises the possibility of further retaliation." Id. at 6. In support of his request, plaintiff
attaches a letter detailing an incident that occurred at Coxsackie Correctional Facility on July
20, 2016. Dkt. No. 28 at 10-12. Plaintiff claims that he was called into a Sergeant's office,
connected to the correctional officers' day room, to review the case file from the New York
State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision Office of Special Investigations
("OSI") that he had requested through discovery for this action. Id. Plaintiff alleges that he
felt threatened and intimidated by staff at that facility and the two OSI agents. Id. Plaintiff
seeks a court order "in the form of a general statement stating that retaliation of any kind by
any Corrections Officer against this Plaintiff will not be tolerated and may result in both Civil
and Criminal penalties."3 Dkt. No. 28 at 8.
In opposition to the motion, defendants urge its denial, asserting that (1) plaintiff does
not satisfy the standards for obtaining preliminary injunctive relief; (2) the claims in the
motions are not sufficiently related to the allegations in the underlying complaint; (3) plaintiff's
request amounts to an "obey the law" injunction, which is disfavored by the courts; and (4)
plaintiff may not obtain preliminary injunctive relief against non-parties. Dkt. No. 30 at 1-2.
Upon review, plaintiff has not demonstrated that he is likely to suffer imminent
irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted. While mistreatment of any kind is not
condoned, plaintiff's allegations are generally conclusory in nature and do not plausibly

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Plaintiff indicates that he wishes to serve that order when he serves his interrogatories. Dkt. No. 28 at
8. Plaintiff also mentions some issues relating to discovery, but does not seek relief regarding discovery in this
motion for preliminary injunctive relief. Plaintiff should raise any issues he may have with discovery in a properly
filed motion to compel discovery after he has made efforts to resolve any discovery disputes with opposing
counsel.

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suggest that plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm if the requested relief is not granted.
Plaintiff's fear that staff at correctional facilities in the Clinton Hub might physically harm or
otherwise mistreat him is purely speculative and, therefore, patently insufficient to make the
showing required for the issuance of preliminary injunctive relief. See e.g., Slacks v. Gray,
No. 9:07-CV-0501(NAM/GJD), 2008 WL 2522075, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. June 25, 2008)
(allegations of future injury without more do not establish a real threat of injury).
In addition, plaintiff has also failed to demonstrate a likelihood of succeeding on the
merits of his claims or the existence of sufficiently serious questions going to the merits of
the claims and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward him. See Otoe-Missouria
Tribe of Indians, 769 F.3d at 110 . Plaintiff's allegations, standing alone, are not sufficient to
entitle him to preliminary injunctive relief. See Ivy Mar Co. v. C.R. Seasons Ltd., 907 F.
Supp. 547, 561 (E.D.N.Y. 1995) ("[B]are allegations, without more, are insufficient for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction."); Hancock v. Essential Resources, Inc., 792 F. Supp.
924, 928 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) ("Preliminary injunctive relief cannot rest on mere hypotheticals.");
Moore, 409 F.3d at 510 (preliminary injunctive relief "'is an extraordinary and drastic remedy,
one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of
persuasion.'") (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)).
Additionally, plaintiff has now been transferred to Bare Hill Correctional Facility ("Bare
Hill C.F."). Dkt. No. 29. To the extent that plaintiff seeks injunctive relief against correctional
officers at Bare Hill C.F. – who are not defendants in this action – injunctive relief is available
against non-parties only under very limited circumstances, none of which are present here.
See Fed.R.Civ.P. 65(d)(2); Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Reinert & Duree, P.C., 191 F.3d 297,
302-03 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Regan, 858 F.2d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 1988); see also In
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re Rationis Enterprises, Inc. of Panama, 261 F.3d 264, 270 (2d Cir. 2001) ("A court may not
grant a final, or even an interlocutory, injunction over a party over whom it does not have
personal jurisdiction."). Plaintiff may also not seek injunctive relief against the defendants
who are all identified as employees of Clinton C.F. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263,
272 (2d Cir. 2006) ("In this circuit, an inmate's transfer from a prison facility generally moots
claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against officials of that facility.").
Finally, it is noted that the relief requested by plaintiff amounts to little more than an
"obey the law" injunction. "Obey the law" injunctions are vague, do not require the
defendants to do anything more than that already imposed by law, subject the defendants to
contempt rather than statutorily prescribed sanctions, and are not readily capable of
enforcement. As such, these injunctions are not favored. N.L.R.B. v. Express Pub. Co., 312
U.S. 426, 435-36 (1941); see also Rowe v. New York State Division of Budget, No. 1:11-CV1150 (LEK/DRH), 2012 WL 4092856, at *7 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2012); New York v.
Shinnecock Indian Nation, 560 F. Supp. 2d 186, 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2008). According to the
Second Circuit, "'[u]nder Rule 65(d), an injunction must be more specific than a simple
command that the defendant obey the law."" S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc. v. Clorox Co., 241
F.3d 232, 240 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Peregrine Myanmar Ltd. v. Segal, 89 F.3d 41, 51 (2d
Cir. 1996)).
Based upon the foregoing, plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Dkt. No.
28) is denied.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunctive relief (Dkt. No. 28) is
DENIED; and it is further
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ORDERED that the Clerk shall serve a copy of this Decision and Order on parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 23, 2016
Albany, NY

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