Miller v. Annucci et al

Filing 7

DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERED that the amended complaint, as modified by this Decision and Order, is accepted for filing and is the operative pleading. ORDERED that all claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their official capacities a re DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). ORDERED that plaintiff's request for injunctive relief against defendant Annucci in his official capacity, as limited herein above, survives sua sponte review and requires a response. ORDERED that all remaining claims are DISMISSED without prejudice in their entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state aclaim upon which relief may be granted. ORDERED that defendants DeSimone, Sheehan, Tynon, and King are DISMISSED without prejudice from this action. ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue a summons and forward it, along with a copy of the amended complaint, to the United Sta tes Marshal for service upon defendant Annucci. The Clerk shall forward a copy of the summons and amended complaint by mail to the Office of the New York State Attorney General, together with a copy of this Decision and Order. ORDERED that a respo nse to the sole remaining claim in plaintiff's amended complaint be filed by defendant Annucci, or his counsel, as provided for in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Signed by Chief Judge Glenn T. Suddaby on 10/5/17. (served on plaintiff by regular mail)(alh, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

OSCAR MILLER,
Plaintiff,
v.

9:17-CV-0369
(GTS/DJS)

ANTHONY ANNUCCI, et al.,
Defendants.

APPEARANCES:
OSCAR MILLER
10-A-3376
Plaintiff, pro se
Washington Correctional Facility
Box 180
72 Lock 11 Lane
Comstock, NY 12821
GLENN T. SUDDABY
Chief United States District Judge
DECISION and ORDER
I.

INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff Oscar Miller commenced this action by filing a pro se complaint pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983") and requesting leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Dkt. No.
1 ("Compl."). Dkt. No. 2 ("IFP Application"). Currently before the Court is plaintiff's amended
complaint. Dkt. No. 6 ("Am. Compl.").
II.

DISCUSSION
A.

Background

By Decision and Order filed May 26, 2017, plaintiff's IFP Application was granted.
Dkt. No. 5 (the "May 2017 Order"). Following review of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b), the Court found that plaintiff's complaint failed to
state a claim for relief pursuant to Section 1983. See generally the May 2017 Order. First,
the Court found that to the extent that plaintiff sought to enjoin the enforcement of his
sentence, plaintiff was essentially seeking his earlier release from incarceration - relief which
could only be obtained in a habeas corpus petition. Id. at 5-6. Second, plaintiff's claims for
monetary damages were dismissed without prejudice as barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512
U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994). May 2017 Order at 6-7. Finally, plaintiff's request for an injunction
directing defendants to produce a copy of his sentencing minutes was dismissed because,
according to plaintiff's exhibits, the New York State Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision ("DOCCS") advised plaintiff that the documents were not available in
their records. Id. at 7-8. Although plaintiff's complaint was dismissed in its entirety, in light of
his pro se status, plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to submit an amended complaint. Id.
at 8-10.
B.

Review of the Amended Complaint

The legal standard governing the dismissal of a pleading for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) was discussed at length in
the May 2017 Order and it will not be restated in this Decision and Order. See May 2017
Order at 2-4.
In the amended complaint, plaintiff alleges that he is being held in the custody of
DOCCS pursuant to an illegal Sentence and Commitment Order. Am. Compl. at 3-5.
"Plaintiff alleges that he is not challenging the validity of the conviction, nor does he seek
immediate release from incarceration[.]" Id. at 5. Instead, plaintiff alleges that he "seeks to
determine the length of a COURT IMPOSED SENTENCE, [and] if any, how much Post
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Release supervision (PRS) was allegedly imposed by the Court." Id. Plaintiff requests
monetary damages, together with declaratory and injunctive relief against the defendants in
their official and individual capacities. Am. Compl. at 1, 13-15. For a more complete
statement of plaintiff's claims, refer to the amended complaint.
Plaintiff requests monetary damages against all of the defendants in both their
individual and official capacities. Am. Compl. at 1, 14. The Eleventh Amendment has long
been construed as barring a citizen from bringing a suit against his or her own state in federal
court, under the fundamental principle of "sovereign immunity." U.S. Const. amend. XI ("The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-21
(1890); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997); Pennhurst State
Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984). Eleventh Amendment immunity is lost
only if Congress unequivocally abrogates states' immunity or a state expressly consents to
suit. Gollomp v. Spitzer, 568 F.3d 355, 365-66 (2d Cir. 2009). It is well-settled that Congress
did not abrogate states' immunity through 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S.
332, 343-45 (1979), and that New York State has not waived its immunity from suit on the
claims asserted in plaintiff's complaint. See generally Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park
Comm'n, 557 F.2d 35, 38-40 (2d Cir. 1977); Dawkins v. State of New York, No. 93-CV-1298
(RSP/GJD), 1996 WL 156764 at *2 (N.D.N.Y. 1996). Actions for damages against a state
official in his or her official capacity are essentially actions against the state. See Will v. Mich.
Dep't. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, plaintiff's claims for monetary damages
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the defendants in their official capacities are dismissed
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) as barred by the Eleventh
Amendment.
Insofar as plaintiff seeks monetary damages against the defendants in their
individual capacities because he believes that his confinement by DOCCS is illegal, his
request fails. As set forth in the May 2017 Order:
In Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the Supreme Court
held that a Section 1983 action seeking money damages is not cognizable if a
decision in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily invalidate a criminal conviction
unless that conviction or sentence "has been reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal . . ., or called
into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus . . . ." Id.
at 486-87. Absent such a showing, an inmate may only seek relief in the
federal courts through a petition for habeas corpus. See Jenkins v. Haubert,
179 F.3d 19, 23 (2d Cir. 1999).
May 2017 Order at 6. As with the original complaint, the amended complaint has no facts to
plausibly suggest that plaintiff's conviction has been reversed, expunged, declared invalid, or
called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Thus, plaintiff's
claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their individual capacities are
dismissed as barred by Heck v. Humphrey.
Plaintiff also requests declaratory relief. Am. Compl. at 13-14. Construed liberally,
plaintiff essentially asks the Court to declare his confinement illegal because "there exists NO
record of this Plaintiff being sentenced to a term of imprisonment." Id. at 13. Because the
declaratory relief requested would implicate the validity of plaintiff's sentence, plaintiff's claims
for declaratory relief are barred by Heck v. Humphrey. See May 2017 Order at 6-7 (citing
Loyd v. Cuomo, No. 8:14-CV-0829 (GLS/CFH), 2015 WL 3637409, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 10,
2015) ("[T]he Supreme Court has explained that the Heck rule applies 'no matter the relief
sought (damages or equitable relief).'") (quoting Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 82 (2005)
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and citing Caswell v. Green, 424 F. App'x 44, 45 (2d Cir. 2011))).
Finally, plaintiff seeks injunctive relief from the defendants. In Ex Parte Young, 209
U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court established an exception to state sovereign immunity in
federal actions where an individual brings an action seeking injunctive relief against a state
official for an ongoing violation of law or the Constitution. Under the doctrine, a suit may
proceed against a state official in his or her official capacity, notwithstanding the Eleventh
Amendment, when a plaintiff, "(a) alleges an ongoing violation of federal law and (b) seeks
relief properly characterized as prospective." See In re Deposit Ins. Agency, 482 F.3d 612,
618 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotations and citations omitted); see also Santiago v. New York State
Dep't of Corr. Serv., 945 F.2d 25, 32 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that such claims, however,
cannot be brought directly against the state, or a state agency, but only against state officials
in their official capacities).
Here, construed liberally, plaintiff seeks a court order directing the defendants to
produce documentary evidence to "substantiate [his] Sentence and Commitment" so that he
may "explore" whether he can lodge a challenge to his confinement. Am. Compl. at 6, 14.
Mindful of the Second Circuit's direction that a pro se plaintiff's pleadings must be liberally
construed, see e.g. Sealed Plaintiff v. Sealed Defendant, 537 F.3d 185, 191 (2d Cir. 2008),
this limited request for injunctive relief against defendant Annucci in his official capacity
survives sua sponte review and requires a response. See, e.g., Caswell v. Green, 424 F.
App'x 44, 45-46 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that a post-conviction claim under Section 1983
seeking evidence for use on direct appeal or in a separate collateral attack does not
"necessarily demonstrate" the invalidity of a conviction or confinement, and may not be
barred by Heck v. Humphrey). In so ruling, the Court expresses no opinion as to whether this
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claim can withstand a properly filed dispositive motion. Plaintiff's remaining requests for
injunctive relief against defendant Annucci and all of plaintiff's requests for injunctive relief
against the remaining defendants are dismissed in their entirety.1
III.

CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, it is hereby
ORDERED that the amended complaint, as modified by this Decision and Order, is

accepted for filing and is the operative pleading; and it is further
ORDERED that all claims for monetary damages against the defendants in their official
capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b);2 and it is further
ORDERED that plaintiff's request for injunctive relief against defendant Annucci in his
official capacity, as limited herein above, survives sua sponte review and requires a
response; and it is further
ORDERED that all remaining claims are DISMISSED without prejudice in their
entirety pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted;3 and it is further

1

Since plaintiff's claim seeking evidence to support a future challenge to his confinement has survived
against defendant Annucci, the Commissioner of DOCCS, in his official capacity, there is no reason to direct that
all of the defendants respond to that claim.
2

Generally, when a district court dismisses a pro se action sua sponte, the plaintiff will be allowed to
amend his action. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999). However, an
opportunity to amend is not required where the defects in the plaintiff's claims are substantive rather than merely
formal, such that any amendment would be futile. Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000); see also
Pucci v. Brown, 423 Fed. App'x 77, 78 (2d Cir. 2011). The Court finds that amendment of these claims would be
futile.
3

Generally, when a district court dismisses a pro se action sua sponte, the plaintiff will be allowed to
amend his action. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999). An opportunity to
amend is not required where plaintiff has already amended his complaint. See Shuler v. Brown, No. 9:07-CV-

6

ORDERED that defendants DeSimone, Sheehan, Tynon, and King are DISMISSED
without prejudice from this action; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk shall issue a summons and forward it, along with a copy of
the amended complaint, to the United States Marshal for service upon defendant Annucci.
The Clerk shall forward a copy of the summons and amended complaint by mail to the Office
of the New York State Attorney General, together with a copy of this Decision and Order; and
it is further
ORDERED that a response to the sole remaining claim in plaintiff's amended
complaint be filed by defendant Annucci, or his counsel, as provided for in the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure;4 and it is further
ORDERED that all pleadings, motions and other documents relating to this action be
filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court, Northern District of New York, 7th
Floor, Federal Building, 100 S. Clinton St., Syracuse, New York 13261-7367. Plaintiff must
comply with any requests by the Clerk's Office for any documents that are necessary to
maintain this action. All parties must comply with Local Rule 7.1 of the Northern District of
New York in filing motions. All motions will be decided on submitted papers without oral
argument unless otherwise ordered by the Court. Plaintiff is also required to promptly

0937 (TJM/GHL), 2009 WL 790973, at *5 & n.25 (N.D.N.Y. March 23, 2009) (McAvoy, J., adopting ReportRecommendation by Lowe, M.J.) ("Of course, an opportunity to amend is not required where the plaintiff has
already amended his complaint."); Yang v. New York City Trans. Auth., No. 01-CV-3933, 2002 WL 31399119, at
*2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2002) (denying leave to amend where plaintiff had already amended complaint once); cf.
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962) (denial of leave to amend not abuse of discretion if movant has
repeatedly failed to cure deficiencies in pleading). Additionally, to the extent that plaintiff's claims are barred by
Heck v. Humphrey, dismissal is without prejudice. See Amaker v. Weiner, 179 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 1999) (dismissal
under Heck is without prejudice; if plaintiff's conviction or sentence is later declared invalid or called into question
by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the suit may be reinstated).
4

The only claim remaining is the claim for injunctive relief against defendant Annucci in his official
capacity, as more fully described herein above.

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notify, in writing, the Clerk's Office and all parties or their counsel of any change in
plaintiff's address; his failure to do so may result in the dismissal of this action; and it
is further
ORDERED that the Clerk serve a copy of this Decision and Order on plaintiff.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated:

October 5, 2017
Syracuse, NY
________________________________
Hon. Glenn T. Suddaby
Chief U.S. District Judge

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