Washington v. Harder et al
Filing
8
DECISION AND ORDER: ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to add Judge Pelella as a defendant herein. ORDERED that the Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 6 ) is DISMISSED with prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failu re to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case. ORDERED that, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), any appeal taken from this Decision and Order would not be taken in good faith. Signed by Senior Judge Gary L. Sharpe on November 18, 2021. {order served via regular mail on plaintiff}(nas)
Case 9:21-cv-00992-GLS-CFH Document 8 Filed 11/18/21 Page 1 of 10
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MALCOLM WASHINGTON,
Plaintiff,
v.
9:21-CV-0992
(GLS/CFH)
SHERIFF HARDER et al.,
Defendants.
APPEARANCES:
MALCOLM WASHINGTON
Plaintiff, pro se
16-B-2263
Franklin Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 10
Malone, NY 12953
GARY L. SHARPE
Senior United States District Judge
DECISION AND ORDER
I.
INTRODUCTION
On September 8, 2021, pro se plaintiff Malcolm Washington ("Plaintiff") commenced
this action by filing a Complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ("Section 1983"). Dkt. No. 1
("Compl."). On October 4, 2021, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. Dkt. No. 4. ("Am.
Compl."). By Decision and Order, filed October 5, 2021 (the "October Order"), the Court
dismissed the Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted. Dkt. No. 5. In light of his pro se status, Plaintiff was
afforded an opportunity to amend his Amended Complaint. Id. Plaintiff's Second Amended
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Complaint is now before the Court for review. Dkt. No. 6 ("2d Am. Compl.").
II.
REVIEW OF SECOND AMENDED COMPLAINT
A. Summary of Second Amended Complaint
In the caption and list of parties, Plaintiff identifies a new defendant, the Hon. William
C. Pelella.1 See 2d Am. Compl. at 1, 2. Plaintiff claims Judge Pelella directed defendant
Sheriff Harder to arrest and detain Plaintiff in the Broome County Jail ("Broome C.J.") on
October 27, 2019. Id. at 3. Harder directed defendant Sgt. Bruce to process Plaintiff in the
jail. Id. Plaintiff alleges he was falsely detained and imprisoned, until November 7, 2019, for
first degree sexual misconduct on "fabricated charges" without a victim, police report,
investigation, or the opportunity to consult an attorney. Id.
Plaintiff asserts the following claims: (1) Fourth Amendment false arrest and/or false
imprisonment; (2) conspiracy; (3) Fourteenth Amendment equal protection; and (4)
obstruction of justice. See 2d Am. Compl. at 5. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages and
expungement of his criminal record. Id.
B. Legal Standard
The legal standard governing the dismissal of a pleading for failure to state a claim
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) was discussed at length in the October Order. See Dkt.
No. 5 at 2-3.
Additionally, a court reviewing a complaint pursuant to Section 1915A may also
consider whether the claims asserted by the plaintiff are duplicative of claims asserted in
another action against the same defendants. It is well-settled that "[a]s part of its general
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The Clerk of the Court is directed to add Judge Pelella as a defendant herein.
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Case 9:21-cv-00992-GLS-CFH Document 8 Filed 11/18/21 Page 3 of 10
power to administer its docket, a district court may stay or dismiss a suit that is duplicative of
another federal court suit." Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000); see
Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) ("As
between federal district courts, . . . though no precise rule has evolved, the general principle
is to avoid duplicative litigation."). The power to dismiss a duplicative lawsuit is meant to
foster judicial economy and the "comprehensive disposition of litigation." Kerotest Mfg. Co.
v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952). The doctrine is also meant to protect
parties from "the vexation of concurrent litigation over the same subject matter." Adam v.
Jacob, 950 F.2d 89, 93 (2d Cir. 1991). The district court has broad discretion in determining
whether an action should be dismissed as duplicative, and the exercise of this power is
reviewed by the Court of Appeals for abuse of discretion. Lopez v. Ferguson, 361 Fed.
App'x. 225, 226 (2d Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of action as duplicative of a pending class
action as to which plaintiff fell within the certified class); Flemming v. Wurzberger, 322 Fed.
App'x. 69, 71 (2d Cir. 2009); Curtis, 226 F.3d at 138.
In managing the litigation in its court, there are several approaches to the proper
disposition of duplicative actions, including stay of the second action, dismissal without
prejudice, and consolidation. See Curtis, 226 F.3d at 138. As the Second Circuit recognized
in Curtis, "[o]f course, simple dismissal of the second suit is another common disposition
because plaintiffs have no right to maintain two actions on the same subject in the same
court, against the same defendant at the same time." Id. at 138-39 (citing Zerilli v. Evening
News Ass'n, 628 F.2d 217, 222 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Walton v. Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 70 (3d
Cir. 1977) (en banc)).
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Although no precise test has been articulated for determining whether actions are
duplicative, see, e.g., Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 817, the general rule which has emerged is
that a suit is duplicative of another suit if the parties, issues and available relief do not
significantly differ between the two actions. Thus, "[c]ourts generally look to the identity of
the parties, legal claims, factual allegations including temporal circumstances, and the relief
sought to determine if the complaint is repetitive or malicious." Hahn v. Tarnow, 06-CV12814, 2006 WL 2160934, *3 (E.D. Mich. July 31, 2006); see I.A. Durbin, Inc. v. Jefferson
Nat. Bank, 793 F.2d 1541, 1551 (11th Cir. 1986).
C. Analysis
1. Claims Against Judge Pelella 2
Judges are entitled to absolute immunity for actions relating to the exercise of their
judicial functions. See Mireless v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991). "Judicial immunity has
been created both by statute and by judicial decision 'for the benefit of the public, whose
interest it is that the judges should be at liberty to exercise their functions with independence
and without fear of the consequences.'" Huminski v. Corsones, 396 F.3d 53, 74 (2d Cir.
2005) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). The law in this Circuit clearly provides that "[j]udges enjoy absolute
immunity from personal liability under Section 1983 for 'acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction.'" Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting Pierson, 386 U.S. at
2
In August 2021, Plaintiff filed a section 1983 complaint in this District against Judge Pelella, "claiming
that he was deprived of his civil rights when Binghamton City Court Judge William C. Pelella allegedly violated
New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 10.30, acting 'based on malice and/or corruption as well as
conspiracy to prosecute.'" See Washington v. Pelella, 2021 WL 3737753, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2021). The
Court dismissed the complaint based upon judicial immunity. See id. at *3.
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554). Thus, under the common law doctrine of judicial immunity, a judge is absolutely
immune from a suit for monetary damages unless (1) the actions giving rise to the suit were
"not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity" or (2) the suit arises from actions taken by the
judge "in the complete absence of all jurisdiction." Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116, 13738 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted); Gonzalez v. Sharpe, No. 1:06-CV-1023, 2006 W L
2591065, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Sep. 8, 2006). Here, the facts suggest that Judge Pelella's actions
occurred in his judicial capacity and within his jurisdiction. See 2d Am. Compl. at 3.
Injunctive relief is not available in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ag ainst a
judicial officer for acts taken in that official's judicial capacity "unless a declaratory decree
was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable." See Montero v. Travis, 171 F.3d 757,
761 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting 1996 amendments to § 1983). Here, Plaintiff has not alleged that
any declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable.
While the doctrine of judicial immunity does not bar claims for prospective declaratory
relief, see Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984); Supreme Court v. Consumers Union, Inc.,
446 U.S. 719 735 (1980), here, Plaintiff seeks an expungement of his criminal record, which
is retrospective. See Panowicz v. Hancock, No. 11-2417, 2012 WL 4049358, at *7 (D. Md.
Sept. 12, 2012) ("The majority of courts have held that an expungement of any kind
constitutes retrospective relief impermissible under § 1983.") (citing Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S.
426, 441 (1975)).
Accordingly, the doctrine of judicial immunity shields Judge Pelella.
2. Claims Against Harder and Bruce
In the October Order, the Court dismissed Plaintiff's claims against Harder and Bruce
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for failure to plead facts implicating Harder and Bruce in any unconstitutional conduct. Dkt.
No. 5 at 5. In the Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff attempts to remedy the deficiencies
in the prior pleading claiming that Harder ordered Bruce to detain Plaintiff at the Broome C.J.
2d Am. Compl. at 6.
Prior to this action, Plaintiff commenced Washington v. Harder, No. 9:20-CV-0023
(GLS/TWD) ("Washington I"), Dkt. No. 1 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 2020), with the filing of a civil rights
complaint in this district asserting claims arising from a hearing in Binghamton City Court
before Judge Pelella in October 2019 and Plaintiff's confinement at Broome C.J. from
October 2019 until November 2019. See Washington I, Dkt. No. 1. The complaint set forth
the same facts, Fourth Amendment claims, and a claim for monetary damages.3 Compare
Washington I, Dkt. No. 1, with 2d Am. Compl.
In February 2020, following an initial review of the complaint in Washington I, this
Court concluded that the allegations were not sufficient to state a claim for the violation of
Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights. See Washington I, Dkt. No. 7 (the "February Order").
The Court held:
In October 2019, Plaintiff was already in the custody of the New
York State Department of Corrections and Community
Supervision (DOCCS). See Compl. at 4; see also DOCCS,
Inmate Lookup, http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov (last visited
Feb. 26, 2020) (demonstrating that Plaintiff was transferred to
DOCCS' custody on August 8, 2016). Therefore, because
Plaintiff was "already effectively 'seized,' " he has failed to state
a claim for false imprisonment. Turner, 130 F.Supp.2d at 1225.
Moreover, the Complaint is devoid of any allegation regarding
the nature of the decisions made and proceedings held in
Binghamton City Court.
3
Judge Pelella was not named as a defendant in Washington I.
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Dkt. No. 7 at 6-7.
Plaintiff was afforded an opportunity to file an amended complaint. See Washington I,
Dkt. No. 7. From June 2020 until September 2020, in lieu of an amended pleading, Plaintiff
filed various motions, which were all denied. See id., Dkt. Nos. 17, 20, 21, 23, 24, and 25.
On February 4, 2021, the Court issued an Order dismissing the action, without prejudice, due
to Plaintiff's failure to comply with the Court's prior orders. See id., Dkt. No. 31. Judgment
was entered on February 4, 2021. See id., Dkt. No. 32.
After carefully considering the matter at hand, Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims in
this action are duplicative of those asserted in Washington I. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court has examined the "identity of parties, legal claims, factual allegations including
temporal circumstances, and the relief sought," and there is no difference between the
Second Amended Complaint in this action and Plaintiff's claims in Washington I. See Hahn,
2006 WL 2160934, at *3.
Alternatively, Plaintiff's constitutional claims against Harder and Bruce are also barred
by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). As discussed in the October Order, Plaintif f is a
frequent litigator in this Court.4 See Dkt. No. 5 at 6-7. In the February Order in Washington I,
this Court noted:
The Complaint is devoid of facts related to the charge(s), the
arrest, or whether Plaintiff was convicted or entered a plead as
to any charges. Therefore, the Court will refrain from discussing
whether the claims for false arrest and/or false imprisonment
are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). See
Matthews v. County of Cayuga, 5:17-CV-1004 (MAD/TWD),
2018 WL 2926272, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. June 8, 2018) ("Under Heck
4
Since 2019, Plaintiff has filed seven civil actions in this District. See U.S. Party/Case Index
(last visited Nov. 16, 2021).
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and its progeny, a '§ 1983 action is barred (absent prior
invalidation) — no matter the relief sought (damages or
equitable relief), no matter the target of the [plaintiff’s] suit (state
conduct leading to conviction or internal prison proceedings) —
if success in that action would necessarily demonstrate the
invalidity of confinement or its duration.' " (quoting Wilkinson v.
Dotson, 544 U.S. 74, 81-82 (2005)).
Dkt. No. 7 at 8, n.6.
Based upon the Court's statement in Washington I, and orders issued in Plaintiff's
other civil actions, Plaintiff is undoubtedly aware of the impact of Heck and the need to plead
facts related to the criminal proceeding. See Washington v. Broome Cty. Dist. Attorney's
Off., No. 3:20-CV-1099 (GLS/ML), 2020 W L 9455048, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2020), report
and recommendation adopted, 2021 WL 1660480 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2021). Nevertheless, in
this action, Plaintiff alleges he was charged with sexual assault in the first degree, but does
not contend that proceedings related to that the charge were overturned, expunged, or
otherwise invalidated. Indeed, in this action, Plaintiff seeks to expunge his record.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's claims for violations of his due process rights, conspiracy,
obstruction of justice — all of which are patent attacks on the validity of his conviction — are
barred. See Washington, 2020 WL 9455048, at *6 (citing Roberites v. Huff, 11-CV-0521,
2012 WL 1113479, at *4 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2012) (dismissing as premature, pursuant to
Heck, due process, conspiracy, obstruction of justice, fabrication of evidence, and equal
protection claims related to the plaintiff's conviction where the plaintiff was convicted of the
underlying criminal charges and his appeal was still pending)).
Generally, when a district court dismisses a pro se action sua sponte, the plaintif f will
be allowed to amend his action. See Gomez v. USAA Fed. Savings Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796
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(2d Cir. 1999). However, an opportunity to amend is not required where the plaintiff has
already been afforded the opportunity to amend. Moreover, an opportunity to amend is not
required where the defects in the plaintiff’s claims are substantive rather than merely formal,
such that any amendment would be futile.
As the Second Circuit has explained, "[w]here it appears that granting leave to amend
is unlikely to be productive, . . . it is not an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend."
Ruffolo v. Oppenheimer & Co., 987 F.2d 129, 131 (2d Cir.1993) (citations omitted), accord
Brown v. Peters, 95-CV-1641, 1997 WL 599355, at *1 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 1997) ("[T]he
court need not grant leave to amend where it appears that amendment would prove to be
unproductive or futile.") (citation omitted); see also Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962)
(denial not abuse of discretion where amendment would be futile); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222
F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) ("The problem with Cuoco's causes of action is substantive;
better pleading will not cure it. Repleading would thus be futile. Such a futile request to
replead should be denied.") (citation omitted); Cortec Indus., Inc. v. Sum Holding L.P., 949
F.2d 42, 48 (2d Cir. 1991) ("Of course, where a plaintiff is unable to allege any fact sufficient
to support its claim, a complaint should be dismissed with prejudice.") (citation omitted);
Health-Chem Corp. v. Baker, 915 F.2d 805, 810 (2d Cir.1990) ("[W]here . . . there is no merit
in the proposed amendments, leave to amend should be denied").
This rule applies even to pro se plaintiffs. See, e.g., Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 103; Brown,
1997 WL 599355 at *1. As explained above, while the special leniency afforded to pro se
civil rights litigants somewhat loosens the procedural rules governing the form of pleadings, it
does not completely relieve a pro se plaintiff of the duty to satisfy the pleading standards set
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forth in Rules 8, 10 and 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; rather, as both the
Supreme Court and Second Circuit have repeatedly recognized, the requirements set forth in
those Rules are procedural and even pro se civil rights plaintiffs must follow them.
Here, Plaintiff was afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to amend his complaint
in Washington I, and in the present matter, to set forth cognizable claims. Dismissal of this
action with prejudice is warranted because the Second Amended Complaint represents
Plaintiff's second unsuccessful attempt to articulate legally cognizable claims against
Defendants, a failure which is due to pleading deficiencies which are substantive, such that
further amendment would be futile. See Cuoco, 222 F.3d at 112.
III.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Clerk of the Court is directed to add Judge Pelella as a defendant
herein; and it is further
ORDERED that the Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 6) is DISMISSED with
prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
be granted; and it is further
ORDERED that the Clerk is directed to enter judgment and close this case; and it is
further
ORDERED that, for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), any appeal taken from this
Decision and Order would not be taken in good faith.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
November 18, 2021
Albany, New York
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