In re McRay, Richardson, Santana, Wise and Salaam Litigation

Filing 153

OPINION AND ORDER re: 134 FIRST MOTION to Compel Defendants to produce documents in unredacted form filed by Daniel Wise, Sharonne Salaam, Antron McCray, Kevin Richardson, Michael Wise, Raymond Santana, Jr., Valerie Cuffee, Linda McCray, Shareef Sa laam, Aisha Salaam, Raymond Santana, Sr., Norman Wise, Crystal Cuffee, Connie Richardson, Doloris Wise, Grace Cuffee, Yusef Salaam, Victor Wise, Angela Cuffee, Kharey Wise, Joann Santana. For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion to compel is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, part. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Ronald L. Ellis on 11/22/2011) (lmb)

USDCSDNY
'f DOCUMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

~I
IN RE MCRAY, RICHARDSON, SANTANA, WISE,
AND SALAAM LITIGATION

'~~~~ft:~~AllY :ED
OPINION AND
ORDER
03 Civ. 9685 (DAB) (RLE)

RONALD L. ELLIS, United States Magistrate Judge:
I. INTRODUCTION

The above-captioned Plaintiffs and their families filed suit against the City of New York,
and various current and former employees of the New York City Police Department ("NYPD")
and the New York County District Attorney's Office ("DANY"), alleging a number of federal
and state causes of action connected to the arrest, investigation, and conviction of certain
PlaintifIs for the attack on the Central Park Jogger on April 19, 1989. (See Am. Compl., Doc.
No. 47.) Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion to compel the production of documents
which Defendants have asserted are privileged or protected from disclosure on other grounds.
For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs' motion is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in
part.
II. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes general familiarity with the events that gave rise to this litigation, and
only recounts the facts relevant to the current inquiry. In June 2010, Defendants began
producing to Plaintiffs the original case files created by the prosecutors in the underlying
criminal prosecution. The production also included documents concerning the Armstrong
Commission's reinvestigation ofthe crime beginning in 2002. As part of Defendants'
production, they provided Plaintiffs with privilege logs on a rolling basis. This process was

completed when a final privilege log was produced to Plaintiffs on February 14,2011, followed
bY!l gupplQnumt!ll privilege log on March 3.1011"
In March 2011, Plaintiffs asked Defendants to reconsider their privilege log in light of
cases that recognized a distinction between factual materials and core opinion materials when
assessing the applicability of the work product doctrine. Plaintiffs provided Defendants with a
list of approximately 8,676 documents from the privilege log to which they objected to the
Defendants' assertion of privilege.
Defendants reviewed the entries in their privilege log which had been objected to by
Plaintiffs, and determined that certain documents contained only factual work product.
Defendants withdrew the privilege claim and produced those documents. Consistent with that
distinction, when Defendants determined that a document contained a combination of factual
material and core work product material, the document was produced in redacted form.
Defendants continued to maintain, however, that other documents contained only core work
product material, and continued to assert their privilege claim, although they attempted to
amplifY the descriptions of the entries for those documents in their privilege log. Ultimately,
Defendants withdrew and/or modified their previous assertions of privilege to 954 documents,
and provided Plaintiffs with a final, revised privilege log on July 14,2011. Defendants assert
that the vast majority of the documents are protected attorney work product, and contend that the
remaining entries are protected by either the law enforcement/official information privilege,
attorney-client privilege, or because of privacy and/or safety concerns. (See Pis.' Mot., Ex. 5.)
On July 19, 2011, Plaintiffs moved to compel Defendants to produce the challenged
documents that continued to be withheld. Based on Defendants' descriptions of the entries,
Plaintiffs have organized the documents into the following four categories, each containing
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multiple subcategories: (1) documents related to the Armstrong Report, (2) ADA notes, (3) ADA

dl'nft!:!, and, (4) other mtl;wellmeom: documents, including hand drawn renderings of various
precincts. (PIs.' Mot. at 3-4.) Defendants responded on July 29, and shortly thereafter submitted
a selection of approximately 2000 documents from the various categories for in camera review if
the Court determined that such a review was necessary. Some of the documents were chosen by
Plaintiffs, although Defendants submitted hundreds of additional documents in order to provide
context for the documents selected by Plaintiffs and to provide a broader cross-section of the
allegedly privileged material. A response letter was also submitted on behalf of DANY on July
29. After a reply and a sur-reply, the motion was fully briefed on August 16, 2011.
III. DISCUSSION

A. The Claim of Work Product for Documents by ADAs or Their Assistants in Connection
with the Criminal Prosecution
1. Work Product Doctrine Overview

The work product doctrine was first defined in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 510-11
(1947), and is intended to preserve a zone of privacy in which a lawyer can prepare and develop
legal theories and strategy "with an eye toward litigation," free from unnecessary intrusion by
his adversaries. The doctrine was later partially codified in Rule 26(b)(3)(A), which provides
that "a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or its representative (including the other party's
attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)." Notably, Rule 26(b)(3)(A) is
narrower in scope than the work product doctrine developed in Hickman and its progeny, and by
its terms only applies to tangible work product. Abdell v. City ofNew York, 05 Civ. 8453, 2006
WL 2664313, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 14,2006). Although Rule 26(b)(3)(A) only applies to

3

parties to an action, "courts have extended the work product doctrine when doing so vindicated
thfl purpo~e of the Hickman doctrine"

Crosby v. Cit)! afNew York. 269 F.R.D. 2671 277

(S.D.N.Y. 2010) (citing cases). When determining whether to apply the doctrine's protection,
courts consider whether such protection is needed to: (1) safeguard an attorney's ability to
formulate legal theories and prepare cases, (2) prevent opponents from "free loading" off their
adversaries work, and (3) prevent interference with ongoing litigation. Id. (internal citations
omitted).
The initial burden ofjustifYing the application of the work product doctrine is on the
asserting party, and "the burden is a heavy one because privileges are neither lightly created nor
expansively construed." Gonzalez v. City ofNew York, 08 Civ. 2699, 2009 WL 2253118, at *2
(E.D.N.Y. July 28, 2009) (internal citations omitted). The doctrine provides only a qualified
protection from discovery, and disclosure of protected information may be ordered if the party
seeking the information can demonstrate a substantial need for the information and an inability
to obtain the information without undue hardship. Fed. R Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(A)(ii). When
assessing whether to order disclosure of work product, "courts have consistently distinguished
between primarily factual work product and 'core' work product, the latter of which includes the
'mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney. '" Crosby, 269
F.RD. at 277 (quoting Abdell, 2006 WL 2664313, at *6). Although factual work product is
subject to disclosure once the required showings are made, core work product is entitled to more
stringent protection, and a highly persuasive showing of need must be made to warrant
disclosure. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 190-91 (2d Cir. 2000);
Crosby, 269 F.RD. at 277-80; Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.RD. 135, 150 (S.D.N.Y. 2001);
Abdell, 2006 WL 2664313, at *6. Even if a court orders the production of materials protected by
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the work product doctrine, "it must protect against disclosure of the mental impressions,
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of a party's attorney or other representative concerning
the litigation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)(B).

2. Application of the Doctrine in this Case
Defendants claim that certain documents that were generated by ADAs and their
assistants in connection with the underlying criminal prosecution of Plaintiffs are protected by
the work product doctrine. (Defs. Mem. at 8-10.) These documents comprise the bulk of the
documents at issue, and mostly consist of handwritten ADA notes. These notes cover a variety
of topics, including ADA: (1) "To Do Lists," (2) thoughts about the discoverability and
admissibility of certain evidence, (3) analysis of evidence and witness testimony, (4) preparation
and draft questions for direct and cross-examination of witness at trial and pretrial proceedings;
(5) communications with expert witnesses, (6) legal research, and (7) draft opening statements
and summations.
As an initial matter, the Court recognizes that the documents relating to the criminal
prosecution were created by both parties and non-parties to this litigation. The vast majority of
these documents were created by Defendants Linda Fairstein, Elizabeth Lederer, and Tim
Clements, who are either current or former ADAs at DANY, and are represented by the City of
New York in this action. Other documents were generated by unidentified ADAs and paralegals,
or by ADAs who are not Defendants in this action. (Decl. of Elizabeth Daitz, Ex. B, Lederer
Decl.

~~

6,21-23.) Because the bulk of the documents were created by, or at the direction of,

Defendant ADAs, and because the documents all appear to be intimately related to the work
completed by Defendant ADAs, the Court will treat Defendants' assertion of work product
pursuant to Rule 26(b)(3).
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In that regard, the Court finds that Defendants have met their initial burden of showing
that the documents at issue are protected by Rule 26(b)(3). Based on the descriptions of the
documents in the privilege log, there is little question that the documents were prepared by
attorneys or their representatives in anticipation of litigation or trial. Although Plaintiffs argue
that the documents should not be viewed as work product because the underlying criminal case
has concluded and the documents were not prepared in anticipation of civil litigation (PIs. Mot.
at 12 n.5), they provide no support for the proposition that documents should be disclosed based
on that distinction. Indeed, courts have held that the attorney work product doctrine generally
extends to subsequent litigation, although the threshold for overcoming the privilege may be
lowered in later cases. In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, 2005 WL 818821, at *8-9 (S.D.N. Y
Feb. 18, 2005); see also S. W v. City ofNew York, 2009 Civ. 1777, 2010 WL 5185141, at * 1
(E.D.N.Y. Dec. 15,2010).
Plaintiffs additionally assert that the documents should not be viewed as work product
because the purposes of the common law work product doctrine would not be served by
shielding the documents from disclosure. (PIs. Mot. at 11-13.) Plaintiffs argue, among other
things, that disclosure would not have a chilling effect on the behavior of prosecutors because of
prosecutors' ethical obligation to seek justice. (PIs. Mot. at 12.) The Court disagrees with both
propositions. Not only are the documents properly classified as work product under Rule
26(b )(3), but that classification is also consistent with the purposes of the common law work
product doctrine and the prosecutorial function. Prosecutors are entitled to the same "zone of
privacy" and qualified work product protection of their mental impressions, thoughts and
opinions as other attorneys. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that the work product
doctrine may be more vital to criminal proceedings than to civil litigation, noting that "[t]he
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interests of society and the accused in obtaining a fair and accurate resolution of the question of
guilt or innON:me{l dtlm!lnd th~t ~dequate

safeguards assure the thoroue,h nreDaration and

presentation of each side of the case." United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 238 (1975)
(emphasis added). Although the nature of an action may, in certain circumstances, lower the
threshold for overcoming the protection, it does not eliminate the existence of such protection.
Because the documents at issue constitute protected work product, the Court's next step
is to determine whether Plaintiffs have demonstrated a sufficient need for the material and an
inability to obtain the material without undue hardship. With respect to factual work product
material, courts have regularly held that "in cases of alleged police misconduct, plaintiffs have a
substantial need to discover statements that officers made to prosecutors," and that often "no
substantial equivalent" of the ADA notes of those statements exists. Abdell, 2006 WL 2664313,
at *7 (citing cases); see also Crosby, 269 F.R.D. at 280. Indeed, Defendants apparently concede
that Plaintiffs are entitled to some of the material because they reviewed their privilege log and
assert they attempted to produce all factual material contained therein. (See Defs. Mem. at 3-4.)
The Court has conducted an in camera review of the documents submitted by
Defendants, and finds that the entries submitted contain core work product created by ADAs in
preparation for, or during, trial. These documents reflect the ADAs' impressions, thoughts, and
analysis of evidence and legal issues, and were clearly generated in anticipation of litigation.
Using Plaintiffs' categorization of Defendants' privilege log, these core work product generally
documents fall under the following categories: (1) "To Do Lists," (2) notes in preparation of
examination of witnesses; (3) notes taken in preparation for examinations at trial and for
summations; (4) contemporaneous notes regarding testimony at suppression hearing and trials;
(5) notes regarding experts; (6) draft examinations for witness interviews; (7) draft pleadings and
7

trial documents; (8) drafts for trial proceedings and examination; (9) legal research, and (10)
ADA dr!lft m~mor!lnd!l. (PIli:. Fy q)

Plaintiffs have not provided a basis for the production of Defendant ADA's core work
product. Plaintiffs argue that courts generally apply liberal discovery standards in civil rights
cases, and that they have a substantial need for the core work product because the prosecutors'
thought processes during the investigation and prosecution of the criminal case has been placed
at issue by their police and prosecutorial misconduct claims. (See PIs. Mot. at 7-10; Pis. Reply
1-7.) In partiCUlar, Plaintiffs contend that the material is relevant to their claims that police
officers and prosecutors conspired together to prosecute Plaintiffs despite the initial lack of, and
subsequent dissipation of, probable cause. (PIs. Reply. 5.)
As a general matter, in certain circumstances, "a party's assertion of factual claims can,
out of considerations of fairness to the party's adversary, result in the involuntary forfeiture of
privilege for matters pertinent to the claims asserted." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 350 F.3d
299, 302 (2d Cir. 2003). The loss of privilege in these circumstances is justified by
considerations of fairness to an adversary. Id For instance, "a party cannot partially disclose
privileged communications or affirmatively rely on privileged communications to support its
claim and then shield the underlying communications from scrutiny by the opposing party." In re
Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 183 (2nd Cir. 2000). "Whether fairness requires
disclosure ... is best decided on a case by case basis, and depends primarily on the specific
context in which the privilege is asserted." In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 219 F.3d 175, 183
(2d Cir. 2000).

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The Court finds that the Plaintiff have made the highly persuasive showing necessary to
demom;tr~te their entitlement to core

work product related to Defendant ADAs assistance with

the investigation of Plaintiffs. Several reasons support this conclusion. First, the Court notes
that although the Honorable Deborah A. Batts previously dismissed Plaintiffs claims against
Defendant ADAs in their prosecutorial capacity, she permitted claims against them in their non­
prosecutorial capacity to go forward. See McCray v. City ofNew York, 03 Civ. 9685, 2007 WL
4352748, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1,2007). Judge Batts specifically noted that "where ADAs
themselves investigated or worked with police officers advising them on their investigative
tactics, they are not entitled to absolute immunity." Id. Plaintiffs have alleged that Defendant
ADAs were heavily involved in the initial investigation and interrogations of Plaintiffs, and
worked closely with police officers to manipulate and coerce confessions. (See Am. CompI.

~~

70,132-33,166,169-190,223,289-97,301,329-30, 421-23, 427-43, 448-50, 510-13, 519-38,
542,550,577,636-55,664-92,697-711,719-21, 790.) Accordingly, ADA Defendants behavior
during the investigation has been placed squarely at issue by Plaintiffs claims, and documents
generated in connection with the investigation are clearly relevant.
Second, Plaintiffs cannot get the substantial equivalent of the material from other
sources. Although Defendant ADAs may be deposed, their ability to recall events that occurred
over twenty years ago will likely diminish the utility of their testimony. The best evidence about
their involvement in the investigation is contained in their notes.
Third, the underlying purposes of the work product doctrine do not warrant withholding
the material in the circumstances of this case. Given the alleged involvement of the ADAs in the
investigation, Plaintiffs allegations regarding the initial investigation, and the fact that DANY

9

has previously submitted an affidavit requesting the Plaintiffs' convictions be vacated, the Court
find\! th~t the intere~t~ favnring

disclosure of core work oroduct related to the ADAs's

involvement in the investigation outweigh any possible chilling effect that disclosure might have
on attorney behavior. Furthermore, the Court finds that disclosure would not reward sloth or
interfere with ongoing litigation.
Although it is difficult to distinguish between work product generated in connection with
the investigation and core work product created in preparation for trial, after reviewing the
documents in camera, the Court finds the following entries contain core work product related to
the investigation of the underlying crimes, and shall be disclosed:
•
•
•

NYC034987 (p. 570)
NYC041385 - NYC041387 (p. 621-23)
NYC045702 - NYC045706 (p. 762-67)

For the most part, these documents contain lists of tasks, created by ADAs, relating to the
investigation of the underlying crime. Although they do not contain factual matter, they contain
the Defendant ADAs' thought processes, analyses, and recommendations regarding the
investigation. The Court finds that these documents were not created in the ADA's prosecutorial
capacity, are relevant to Plaintiffs' claims, and therefore orders that they be produced, along with
any other similar documents in Defendants' possession.
With respect to the remaining core work product material, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
have failed to make a highly persuasive showing of their need for the material. The remaining
work product material is directly related to work completed by Defendant ADAs in their
prosecutorial, rather than investigative, capacity. The documents include, for example,
evaluations regarding the admissibility and discoverability of evidence, draft questions for direct

10

and cross-examination, marked transcripts of testimony of various witnesses and Defendants,
contemporaneous notes taken during trial, and legal research and analysis. The documents are
only directly relevant to possible claims against the ADAs in their prosecutorial capacity, claims
that Judge Batts has previously dismissed. Insofar as the documents are relevant to the subject
matter of this action, the Court finds that the general relevance of the material is insufficient to
overcome the heightened protections for core work product material. Accordingly, Plaintiffs
motion to compel production of core work product material generated in Defendant ADAs'
prosecutorial capacity is denied.

B. Documents Related to the Armstrong Report
Defendants assert that certain documents prepared by Ruby Marin-Jordan are protected
by attorney-client privilege and the work product doctrine. (See Defs. Mem. at 23-28.)
Plaintiffs argue the attorney-client privilege is not applicable because the Armstrong
Committee's report was ultimately published, and therefore Marin-Jordan's communications
were not intended to be kept confidential. (PIs. Mot. at 17-18.) Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend
that documents should be disclosed based upon the undersigned's previous ruling that rejected
Defendants' assertion of deliberative process privilege to protect the opinions, deliberations and
recommendations of personnel in connection with the creation of the Armstrong Report. (PIs.
Mot. at 16-18.)
As an initial matter, the Court finds that the materials are not protected by the work
product doctrine because doing so would not vindicate any of the purposes of the work product
doctrine. The doctrine "create[s] a 'zone of privacy' that allows an attorney to prepare for
litigation 'free from unnecessary intrusion by his adversaries.'" United States v. Adlman, 134

11

F.3d 1194, 1196 (2d Cir. 1998)(citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,510-11 (1947)). Here,
the Court finds that the documents at issue were not created in anticipation oflitigation or trial.
but were rather generated in connection with a public report relating to a matter of public
concern. Therefore, the Court finds that the materials are not protected by the work product
doctrine.
The Court also finds that the documents are not protected by the attorney-client privilege.
The attorney-client privilege applies to (l) a communication between client and counsel, which
(2) was intended to be and was in fact kept confidential, and (3) made for the purpose of
obtaining or providing legal advice. United States v. Construction Projects Research, Inc., 73
F.3d 464, 373 (2d Cir. 1996). The attorney-client privilege attaches to corporations as well as
individuals, and "[t]he burden of establishing the existence of an attorney-client privilege, in all
of its elements, rests with the party asserting it." United States v. Int'l Brotherhood of

Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir. 1997). Defendants have established that, at the time the
documents at issue were created, Marin-Jordan served as Special Counsel to the Deputy
Commissioner of Legal Matters at NYPD, and was assigned to analyze the potential legal and
policy issues presented by the Armstrong Report. (Daitz Decl., Ex. C, Marin-Jordan Decl.

~~

1,

11.) Defendants state that the advice was provided in the form of both oral and written
communications, and in the form of substantive edits and comments made on drafts of the
Armstrong Report, ADA Nancy Ryan's Affirmation, and a draft response to Ryan's Affirmation.

(Id

~~

12-15.) Defendants state that the legal advice provided by Marin-Jordan was undertaken

with the "expectation of secrecy" and was kept confidential. (Id

12

t'

15.)

After reviewing the documents created by Marin-Jordan that were submitted for in
camera review, the Court finds that the documents do not reflect any legal advice provided by

Rubin-Jordan. Three of the submitted documents are drafts of the Armstrong Report, which
contain Marin-Jordan's typographical edits, along with her handwritten notes recommending the
inclusion of certain facts or the exclusion of others. (See NYC017488 - NYC017573,
NYC018441 - NYCOI8483.) Another document contains a typed draft ofa response to ADA
Nancy's Ryan's December 5, 2002 affirmation, with handwritten notes by Rubin-Jordan. (See
NYC018431 - NYC018432.) Finally, another document contains ADA Ryan's affirmation, with
Rubin-Jordan's handwritten notes reflecting her thoughts on the various factual statements
contained in the affirmation. (See NYC018484 - NYC018541.) The Court fails to see how any
of the notes relate to legal advice, given the purpose of, and ultimate pUblication of, the
Armstrong Report. Although Marin-Jordan may have provided legal advice in connection with
the Armstrong Report, her legal advice is not reflected in the entries submitted for in camera
review. Furthermore, the Court finds that the information is relevant to Plaintiffs' intentional
infliction of emotional distress claims against Commissioner Kelly. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs'
motion to compel the production of all documents created by Marin-Jordan in connection with
her involvement in the Armstrong Commission is GRANTED.
C. Documents Relating to Detective Arroyo

Defendants also assert that certain documents concerning Detective Humberto Arroyo are
protected by the work product doctrine and the deliberative process privilege. (Defs. Mem. at
28-30.) The documents at issue concern an unrelated and unsubstantiated 1993 disciplinary
proceeding against Arroyo. The documents reflect the recommendation of an Assistant Deputy

13

Police Commissioner Lupin to Police Commissioner Bratton concerning the disposition of those
charges. Defendants contend that the documents have no relevance to any of Plaintiffs' claims~
and have "no relevance to defendant Arroyo's credibility, motivation or bias separate and apart
from all the information readily available to plaintiffs." (Defs. Mem. at 29.) Plaintiffs contend
that Arroyo's credibility is relevant because he was officially designated the officer in charge of
the Central Park jogger investigation. (PIs. Mot. at 18.)
The Court finds that the documents concerning Arroyo are not protected under the
deliberative process privilege. The deliberative process privilege protects "documents reflecting
advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated." Tigue v. United States Department of

Justice, 312 F.3d 70,76 (2d Cir. 2002). To be protected, a document must be both
"predecisional" and "deliberative." Grand Cent. P'ship, Inc. v Cuomo, 166 F.3d 473, 482 (2d
Cir. 1999). Courts have held, however, that the deliberative process privilege is inapplicable to
personnel decisions by law enforcement agencies. See, e.g., Mercado v. Division ofNew York

State Police, 989 F. Supp. 521, 523 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Nat'/ Cong.for Puerto Rican Rights ex
reI. Perez v. City of New York, 194 F.R.D. 88,95 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Because the documents
relate to a personnel decision, the Court finds that the documents do not concern a governmental
decision or policy within the ambit of the deliberative process privilege.
To the extent that Defendants are claiming that the documents are protected by the work
product doctrine, they may submit by December 2, 2011, further explanation on the role of
Deputy Commissioner Lupin and why the documents are protected.

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D. Hand Drawn Renderings of Precinct Rooms
Dcfclldunl.::> ha.vc ussortod tha.t a. num.bot' of hlmd

drllum ri=lnd~ring~ of Dfecinct rooms aTe

protected by the law enforcement/official information privilege. Plaintiffs contend that the
privilege does not apply because disclosure would not interfere with police investigations or
cause any meaningful harm to Defendants. (PIs. Mot. at 15.)
The law enforcement privilege is designed "to prevent disclosure of law enforcement
techniques and procedures, to preserve the confidentiality of sources, to protect witness and law
enforcement personnel, to safeguard the privacy of individuals involved in an investigation, and
otherwise to prevent interference with an investigation." In re Dep 't Investigation ofthe City of
New York v. Myerson, 856 F.2d 481, 484 (2d Cir. 1988). Here, the documents at issue appear to

be drawings of rooms within a police precinct made at the time of the investigation of the
Central Park jogger case. Defendants fail to show how disclosure of the documents will
undermine law enforcement efforts or reveal law enforcement techniques. Moreover, the
documents appear to be potentially relevant to the claims in this case, which relate, in part, to the
initial interrogations of Plaintiffs by the police. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' motion to compel
production of these drawings is GRANTED.
IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs motion to compel is GRANTED, in part, and
DENIED, part.
SO ORDERED this 22nd day of November 2011
New York, New York

The Honorable Ronald L. Ellis
United States Magistrate Judge

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