Tiffany (NJ) Inc. et al v. eBay Inc.

Filing 59

MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Opposition re: 55 MOTION in Limine to Exclude Evidence that Purports to Create Liability Based on Trademarks First Asserted in Tiffany's Proposed Findings of Fact.. Document filed by Tiffany (NJ) Inc., Tiffany and Company. (Boccanfuso, Anthony)

STATES SOUTHERN

DISTRICT

COURT YORK

DISTRICT

OF NEW

TIFFANY CNJ) INC. and TIFFANY AND
COMPANY, 04 Civ. 4607 (KMK)

Plaintiffs,

eBAY INC.,
Defendant.

TIFFANY"S
TO

MEMORt~NDUM
DEFENDANT'S

OF LAW
MOTION

LN OPPOSITION

INLIMINE

ARNOLD

& PORTER

LLP

Attorneys for Plaintiffs
399 Park Avenue

New York, New York

10022

[phone]

Tiffany (NJ) Inc. et al v. eBay Inc.

Doc. 59

Dockets.Justia.com

OF CONTENTS

Pag;e
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .......................................................................................................... .....................................................................................................1 ii

PRELIMINARY
STATEMENT ARGUMENT POINT I

STATEMENT
OF FACTS

..............................................................................................................2

..................................................................................................................................5 ADMISSION PREJUDICE OF THE TRADEMARKS eBAY OR UNDULY WOULD NOT UNFAIRLY

DELAY

THE TRIAL.....................................5

A.

eBay Cannot Demonstrate Unfair Prejudice............................................................6 1. Because eBay Had Notice of the "New" Trademarks from the

Outset of This Action, eBay Is Not Prejudiced........... .........,..,.., .........,.7
2. eBay Was Not Denied the Ability to Pursue Discovery Concerning the "New" Trademarks........................................................... ii

3. B. C.
POINT II

eBay Is Not Prejudiced by the Absence of Citation to Any of the
Trademarks in the Pretrial Order ............................................................... 12

The Risk of a Possibly Higher Damage Award Is Not the Type of
Prejudice That Would Trigger Rule 403 ................................................................ 14

The Admission of the 'T\Tew" Trademarks Would Not Delay Proceedings
in This Action THE ........................................................................................................15 OF JUSTICE REGISTERED SUPPORT INTRODUCTION OF ALL 15 17 INTERESTS

OF TIFFANY'S

TRADEMARKS

...............................................

CONCLUSION..............................................................................................................................

OF CASES

AUTHORITIES

Page(s)

Constantino v. David M. Herzog, MD., P.C,
203 F.3d 164 (2d Cir. 2000).........................................................................................14 Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613 (5th Cir. 1977), cert denied, 435 U.S. 996 (1978) ................................................................................. Exxon Corp. v. Exxene Corp., 696 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1982) .......................................................................................12

14

Fingermates, Inc. v. Nailtique Cosmetic Corp.,
42 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1248 (D.N.J. 1996) .........................................................................7. Geremia v. First National Bank ofBoston, 653 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1981) ...........................................................................................12 16

Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Ecodyne Corp.
635 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1981) ........................................................................................6 Home Depot USA., Inc. v. G $ S Investors/Willow Park, L.P.,

Nos. 98-CV-6719 (TCP ARL), 00-CV-676 (TCP ARL),
2005 WL 3018701 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2005).................................................................5 Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187(9th Cir. 1973) .......................................................................................6 In re WorldCom, Inc. Securities Litigation,
No. 02 Civ. 3288 DLC

2005 WL 375314 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 17, 2005)................................................................14

John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632 (3d Cir. 1977).........................................................................................15
Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 813 (1989) ................................................................................ Lamborn v. Dittmer, 873 F.2d 522 (2d Cir. 1989)...................................................................................12.

16

13

Middle Atlantic Utilities Co. v. S.M.W.Development Corp.,
392 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1968)...........................................................................................6

International, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co.,
343 F.3d 669 (3d Cir. 2003).........................................................................................13

NRTMetals, Inc. v. Manhattan Metals (Non-Ferrous) Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 1046 (S.D.N.Y.1983)..............................................................................13 NordicTrack, Inc. v. ConsumerDirect, Inc.,
158 F.R.D. 415 (D. Minn. 1994)...................................................................... ............16

Pesce v. General Motors Corp., 939 F. Supp. 160 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) ................................................................................6 Poulson v. Beet Bugeez, Inc, No. 84 Civ. 7035 CSH, 1986 WL 11457 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1986)................................6
Schultz v. Butcher,

24 F.3d 626 (4th Cir. 1994) ...........................................................................................6
Shetterly v. Raymark Industrial, Inc., 117 F.3d 776 (4th Cir. 1997) ....................................................................................... Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire ~ Rubber Co.,

12

519 F.2d 708 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975)............................................5
Trujillo v. Uniroyal Corp.,

608 F.2d 815 (IOth Cir. 1979) ..................................................................................... 12 Tupman 17zurlowCo. v. SS Cap Castillo,
490 F.2d 302 (2d Cir. 1974).........................................................................................13 United States v. Chan,

184 F. Supp. 2d 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)............................................................................5 United States v. International Business Machines Co~p.,
87 F.R.D. 411 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ...................................................................................15 United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76 (6th Cir. 1986),

cert. denied, 482 U.S. 922 (1987) ............................................................................. ...14
United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000) .......................................................................................15 Vaweris v. United States Lines Co., 141 F. Supp. 874 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ..............................................................................14

AUTHORITIES

Fed. R. Evid 403 ............................................................................................................6,

15

iv

STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

TIFFANY (NJ) INC. and TIFFANY AND
COMPANY,

04 Civ. 4607 (KMK) Plaintiffs,

eBAY INC.,
Defendant.

TIFFANY'S

MEMORANDUM

OF LAW IN OPPOSITION
MOTION IN LIMINE

TO DEFENDANT'S PRELIMINARY

STATEMENT

Plaintiffs Tiffany (NJ) Inc. and Tiffany and Company (collectively,"Tiffany") submit this memorandumof law in oppositionto the motionin limineof defendanteBay Inc. ("eBay").
eBay moves to preclude Tiffany from establishing as part of its claims that eBay

infringed and contributorily infringed several registered trademarks that Tiffany did not specificallyrecite in its First Amended Complaint and the Pretrial Order.' eBay's motion is
based on the dual contention that it is surprised by the addition of these trademarks to the action

and that it wouldbe prejudicedif its motionis not granted. There was no surprise. As set forth below, and contrary to what eBay contends, the
trademarks have always been at issue in this case, and Tiffany has never limited its claims to the specific marks recited in the Pretrial Order. Both the First Amended Complaint and the
PERETTI, PALOMA PICASSO and the color

The marks at issue are ATLAS, ELSA PEREITI, mark, Tiffany Blue.

in this actionput eBayon noticeof the full arrayof trademarks are the basis of that Tiffany's claims. Yet, eBay displayeda blithe indifference those trademarks, to essentially

declining pursue discovery to any concerning trademarks the themselves theirscope. or
Further,there is no unfair prejudice. eBay has the burden of establishing unfair prejudice, its motionpapersare devoidof any evidence prejudice.Rather,eBaymerely but of complains, withoutany specificity, it wouldhave engaged morediscovery.Its conduct that in beliesthat claim, eBayalso complains its potential that liabilityfor damages increase, will but
even were that the case, that consequencecannotconstituteunfair prejudice. Because eBay cannot demonstratethat it is entitled to any relief, the motion should be
denied in its entirety.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

eBayhas longbeenon noticethatthis caseinvolves saleof counterfeit the goodsbearing
marks other than TIFFANY, TIFFANY & CO. and T & C0.2

Paragraph12 of the AmendedComplaintbegins with the statement: TIFFANY and TIFFANY & CO. are subject to the following registrations,among many others, on the PrincipalRegister in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office: ....

See Declaration Lori Schiffer, of datedMay is, 2007("Schiffer Decl.'?,Ex. A a 12 (emphasis supplied). That statementis followedby a listingof four registrations containing word the "TIFFANY" one for "T & CO." and two registrations designmarksonly,one for the and for

eBay complains of the "addition" in Tiffany's Proposed Findings of Fact of Tiffany owned or licensed trademarksthat bear the brands names: ATLAS, ELSA PERETTI,PERETTI and PALOMA PICASSO. eBay also complains of the "addition" of packaging and "collateral material" bearing the
Tiffany trademarked distinctive blue color.

design" of Elsa Peretti and the other for the "X design"of Paloma Picasso."3 See
Declarationof Erik Walsh, dated June 1, 2007 ("WalshDecl."),Exs. A-D. Paragraph l(b) of Tiffany's prayer for relief seeks a judgment: (1) preliminarily and then permanentlyenjoining and restraining defendant... fkom assistingin or contributingto the offering for
sale, sale, advertising and/or promotion in the United States of (a) jewelry bearing the TIFFANY, TIFFANY & CO., or T & CO.

trademarks,except for genuinemerchandisethat in its entiretyhas been made, sponsored or approved by plaintiffs; [and] (b) any
otherjewelry
trademarks...

or other merchandise that bears tradeniarks that are
."

confusingly similar to or dilutive of plaintiffs' registered See SchifferDecl., Ex. A at 12 (emphasissupplied).

Consistentwith the inclusivelanguageof the First AmendedComplaint,Tiffany's
discovery requests sought information pertaining to trademarks in addition to the Core Trademarks. For example, Tiffany's First Request for the Productionof Documents and First

Set of interrogatories teach dated October22, 2004) soughtinformationconcerningitems,

including packaging, bearing 'TiffanyMarks" on eBay. In thosediscovery the sold requests,
Tiffany defined "Tiffany Marks" to include:

[T]he distinctive blue coloring often described as 'robin's egg
blue' that is the subject of United States Patent and Trademark Office registration numbers 2,359,351; 2,416,794; 2,416,795; and 2,184,128, and any marks or colors that are confusingly similar to
those trademarks.

SeeWalshDecl.,Ex. E at 2 & Request Nos.4-11,13& 15;Ex.F at 2 & Interrogatories 1-5.
eBay did not object to or othen;vise challenge these definitions. Id., Exs. G-H.

Moreover, eBay did not limit its own discoveryrequeststo the Core Trademarks. For example, in its First Request for the Production of Documents,dated October 25, 2004, eBay sought
For convenience, the marks listed in paragraph 12 are referred to as the "Core Trademarks."

on Tiffany trademarks "including, but not limited to" the Core Trademarks. ~d., Ex. I
at 2.

Before as well as after the litigation began, Tiffany conducted "buying programs" during which "Tiffany" merchandise offered for sale on eBay was randomly selected for purchase and then inspected to determine whether it was genuine. During those two programs, a total of 325 pieces of jewelry and the accompanying packaging were purchased and inspected. Although the search term used to determine eligible merchandise was simply "Tiffany sterling", 45 of the pieces purchased illegitimately used the marks ATLAS, PERETTI, ELSA PERETTI and/or
PALOMA PICASSO. Id. B 15. The pertinent information relating to all of the merchandise

purchased in the two programs was entered on spreadsheets, including the ATLAS, PERETTI, ELSA PERETTI, and PALOMA PICASSO marks described above. Id., Exs. J and K. Tiffany produced those spreadsheets to eBay in discovery, id, sTI13-14, along with the eBay screenshots
corresponding representative to the items, which listed the marks being advertised. Id. TITI16-18. A

sample is annexed as Exhibit L (listing for "Tiffany Atlas Sterling Silver and

Rubber Bracelet"), Exhibit M (listing for "Tiffany & Co. Paloma Picasso Loving Heart Necklace") and Exhibit N (listing for "Tiffany & Co. Large Elsa Peretti Crucifix Necklace") to
the Walsh Declaration.

Tiffany also designated the buying program spreadsheets as trial exhibits in the Joint

Pretrial Order, which was submitted to the Court in October 2006. Id. fl'lT 13-14. eBay did not raise any objections to those exhibits. Id., Ex. O at 14. In addition, representative specimens of the physical evidence described above have been designated as trial exhibits in the Joint Pretrial
Order. Id. TI20, Ex. P.

deposed several witnesses concerning the buying programs and the results thereof, including Mary Grasso, Ewa Zalewska, George Callan (twice) and Robert Headley. At no time did eBay ask any questions concerning these marks, nor did it even request to inspect the original
merchandise, packaging etc., that had been purchased. In sum, eBay cannot establish "surprise" because Tiffany seeks to offer evidence

concerning its non-Core Trademarks, nor can it establish that discovery concerning them was blocked in any manner.
ARGUMENT

Motions in limine are subject to a high standard ofproof. See, e.g., Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire $ Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 712 (6th Cir.) ("Orders in limine which exclude broad categories of evidence should rarely be employed. A better practice is to deal with questions of admissibility of evidence as they arise."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); Home Depot U.S.A.,
Inc. v. G & S Investors/Willow Park, L.P., No. 98-CV-6719 (TCP ARL), 2005 WL 3018701 at "9 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2005). "Evidence should be excluded on a motion in limine only when the evidence is clearly inadmissible on all potential grounds. Indeed, courts considering a motion in

limine may reserve judgment until trial, so that the motion is placed in the appropriate factual
context." United States v. Chan, 184 F. Supp. 2d 337, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citations omitted).
POINT I

ADMISSION UNFAIRLY TRIAL

OF

THE

TRADEMARKS eBAY OR UNDULY

WOULD DELAY

NOT THE

PRE~PUDICE

eBay seeks to preclude Tiffany from barring its claims on certain of Tiffany's trademark registrations. eBay contends that, unless the motion is granted, it will be unfairly prejudiced, and
that Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence mandates that such relief be granted. See eBay's

at 1. A review of both the record facts, as well as eBay's failure to specify how it would be prejudiced, demonstrates that eBay's motion has no basis.
A. eBay Cannot Demonstrate Unfair Preiudice

Because the evidence at issue will not be shown to a jury, eBay's "unfair prejudice" argument under Rule 403 is misplaced. In a bench trial, the question of unfair prejudice under Rule 403 "has no logical application." Schultz v. Butcher, 24 F.3d 626, 632 (4th Cir. 1994) ("in the context of a bench trial, evidence should not be excluded under 403 on the ground that it is unfairly prejudicial."); Gulf States Utilities Co. v. Ecodyne Corp., 635 F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1981) ("excluding relevant evidence on the basis of'unfair prejudice' is a useless procedure"). Rule 403 provides that, "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." According to eBay, inclusion of the trademarks would "implicate both
prejudice and undue delay" under Rule 403. See eBay's Memo at 3. eBay is wrong on both

points.4
To the extent that eBay suggests that the "addition" of the eleven "new" trademarks constitutes an

attempt to amend Tiffany's Complaint, see eBay's Memo at 4, eBay is mistaken. As set forth above, paragraph 12 of the First Amended Complaint listed a number of trademarks "among many others".
Given notice pleading, no amendment is necessary. However, even if the Court were to find that Tiffany - by listing in its Proposed Findings of Fact each specific trademark registration concerning which Tiffany intends to produce evidence at trial -- is seeking to amend the complaint or modify the pretrial order (which it is not), such amendment or modification would be appropriate for the same reasons set forth above in the discussion of Rule 403. See Pesce v. General Motors Corp., 939 F. Supp. 160, 166 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (pure monetary increase of damages held not prejudicial to defendant); Poulson v. Beet Bugeez, Inc., No. 84 Civ. 7035 CSH, 1986 WL 11457 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 3, 1986) (increased amount of damages "do[es] not ordinarily impose any prejudice on an opposing party since judgments under Rule

54(c) are not bound by the relief prayed for in the pleadings. Damages are proved at the trial, not in the pleadings." (citation omitted)); Howey v. United States, 481 F.2d 1187, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) tallowing
amendment aRer five-year interval and on second day of trial); Middle Atlantic Utilities Co. v. S.M.·W. Development Corp., 392 F.2d 380, 384 (2d Cir. 1968) (mere delay is an insufficient ground for denying leave to amend; allowing amendment after three-year interval and notice of trial readiness).

only basis for the purported "prejudice" that can be gleaned from eBay's motion is: (1) Tiffany's introduction of the trademark registrations came 'Yoo late," leaving eBay without the opportunity to conduct unspecified discovery on the "new" trademarks; and (2) there is a possibility that eBay may be subject to an increased damages award. Neither of these assertions
constitutes undue prejudice.

It is not enough for a party to claim that it would be disadvantaged when it asserts that it would be unfairly prejudiced by the insertion of new facts into a case. "[T]he asserted prejudice must amount to more than mere inconvenience to the non-moving party. Instead, the non-

moving party must establishthat the amendment'unfairly disadvantage[d]or deprive[d] [it] of
the opportunity to present facts or evidence which it would have offered had the amendments

been timely."

Fingermates, Inc. v. Nailtiques Cosmetic Corp., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d 1248, 1250

(D.N.J. 1996) (citations omitted). Delay by itself does not constitute such prejudice. I~d. Nor does increasing the potential amount of damages for which a party may be liable constitute such prejudice. See this Memo at 14, inJi~a. It is eBay's burden to establish that it would be unfairly
prejudiced, and eBay cannot meet that burden. 1. Because eBay Had Notice of the 'CNew" Trademarks Outset of This Action, eBay Is Not Preiudiced from the

Contrary to eBay's assertion, this action involves, and always has involved, each of the trademarks listed in Tiffany's Proposed Findings of Fact. eBay's contention that this action is limited only to the Core Trademarks specifically identified in the First Amended Complaint is
based upon the faulty premise that this list is limited and exclusive. See eBay's Memo at 1-2.

eBay makes the same faulty assertion with respect to the discovery requests made in this action
and the Pretrial Order. See id. A review of each of these documents, however, establishes that

actionhas alwaysbeen about all of the infringedupon Tiffanyownedor licensedtrademarks
available on eBay.

In reviewingeBay's contentionand its lack of factualbasis, it is importantto understand the factual context of the additionaltrademarkregistrations. None of those trademarksare used
in isolation or by themselves. They are all used in concert with the "TIFFANY" and "TIFFANY

& CO." trademarks; they are all elicited by searches on eBay for "Tiffany" goods. The additional trademarks relate to specific designs or brands sold exclusivelyby Tiffany, all of
which are always accompanied by the Tiffany mark itself. Thus, the citation of those trademarks

in the Proposed Findings of Fact does not introduce any new issues or facts into this action.

Boththe CoreTrademarks theseadditional and trademarks simultaneously are infringed the by
sale of the counterfeitgoods on eBay. None of those facts shouldcome as a surpriseto eBay. In its First Amended Complaint, Tiffany sets forth its Core Trademarks, i.e., seven
examples of Tiffany owned or licensed registrations that are included in the terms '"TIFFANY"

and "TIFFANY & CO." as used therein. See Schiffer Decl., Ex.A TI12. These Core Trademarks are some of the most commonly infi-ingedupon Tiffany owned or licensed trademarks on eBay, but there are many more, almost always appearing in conjunctionwith auctions that infringe the Core Trademarks. This fact is evident in Paragraph12 of the First
Amended Complaint, which indicates that the list is not meant to be exclusive or exhaustive. It

states: "TIFFANY and TIFFANY & CO. are subject to the following registrations, among many

others ... ." Id. fl 13 (emphasisadded). Further, Tiffany's requestedrelief involves more than
just the Core Trademarks: WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray for a judgment: (1) preliminarily

and then permanently enjoining and restraining defendant... ~om assisting in or contributing to the offering for sale, sale, advertising

promotion in the United States of (a)jewelry bearing the
TIFFANY, TIFFANY & CO., or T & CO. trademarks, except for genuine merchandise that in its entirety has been made, sponsored or approved by plaintiffs; [and] (b) any other jewelry or other merchandise that bears trademarks that are confusingly similar to or dilutive ofplainti~t"s'registered trademarks .... Id. at 12 (emphasis added).

Further, two of the Core Trademarksspecificallyput eBay on notice that Tiffany was

relyingon a groupof trademarks beyondthosebearingvariations the mark "Tiffany"itself. of
Those two trademarks are the design marks created by the famous designers Elsa Peretti and Paloma Picasso and known as the Elsa Peretti "Beandesign"and the PalomaPicasso "X design". See Walsh Decl., Exs. A-D. They are clearlyrelatedto some of the "new" trademarksthat are at
issue in this motion, namely the word marks ELSA PERETTI, PERETTI and PALOMA

PICASSO. The Peretti and Picasso design marks and the broad language in both Paragraph 12 and the Prayer for Relief enabled eBay to know that those marks, among many others, are
included within Tiffany's claims. eBay's assertion that both parties' discovery focused exclusively on the Core Trademarks

is incorrect. Tiffany's document requests and interrogatoriesto eBay sought information concerningitems sold on eBay bearing Tiffany's trademarkeddistinctiveblue coloring and on packagingbearing the trademarkedcolor (or colors confusinglysimilarthereto). See this Memo
at 3. Nor did eBay itself limit its discovery requests to the Core Trademarks. See id, at 3-4, supra. eBay defined "Tiffany Marks" as including, "but not limited to" the Core Trademarks.
See id.

eBay also asserts that Tiffany's claims are limited to the Core Trademarks because Tiffany used only the search term "Tiffany" when searching the eBay website. See eBay's Memo at 2. As would a typical individual using eBay, Tiffany employed the search term

when it monitoredeBay for the sale of counterfeits. As eBay acknowledges,see id.,
Tiffany's Buying Programs, which established that approximately 75% of "Tiffany" silver jewelry on eBay is counterfeit, also used the search term "Tiffany" to select items for purchase. eBay makes the unjustified logical leap that, given the use of this search term, this action must therefore implicate only the Core Trademarks. See id, at 1-2. That claim is also based on a false premise. As eBay should know, use of the search term "Tiffany" generates results for listings offering jewelry bearing numerous Tiffany owned or licensed trademarks. Among these are ATLAS, PERETTI, ELSA PERETTI and PALOMA PICASSO. Tiffany has disclosed evidence of the infringement of these marks on eBay

throughout the course of discovery. For example, the charts tracking all the relevant data from Tiffany's Buying Programs include the listing title of the item purchased. In the two Buying

Programs, Tiffany purchased a total of 45 items that bore those specific trademarks.' Walsh
Decl. T[15, Exs. J-K. Additionsilly, Tiffany has produced the eBay screenshots corresponding to those items. Id., Exs. L-M. Numerous additional items included replicas ofTiffany's packaging
bearing its "blue" mark.

Furthermore, use of the search term "Tiffany" generates results for counterfeit Tiffany merchandise that commonly is accompanied by counterfeit Tiffany packaging. Such packaging bears Tiffany's trademarks and/or Tiffany's trademarked distinctive blue coloring (or marks
confusingly similar thereto), eBay long has been aware of Tiffany's focus on counterfeit

packaging, as revealed by Tiffany's discovery requests.
eBay wrongly

Moreover, Tiffany has designated
listed as ELSA

claims that Tiffany did not "attempt to authentic merchandise

PERE1TTI,PERETTI or PALOMA PICASSO." See eBay's Memo at 2 n.l. As the Buying Program
charts indicate, Tiffany did discover and disclose such instances of counterfeit goods. See Walsh Decl.,
Era. J-K.

packaging purchased on eBay as trial exhibits in connection with the Joint Pretrial Order. See Walsh Decl., TI Ex. P. 20,
2. eBay Was Not Denied the Ability to Pursue Discoverlv Concernine the "New" Trademarks

eBay cannot establish that it will suffer any unfair prejudice because of the additional trademarks listed in Tiffany's Proposed Findings of Fact. eBay claims that, had the "new" trademarks been identified earlier, "the parties might have been able to address them properly, and conduct relevant discovery." eBay's Memo at 3. It is unclear what eBay means by "address them properly," or how this could constitute prejudice - or unfair prejudice - in any event. What is clear, however, is that eBay had the opportunity but did not conduct any discovery on these
"new" trademarks.

Prior to the filing of this motion, eBay never showed any interest in the trademarks underlying Tiffany's claims. Despite the inclusive language in the Amended Complaint, see Schiffer Decl., Ex. A TI12, during the entire course of discovery, eBay never served a document
request or an interrogatory, or asked any questions during the many depositions, about the scope

of the trademarks that Tiffany alleges that eBay infkinged. See Walsh Decl. B 11. Indeed, in its
motion, eBay does not even identify what discovery it would have requested had Tiffany specifically listed these "new" trademarks earlier. Moreover, assuming arguendo that these registrations have not been part of the action, Tiffany's specification of the eleven "new" trademark registrations in the Proposed Findings of Fact does not constitute undue unfairness. same conduct, transactions As discussed above, those "new" marks relate to the at issue in each count of the First Amended

and occurrences

Complaint. Since no new conduct or transactions are implicated by these additional trademarks,

is nothing more that eBay had to do in discovery or to prepare for trial. See EmxonCorp. v. Ex~ceneCorp., 696 F.2d 544, 547-48 (7th Cir. 1982) (introduction at trial of 13 trademark registrations not listed in pretrial order held not to be prejudicial when party had time to prepare
a response to such evidence). The only potential consequence of these trademark registrations

being at issue is the amount of damages, which, as discussed below, does not constitute undue
prejudice. 3. eBay Is Not Prejudiced Any of the Trademarks by the Absence of Citation to in the Pretrial Order

Because eBay had the ability to seek discovery with respect to all trademarks that were

the subject of the First Amended Complaint, eBay may not seek to preclude introduction of
evidence regarding the additional trademarks on the ground that they were not specifically

identified in the Pretrial Order. Prior to the parties preparing and submitting the Pretrial Order,
eBay was unrestrained in its ability to pursue discovery. By the time that the parties submitted

the Pretrial Order, all discovery had been completed and the inclusion or exclusion of the additional trademark registrations could not have had any impact on whatever discovery eBay
had already pursued. "Proper pretrial orders are indeed powerful, but even at their best they should be

'liberally construed to cover any of the legal or factual theories that might be embraced by their
language."' Trujillo v. Uniroyal Corp., 608 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir. 1979) (citation omitted); Inc., 117 F.3d 776, 784 (4th Cir. 1997) (interpreting

see Shetterly v. Raymark Industries,

language in pretrial order to include claim not specifically listed therein); Geremia v. First National Bank ofBoston, 653 F.2d 1, 5 (5th Cir. 1981) (interpreting ambiguous statement in

pretrial order broadly).

A pretrial order is not intended to fUnction as "an inflexible'

on the conduct of litigation or to produce an abstract, perfect equivalence between the pretrial papers and the course of the litigation; instead, it [is] intended to insure the efficient resolution of cases and, most importantly, minimize prejudicial surprise." Lamborn v. Dittmer, 873 F.2d 522, 527 (2d Cir. 1989). For that reason, the Second Circuit rejected the attempt in Lamborn to use the pretrial order as a basis for denying the plaintiff the ability to introduce an
additional claim - the court found that the defendant had been on notice to the claim because of

the prior proceedings in the action. Id. Accordingly, when a defendant is not surprised or prejudiced, a plaintiff may introduce

evidence not specifically listed in a pretrial order. See Tupman ~zurlow Co. v. SS Cap Castillo, 490 F.2d 302, 309 (2d Cir. 1974) (when litigant was able to cope with evidence not identified in
pre-trial order, it was not error to admit that evidence); NRT Metals, Inc. v. Manhattan Metals

(1Von-Ferrous)Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 1046, 1053 (S.D.N.Y.1983) (although pre-trial order is binding on parties, issue should not be foreclosed when complaining party had meaningful opportunity to address the evidence and therefore could not claim surprise and unfairness); cJ: Morton
International, Inc. v. A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co., 343 F.3d 669, 684 (3d Cir. 2003)

(adjudication of claim not listed in pretrial order held proper when plaintiff raised claim in
statement of facts and brief and thereby gave defendant notice of claim). eBay cannot fairly argue that Tiffany's claims for trademark infringement are limited to the Core Trademarks and do not include the "new" trademarks. Nor can eBay fairly argue, in

light of the discovery throughout the case and the submission of the findings of fact well prior to

trial, that it is surprised or unfairly prejudiced by the inclusion of all of the applicable Tiffany
trademarks in the Pretrial Order.

The Risk of a Possibly Higher Damage Award Is Not the Type of Prejudice That Would Trigger Rule 403

According to eBay, the introduction of the "new" trademarks raises the possibility that presuming that Tiffany elects statutory damages and that the Court, in its discretion, awards the maximum of such damages - a higher damage award may be assessed against eBay. See eBay's Memo at 4-5. Although such a result would be adverse to eBay, it is not enough to preclude
introduction of these trademarks into the case.6

eBay is required to establish that it would be "unfairly" prejudiced.

See Constantino v.

David M. Herzog, M.D., P.C., 203 F.3d 164, 174-75 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that the "unfairness" contemplated under Rule 403 "involves some adverse effect beyond tending to prove a fact or issue that justifies admission."). Although introduction of trademark registrations might be prejudicial, as is generally the case with all evidence introduced against an opposing

party,7it is not unfair to informthe Court of the scope of trademarkviolationseBay is alleged to
have committed. The risk of increased damages by the admission of such evidence does not rise to the level of unfair prejudice. See In re WorldCom,Inc. Securities Litigation, No. 02 Civ. 3288 DLC, 2005 WL 375314, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Feb.l7, 2005) (testimony supporting an award of

damages in amount of approximately $17 billion did not constitute unfair prejudice); Vaweris v.
United States Lines Co., 141 F. Supp. 874, 875 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (prejudice "does not flow ~om proper exposure to the damages proved"). Such a result, however, is unlikely. Whether Tiffany elects to pursue an accounting of eBay's profits for the counterfeit goods pursuant to 15 U.S.C. ~ 1117(a)(1) or statutory damages under 15 U.S.C. ~
1117(c), the number of counterfeit items considered by the Court should not increase. That outcome is likely because all of the "new" marks appeared in conjunction with the Core Trademarks. "Virtually all evidence is prejudicial or it isn't material." Dollar v. Long Mfg., N.C., Inc., 561 F.2d 613, 618 (5th Cir. 1977). See also United States v. Mendez-Ortiz, 810 F.2d 76, 79 (6th Cir. 1986) ("'Unfair prejudice,' as used in Rule 403, does not mean the damage to a defendant's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the evidence; rather, it refers to evidence which tends to suggest decision on an improper basis." (citations omitted)), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 922 (1987).

The

Admission

of the "New"

Trademarks

Would

Not

Delay Proceedings

in This Action delay in identifying the additional trademarks by itself

eBay contends that Tiffany's mandates preclusion.

See eBay's Memo at 3-4. As shown above, the marks were all identified

during the course of the discovery period.

In any event, eBay's assertion is based on a

misinterpretation of Rule 403. Rule 403 does not require preclusion unless eBay establishes, at a minimum, that denial of its motion in limine would burden the resources of this Court, delay the trial or constitute a waste oftime. eBay cannot make any such showing. eBay contends that the specification of the additional trademark registrations in the Proposed Findings of Fact is too late. Yet, such conduct is not the type of undue "delay" that is
contemplated by Rule 403. See United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306, 316 (6th Cir. 2000)

("the term 'delay' does not connote delay in the submission of motions or proffers; rather, it
encompasses the prolonging of the length of the trial, and can be read properly in conjunction

with the other exclusionary factors: 'waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."'); John McShain, Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 563 F.2d 632, 636 (3d Cir. 1977) (reception of reports into evidence would have involved a lengthy inquiry into admissible hearsay and authenticity); United States v. International Business Machines Corp., 87 F;R.D.
411, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (discussing delay under Rule 403 in the context of lengthening the time oftrial).
POINT II

THE

INTERESTS

OF

JUSTICE

SUPPORT

INTRODUCTION

OF ALL

OF TIFFANY'S

REGISTERED

TRADEMARKS

The narrow reading of the pleadings and Pretrial Order advocated by eBay is not in the interests ofjustice. As discussed above, Tiffany's pleadings and the discovery process gave

sufficient notice that the trademark registrations at issue in this case werenot limited to those specifically listed in the pleadings, much less only those containing the word "Tiffany." Permitting the admission into evidence of all of Tiffany's previously identified trademark
registrations would serve judicial economy. Tiffany could commence a second action regarding

the additional trademarks. Yet,it would be pointless to impose such a burden on the parties and the Court when the gravamen of the second action would be the very same transactions at issue in this action. Further, this Court has an interest in resolving all of Tiffany's trademark claims against eBay that arise from the sale of counterfeit goods on the eBay website. See Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 473 (9th Cir. 1988) (adding claims into a pending proceeding "promote[s] the economical and speedy disposition of the controversy"), cert denied, 493 U.S. 813 (1989). Requiring Tiffany to litigate infringement of its "new" trademarks in a separate action "would waste judicial resources as well as the resources of the parties."
Nailtique Cosmetic Corp., 42 U.S.P.Q.2d

See Fingermates, Inc. v.
addition of additional

1248 at 1251 tallowing

trademark registrations when the claims relating to such registrations they were inextricably
intertwined with the existing claims); NordicTrack, Inc. v. Consumer Direct, Inc., 158 F.R.D. 415, 422 (D. Minn. 1994) tallowing supplementation of Lanham Act claims seeking relief from additional advertisements not listed in the complaint when no further discovery was required and the trial would not be delayed). Thus, in light of the fact that no additional discovery is required and the trial would not be delayed by the introduction of these trademarks, it is in the interest of judicial economy to permit Tiffany's
determine.

additional trademarks to be included in the claims that this Court is to

For the foregoing reasons, eBay's motion in limine should be denied in its entirety.
Dated: New York, New York
June 1, 2007

Respectfully submitted,
ARNOLD & PORTER LLP

By:
Jam~s B."Swire (JS-5996) Fl. Peter Haveles, Jr. (HH-8230) Eleanor M. Lackman ~(EL-3668) Erik C. Walsh (EW-2765)
399 Park Avenue

New York, New York [phone]

10022

Attorneys for Plaintiffs

OF SERVICE

I, AnthonyD. Boccanfuso,the undersignedattorneyat law duly admittedto practicein the State of New York, respectfullyshow that on the 1"'day of June, 2007, the annexed
TIFFANY'S MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S

MOTION INLIMINE was served by hand delivery upon:
Mark Fiore, Esq.
WEIL GOTSHAL 767 Fifth Avenue & MANGES LLP

New York, NY 10153

Anthony D. BoccanfUso