Sahu et al v. Union Carbide Corporation et al

Filing 64

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER:#98055 Plaintiffs' motion under Rule 56 (f) is granted. Defendants' May 18, 2005, motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment is stayed until further discovery can be conducted. Nonetheless, for reasons alread y stated, all of Plaintiffs' discovery requests are denied save for the following: Document Requests Nos. 21-25, 28, and 31-34. Document Requests Nos. 21 and 25 are modified as discussed above. If Defendants make any claims of privilege, they ar e directed to provide a privilege log in conformity with Fed. R. Civ. P. 26 (b) (5). Discovery can commence immediately and will close on December 15, Magistrate Judge Pitman will handle any disputes. A conference is set for December 21, 2009, at 10 a.m. to discuss the briefing schedule for the motion for summary judgment. (Signed by Judge John F. Keenan on 9/22/09) (ae) Modified on 9/23/2009 (jab).

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----------------------------------------X SAHU, et al., : : Plaintiffs, : : v. : : UNION CARBIDE CORPORATION, et al., : : Defendants. : ----------------------------------------X

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER 04 Civ. 8825(JFK)

JOHN F. KEENAN, United States District Judge: Before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion under Rule 56(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for an order staying the time for their opposition to Defendants' May 18, 2005, motion to dismiss and/or for summary judgment until further discovery can be conducted. I. BACKGROUND

The Court assumes familiarity with the facts and procedural history of the case. For a detailed statement thereof, see Sahu

v. Union Carbide Corp., 548 F.3d 59, 60-65 (2d Cir. 2008). Briefly, Plaintiffs seek recovery for injuries allegedly caused ("UCIL") by pollution plant in from the Union India Carbide (the India Limited Plant").

Bhopal,

"Bhopal

Plaintiffs allege that the Bhopal Plant ­ which was the site of a catastrophic gas leak in 1984 unrelated to the instant claims ­ produced hazardous wastes during its normal operations that 1

contaminated the soil and drinking water of local communities. UCIL was a subsidiary of the Union Carbide Corporation ("UCC") until 1994, when UCC sold all of its shares. UCIL has since

changed its name to Eveready Industries India Limited ("EIIL"). Plaintiffs seek to hold UCC and its former CEO, Warren Anderson, liable for their injuries on the grounds that (1) they were direct participants and joint tortfeasors in the activities that resulted in the pollution; (2) they worked in concert with UCIL to cause, exacerbate, or conceal the pollution; and (3) UCIL acted veil. The instant motion arises in the wake of the following procedural history. On May 18, 2005, Defendants moved to as UCC's alter ego, justifying piercing the corporate

dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56. To the extent Defendants moved for dismissal on the

pleadings, the Court converted the motion to one for summary judgment on the grounds that matters outside the pleadings had been presented to the Court and that Plaintiffs were on notice that such a conversion was possible. Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp. (Sahu I), 418 F. Supp. 2d 407, 410-11 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). The

Court granted Defendants summary judgment on all claims, save

2

Plaintiffs' veil-piercing claim.1 Id. at 416.

Defendants had

argued that there was no equitable basis to pierce the corporate veil since EIIL ­ UCIL's current incarnation ­ is a financially viable corporation capable of meeting its liabilities. opposition to Defendants' motion, Plaintiffs In their an

requested

opportunity to conduct discovery pursuant to Rule 56(f) in order to rebut this on assertion. the The Court claim "EIIL consented until and and reserved had

decision received

veil-piercing regarding

Plaintiffs its

discovery

corporate

relationship to UCIL and UCC." Id. Plaintiffs subsequently submitted 199 document requests and sought to take four depositions on wide-ranging topics. The

Court denied these as beyond the scope of permitted discovery save for seventeen of the document requests, which explicitly related to EIIL. Sahu v. Union Carbide, No. 04 Civ. 8825, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 714 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2006). The Court also

issued a letter rogatory addressed to the appropriate judicial

As noted in the Court's prior opinion, "`piercing the corporate veil . . . is not, in and of itself, an independent cause of action but a procedural device through which a plaintiff may assert facts and circumstances to persuade the court to impose' a subsidiary's obligation on the parent." Sahu I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 410-11 (quoting Sec. Investor Protection Corp. v. Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 234 B.R. 293, 321 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999)). The Court refers to it as a claim, nonetheless, in keeping with common legal parlance. 3

1

authority in India to obtain documents directly from EIIL on relevant topics. (Heck Aff. Ex. 4.) After the close of this discovery, by order and opinion dated November 20, 2006, the Court granted Defendants summary judgment on the veil-piercing claim. Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp. (Sahu II), No. 04 20, Civ. 2006). 8826, The 2006 Court U.S. Dist LEXIS 84475 was

(S.D.N.Y.

Nov.

found

that

there

insufficient evidence to make the wrong- or fraud-prong of the veil-piercing test a genuine issue of material fact. Id at *30. With regard to EIIL, the Court found that Plaintiffs could not dispute that it was a financially viable corporation, meaning no inference of abuse of the corporate form could be drawn. Id. at *20. The Second Circuit addressed in a single opinion both the initial grant of summary judgment on the non-veil-piercing

claims and the subsequent grant of summary judgment on the veilpiercing claim. Sahu v. Union Carbide Corp., 548 F.3d 59 (2d Cir. 2008). question," remanded claims, received Twice noting that it was a "close case" or "close id. both the at 67, 70, the Second Circuit the vacated and

decisions. court

Regarding found

non-veil-piercing had would not be

appellate

that

Plaintiffs motion

sufficient

notice

that

Defendants'

converted to one for summary judgment. Id. at 66-70; see also 4

id. at 70 ("Underlying the notice requirement is the principle that parties are entitled to a reasonable opportunity to present material pertinent to a summary judgment motion."). the veil-piercing relied claim, in part the on Second the Circuit found of the Regarding that its

dismissal

dismissal

non-veil-

piercing claims; consequently the appellate court vacated the Court's judgments in their entirety. In closing, the Second

Circuit observed that "relatively limited further proceedings" were likely necessary "in connection with consideration of

summary judgment." Id. Plaintiffs now bring the instant motion, requesting a stay and an opportunity under Rule 56(f) to conduct discovery

relevant to the following issues: 1. Whether Union Carbide directly participated in and/or acted as a joint tortfeasor with [UCIL] in the activities and decisions that caused or resulted in the environmental pollution at issue; Whether Union Carbide conspired with and/or aided and abetted UCIL to cause, exacerbate and/or conceal the pollution problem in Bhopal; Whether the corporate veil of UCIL and/or [EIIL] may be pierced to hold UCC liable for the pollution at issue; and Whether UCC may be held liable for some form of injunctive relief and medical monitoring. They propose that this discovery be effected for the 5 production of documents from

2.

3.

4.

(Pls.' Mem. 3.) through 63

requests

Defendants (Garbow Aff. Ex. B); 18 requests for the production of documents from third party Arthur D. Little, a consulting firm that assisted in the environmental rehabilitation of the Bhopal site (Garbow Aff. Ex. F); a Rule 30(b)(6) deposition of Defendant UCC (Garbow Aff. Ex. G); depositions of several of Defendant UCC's former officers (Garbow Aff. Exs. H, I, J); and 86 requests for admission (Garbow Aff. Ex. K). II. A. Rule 56(f) provides, If a party opposing the motion [for summary judgment] shows by affidavit that, for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may: (1) deny the motion; (2) order a continuance to enable affidavits to be obtained, depositions to be taken, or other discovery to be undertaken; or (3) issue any other just order. Fed. R. Civ. P. of 56(f). Rule According 56(f), to the a Second party Circuit's facing an DISCUSSION Rule 56(f)

interpretation

"when

adversary's motion for summary judgment reasonably advises the court that it needs discovery to be able to present facts needed to defend the motion, the court should defer decision of the motion until the party has had the opportunity to take discovery and rebut the motion." Commercial Cleaning Servs. v. Colin Serv. Sys., 271 F.3d 374, 386 (2d Cir. 2001). The affidavit required

by Rule 56(f) must state "(1) what facts are sought and how they 6

are to be obtained, (2) how those facts are reasonably expected to create a genuine issue of material fact, (3) what effort the affiant has made to obtain them, and (4) why the affiant was unsuccessful in those efforts." Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep't of Navy, 891 F.2d 414, 422 (2d Cir. 1989). "Rule 56(f) discovery is specifically designed to enable a plaintiff to fill material evidentiary gaps in its case in an effort to withstand summary judgment." Capital Imaging Assocs., P.C. v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assocs., Inc., 725 F. Supp. 669, 680 (N.D.N.Y 1989). It does not, however, permit a plaintiff to

engage in a "fishing expedition." Waldron v. Cities Serv. Co., 361 F.2d 671, 673 (2d Cir. 1966). A plaintiff must also show

"that the material sought is germane to the defense, and that it is neither cumulative nor speculative." Paddington Partners v. Bouchard, 34 F.3d 1132, 1138 (2d Cir. 1994). "[I]f the court

decides to grant . . . a continuance, it must also determine the appropriate scope and manner of . . . discovery." Capital

Imaging Assocs., P.C., 725 F. Supp. at 680 (citing Sam Wong & Son, Inc. v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 735 F.2d 653, 678 (2d Cir. 1984)); see also Cruden v. Bank of New York, 957 F.2d 961, 972 (2d Cir. 1992) ("A trial court enjoys wide discretion in its handling of pre-trial discovery.").

7

The

Court

first

considers

whether

Plaintiffs

have

demonstrated a need for the discovery sought under Rule 56(f) and, second, whether any of the discovery that survives this analysis is overbroad or unduly burdensome. B. Plaintiffs' Need For Rule 56(f) Discovery

The parties' primary disagreements under Rule 56(f) concern whether the discovery to the Plaintiffs motion for seek is "germane" judgment to their and/or

opposition

summary

"cumulative" of past discovery received in this and a related case. 1. Germane

Defendants contend that the discovery sought by Plaintiffs is not germane to Defendants' narrow summary judgment argument on Plaintiffs' direct, joint, and concerted action liability

claims. the

Defendants' summary judgment argument is simply that Plaintiffs cite in their complaint contradict

documents

their allegations. The Court agrees, as it did in its prior decisions, that Plaintiffs' undermine complaint cites claims documents of direct, that joint, contradict and or

Plaintiffs'

concerted

action liability. See Sahu I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 412-15; Sahu

8

II, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84475, at *27-30.2 support of their claim that UCC

For example, in inadequate

transferred

technology to UCIL ­ a lynchpin of Plaintiffs' direct liability theory ­ the complaint relies on a 1973 "UCC" capital budget proposal. In reality the budget proposal was a UCIL document,

not a UCC document, and it expressly stated that UCIL would develop its own technology, rather than turn to UCC for help. Sahu I, 418 F. Supp. 2d at 413. The Court recognizes, however, that Plaintiffs can overcome these contradictions, and with them Defendants' summary judgment argument, by obtaining documents that actually support their

claims as expressed in the complaint. See

Vox Advertising &

Design, Inc. v. Makela, No. 99 Civ. 10097, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16533, at *14-17 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 13, 2000) (denying summary

judgment where parties' documentary evidence was conflicting and inconclusive). It is arguable that more than mere speculation On the to

motivates Plaintiffs' belief that such documents exist: question UCIL, of whether point to UCC transferred 1 of inadequate the Heck

technology

they

Exhibit

Affidavit,

which

indicates that UCIL obtained some of its technology from the

The Court is aware that it is not bound by the law of the case since these decisions were vacated. See Johnson v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 457 U.S. 52, 53-54 (1982). It nonetheless reaches the same conclusion after renewed, independent consideration of the complaint. 9

2

Stauffer Chemical Company in a "purchase thru UCC." (Heck Aff. Ex. 1 at UCC 04705.) letter from Union They also offer a September 8, 1975, Eastern, assuring a creditor that

Carbide

"[k]now-how for the [Bhopal] project is being provided by Union Carbide Corporation of New York" (Handley Aff. Ex. 3 at 2); as well as a September 22, 1975, memorandum from an engineer

stating that UCC will "furnish technical services during the first five years support, of and operation" majority and that UCC's of "know-how, provide

technical

ownership

UCIL

assurance of technical competence." (Handley Aff. Ex. 5 at 1-2.) These documents may suggest there is reason to believe discovery regarding the transfer of technology ­ such as Document Request No. 34 ­ might yield documents that Plaintiffs can use to

justify their opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Other discovery requests that may yield germane documents

include Document Request Nos. 21-25, 28, and 31-34.3 Nonetheless, the Court finds that a number of Plaintiffs' discovery requests are not in fact germane to the motion for summary judgment. For example, Document Request No. 35 asks for

"[a]ny statement of business principles issued by UCC, Union Carbide Eastern or Union Carbide Agricultural Division."

The Court does not consider whether discovery requests that are obviously cumulative or improper for reasons discussed below are germane. 10

3

Plaintiffs fail to show how "business principles" could possibly be germane. The Court denies Document Request No. 35 and, for

similar reasons, Document Request Nos. 8-10, and 20. 2. Defendants contend Cumulative many of Plaintiffs' discovery

that

requests are cumulative of (a) the Rule 56(f) discovery already received in this case and (b) discovery received in a related case, Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 99 Civ. 11329. agrees in large measure. a. Plaintiffs' Earlier Rule 56(f) Discovery requests related to their veilThe Court

discovery

piercing claim are cumulative of the Rule 56(f) discovery they received in 2006. Defendants moved for summary judgment on this

claim on a single ground: there is no equitable basis to pierce the corporate veil since of EIIL its is a financially The viable Court

corporation

capable

meeting

liabilities.

already afforded Plaintiffs an opportunity to obtain discovery for the purposes of rebutting this assertion. Consequently, the

requests Plaintiffs now make to obtain veil-piercing discovery are either duplicative Defendants' of past discovery summary or unnecessary to

withstand

narrow

judgment

argument.4

In their reply affidavit, Plaintiffs urge the Court to reject Defendants' financial viability defense as a matter of law. (See Handley Aff. ¶¶ 39-44.) Ironically, this suggests 11

4

Therefore, categorize

the as

Court

denies Veil

all

requests

that

Plaintiffs namely,

"Corporate

Piercing"

discovery,

Document Request Nos. 36-62. Nonetheless, the Court declines Defendants' invitation to deny all requests that might yield information relevant to the veil-piercing Defendants claim. (See Heck Aff. ¶ 38.) the For example, Task

contend

that

discovery

regarding

"Bhopal

Force" ­ a group that allegedly played a role in managing UCIL and that may have included UCC employees ­ should be denied on these grounds. to the It is true that such discovery would be relevant veil-piercing defense that UCC did not

hypothetical

sufficiently dominate UCIL to justify disregarding the corporate form. See Morris v. State Dep't of Taxation & Fin., 82 N.Y.2d 135, 141 (1993) (holding that domination is required to pierce the corporate veil). However, such discovery is also relevant

Plaintiffs believe they need no further discovery to resist Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Although the Court agrees that no further discovery is needed, it declines to rule on Defendants' financial viability defense at this time. Doing so without affording Defendants a chance to respond to Plaintiffs' never before raised legal arguments would be unfair and would deprive the Court of valuable assistance in deciding an important legal question. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Dumas, 960 F. Supp. 710, 720 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) ("Arguments made for the first time in a reply brief need not be considered by a court."). Moreover, the Court is aware that its prior analysis of the veil-piercing claim relied, in part, on its analysis of the non-veil-piercing claims. See Sahu, 548 F.3d at 70. Therefore, any ruling before receiving further briefing on all claims would be premature. 12

to Plaintiffs' claims that UCC and UCIL were joint tortfeasors or co-conspirators. See Rastelli v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 79 N.Y.2d 289, The 295 Court (1992) will (discussing not deny concerted action

liability).

Plaintiffs

discovery

necessary to resist the motion for summary judgment on the nonveil-piercing claims simply because it may also be relevant to veil piercing. 2. Plaintiffs make Bano Discovery requests cumulative of the

numerous

discovery they received as members of the putative plaintiff class in Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 99 Civ. 11329, a related case. In order to explain its ruling here, the Court That

recounts the history of discovery in Bano at some length. case involved claims essentially identical to those

asserted

here, save for the important difference that those claims were time-barred and, as such, were ultimately dismissed. Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 99 Civ. 11329, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4097 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2003). Plaintiffs in the instant case

consist of Bano plaintiffs whose claims are not in fact timebarred. Initial discovery commenced in Bano on December 17, 2001, concluded on March 18, 2002, and was limited exclusively to

13

document

requests. produced

(Heck

Aff.

Ex.

5A.5)

During

discovery, to "UCIL's

Defendants

documents

related

generally

practices at the Bhopal plant for the disposal of chemical waste products and the alleged environmental contamination or

pollution of the soil or groundwater in or around the Bhopal plant, not arising (Heck out Aff. of Ex. or 5C related at 3.) to the More [1984] Bhopal

Disaster."

specifically,

Defendants produced documents responsive to the following topics (the "Eight Initial Discovery Topics"): 1. Chemical spills and leaks which could have caused soil or ground water contamination in or around the Bhopal plant; The plant's disposal and chemical waste products; handling practices for

2. 3. 4.

The plant's disposal facilities; The plant's environmental practices, as reflected in manuals, internal memoranda, correspondence, etc.; The plant's safety procedures related to the environment and disposal of chemicals and waste products; Studies, surveys, safety audits, and action plans involving the environment or chemical disposal practices; The solar evaporation ponds; and

5.

6.

7.
5

Exhibit 5 to the Heck Affidavit is a July 20, 2005, letter from Defendants to Magistrate Judge Pitman, which itself contains exhibits designated by letters. Rather than use the awkward notation "Heck Aff. Ex. 5 Ex. A," the Court adopts the shorthand "Heck Aff. Ex. 5A." 14

8.

The toxicity products.

of

the

plant's

chemical

waste

(Id. at 3-4.) In a March their 25, 2002, letter to the Court, in Defendants They

described

document

production

effort

detail:

devoted over 900 attorney hours at a cost of $270,000 to review 355 boxes of potentially relevant materials. (Id. at 2.) This

yielded a total production of 4,102 pages of documents, which, as Plaintiffs note, amounts to less than two banker's boxes. Following this document production, a dispute arose, which the Court summarized in an April 8, 2002, order: This discovery dispute is occasioned by the overbroad discovery requests of plaintiffs relating to the environmental claims . . . . Discovery closed on March, 18, 2002. After a conference was held on March 18, 2002, in an effort to resolve the differences between the parties, plaintiffs served, without any authorization from the Court, seventeen (17) new discovery requests which far exceed the environmental claims here and which, rather than refining the original requests, broadened them. (Heck Aff. Ex. 5I at 1.) Noting that Defendants had "already

produced 4102 pages of documents," the Court determined that it was appropriate at that juncture to permit Defendants to move for summary judgment and, if necessary, to permit Plaintiffs to move in response for additional discovery under Rule 56(f). (Id.

15

at 1-2.)

Plaintiffs did so move and the Court found that they

were entitled to the following additional discovery: 1. Documents concerning the lease granted by the State of Madhya Pradesh to UCIL and its subsequent modification or termination in 1998; Documents concerning any contamination found in or around solar evaporation ponds at the UCIL plant site while UCIL was in possession and control of the plant and any measures taken to remedy the contamination during that time; Documents concerning the decision to back-integrate the UCIL plant and the technology and environmental risks associated with such decision; Documents concerning the alleged seizure or control of the UCIL plant site by governmental authorities following the Bhopal disaster, through the sale of UCIL in 1994 and the alleged termination of UCIL's lease in 1998; Documents concerning the sale of Union Carbide's equity in UCIL to McLeod Russell in 1994 including documents concerning the sale of Union Carbide's equity in Eveready Industries and the subsequent merger of McLeod Russell and Eveready Industries, the continuing involvement after the sale of the former UCIL, renamed [EIIL], in site rehabilitation efforts at the Bhopal plant site. The Court certified that Defendants' complied with the Court's

2.

3.

4.

5.

(Heck Aff. Ex. 6 at 2-3.) subsequent Rule 56(f)

production

mandate. (Heck Aff. Ex. 7 at 1.)

With Rule 56(f) discovery

complete, the Court granted Defendants' motion for dismissal, Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., No. 99 Civ. 11329, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4097 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2003), a decision that the Second Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part, 361 F.3d 696, 702 16

(2d Cir. 2004) (remanding plaintiffs' claims for monetary and injunctive relief for injury to property). On June 23, 2005, the Bano plaintiffs moved before

Magistrate Judge Pitman, who oversaw discovery in the case, for an order to compel further discovery on the remanded claims. Plaintiffs argued that additional discovery was needed since (1) Defendants excluded from their 2002 production documents that made reference to the 1984 disaster at the Bhopal Plant; (2) Defendants produced only a single box of responsive documents, a small percentage of the 355 boxes of material that they actually reviewed; and (3) there were "inexplicable gaps" in the

documents produced.6 (Handley Aff. Ex. 1 at 3-5.)

Defendants

countered that the exclusion of any documents concerning the 1984 disaster was proper since Plaintiffs' claims based thereon had been dismissed, that the small number of documents produced reflected Defendants' limited role in building and operating the Bhopal Plant, and that Plaintiffs' "inexplicable gaps" argument was baseless. Although Magistrate Judge Pitman did not formally rule on Plaintiffs' motion to compel, he did hold a conference on the motion that the Court finds relevant to its analysis here. At

the conference, Magistrate Judge Pitman stated, "The defendants Plaintiffs instant motion.
6

made

other

arguments 17

not

relevant

to

the

have produced all the documents in their possession, custody or control that relate to [the Eight Initial Discovery Topics]." (Heck Aff. Ex. 9 at 3.) of documents produced He further stated that the small number was not "surprising" in light of

Defendants' position that they had limited involvement with the operations of the Bhopal Plant. (Id. at 4.) used the conference production Topics, to on question topics as the Notably, Plaintiffs of the 2002

adequacy than the

document Discovery

other

Eight to

Initial an

such

Defendants'

failure

produce

organizational chart or discovery related to the history of the Bhopal Plant. The Court concludes that the discovery produced in Bano is cumulative of much of the discovery sought in this case. Court finds no reason the to Bano doubt Defendants' was The

repeated and

representations complete endorsed. ­

that

discovery

thorough Judge

representations

that

Magistrate

Pitman

Therefore, to the extent that Plaintiffs' instant

discovery requests are duplicative of the Bano discovery, they are denied as cumulative. discovery requests: 27, and 29. The Court of also the finds Bano that, to the a extent number they of are not This ruling applies to the following

Document Request Nos. 1-6, 11, 13, 17-19,

duplicative

discovery, 18

Plaintiffs'

requests are not germane.

For example, Document Request No. 7

asks for "[d]ocuments provided to or received from Arthur D. Little or Burson-Marsteller referring or relating to the Bhopal plant." (Burson-Marsteller is a public relations firm that

represented UCC.) as part of the

Insofar as such documents were not provided Bano discovery in response to, among other

requested topics, "measures taken to remedy the contamination," they are not germane. no more than speculate. In arguing otherwise, Plaintiffs can do The Court denies Document Request No. 7

and, for similar reasons, Document Request Nos. 14-16, 26, 30. C. Overbroad

Courts deny or modify discovery requests that are fashioned so broadly that they would require the production of irrelevant material. See, e.g., Martinez v. Robinson, No. 99 Civ. 11911, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4454 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2002); Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 90 Civ. 7811, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17769 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 13, 1994). One of

Plaintiffs' requests is so overbroad that it requires denial. Document Request No. 12 requests "[d]ocuments referring or

relating to cost-cutting or economy drive measures proposed or implemented at the Bhopal plant between 1980 and 1984." This

request has the potential to dredge up a mountain of irrelevant documents, such as memoranda advising plant employees to turn 19

off the lights when they leave for the night or to use both sides of Post-it notes. Request No. 12. Two other requests require slight modification. Document Therefore, the Court denies Document

Requests Nos. 21 and 25 both request documents relating to the "ownership, operation or control of the Bhopal plant." Court strikes the word "operation" as being susceptible The to

various meanings, a number of which would make the requests overbroad. D. Burdensome

Courts may limit discovery on the ground that "the burden or expense of the proposed the discovery of the outweighs case, the its likely in the the P.

benefit,

considering the

needs

amount of of Civ.

controversy, issues at

parties' in the

resources, action, the and

the the

importance importance Fed. P. R.

stake in

discovery

resolving see

issues." R. Civ.

26(b)(2)(C)(iii); (stating that

also may

Fed. limit

26(b)(2)(c)(i) it "can be

courts

discovery

where

obtained from some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive"). In considering whether any of

Plaintiffs' requests are unduly burdensome, the Court is mindful of the Second Circuit's observation that this case likely only

20

requires "relatively limited further proceedings" in connection with the summary judgment motion. Sahu, 548 F.3d at 70. The Court finds that, given the needs of the case, all of Plaintiffs' proposed depositions are unduly burdensome. This is

particularly so since the depositions would require Defendants to prepare witnesses to respond to questions regarding events that took place between fifteen and thirty-five years ago. Not

only would this be difficult and costly, but the benefit to the Plaintiffs would likely be extremely low: no witness can be

expected to provide accurate and detailed accounts of events so far in the past. Furthermore, as summarized below, the Court is

granting Plaintiffs limited document discovery ­ this discovery is a more convenient, less costly, and less burdensome

alternative to the depositions.7 The Court also denies as unduly burdensome Plaintiffs' As

request to take discovery from third party Arthur D. Little.

Plaintiffs' request for depositions relies on Hellstrom v. U