Abdell et al v. The City of New York et al

Filing 403

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION re: 400 MOTION to Set Aside Verdict . MOTION to Vacate Jury Award. MOTION for New Trial filed by The City of New York, Terrence Monahan, Thomas Galati. As set forth within, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants motion is DENIED. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at docket number 400. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge Richard J. Sullivan on 8/5/2014) (ajs)

USDSSDNY
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC#:-------DATE FILED: S- ~., . .,

T ARASIK AB DELL, et al.,
Plaintiffs,
-v-

No. 05-cv-8453 (RJS)
OPINION AND ORDER

CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.

RICHARD J. SULLIVAN, District Judge:
Now before the Court is Defendants' motion to set aside the verdict pursuant to Rules
50(b) and 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. No. 400.) The motion argues that
the Court should (A) enter judgment in Defendants' favor because Defendants have established a
qualified immunity defense; (B) set aside or reduce the punitive damages award because it is
unsupported by the evidence and excessive; (C) reduce or set aside the compensatory damages
because the amount of damages are unsupported by the evidence; or (D) grant a new trial
because of numerous allegedly erroneous rulings by the Court. For the reasons set forth below,
the motion is denied.
I. LEGAL STANDARD

"[J]ury verdicts should be disturbed with great infrequency." Raedle v. Credit Agricole
Indosuez, 670 F.3d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 2012). Nevertheless, "[a] court may grant a new trial ... if
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence." Id. at 417. "A verdict is against the weight of
the evidence if and only if it is seriously erroneous or a miscarriage of justice." DePascale v.
Sylvania Elec. Prods., Inc., 510 F. App'x 77, 78 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks

omitted). Moreover, although a court "is free to weigh the evidence [it]self, and need not view

[the evidence] in the light most favorable to the verdict winner," DLC Mgmt. Corp. v. Town of

Hyde Park, 163 F.3d 124, 134 (2d Cir. 1998), the "court should only grant [a new trial] when the
jury's verdict is egregious ... [and] should rarely disturb a jury's evaluation of a witness's
credibility," id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "The moving party bears the
burden of proving that ... a new trial is warranted." Allam v. Meyers, 906 F. Supp. 2d 274, 281
(S.D.N.Y. 2012).

II. DISCUSSION
A. Qualified Immunity
Defendants argue that "[b ]ased upon the undisputed evidence presented at trial, judgment
should be entered in favor of the Individual Defendants on the basis that the trial record
definitively reflects that both are entitled to qualified immunity." (Doc. No. 402 ("Defs. Br.") at
3.) Qualified immunity was not at issue at trial, however, and the jury was not asked to rule on
any factual issues relating to qualified immunity. (See Doc. No. 374

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IV.B (list of defenses,

omitting qualified immunity, included in the Joint Pretrial Order drafted by the parties); see also
Doc. No. 352 (Defendants' proposed verdict form, omitting any mention of qualified immunity
or any special interrogatories that might be relevant to qualified immunity).)

Therefore, in

reality, Defendants do not take issue with the jury's verdict, but instead ask the Court to revisit
its prior ruling on qualified immunity. To the extent Defendants ask the Court to reconsider its
legal ruling that, on the undisputed facts at summary judgment, the Individual Defendants were
not entitled to qualified immunity, the Court declines to do so.

See SEC v. Amerindo Inv.

Advisors, Inc., No. 05-cv-5231 (RJS), 2014 WL 405339, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 3, 2014) (noting
that "a court must be mindful that "where litigants have once battled for the court's decision, they
should neither be required, nor without good reason permitted, to battle for it again,"' (quoting

Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Color Tile, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 322 F .3d
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147, 167 (2d Cir. 2003)) and holding that "a motion for reconsideration should be denied unless
there is a strong likelihood that the district court's decision would ultimately be reversed on
appeal"). To the extent Defendants ask the Court to make factual findings, the Court is not
entitled to make such findings for the simple reason that Defendants never asked the jury to
address the issue. See Zellner v. Summerlin, 494 F.3d 344, 368 (2d Cir. 2007) ("To the extent
that a particular finding of fact is essential to a determination by the court that the defendant is
entitled to qualified immunity, it is the responsibility of the defendant to request that the jury be
asked the pertinent question. If the defendant does not make such a request, he is not entitled to
have the court, in lieu of the jury, make the needed factual finding." (citation omitted)). The
Court therefore finds that Defendants have not established a qualified immunity defense.
B. Punitive Damages
Defendants argue that an award of punitive damages was unsupported by the evidence
and that the amount awarded was excessive. (Defs. Br. at 8-10.) Based on the evidence at trial,
the Court determines that there was ample evidence for the jury to find that Defendant Monahan
acted with callous disregard to these Plaintiffs' rights.

Indeed, there was no evidence that

Defendant Monahan ever saw these Plaintiffs or knew of their existence, let alone stopped to
consider whether there was probable cause to arrest them. Moreover, the jury could easily infer
from Defendant Monahan's demeanor, as shown on the videos of the arrests admitted into
evidence, that he arrested all of the marchers out of frustration with the march itself and not out
of a belief that the four Plaintiffs here had violated any law. In any event, "it is long-settled that
·the lack of probable cause may give rise to an inference of malice."' Cameron v. City of New

York, 598 F.3d 50, 69 (2d Cir. 20 I 0).

Thus, the jury could infer malice sufficient to award

punitive damages based solely on the Court's finding that there was no probable cause to arrest
Plaintiffs.
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The Court notes that Defendants claim in their brief than Cameron is inapplicable here
and that its statement that malice may be inferred refers to the malice element of malicious
prosecution and not the malice element of punitive damages. (Defs. Br. at 15-16.) That claim is
completely contradicted by Cameron.

The full section of Cameron from which the Court's

quotation is drawn - which is entitled "Punitive Damages Instructions" - makes it undeniably
clear that Cameron was referring to the requirements of punitive damages and not the
requirements of malicious prosecution:

IV. Punitive Damages Instruction
Appellants' final claim challenges the District Court's decision not to instruct
the jury that it could consider awarding punitive damages if it found for
Appellants. We agree that this was error. To warrant an instruction, all that a
party needs to show is that there is some evidence supporting the theory behind
the instruction so that a question of fact may be presented to the jury. A punitive
damages instruction is appropriate when the plaintiffs have produced evidence
that the defendant's conduct is motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it
involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others,
or, in other words, when the plaintiffs have produced evidence of a positive
element of conscious wrongdoing or malice. The plaintiffs' evidence need only
be enough to permit the factfinder to infer that the responsible official was
motivated by malice or evil intent or that he acted with reckless or callous
indifference.
In denying Appellants' request for the instruction, the District Court
concluded that there was no evidence that Ramos and Rivera's actions were
wanton, malicious or reckless. But it is long-settled that the lack of probable
cause may give rise to an inference of malice. In this case, Appellants alleged
that Ramos and Rivera knew that they lacked probable cause to suspect Cameron
or Higgenbottom of any crime but arrested them anyway, and then proceeded to
provide false information to the Bronx District Attorney's Office that led to
Cameron's prosecution. While a jury was free to reject this version of events, the
evidence at trial was at least minimally sufficient to support it. Had the jury
accepted Appellants' account, it could have readily inferred that Ramos and
Rivera were conscious of their alleged wrongdoing and hence acted maliciously.
Accordingly, a question of fact as to malice was presented to the jury. And this

made a punitive damages instruction appropriate.
Cameron, 598 F.3d at 69 (citations, alterations, and internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis

added).
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The Court also determines that the amount of punitive damages is not excessive.
Plaintiffs received $25,000 total, equal to $6,250 per Plaintiff, and yielding a compensatory to
punitive damages ratio of 6.4 to 1. That amount falls well within the bounds of acceptability.
See Milfort v. Prevete, No. 10-cv-4467 (WFK), 2014 WL 988768, at *9-10 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 14,

2014) (reducing a $40,000 award of punitive damages to $5,000 in a case with nominal
compensatory damages and one-and-a-half hours of detention, and citing cases awarding
between $7,500 in punitive damages to approximately $100,000 in punitive damages).

The

Court therefore declines to set aside or modify the jury's findings on punitive damages.
C. Compensatory Damages
Defendants next argue that the amount of compensatory damages should be reduced
because the jury awarded an equal amount of compensatory damages to each Plaintiff despite the
differing amounts of time that each Plaintiff spent in custody. (Defs. Br. at 12-13.) There is,
however, no requirement that a jury compute damages on an hourly basis. The jury could have
rationally determined that the injury of being wrongfully arrested and imprisoned - fear,
uncertainty, shame, and loss of dignity and agency - is approximately the same whether the
detention lasted 20 hours or 40 hours. See Raysor v. Port Auth. of N. Y & NJ, 768 F.2d 34, 39
(2d Cir. 1985) (noting that the amount of damages for the "intangibles" involved in a false arrest
case are "necessarily arbitrary and unprovable"). Further, even assuming that damages should
have been awarded on an hourly basis, the departure from that standard apparently benefited
Defendants. Here, the hourly rate of damages ranged from approximately $1, 127 for Robert
Siegel to $1,860 per hour for Steven Ekberg. Those rates are below amounts commonly awarded
for false arrests in New York City. See Gardner v. Federated Dep 't Stores, Inc., 907 F.2d 1348,
1350 (2d Cir. 1990) (remitting an award of general compensatory damages for false arrest to
approximately $6,250 per hour); Raysor, 768 F.2d at 39 (citing false arrest cases approving
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awards ranging from $1,500, in 1981 dollars, per hour to $3,333, in 1977 dollars, per hour);

Robinson v. Holder, No. 07-cv5992 (DLC), 2008 WL 2875291, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 2008)
(stating that, in false arrest cases, the average rate for compensatory damages is "$6,416 per hour
of detention"); Martinez v. Port Auth. ofN.Y & N.J., No. Ol-cv-721(PKC),2005 WL 2143333,
at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 2, 2005) (approving an award of general compensatory damages for false
arrest equal to approximately $8,889 per hour), ajf'd sub nom., 445 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2006); see
also Kerman v. City of New York, 374 F.3d 93, 125-26 (2d Cir. 2004) ("[E]ven absent ... other
injuries, an award of several thousand dollars may be appropriate simply for several hours' loss
of liberty.").

The Court therefore declines to set aside or modify the jury's findings on

compensatory damages.
D. Other Alleged Errors
Defendants finally argue that the Court made various errors warranting a new trial.
( Defs. Br. at 14-16.) The Court addressed each of the alleged errors on the record and sees no
reason to reconsider its rulings at this time. The Court therefore declines to order a new trial on
the basis of any of the alleged errors.
III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT Defendants motion is DENIED. The
Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion pending at docket number 400.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:

August 5, 2014
New York, New York
RICH

J. SULLIVAN

UNITED STA TES DISTRICT JUDGE

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