Lidle et al v. Cirrus Design Corporation

Filing 228

Opinion and Order, that defendant's request for certification is DENIED. (Signed by Judge Barbara S. Jones on 10/28/2010) (lnl)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT USDCSDNY SOU THERN DIST R I C T OF NEW YORK DOCUMENT ------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x ELECfRONICALLY FILED MELANIE LIDLE, personal representative DOC #: on beha l f of the Estate of Cory Lidle; DATE FI- E ,D.-·/~rJ+rrZq""""--I+""""""1 LMELANIE LIDLE, an indi v idual; CHRI S TOP HE R LIDLE, a minor, by and through his guard i an ad lit em , JORDAN FEAGAN; STEP HAN I E STANGER , a n administrator on beha l f o f the 08 Cv. 1 2 5 3 (BSJ) (HBP) Estate of Tyler Stanger ; STEPHANIE STANGER, an individual; ASHLUND Opinion and Order STANGER, a minor by and throu g h her guardian ad lit em , THAYNE STANGER;

D

Plaintiffs, v. CIRRU S DES I GN CORPORATI ON , et al. Defendants. --------------------------- - - - - - - - - - - - - - x BARBARA S. JONES UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

P l a i n t i f f s in the above - c a p t i o n e d case

("Plaintiffs")

filed

wrongfu l death c l a im s against Ci rrus Des i gn Corporation ("Defendant " ) aris i n g from an air c r a f t accident that occurred on October 11 , 2006 in New York , New York . On February 10 , 20 1 0 ,

Defendant moved to strike the expe r t opinions of five of Plaintiffs' witnesses. On July 6, 2010, the Court issued an

Order and Opin i on denying Defendant ' s various motions to strike expert opinions and to grant summary jUdgme n t . Lidle et a l. v . Cirrus Design Corp ., No. 2010 WL 2674584 (July 6 , 2010 S . D . N . Y.) . Lidle ex reI.

08 Ci v. 1253 (BSJ) (HBP) , Now pend i n g before the

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Court is defendants' motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§

1292(b) to

certify the July 6 Opinion and Order for interlocutory appeal. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion is DEN I ED.
BACKGROUND

In their Complaint, Plaintiffs allege (1)

that the

Aircraft's flight control system failed as a result of a design defect in the rudder-aileron interconnect ("RAI"); (2) that the

flight control system in the Aircraft was misrigged due to a manufacturing defect, causing the RAI to lock up and the pilots to lose control; (3) that the RAI system in the Aircraft was

negligently designed; and (4) that Defendant failed to warn Lidle and Stanger of latent dangers resulting from foreseeable uses of the Aircraft. On February 10, 2010, defendants moved

for summary judgment and to strike the expert opinions of Peter R. Leffe, Abdon Llorente, Arthur C. Hughes, Dr. Arun Kumar, and Stephen M. Lind. In the July 6 Opinion and Order, the Court denied Defendant's motion to strike the defect and causation opinions of Plaintiffs' experts. The Court concluded that each witness

was qualified to offer an expert opinion in this case, that their expected testimony was both reliable and relevant, and that the testimony was based on adequate information. Further,

the Court held that the Daubert factors were inapplicable to the experts' proposed testimony and that the failure to test their

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theories was not fatal.

Thus, the Court determined that the

testimony of each of pla i n t i f f s ' expert witnesses was admissible.

Defendant seeks certifica t i on for an inter l o c u t o r y appea l
for this Order. Defen d a n t wishes to appeal: (1) whether and to

what extent an expert's hypothesis on why an airplane accident allegedly occ u r r e d is governed by Daubert's criteria for scientific reliability; (2 ) whether a Court may forego the

application of Daubert criteria to an expert's acc i dent reconstruction hypotheses; and (3) whether the inability or failure to confirm an acc i d e n t reconstruction hypothesis through a va l i d sc i e n t i f i c methodo l ogy goes to the weight of an expert's testimony, not its admissibility. (Of. Br. at 1- 2 ).

LEGAL STANDARD

As a general matt e r , "[iJt i s a basic tenet of federal la w to delay appellate review until a final j udgment ha s been entered." Koehler v . Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 1 0 1 F.3d 863, 865 Cir . 1996) 475 (1978 ) ) (citing Coopers
&

(2d

Lybrand v. Livesay,

437 u.s. 463,

However , a district court may grant a party le a v e
§

to appeal an inte r l o c u t o r y order , pursuant to

1 2 9 2 ( b ) , if the (1)

party seeking certification can establish that the order: " in v o l v e s a controll i n g question of law";

(2 ) "as to which there "that

is subs t a n t i a l ground f o r difference o f opinion " ; and (3)

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an immediate appeal would materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).

"[TJhe power to grant an interlocutory appeal must be strictly limited to the precise conditions stated in t he law. [OJnly exceptional circumstances will justify a departure from the basic policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment." Klinghoffer v. S.N.C. Achille Lauro

Ed Altri-Gestione Motonave Achille Lauro in Amministrazione Straordinaria, 921 F. 2d 21, 25 (2d Cir. 1990) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted) . As such, "[iJnterlocutory appeals are strongly disfavored in federal practice." In re Ambac Fin. Group, Inc. Sec. Litig.,

693 F. Supp. 2d 241,282 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).

Section 1292(b)

operates as "a rare exception to the final judgment rule that generally prohibits piecemeal appeals." Koehler, 101 F.3d at 865-66 (citation omitted) . Section 1292(b) "was not intended to

open the floodgates to a vast number of appeals from interlocutory orders in ordinary litigatio n , or to be a ve h i c l e to provide early review of difficult rulings in hard cases." Martens v. Smith Barney, Inc., 238 F. Supp. 2d 596, (S.D.N.Y. 2002) omitted). 600

(internal quotation marks and citations

Accordingly, a court should "exercise great care in Westwood Pharm., Inc. v.

making a § l292(b) certification."

4

Nat'l Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 1992) .

964 F.2d 85,

89

(2d Cir.

Though § 1292(b) does not identify a specific time period within which a party may seek appellate certification from a district court, "courts have held that any delay in seeking amendment and certification must be reasonable." Flaig, 511 F. Supp. 2d 282, 314 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) Morris v. (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).
DISCUSSION

The instant motion is denied because Defendant fails to satisfy the section 1292(b) criteria for permitting an interlocutory appeal. Defendant does not present "controlling

question[s] of law as to which there [are] substantial ground[s] for difference of opinion." Nor does it establish "that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

None of the issues raised by Defendant meet this standard, and the Court is not persuaded that these are exceptional circumstances justifying interlocutory appeal. As an initial matter, Plaintiffs contend that Defendant's two-month delay in seeking certification was unreasonable. Mem. at 3). The Court declines to treat this delay as (Pl.

dispositive and chooses instead to "treat it as one of several factors weighing against certification." Whiteface Real Estate

5

Development & Const., LLC. V. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., No. 8:08-cv-24 N.D.N.Y.). (GLS/DRH), 2010 WL 4024517, at *1 (Oct. 13, 2010

Defendant argues that the Court failed to apply the correct
legal standard by not applying the Daubert factors to the testimony of Plaintiffs' expert witnesses. Defendant does not

dispute that court made a determination of whether the pro f f e r e d expert testimony was reliable and relevant. Defendant argues

that the Court was required to evaluate an expert's opinions under the Daubert criteria when making this determination. However, none of the cases cited by Defendant stand for the proposition that an expert's opinion which does not otherwise satisfy the Daubert factors cannot still be reliable when based on an expert's relevant professional knowledge and experience. Rather, the determination of whether to apply the Daubert

factors to an expert's proposed testimony is a matter clearly left to the discretion of a District Court. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999) See Kumho Tire Co.

(Daubert factors not to The essence of

be considered "a defini t i v e checklist or test") .

Defendant's argument is that the Court incorrectly applied the law to the facts presented. Thus, the questions presented for

interlocutory appeal by plaintiffs would require the Second Circuit to review this Court's application of the law to the facts presented by the parties. Thus, this is not a "pure

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question of law that the reviewing court cou l d decide quickly and c leanl y without having to study the record." Stone v. Patchett, No. 08 CV 5171(RPP), 2009 WL 154465 0 , at *2 2009 S.D.N.Y.) (June 3,

(citing Century Pac. Inc. v. Hilt o n Hotels Corp., (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (internal quotation marks

574 F. Supp. 2d 369

omitted) .

Under these circumstances, such determinations do

not present issues of pure law and therefore are not appropri a t e for interl o c u t o r y review. Additionally, Defendant has not established that there is "substantial ground for difference o f op i n i o n " regarding the Court's determination that the Daubert fa c t o r s were inapplicab l e to the particular experts' testimony. The issues presented here The Second Circuit has

are not particularly difficult or novel.

held that a district court possesses "broad discretion in determining what method is appropriate for evaluating reliability under the circumstances of each case." v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 303 F.3d 256 , 265 Amorgianos

(2d Cir. 2002)

In this Court 's Opinion and Order dated July 6 , 2010, the Court determined that the experts' testimony was relevant and had a sufficiently reliable foundati o n to permit it to be considered . Defendant fails to cite to any cases that hold that a district court must apply the Daubert criteria to an accident reconstruction hypothesis. To the contrary, Daubert provides in addition

factors that a court ma y cons i d e r at its discretion,

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to those found in Federal Rule of Evidence 702, when determining relevance and reliability. See Kumho Tire, 526 u.S. at 153; (2d Cir.

Zaremba v. Gen. Motors Corp, 360 F.3d 355, 357-58 2004); Fernandez v. Cent. Mine Equip. Co., 185 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).

670 F. Supp. 2d 178,

Thus, these issues simply require the

application of well-settled legal principles routinely confronted by the courts of this Circuit and do not present an issue with "substantial ground for difference of opinion." Finally, an interlocutory appeal will not advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. Any decision on the Such

merits will be delayed by an appeal at this time.

piecemeal appeals that do not "materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation," as required by strongly discouraged.
§

1292(b), are Defendant

See Koehler, 1 0 1 F.3d at 865.

has also failed to establish that there are any exceptional circumstances at play here that warrant a departure from the policy of postponing appellate review until after the entry of a final judgment. See Id. As such, Defendant has not satisfied

the criteria for the certification of an interlocutory appeal.
CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, Defendant's request for certification is DENIED.

SO ORDERED:

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Dated:

New York, New York
October 28, 2010

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