Gary Friedrich Enterprises, LLC. et al v. Marvel Enterprises, Inc. et al
Filing
145
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER. For the reasons set forth in this memorandum and order, the plaintiffs' motion for an order reconvening the deposition of Roy Thomas at the defendant's expense is denied. (Signed by Magistrate Judge James C. Francis on 5/20/11) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (rjm)
(ECF)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -:
GARY FRIEDRICH ENTERPRISES, LLC
:
and GARY FRIEDRICH,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
-against:
:
:
MARVEL ENTERPRISES, INC., et al., :
:
Defendants.
:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -:
JAMES C. FRANCIS IV
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This
is
a
copyright
08 Civ. 1533 (BSJ) (JCF)
MEMORANDUM
AND ORDER
infringement
action
in
which
Gary
Friedrich Enterprises, LLC and its principal, Gary Friedrich,
allege that the defendants misappropriated characters and story
elements
developed
created
and
distributed the movie “Ghost Rider” and related merchandise.
The
plaintiffs
the
have
by
moved
Mr.
by
Friedrich
letter
for
when
an
they
order
reopening
deposition of a third-party witness, Roy Thomas, a former employee
of
defendant
Marvel
Entertainment,
LLC
(sued
here
as
Enterprises, Inc.) (“Marvel”), at Marvel’s expense.
Marvel
For the
reasons set forth below, the motion is denied.
Background
The
developed,
plaintiffs
created,
allege
that
articulated,
Mr.
Friedrich
particularized,
“conceived,
authored
and
brought to life” the comic book character known as Ghost Rider, his
alter ego Johnny Blaze, and the character and story elements that
formed the basis for the original Ghost Rider comic book (the
“Spotlight Work”) and subsequent series of comic books authored by
1
Mr. Friedrich and published by Magazine Management, the former
owner of Marvel Comics.
(First Amended Complaint (“Compl.”),
¶¶ 65-67, 91, 94; Transcript of Deposition of Roy Thomas dated
April 12-13, 2011 (“Thomas Dep.”) at 15).
The plaintiffs claim
that, in 1971, Mr. Friedrich conceived of all of the elements of
the Ghost Rider series independently and for his own profit, and
then initiated a meeting in which he persuaded Magazine Management
to publish comic books based on this idea.
(Compl., ¶¶ 82-84).
The plaintiffs concede that Magazine Management owned the copyright
for the Spotlight Work for the first twenty-eight years following
its publication, but argue that, after that period, the copyright
“reverted to the author of the work,” Gary Friedrich.
(Compl.,
¶¶ 95-98). Marvel argues, in contrast, that “Friedrich and several
other individuals engaged by MMC made creative contributions to”
the Spotlight Work and that it was a “work[] made for hire” for
which Marvel has been and continues to be the exclusive copyright
holder.
(Counterclaims, ¶¶ 14-15).
Roy Thomas was employed by Marvel Comics from 1965 to 1980,
working as a writer, editor, and, for some time, editor-in-chief.
(Thomas Dep. at 15, 176-86).
Mr. Thomas is also a longtime friend
of Mr. Friedrich and was responsible for helping Mr. Friedrich to
get a job at Marvel Comics in 1966.
137).
(Thomas Dep. at 12, 29-32,
Mr. Thomas participated in the creation of the Spotlight
Work and thus his testimony is highly relevant to resolving the
factual dispute at the heart of this action.
50, 55-57, 63-66, 69-70, 87-98).
2
(Thomas Dep. at 46-
Mr. Thomas was deposed in
connection with this case on April 12 and 13, 2011; at his
deposition,
he
was
asked
several
questions
regarding
his
interactions with the attorneys representing Marvel, which those
lawyers directed him not to answer on the ground that the substance
of
the
communications
privilege.
are
protected
by
the
attorney-client
(Thomas Dep. at 100-11, 126-28, 151-56).
Discussion
The plaintiffs contend that Marvel improperly asserted the
attorney-client privilege with respect to some of Mr. Thomas’s
responses to their questions and that they should be permitted to
inquire into the substance of the communications between Mr. Thomas
and counsel for Marvel.
(Letter of Charles S. Kramer dated April
15, 2011) (“Kramer Letter”) at 7).
In particular, the plaintiffs
contend, first, that the attorney-client privilege as it is applied
to former employees of the defendant corporations does not protect
the communications between counsel and Mr. Thomas (Kramer Letter at
3-6); and, second, that Marvel may not assert this privilege in any
event because it has not established that it is the successor
corporation to the companies with which Mr. Thomas had an employeremployee relationship (Kramer Letter at 6-7).
Marvel argues, in
response, that counsel is representing Mr. Thomas personally in
connection with his deposition in this case and that the attorneyclient privilege therefore protects their communications with him
irrespective of Marvel’s ability to assert any privilege.
(Letter
of Jodi A. Kleinick dated May 6, 2011 (“Kleinick Letter”) at 2, 45).
In the alternative, they contend that Marvel is indeed the
3
legal successor to Mr. Thomas’s employer and therefore is entitled
to assert the privilege with respect to its counsel’s conversations
with him; that these conversations are within the category of
former employee conversations immune from discovery under the
attorney-client privilege; and that, to the extent they are not,
they are protected by the work product doctrine.
Fleischer
dated
April
20,
2011
(“Fleischer
(Letter of David
Letter”)
at
2-3;
Kleinick Letter at 3-5).
A.
Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Doctrine
“The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges
for confidential communications known to the common law.”
Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
“‘full
and
frank
communication
between
Upjohn
By facilitating
attorneys
and
their
clients,’” the attorney-client privilege lays the foundation for
effective representation.
United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554,
562 (1989) (quoting Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389).
The attorney-client
privilege protects from disclosure communications among clients and
counsel made for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, provided
that the communications were intended to be kept confidential and
the
privilege
has
not
been
waived.1
1
See
United
States
v.
The Federal Rules of Evidence typically control civil
actions
in
federal
court,
regardless
of
subject
matter
jurisdiction, although where state law supplies the rule of
decision, state law determines the existence and scope of the
attorney-client privilege. Fed. R. Evid. 501; accord Gulf Islands
Leasing, Inc. v. Bombardier Capital, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 466, 470
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Shamis v. Ambassador Factors Corp., 34 F. Supp. 2d
879, 892 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). Federal law always controls application
of the attorney work product doctrine. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
26(b)(3); Tompkins v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 92 F. Supp. 2d 70,
75 (N.D.N.Y. 2000). Here, the only claims remaining in the case
4
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 119 F.3d 210, 214 (2d Cir.
1997); Amnesty International USA v. CIA, 728 F. Supp. 2d 479,
518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
The burden of establishing each of the
elements of the privilege rests on the party asserting it.
See In
re Grand Jury Subpoenas Dated March 19, 2002 and August 2, 2002,
318 F.3d 379, 384 (2d Cir. 2003); Pure Power Boot Camp v. Warrior
Fitness Boot Camp, 587 F. Supp. 2d 548, 563 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
It is beyond question that corporations as well as individuals
are entitled to assert the privilege.
See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 386;
Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Weintraub, 471 U.S. 343,
348 (1985).
As the Supreme Court has observed, however,
[t]he administration of the attorney-client privilege in
the case of corporations . . . presents special problems.
As an inanimate entity, a corporation must act through
its agents. A corporation cannot speak directly to its
lawyers.
Similarly, it cannot directly waive the
privilege when disclosure is in its best interest. Each
of these actions must necessarily be undertaken by
individuals empowered to act on behalf of the
corporation.
Weintraub, 471 U.S. at 348.
Thus, for a solvent corporation,
corporate management, acting through its officers and directors,
has the authority to exercise the privilege, a power that must be
exercised consistently with management’s fiduciary duties.
Id. at
348-49.
“The work product doctrine ‘is intended to preserve a zone of
arise under the federal Copyright and Lanham Acts.
(Compl;
Counterclaims; Report and Recommendation dated June 26, 2009 at 3l;
Order dated May 3, 2009; Report and Recommendation dated May 4,
2011 at 1). Therefore, federal common law governs the application
of both the attorney-client privilege and the work product
doctrine.
5
privacy in which a lawyer can prepare and develop legal theories
and strategy “with an eye toward litigation,” free from unnecessary
intrusion by his adversaries.’”
William A. Gross Construction
Associates, Inc. v. American Manufacturers Mutual Insurance Co.,
262 F.R.D. 354, 359 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Adlman,
134
F.3d
1194,
1196
(2d
Cir.
1998)).
To
warrant
protection, a document or communication must have been prepared in
anticipation
of
litigation
by
or
for
a
party,
or
by
his
representative. Gulf Islands Leasing, Inc., 215 F.R.D. at 474. As
with the attorney-client privilege, the plaintiff bears the “heavy
burden” of establishing the applicability of the work product
doctrine.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Dated July 6, 2005, 510 F.3d
180, 183 (2d Cir. 2007).
B.
Ownership of the Privilege
1.
Individual Representation
As an initial matter, counsel for Marvel argue that the
attorney-client privilege plainly protects their communications
with
Mr.
Thomas
deposition,
and
because
would
be
they
(Kleinick Letter at 2, 4).
were
“providing
representing
legal
him
advice”
at
to
the
him.
However, Mr. Thomas admittedly has not
paid for this representation. (Thomas Dep. at 104). In situations
such as this where a former employee is represented by counsel for
a
defendant
corporation
for
the
purpose
of
testifying
at
a
deposition at no cost to him, courts have not treated the former
employee as having an independent right to the privilege, even
where that employee believes that he is being represented by that
6
counsel.
See, e.g., Wade Williams Distribution, Inc. v. American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 5002, 2004 WL 1487702, at
*1
&
n.2
(S.D.N.Y.
June
30,
2004)
(“The
mere
volunteered
representation by corporate counsel of a former employee should not
be allowed to shield information which there is no independent
basis for including within the attorney-client privilege.”); see
also Gioe v. AT & T Inc., No. 09 CV 4545, 2010 WL 3780701, at *1-2
&
n.1
(E.D.N.Y.
defendant’s
Defendant
Sept.
20,
2010)
attorney-client
also
represents
(applying
privilege
the
former
only
although
employee,
corporate
“counsel
for
at
for
least
purposes of his deposition,” and citing Wade Williams Distribution,
2004 WL 1487702, at *2); Price v. Porter Novelli, Inc., No. 07 Civ.
5869,
2008
WL
2388709,
at
*1-2
(S.D.N.Y.
June
11,
2008).
Therefore, to the extent that counsel’s communications with Mr.
Thomas
are
protected
by
the
attorney-client
privilege,
that
privilege belongs to Marvel.
2.
Corporate Successors
The plaintiffs contend that, to the extent Marvel argues that
communications between counsel for Marvel and Mr. Thomas are
privileged because Mr. Thomas is a “former employee,” Marvel does
not have “the right to assert any privilege belonging to Mr.
Thomas’[s] prior employer” because it has not met its burden of
establishing
that
the
privilege
remained
intact
as
Marvel’s
predecessor companies merged or were reorganized in bankruptcy.
(Kramer Letter at 2; Letter of Charles S. Kramer dated April 29,
2011 at 2).
7
“When ownership of a corporation changes hands, whether the
attorney-client relationship transfers as well to the new owners
turns on the practical consequences rather than the formalities of
the particular transaction.”
Tekni-Plex, Inc. v. Meyner and
Landis, 89 N.Y.2d 123, 133, 651 N.Y.S.2d 954, 959 (1996); accord
Orbit One Communications, Inc. v. Numerex Corp., 255 F.R.D. 98, 104
(S.D.N.Y. 2008); Postorivo v. AG Paintball Holdings, Inc., Nos.
2991, 3111, 2008 WL 343856, at *5 (Del. Ch. Feb. 7, 2008); see also
Del. Code Ann., tit. 8, § 259.
This rules applies for mergers, see
Bass Public Ltd. v. Promus Cos., 868 F. Supp. 615, 620 (S.D.N.Y.
1994), as well as for bankruptcy reorganizations, see In re Flag
Telecom Holdings, Ltd., Nos. 02 Civ. 3400, 04 Civ. 1019, 2009 WL
5245734, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 14, 2009); see also Weintraub, 471
U.S. at 354-55.
lives
on
“As a practical matter, the predecessor company
when
notwithstanding
its
the
business
technical
acquisition and merger.”
operations
legal
changes
are
continued,
effected
by
the
Orbit One Communications, Inc., 255
F.R.D. at 104 (citing Tekni-Plex, Inc., 89 N.Y.2d at 134, 651
N.Y.S.2d
at
960).
“‘[W]here
efforts
are
made
to
run
the
pre-existing business entity and manage its affairs, successor
management stands in the shoes of prior management and controls the
attorney-client privilege with respect to matters concerning the
company’s operations.’”
Id. (quoting Tekni-Plex, Inc., 89 N.Y.2d
at 133, 651 N.Y.S.2d at 959); see also In re Flag Telecom Holdings,
Ltd., 2009 WL 5245734, at *7-10 (holding that, where bankruptcy
reorganization
created successor
8
entity
and
litigation
trust,
attorney-client privilege transferred to litigation trust based on
“practical consideration of the consequences of such a transfer”);
Bass Public Ltd., 868 F. Supp. at 620 (“‘[A] surviving corporation
following
a
pre-merger
merger
possesses
companies
.
.
all
.
of
the
includ[ing]
privileges
the
of
the
privileges
the
subsidiary company holds at the time the sale is completed.’”
(second and third alterations in original) (quoting Rayman v.
American Charter Federal Savings & Loan Association, 150 F.R.D.
634, 638 (D. Neb. 1993))); In re I Successor Corp., 321 B.R. 640,
653
n.4
(Bankr.
S.D.N.Y.
2005)
(“Examining
the
‘practical
consequences’ of a transaction . . . [means] examining as a
practical matter what claims or liabilities passed from or remained
with the seller pursuant to the transaction to determine whether
the attorney-client privilege was important to the transferee
and/or the trustee.”); Postorivo, 2008 WL 343856, at *5 (“[A]s a
practical matter, the business operations of NPS continue under the
management of KEE Action.
the
shoes
of
attorney-client
the
Consequently, . . . KEE Action stands in
former
privilege
NPS
that
management
NPS
formerly
and
held,
holds
the
including
pre-[acquisition] representation.”); cf. American International
Specialty Lines Insurance Co. v. NWI-I, Inc., 240 F.R.D. 401, 406
(N.D.
Ill.
2007)
(“[W]e
see
no
reason
to
deviate
from
the
well-established principle that the right to assert or waive a
corporation’s attorney-client privilege is an incident of control
of the corporation.”).
Marvel has submitted evidence establishing that, through a
9
series of mergers and one bankruptcy reorganization, control of
Magazine Management Company, Mr. Thomas’s former employer, passed
to Marvel Entertainment Group, Inc.; then to Toy Biz, Inc.; then to
Marvel Enterprises, Inc.; then to Marvel Entertainment, Inc.; then
to Marvel Entertainment, LLC.
F).
(Fleischer Letter at 2-3 & Exhs. A-
“[N]otwithstanding the technical legal changes effected” by
Marvel’s
prolific
reorganization
and
renaming,
the
“business
operations” of Marvel have continued, and, as a result, Marvel
Entertainment, LLC “controls the attorney-client privilege with
respect to matters concerning the company’s operations.” Orbit One
Communications, Inc., 255 F.R.D. at 104.
At the time of Mr.
Thomas’s employment, the business of Marvel -- which was owned by
Magazine Management -- was creating comic books.
14-18, 228-29).
(Thomas Dep. at
That continues to be part of Marvel’s business,
and indeed, those historic and continuing business operations are
the subject of this case.
as
a
practical
matter,
(Thomas Dep. at 146-49, 190-91).
it
is
proper for
the
Thus,
attorney-client
privilege, as it relates to former employees involved in producing
comic books, to remain vested in Marvel Entertainment, LLC.
Communications between counsel for Marvel and Mr. Thomas are
therefore privileged to the full extent that communications between
counsel for a corporation and former employees of that corporation
are privileged.
C.
Former Employees
“Virtually all courts hold that communications between company
counsel and former company employees are privileged if they concern
10
information
obtained
during
the
course
of
employment.”
Export-Import Bank of the United States v. Asia Pulp & Paper Co.,
232 F.R.D. 103, 112 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); accord Gioe, 2010 WL 3780701,
at *1; Surles v. Air France, No. 00 Civ. 5004, 2001 WL 815522, at
*6 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2001) (“The vast majority of federal cases
hold that communications between company counsel and former company
employees are protected by the attorney-client privilege if they
are focused on exploring what the former employee knows as a result
of his prior employment about the circumstances giving rise to the
lawsuit.”), aff’d, 2001 WL 1142231 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2001).
Where the corporate employee is a former employee,
communications (1) which occurred during employment
remain privileged; (2) of whose “nature and purpose” was
for the corporation’s counsel to learn facts related to
a legal action that the former employee was aware of as
a result of his or her employment, are privileged
regardless of when they occurred; and (3) between a
corporation’s counsel “and a former employee whom counsel
does not represent, which bear on or otherwise
potentially affect the witness’ testimony” are not
privileged.
Nicholls v. Philips Semiconductor Manufacturing, No. 07 Civ. 6789,
2009 WL 2277869, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 27, 2009) (quoting Peralta v.
Cedant Corp., 190 F.R.D. 38, 41-42 (D. Conn. 1999)). However, this
final,
third
category
creates
“a
very
narrow
exception.”
Export-Import Bank of the United States, 232 F.R.D. at 112.
Nonetheless, “‘opposing counsel has the right to ask about matters
that may have affected or changed the witness’s testimony.’”
Wade
Williams Distribution, 2004 WL 1487702, at *1 (quoting Peralta, 190
F.R.D. at 41); see also Gioe, 2010 WL 3780701, at *2 (“[A]ny
communication between counsel and [the former employee], occurring
11
after [his] employment . . . that goes beyond [his] knowledge of
the circumstances [at issue], and beyond [his] activities within
the course
of
[]
employment
. .
.
is
not protected
by
the
attorney-client privilege.”).
Although there are some aspects of attorney communications
with former employees that are carved out of the attorney-client
privilege, many of these communications are nevertheless protected
under the aegis of the work product doctrine.
See Gioe, 2010 WL
3780701, at *3 (holding that “to the extent that communications
between Defense counsel and [the former employee] are specifically
counsel’s conclusions or opinions, they may be covered by work
product protection” but noting that this does not necessarily
preclude questions regarding other non-privileged communication);
Nicholls, 2009 WL 2277869, at *2 (“Moreover, communications between
a corporation’s counsel and former employee which are counsel’s
‘legal
conclusions
or
legal
opinions
that
reveal
[the
corporation’s] legal strategy’ may be protected by the work-product
doctrine.” (alteration in original) (quoting Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at
42)); Export-Import Bank of the United States, 232 F.R.D. at 112
(“Pre-deposition conversations may also be work product; to the
extent
[the
plaintiff]’s
attorneys
communicated
their
legal
opinions and theories of the case, their conversations are immune
from discovery.”); Surles, 2001 WL 815522, at *6 (“Additionally,
any information beyond the underlying facts of this case that []
might [be] unearth[ed] by questioning [the former employee] about
his conversations with [the employer]’s counsel would likely expose
12
defense
counsel’s
thought
processes
which
protection under the work product doctrine.”).
are
entitled
to
To the extent that
a meeting between a former employee and his former employer’s
counsel is
held
“to
discuss
the matters
concerning
which he
subsequently testified at his deposition,” it is “obvious that the
discussions at the meeting come within the broad purview of the
work-product doctrine.
Disclosure of statements made or questions
posed . . . at the meeting could tend to reveal [counsel’s]
thoughts about or analysis of the issues posed by this litigation.”
In re Gulf Oil/Cities Service Tender Offer Litigation, Nos. 82 Civ.
5253, 87 Civ. 8982, 1990 WL 108352, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 1990).
Here, Mr. Thomas’s communications with Marvel’s counsel in
preparation for his deposition is protected by Marvel’s attorneyclient privilege.
Mr. Thomas is a former employee of Marvel, and
he was deposed in order to provide information about the origin of
the Spotlight Work -- “information obtained during the course of
[his] employment.”
F.R.D. at 112.
Export-Import Bank of the United States, 232
Indeed, his deposition was dominated by questions
regarding the business practices at Marvel while he was employed
there
and
the
Spotlight Work.
circumstances
surrounding
the
creation
of
the
Counsel for Marvel have represented that their
communications with Mr. Thomas covered only facts within the scope
of Mr. Thomas’s former employment.
2
(Kleinick Letter at 1, 4).2
The plaintiffs’ arguments at times appear to misapprehend
this standard, contending that “[p]re-deposition communications
between counsel for a corporate party and a non-party former
employee are not protected by the attorney client privilege to the
extent such communications concern matters not originally protected
13
Additionally, to the extent that Marvel’s counsel communicated with
Mr. Thomas in order to prepare him for deposition, any inquiry into
“statements made or questions posed” that may reveal counsel’s
legal analysis is barred by the work product doctrine.
In re Gulf
Oil/Cities Service Tender Offer Litigation, 1990 WL 108352, at *3.
The plaintiffs have not suggested, either at deposition or in
their letter briefs, any questions they might wish to ask that
would fall within the very narrow field of topics not covered by
the attorney-client privilege or the work product doctrine.
Indeed, most of the questions they asked regarding attorney-client
communications were extremely broad.
109, 152-53, 155).
(Thomas Dep. at 105, 107,
The only questions the plaintiffs suggest that
pertained to communications regarding matters outside the scope of
Mr. Thomas’s employment relate to previous accounts Mr. Thomas had
given of the creation of the work at issue here.
5; Thomas Dep. at 83-86, 99-104).
(Kramer Letter at
Concerning as they do the same
basic facts that are within the scope of Mr. Thomas’s former
employment, responses to these questions are also protected by the
while the employee was still working for the employer.” (Kramer
Letter at 7). However, it is not only communications with counsel
that took place during the employment that are covered, but all
communications with counsel about that employment, regardless of
whether those communications take place following the employee’s
termination. See Peralta, 190 F.R.D. at 41 (“[I]f the nature and
purpose of [counsel]’s communications with [the former employee]
was to learn facts related to [the underlying case] that [the
former employee] was aware of as a result of her employment, such
communications are also privileged, whenever they occurred.”).
Thus, any discussion between Mr. Thomas and counsel for Marvel
about Mr. Thomas’s work for Marvel -- including his role in and
memory of the creation of the Ghost Rider character, story, and
comic books -- is privileged under this standard.
14
privilege.
Furthermore, to the extent that these questions were
limited only to whether Mr. Thomas had “spoken to anybody at any
current or former Marvel company with respect to any statements
that [he had] made or been quoted as having made with respect to
[the Spotlight Work] in the last five years,” he appears already to
have answered the question.
(Thomas Dep. at 103-04).
In ruling under Rule 30(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure whether to allow further examination of a person already
deposed, courts are guided by the standards set forth in Rule
26(b)(2), which requires, among other things, that the court limit
discovery
where
“the
party
seeking
discovery
has
had
ample
opportunity to obtain the information” or “the burden or expense of
the
proposed
discovery
outweighs
its
likely
benefit.”
The
attorney-client privilege was properly asserted in this case.
Moreover, the plaintiffs have had ample opportunity to probe
whether Mr. Thomas’s deposition testimony was improperly influenced
by Marvel.
(Thomas Dep. at 86, 101-12, 120-28, 131, 133, 140-54,
160-62, 192-96). The expense and burden of a reconvened deposition
are not justified by the very limited nature of the information
regarding Mr. Thomas’s communications with Marvel’s counsel that
plaintiffs might properly discover.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the plaintiffs’ motion for an
order reconvening the deposition of Roy Thomas at the defendant’s
expense is denied.
15
SO ORDERED.
rN~C. e'~~_7r
JAMES
FRANCIS IV
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Dated:
New York, New York
May 20, 2011
Copies mailed this date to:
Leonard F.Lesser, Esq.
Simon-Lesser PC
420 Lexington Avenue
New York, New York 10170
Charles S. Kramer, Esq.
Joseph D. Schneider, Esq.
Daniel Bloom, Esq.
Nelson L. Mitten, Esq.
Riezman Berger P.C.
7700 Bonhomme Avenue
7th Floor
St. Louis, IL 63105
Dawn K. O'Leary, Esq.
Eric W. Evans, Esq.
Roth, Evans & Landing
2421 Corporate Centre Drive, Suite 200
Granite City, IL 62040
David Fleischer, Esq.
Sara Jacobson, Esq.
Haynes and Boone, LLP
30 Rockefeller Plaza, 26th Floor
New York, New York 10112
Jodi A. Kleinick, Esq.
Paul Hastings Janofsky & Walker LLP
75 East 55th Street
New York, New York 10022
16
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