Paidi et al v. Mills et al
Filing
117
OPINION AND ORDER re: (87 in 1:08-cv-06932-JMF) MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Alanna Farrell, (92 in 1:08-cv-06932-JMF) MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Getu Nagasa, Nitasha Khurana, Sirisha Parupalli, Sireesh K. Thummalapally, Nareen Adusumell i, Sumirkumar S. Talati, Seong Mi Seo Kim, Ravi Kumar Chenna, Venkat Rao Dandamudi, Jitendra Keshavlal Patel, Krishna Kishore Inapuri, Balaji Duddukuru, Yvonne May Perry, Jitendra Kumar Patel, Sunitha Talluri, Vishnu Akula, Young Mee Lee, Grace Chan, Kaichuan Yeh, Herng Yih Lai, Ngoc Bui, Lavanya Akula, Naveen Parupalli, Xuan Uyen Thuy Nghiem, Lakshman Rao Paidi, Phuong Giang, Hareen Karra, Yecham Kumaraswamy, Holly Elizabeth Benoit, (62 in 1:09-cv-04902-JMF) MOTION for Attorney Fees filed by Al anna Farrell. For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs' motions for attorney's fees and costs are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Adusumelli Plaintiffs' request for $304,500.95 in fees and costs will be reduced by $ ;65,415 for Chittur's excessive billing rate (436.1 hours claimed multiplied by the $150 per hour reduction), $500 for the disallowed miscellaneous costs, and then by fifteen percent across-the-board for the vague entries and claimed p aralegal and clerical work. The Adusumelli Plaintiff are therefore awarded $202,798.06 in attorney's fees and costs. Farrell's request for $215,020.34 in attorney's fees and costs will be reduced by $5,062.50 based on Ha rter Secrest's prior work on the Kirk litigation and by $2,088.75 for counsels' travel time. Farrell is therefore awarded $207,869.09 in attorney's fees and costs. The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Docket Nos. 87 and 92 and to close these cases. (Signed by Judge Jesse M. Furman on 3/28/2013) (lmb)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X
NAREEN ADUSUMELLI, et al.,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
-v:
:
DAVID STEINER, COMMISSIONER OF
:
EDUCATION, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X
ALANNA FARRELL,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-v:
:
:
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF
:
EDUCATION, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X
VISHNU AKULA, et al.,
:
:
Plaintiffs,
:
:
-v:
:
DAVID STEINER, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X
Mar 28, 2013
08 Civ. 6932 (JMF)
09 Civ. 4902 (JMF)
10 Civ. 4549 (JMF)
OPINION AND
ORDER
JESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:
Plaintiffs in these consolidated cases are pharmacists who successfully challenged
New York State Education Law Section 6805(1)(6) on the ground that the statute’s
requirement that an applicant for a pharmacist’s license in New York be either a United
States citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States
violated the Equal Protection and Supremacy Clauses of the United States Constitution.
See Dandamudi v. Tisch, 686 F.3d 66, 69 (2d Cir. 2012). Plaintiffs now move for an
award of attorney’s fees pursuant to Title 42, United States Code, Section 1988 and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2). For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiffs’
motions are granted in part and denied in part.
BACKGROUND
The first of these cases was filed on August 4, 2008; it was later consolidated with
the other two cases, as all three challenged the constitutionality of Section 6805(1)(6).
Early in the proceedings, the parties stipulated to stay the cases pending the outcome of
Kirk v. New York State Department of Education, No. 08-CV-6016, (W.D.N.Y), a lawsuit
challenging an analogous provision of the New York State Education Law on similar
grounds, as all parties agreed that the outcome in Kirk would likely be dispositive of this
lawsuit. (Docket Nos. 7, 15). 1 In Kirk, the district court awarded summary judgment to
the plaintiff, who was represented by same firm representing Farrell in this case, Harter
Secrest & Emery LLP (“Harter Secrest”). See Kirk v. N. Y. State Dep’t of Educ., 562 F.
Supp. 2d 405, 407 (W.D.N.Y. 2008). While Defendants’ appeal of that decision was
pending, however, the plaintiff received his green card, thus mooting the case. (See
Docket No. 15 (advising this Court of the dismissal of the Kirk appeal on mootness
grounds)).
Upon dismissal of Kirk, the parties resumed active litigation in these cases.
(Docket No. 15). On September 10, 2010, then District Judge Richard J. Holwell, to
1
As these cases are consolidated, all relevant filings are available on the docket of
the earliest filed case, Adusumelli v. Steiner, 08 Civ. 6932. Accordingly, all citations to
docket entries in this opinion refer to the docket in that case, except for one instance
where the reference to the Kirk docket is specifically noted.
2
whom these cases were previously assigned, granted summary judgment to the Plaintiffs,
holding that Section 6805(1)(6) violated the Equal Protection and Supremacy Clauses of
the United States Constitution. See Adusumelli v. Steiner, 740 F. Supp. 2d 582 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (Holwell, J.). Defendants appealed that decision to the Second Circuit. (Docket
No. 74). On July 10, 2012, the Second Circuit affirmed Judge Holwell’s decision. See
Dandamudi, 686 F.3d 66. Thereafter, Plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees pursuant to
Title 42, United States Code, Section 1988 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2).
(See Docket Nos. 87, 92).
APPLICABLE LAW
Section 1988(b) provides that, in federal civil rights actions, “the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party . . . a reasonable attorney’s fee.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988(b). As the Second Circuit has explained, “the ‘function of an award of attorney’s
fees is to encourage the bringing of meritorious civil rights claims which might otherwise
be abandoned because of the financial imperatives surrounding the hiring of competent
counsel.’” Raishevich v. Foster, 247 F.3d 337, 344 (2d Cir. 2001) (quoting Kerr v.
Quinn, 692 F.2d 875, 877 (2d Cir. 1982)); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
429 (1983) (stating that fee awards “ensure effective access to the judicial process for
persons with civil rights grievances” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Thus, although
a district court has wide discretion in choosing whether to award or deny attorney’s fees,
“this discretion is narrowed by a presumption that successful civil rights litigants should
ordinarily recover attorneys’ fees unless special circumstances would render an award
unjust.” Raishevich, 247 F.3d at 344; accord Hensley, 461 U.S. at 429.
3
Courts in the Second Circuit use the familiar “lodestar” method of calculating
reasonable attorney’s fees — multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended by a
reasonable hourly rate. Millea v. Metro-North R.R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 166 (2d Cir. 2011)
(noting that “absent extraordinary circumstances, failing to calculate [the lodestar
amount] as a starting point [for awarding attorney’s fees] is legal error”). Although the
Second Circuit and the Supreme Court have stated that an award calculated using this
method is “presumptively reasonable,” district courts “may adjust the lodestar when it
‘does not adequately take into account a factor that may properly be considered in
determining a reasonable fee.’” Id. at 166-67 (quoting Perdue v. Kenny A. ex rel. Winn,
— U.S. —, 130 S. Ct. 1662, 1673 (2010)).
FARRELL’S FEE REQUEST
Farrell requests $215,020.34 in attorney’s fees and costs billed by her counsel,
Harter Secrest. (See Catillaz Decl. (Docket No. 115) (“Catillaz Decl. II”) ¶ 6). This
figure represents the lodestar amount for Harter Secrest’s work on all stages of this case,
including the preparation of this motion, less a small reduction based on Harter Secrest’s
exercise of billing judgment. (See Farrell Mem. Law Supp. Mot. Att’y Fees (Docket No.
90) (“Farrell Mem. Law”) 8-9; Catillaz Decl. (Docket No. 88) (“Catillaz Decl. I”) ¶ 50;
Catillaz Decl. II ¶¶ 4-5). Defendants challenge this fee request on four grounds: (1) that
Harter Secrest’s billing is excessive and duplicative of the work it performed on behalf of
the plaintiff in Kirk; (2) that some of the legal research conducted by a senior associate
(who later made partner) should have been conducted by a junior attorney billing at a
lower rate; (3) that some of Harter Secrest’s billing entries reflect “block billing,” which
limits the Defendants’ and the Court’s ability to evaluate the reasonableness of the fee
4
requests; and (4) that Harter Secrest should be awarded only 50% of their normal rate for
travel time, rather than the full rate that Harter Secrest seeks. (Defs.’ Mem. Law Opp’n
to Farrell Mot. (Docket No. 107) (“Opp’n to Farrell”) 2). Notably, Defendants do not
challenge the reasonableness of Harter Secrest’s billing rates. Nor do they argue that,
aside from the fact that Harter Secrest previously worked on similar issues in Kirk, the
firm spent an excessive amount of time litigating the complex legal issues decided in this
case. The Court will address each of Defendants’ arguments in turn.
A. The Kirk Litigation
Defendants first contention is that Harter Secrest seeks, in effect, to double bill for
work it conducted on the present litigation because it conducted substantially the same
work, and was compensated for it, in the Kirk litigation. (Opp’n to Farrell 5-8). In fact,
Defendants argue that this case was only necessary because of Harter Secrest’s
“avoidable” failure to substitute a new plaintiff into Kirk to avoid the dismissal as moot.
(Id. at 8). This latter argument is plainly without merit, as Harter Secrest’s obligation in
Kirk was to represent the interests of its client and, having obtained a successful outcome
for him, it was under no obligation to find another potential plaintiff to take his place.
Similarly, to the extent that Defendants suggest that an award of attorney’s fees should be
reduced any time a plaintiff’s counsel has litigated a substantially similar case, their
argument goes too far. Defendants cite no legal authority for such a categorical
proposition, and the Court is not aware of any. And a per se rule of that sort would
disincentivize experienced attorneys from taking on civil rights litigation, which would
be inefficient and contrary to the purpose of Section 1988(b).
5
Nevertheless, on the specific facts of this case, the Court agrees with Defendants
that a reduction of Farrell’s fee request is warranted in light of Harter Secrest’s work on
Kirk. The firm’s summary judgment brief in this case is virtually identical to the brief it
filed in the Kirk case. (See Coulston Decl. (Docket No. 108) (“Coulston Decl. I”), Exs. B
and C). Indeed, aside from the elimination of two sections and the addition of a new fact
section, there are only cosmetic changes to transitions between paragraphs, proper names,
and statutory provisions; further, the only additional case law cited in the Farrell brief is
Kirk itself. To be sure, there is nothing improper about Harter Secrest recycling its work
from Kirk in this case, as the issues in the two cases were nearly identical. Further, the
similarity between two briefs is not, in itself, a reason to reduce a fee award, as one
would imagine that the use of prior work would be reflected in the fee request itself. (Cf.
Farrell Reply Mem. 2-3 (Docket No. 109) (contending that there are “built-in efficiencies
. . . already reflected in Plaintiff Farrell’s fee request as a result of her counsel’s
experience with Kirk”)). In other words, one would assume that, because Harter Secrest
did not have to write a brief from scratch, it would have billed many fewer hours for
preparation of the brief in this case.
Harter Secrest’s problem is that this assumption is not borne out by its billing
records. Looking only at the time spent preparing Kirk’s and Farrell’s motions for
summary judgment (that is, not considering the time spent preparing opposition and reply
briefs, as those differed more significantly between the cases), it appears that Harter
Secrest billed almost twenty-five hours more for its work in this case than for its work in
6
Kirk. 2 And while the firm’s work in Kirk did not save it from having to spend time in
this case drafting, among other things, a new facts section, a Local Rule 56.1 statement of
material facts, and a Local Rule 56.1 counterstatement to Defendants’ statement of
material facts, Margaret A. Catillaz billed over twenty-two hours of time on preparation
of the “brief” alone (a total that does not even include any of the more than twenty hours
that she block-billed for work on the brief and other summary judgment documents,
hours she billed specifically for work on other summary judgment documents, or hours
billed by an associate that may have been brief-related). (See Catillaz Decl. I Ex. B, at
14-17). In short, on the facts of this case, the Court finds that the amount of time Harter
Secrest billed for preparation of the summary judgment brief, given its prior work in
Kirk, was excessive and that a reduction in its fee request is warranted.
Nevertheless, the Court does not find that the reduction should be as large as the
twenty percent that Defendants seek. (Opp’n to Farrell 8). In fact, any across-the-board
percentage reduction would be inappropriate, as there is no allegation, let alone evidence,
that Harter Secrest’s work in this case beyond the summary judgment brief was
duplicative of its work in Kirk. (Among other things, the fees in awarded in Kirk did not
include any time spent on the merits appeal. (Farrell Reply Mem. 3).) Instead, the
remedy should fit the circumstances. Accordingly, instead of reimbursing Farrell for the
2
Specifically, for the period between January 5, 2010, when the first time entry for
work on Farrell’s summary judgment motion appears, and March 1, 2010, when the
motion was filed, Harter Secrest attorneys and paralegals claim 68 hours of billed work
on the motion. (See Catillaz Decl. I, Ex. B, at 14-17). By contrast, for the analogous
period of time in the Kirk litigation, Harter Secrest sought fees for only 41.7 hours of
work (including some time that was block-billed and therefore may have been spent on
other work). See Decl. of Margaret A. Catillaz in Supp. App. by Pl. Simon E. Kirk for an
Allowance of Att’ys’ Fees, Kirk v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Educ., No. 08-CV-6016
(W.D.N.Y.) (Docket 08-CV-6016 No. 48).
7
more than twenty-two hours that Catillaz billed for preparation of the summary judgment
brief in this case, the Court will award fees for only ten hours of that time — a reduction
of 12.5 hours, or $5,062.50.
B. Legal Research by Senior Attorneys
Next, Defendants seek to reduce the fee request because Jeffrey A. Wadsworth,
currently a Partner at Harter Secrest, conducted a significant amount of legal research.
(Opp’n to Farrell 9-10). In support of their request, Defendants rely exclusively on
Shannon v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 156 F. Supp. 2d 279, 301-02 (S.D.N.Y. 2001), in
which the Court concluded that a senior partner with forty years of experience should
have delegated some tasks to junior associates rather than drafting the complaint, drafting
and responding to discovery requests, drafting statements of fact, and doing legal
research all himself. This case is easily distinguished from Shannon, however, as Harter
Secrest made significant use of junior associates and paralegals to perform more basic
tasks on the case. Moreover, when Wadsworth himself conducted most of the research in
this case, he was an associate, not a partner. (See Wadsworth Decl. (Docket No. 110) ¶
6). Thus, the Court declines to reduce the fee request on this basis.
C. Block Billing
As a general matter, any attorney who seeks court-ordered compensation in this
Circuit “must document the application with contemporaneous time records[,] . . . .
specify[ing], for each attorney, the date, the hours expended, and the nature of the work
done.” N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 711 F.2d 1136, 1148 (2d
Cir. 1983). In light of this requirement, Defendants seek a five percent reduction for
entries that they identify as “block billed” (Opp’n to Farrell 10), a time-keeping practice
8
“that involves stating the total daily time spent on a case, rather than separating out the
time into individual entries describing specific activities.” Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven,
No. 94-CV-2622 (FBW) (DW), 2005 WL 1397202, at *2 n.5 (E.D.N.Y. June 13, 2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted). As Defendants note, courts in this Circuit have
sometimes applied a percentage reduction to block-billed entries based on the “inherent
difficulties the Court would encounter in attempting to parse out whether the number of
hours spent on the work performed was reasonable” in light of the fact that “a single
billing entry might mix tasks that are compensable with those that are not, or mix
together tasks that are compensable at different rates.” Hnot v. Willis Grp. Holdings Ltd.,
No. 01 Civ. 6558 (GEL), 2008 WL 1166309, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted). At the same time, “block billing is not automatically
disfavored by courts in this district.” Id. Thus, courts have generally limited across-theboard reductions to situations “where there was evidence that the hours billed were
independently unreasonable or that the block-billing was mixing together tasks that were
not all compensable, or not all compensable at the same rate.” Id. (collecting cases).
Here, Defendants assert that Harter Secrest has “engaged in substantial block
billing, including many entries from Mr. Wadsworth.” (Opp’n to Farrell 10). Despite
this claim, Defendants identify only four examples of block-billing; fail to “identify a
single block-billed entry that contains tasks that are themselves unreasonable or
duplicative,” Hnot, 2008 WL 1166309, at *6; and fail to include any block-billed entry in
their table of objections to specific time entries. (See Opp’n to Farrell 10-12; Coulston
Decl. I Ex. A). Nor is there any evidence of imprecise billing into quarter-, half-, or fullhour blocks; vagueness in the block-billed entries; or combined billing of activities
9
compensable at different rates (other than travel discussed below), any of which might
call for heightened scrutiny of block-billing. See, e.g., Nimkoff Rosenfeld & Schechter,
LLP v. RKO Properties, Ltd., No. 07 Civ. 7983 (DAB) (HBP), 2011 WL 8955840, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2011) (imprecise billing into quarter-, half-, or full-hour blocks), report
and recommendation adopted, No. 07 Civ. 7983 (DAB), 2012 WL 3871394 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 6, 2012); LV v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 700 F. Supp. 2d 510, 525-26 (S.D.N.Y.
2010) (vagueness in the entries); Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 975 F. Supp. 317, 328
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (combined activities).
In short, because there is no “evidence that plaintiffs’ block-billing has obscured
. . . unreasonable billing, the Court will not impose an across-the-board penalty simply
because a law firm has engaged in a generally accepted billing practice.” Hnot, 2008 WL
1166309, at *6; see also, e.g., G.B. ex rel. N.B. v. Tuxedo Union Free Sch. Dist., 09 Civ.
859 (KMK), 2012 WL 4108111, at*15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 18, 2012) (“Defendant has
identified no entries where the hours billed are unreasonable, or where block billing has
combined activities compensable at different rates. Therefore, the Court does not find any
reduction warranted.”).
D. Travel Time
Finally, Defendants object to Farrell’s fee request insofar as it seeks compensation
for Harter Secrest attorneys’ travel time at 100% of their standard rate. In recognition of
the fact that travel time “may be beneficial, but . . . probably is not as productive as time
at the office or in court,” Wilder v. Bernstein, 975 F. Supp. 276, 284 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), courts in the Second Circuit “regularly
reduce attorneys’ fees by 50 percent for travel time,” LV, 700 F. Supp. 2d at 526.
10
In this
case, Harter Secrest contends that its clients are generally willing to pay its full rates for
travel time because its rates are lower than those charged by most attorneys who practice
in this District. (Catillaz Decl. I ¶ 29; Wadsworth Decl. ¶ 7). Nevertheless, because there
is no evidence that the attorneys performed legal work during their travels in this case,
the Court will reduce the fees requested for travel time by fifty percent. Cf. Lilly v. Cnty.
of Orange, 910 F. Supp. 945, 951 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (finding that an attorney
demonstrating that he worked while traveling on public transit “might have demonstrated
sufficient productivity to warrant his full rate for travel time”). Based on a comparison of
the billing records for Wadsworth (who block-billed for travel time and performance of
other tasks) and Catillaz (who did not), the Court finds Catillaz billed for five and a half
hours of travel time and Wadsworth billed for six hours of travel time, and will reduce
the fees requested for that time by fifty percent, or $2,088.75. (See Catillaz Decl. I Ex. B,
at 37, Entries for Jan. 8 and 10, 2012; Wadsworth Decl. ¶¶ 7-8).
THE ADUSUMELLI PLAINTIFFS’ FEE REQUEST
Plaintiffs in the Adusumelli and Akula cases (“Adusumelli Plaintiffs”), seek
$304,500.95 in attorney’s fees and costs. (Adusumelli Reply Mem. 10 (Docket No.
112)). Defendants challenge this fee request on six grounds: (1) that the billing rate of
Krishnan S. Chittur, the Adusumelli Plaintiffs’ lead counsel, is excessive; (2) that certain
fees relating to the preparation of an amicus brief in Kirk and time spent speaking with
potential clients is nonrecoverable; (3) that a substantial number of time entries are vague
and block-billed; (4) that substantial legal research was inappropriately performed by
Chittur at the highest billing rate; (5) that Chittur engaged in substantial work of a clerical
or nonlegal nature that should be billed at a lower rate; and (6) that costs relating to the
11
filing of the amicus brief and in a vague entry are nonrecoverable. (Defs.’ Mem. Law
Opp’n Adusumelli Mot. (Docket No. 105) (“Opp’n to Adusumelli”) 5).
The Court will address each of these arguments in turn.
A. Billing Rate
First, Defendants contend that Chittur’s billing rate of $600 per hour is excessive.
(Opp’n to Adusumelli 6-9). This precise issue was recently addressed in Serin v. N.
Leasing Sys., Inc., No. 06 Civ. 1625 (JSG), 2011 WL 1467560, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19,
2011), in which the Court held that Chittur’s rate was unreasonable when compared to
“market rates among similar firms,” and reduced his rate to $450 per hour. Although the
Adusumelli Plaintiffs contend that this holding was “clear error” (Adusumelli Reply
Mem. 4), the Second Circuit affirmed the decision late last year, noting that the district
judge had reduced Chittur’s billing rate “after extensive consideration of existing
precedents.” Serin v. N. Leasing Sys., Inc., No. 11-1778-CV, 2012 WL 5275359, at *2
(2d Cir. Oct. 26, 2012) (summary order). Substantially for the reasons stated in Serin,
this Court reaches the same conclusion here. That conclusion is further supported by the
fact that Chittur’s rates were almost $200 more per hour than the highest rates charged by
Harter Secrest in the same case. Even allowing Chittur a higher hourly rate to account
for the difference between the Rochester and New York City legal markets, that
difference is excessive. Accordingly, Chittur’s billing rate will be reduced to $450 per
hour.
B. Billing Related to Prospective Clients and the Kirk Amicus Brief
Next, Defendants seek to reduce the Adusumelli Plaintiffs’ fee request for the time
the Chittur firm spent speaking with prospective clients and preparing an amicus brief
12
that was filed in the Kirk litigation. (Opp’n to Adusumelli 11-13). The Adusumelli
Plaintiffs’ have agreed to withdraw their request for the former (Chittur Decl. (Docket
No. 113) (“Chittur Decl. II”) ¶ 4), so the Court will reduce the fee request for that time.
As for the latter, Defendants argue that the Adusumelli Plaintiffs are not entitled to
recover for their counsels’ time spent on preparation of the Kirk amicus brief because the
Adusumelli Plaintiffs were not “prevailing parties” in the Kirk litigation and do not
otherwise meet the standard for amici seeking fee awards. (Opp’n to Adusumelli 12-13
(citing Wilder v. Bernstein, 965 F.2d 1196, 1203 (2d Cir. 1992) (distinguishing between
intervenors as prevailing parties and amici)). The question is not whether Plaintiffs were
“prevailing parties” in Kirk, however, but rather whether Plaintiffs — as prevailing
parties in this case — are entitled to recover for their counsel’s work on the amicus brief
in Kirk as a component of their work in this case. The Court concludes that they are.
Although it does not appear that the Second Circuit has addressed when a
prevailing party can recover fees for the preparation of an amicus brief in related
litigation, other courts have spoken to the issue under other fee-shifting statutes. These
courts have held that a prevailing party is entitled to recover for “every item of service
which, at the time rendered, would have been undertaken by a reasonable and prudent
lawyer to advance or protect his client’s interest.” Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles
O. Finley & Co., Inc., 676 F.2d 1291, 1313 (9th Cir. 1982); Ariz. v. Maricopa Cnty. Med.
Soc’y, 578 F. Supp. 1262, 1268 (D. Ariz. 1984) (applying this standard to the filing of an
amicus brief in related litigation). As the D.C. Circuit has explained, therefore,
“[c]ompensable time should not be limited to hours expended within the four corners of
the litigation”; instead, time is compensable as long as it was “expended in pursuit of a
13
successful resolution of the case in which fees are being claimed.” Nat’l Ass’n of
Concerned Veterans v. Sec’y of Def., 675 F.2d 1319, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also
Boehner v. McDermott, 541 F. Supp. 2d 310, 320 (D.D.C. 2008) (applying the standards
from Twin City Sportservice and Concerned Veterans to a fee request under the federal
wiretapping statute for an amicus curiae filing in a related case).
Applying these standards here, Plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement for the
Chittur firm’s preparation of an amicus brief in Kirk. The parties in these cases stipulated
to stay litigation pending the outcome in Kirk based on a recognition that the legal issues
were nearly identical and that the outcome in Kirk would likely be dispositive here. (See
Docket No. 7; Opp’n to Farrell (acknowledging that Kirk “would be dispositive of the
issues litigated in these consolidated actions”)). In fact, as discussed above, Defendants
oppose the Farrell fee request in this case based in part on the similarity between Kirk and
these cases. (Opp’n to Farrell 6). Given these similarities, the Court has no trouble
finding that “a reasonable or prudent lawyer” in the Chittur firm’s position would have
filed an amicus brief in Kirk “to advance or protect his client’s interest” and “in pursuit of
a successful resolution” of these cases. Accordingly, Defendants’ objection is rejected.
C. Block-Billing, Vague Billing Entries, and Non-Attorney Work
Defendants argue that the Adusumelli Plaintiffs’ fee request should also be
reduced because of block-billing, vague billing entries, and the performance of clerical
and other non-legal work by attorneys. (See Opp’n to Adusumelli 13-20). The Chittur
firm engaged in even less block-billing than Harter Secrest, however, so it follows from
the Court’s discussion above that a reduction on that basis is unwarranted. Defendants’
other arguments have more merit. For Chittur, in particular, there are dozens of billing
14
entries relating to telephone calls or correspondence with clients, the Court, co-counsel,
and opposing counsel, that provide no information whatsoever regarding the purpose or
topic of the work, making it impossible for the Court to evaluate the reasonableness of
the claimed time. (See, e.g., Chittur Decl. (Docket No. 93) (“Chittur Decl. I”), Ex. 2, at
4-6, 8-13). In addition, Chittur and Andrey Strutinskiy, of counsel at the Chittur Firm,
unreasonably billed at their full rates for routine tasks, such as applying for pharmacist’s
licenses for their clients and faxing or e-filing documents. Accordingly, the Court will
reduce the Adusumelli Plaintiffs’ fee request by fifteen percent due to vague billing
entries and clerical or paralegal work performed at full attorney rates. See, e.g., LV, 700
F. Supp. 2d at 525-26 (vagueness); Tatum v. City of N.Y., No. 06 Civ. 4290 (PGG)
(GWG), 2010 WL 334975, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 28, 2010) (paralegal and clerical work).
D. Legal Research Performed by Chittur
Defendants also contend that the Adusumelli Plaintiffs’ fee request should be
reduced on the ground that Chittur did legal research himself rather than delegating it to
“less expensive junior attorneys.” (Opp’n to Adusumelli 18-19 (internal quotation marks
omitted)). In Serin, however, the Court rejected precisely this argument, reasoning as
follows:
It is inevitable in smaller law firms that more experienced attorneys must
complete work that would be completed by a junior associate at a larger
firm. Indeed, the lean staffing at Chittur & Associates prevented Chittur
from delegating all legal research to junior attorneys. Additionally, the
greater cost of Chittur performing legal research is somewhat offset by
Chittur & Associate’s practice of not billing Westlaw or Lexis charges to
their client.
15
2011 WL 1467560, at *11 (citation omitted). The Court finds this reasoning persuasive
and therefore declines to reduce the fee request “simply because [Chittur] performed
legal research that could have been completed by a junior associate at a larger firm.” Id.
E. Costs
Finally, Defendants dispute Plaintiffs’ request to be reimbursed for $438.29 in
costs associated with the filing of the amicus brief in Kirk and $500 for “miscellaneous”
costs. (Opp’n to Adusumelli 20-21). As Plaintiffs are entitled to recover for their
counsel’s work on the Kirk amicus brief, they are plainly entitled to recover for the costs
associated with that work. The reimbursement request for “miscellaneous” costs,
however, is a different story. That description is plainly too vague for the Court to
determine if the costs are associated with “[i]dentifiable, out-of-pocket disbursements for
items such as photocopying, travel, and telephone costs,” which are “generally taxable
under § 1988,” or with “nonrecoverable routine office overhead, which must normally be
absorbed within the attorney’s hourly rate.” Kuzma v. I.R.S., 821 F.2d 930, 933-34 (2d
Cir. 1987). In a footnote to a declaration submitted in reply to Defendants’ opposition,
Chittur asserts that the “miscellaneous” costs were “cumulative” expenses and “include
such expenses as copying, phone bills, conveyance, and similar items routinely billed by
law firms to clients.” (Chittur Decl. II 3 n.4). This conclusory assertion, however, is
both too little (in that it lacks any meaningful detail) and too late (in that it came only in
reply). Accordingly, the Court will reduce Plaintiffs’ request by $500.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiffs’ motions for attorney’s fees and costs
are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The Adusumelli Plaintiffs’ request for
16
$304,500.95 in fees and costs will be reduced by $65,415 for Chittur’s excessive billing
rate (436.1 hours claimed multiplied by the $150 per hour reduction), $500 for the
disallowed miscellaneous costs, and then by fifteen percent across-the-board for the
vague entries and claimed paralegal and clerical work. The Adusumelli Plaintiff are
therefore awarded $202,798.06 in attorney’s fees and costs. Farrell’s request for
$215,020.34 in attorney’s fees and costs will be reduced by $5,062.50 based on Harter
Secrest’s prior work on the Kirk litigation and by $2,088.75 for counsels’ travel time.
Farrell is therefore awarded $207,869.09 in attorney’s fees and costs.
The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Docket Nos. 87 and 92 and to close
these cases.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 28, 2013
New York, New York
17
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?