Anwar et al v. Fairfield Greenwich Limited et al

Filing 1378

BRIEF re: #1377 MOTION to Intervene New Greenwich Litigation Trustee, LLCs Notice of Motion to Intervene for Limited Purposes and for Entry of Order Unsealing Class Certification Motion Papers. . Document filed by New Greenwich Litigation Trustee, LLC, as Successor Trustee of Greenwich Sentry, L.P. and Greenwich Sentry Partners, L.P. Litigation Trusts.(Wallner, Robert)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PASHA S. ANWAR, et al., Plaintiffs, 09ev 11 8-VM-FM -againstFAIRFIELD GREENWICH LTD., et al., Defendants. NEW GREENWICH LITIGATION TRUSTEE, LLC'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO INTERVENE FOR LIMITED PURPOSES AND FOR ENTRY OF ORDER UNSEALING CLASS CERTIFICATION MOTION PAPERS MILBERG LLP Robert A. Wailner Kristi Stahnke McGregor Charles Slidders One Pennsylvania Plaza New York, NY 10119 Tel.: (212) 594-5300 Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor New Greenwich Litigation Trustee, LLC, as Successor Trustee of Greenwich Sentry, L.P. and Greenwich Sentry Partners, L.P. Litigation Trusts TABLE OF CONTENTS Page TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . ii BACKGROUND............................................................................................................................. 1 ARGUMENT...................................................................................................................................3 A. The Trustee Should be Permitted to Intervene for Limited Purposes .....................3 B. 5 The Class Certification Papers Should be Unsealed ............................................... 1. 5 There is a Presumptive Right of Access to the Papers ................................ 2. The Anwar Parties Bear the Heavy Burden to Overcome the Presumptive Right of Access.....................................................................12 3. The Anwar Parties Cannot Satisfy their Burden........................................14 CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................................17 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Page(s) CASES In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liability L itig., Cir. 821 F.2d 139 (2d 1987) ....................................................................................................16 In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liability L itig., Cir. 104 F.R.D. 559 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 821 F.2d 139 (2d 1987) ..............................13,15 Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 2015 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 27050(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2015),petition filed, passim No. 15-792(2d Cir Mar. 16, 2015)................................................................................... Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 372(S.D.N.Y. 2010) .......................................................................................9 In re Bankof New York Mellon Corp. Forex Transactions Litig., (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30,2015) ............................................................14,15 No 12-md-2355 In re Bernard L. Madofflnv. Sec. LLC, 654 F.3d 229 (2d Cir. 2011) ...................................................................................................... 9 Cochran v. Volvo Group North Am., LLC, (M.D.N.C. 2013).................................................................................... 13 931 F. Supp. 2d735 Doe v. Ashcroft, 317 F. Supp. 2d 488(S.D.N.Y. 2004) .................................................................................... 12 Dorsett v. Cnty.of Nassau, 283 F.R.D. 85 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).................................................................................................5 Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Arrowood Indem, Co., (HB), 2013 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 135869(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, No. 13 Civ. 3410 2013)..............................................................................................................................5, 13, 17 In re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., Cir. 92 F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 677 F.2d 230 (2d 1981) ..... 3 In re Greenwich Sentry, L.P. and Greenwich Sentry Partners, L.P., Case No.10-16229(Bankr. S.D.N,Y.)................................................... 1 Hartford Courant v. Pelligrino, Cir, 371 F.3d 49 (2d 2004) ..................................................................... 8 11 In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305 (3d Cir. 2008) ..................................................................................................... 7 Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982) .................................................................................................... 15 Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, 435 F.3d 110 (2d Cir. 2006) .............................................................................................passim Manchanda v, Bose, No. 25 Civ. 9658 (LGS), 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2015)........................................................................................................... 13 Martindell v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2dCir. 1979) ......................................................................................................3 Nixon v. Warner Commc 'ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589 (1978).................................................................................................................. 8 Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 772F.3d111 (2dCir. 2014)...................................................................................................... 6 Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772 (3d Cir. 1994) ........................................................................................................4 In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002)..........................................................................................................8 Sec. Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madofflnv. Sec. LLC, Adv. Pro. No. 08-01789 (BRL), 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 1390 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2011).............................................................................................15 United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141 (2d Cir. 1995) ....................................................................................................... 5 United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044 (2d Cir. 1995) ............................................................................................... 5,12 United States v. Erie County, 763 F.3d 235(2d Cir. 2014) .............................................................................................passim United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 F.R.D. 610 (D.D.C. 1983) .................................................................................................. 15 United States v, Green, ....................... 6, 12 No. 12 CR 83S, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48982 (W.D.N,Y. Apr. 14, 2015) United States v. mt '1 Bus. Machines Corp., 67 F.R.D. 39 (S.D.N.Y. 1975)................................................................................................. 15 111 United States ex rel. Alcohol Foundation, Inc. v. Kalmanovilz Charitable 458 Foundation, Inc.,186 F. Supp. 2d (S.D.N.Y. 2002) ..................................................13, 14 Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d256 (2d Cir. 2001) ......................................................................................................6 Walker, Truesdell, Roth & Assocs., Inc. v. Globe Op Fin. Servs. LLC, Index Nos. 600469/2009 & 600498/2009 (Sup. Ct., NY Cnty. May 27, 2014), Ct., notices of appeal filed (Sup. NY Cnty., June 27, 2014)r....................................................1 STATUTES AND RULES Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 101, ...............................................................................................................2 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f).........................................................................................................................7 Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)....................................................................................................................3, 4 Fed, R. Civ. P.26(c) ...................................................................................................................... 16 OTHER AUTHORITIES Charles Wright, Arthur Miller & Mary Kane, 7C Federal Practice and Procedure 3d1911(2007)........................................................................................................................4 Linda Mullinex, Putting Proponents to Their Proof Evidentiary Rules at Class Certification, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 606 (May 2014).............................................................8 MISCELLANEOUS Joe Van Acker,Madoff Investors Win Class Cert. In Suit Against PwC, Citco, Law360(Mar. 4,2015) ............................................................................................................ 11 Wall Chad Bray, Fairfield Greenwich Founders to Settle Madoff Suit, St. J. (Nov. 6,2012) .................................................................................................................................... 11 Back Christine Vargas Colmey & Jonathan Sablone, in the saddle again: Madofj' ffs feeder fund plaint closer to recovery from fund service providers Citco and Nixon Peabody LLP (Mar. 17, 2015) ........................................... 11 Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Accounting Firms That Missed Fraud at Madoff lanthe Dugan & David Crawford, Wall St. J. (Feb. 18, 2009) .............................................................................11 May Be Liable, Time.com Stephen Gandel, The Madoff Fraud: How Culpable Were the Auditors? (Dec. 17, 2008) ........................................................................................................................10 lv Madoff lawsuit shows that Stephen R. Hernick & Matthew C. Blickensderfer, of fraud individual issues of reliance will not doom class certification claims Lexology (Apr. 24. 2015) ........................................................................11 in securities cases, Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario, Allegations of Professional Misconduct against Stephen Wall (Oct. 12, 2012) .................................................................10 The MadoffAffair, Frontline (May 12, 2009)................................................................................10 Michael J. de la Merced, In Madoff's Wake, Scrutiny ofAccounting Firms, N.Y. Times(Dec. 21, 2008).............................................................................................................10 Francine McKenna, PwC Partner At MF Global Has Long, And Mixed, Track (June 7, 2013).........................................................................................10 Record, Forbes.com PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, "Ponzi schemes: a classicForensic eye scam," 10 (Summer 2013) .....................9 opener, Exploring today's hottest issues in economic crime Forbes.com (Apr. 6, 2011)..................................................10 Halah Touryalai, Protection Racket, V New Greenwich Litigation Trustee, LLC, as Successor Trustee of Greenwich Sentry, L.P. and Greenwich Sentry Partners, L.P. Litigation Trusts, by its undersigned counsel, respectfully submits this memorandum in support of its motion (i) pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(b), to intervene in this action for the limited purposes of this motion, and (ii) for entry of an Order unsealing the papers filed in support of and in opposition to the motion for class certification, which motion was granted by the Court by Decision and Order dated March 3, 2015 (ECF No. 1357, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27050 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2015) ("Class Certification Decision")).' BACKGROUND Greenwich Sentry, L.P. and Greenwich Sentry Partners, L.P. (collectively, the "Domestic Funds") are among the Fairfield Greenwich Group ("FGG") family of funds that invested with Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC. In November 2010, the Domestic Funds filed 2 In connection with petitions for relief under Chapter 11 of the United States bankruptcy code. the bankruptcy, the Greenwich Sentry and Greenwich Sentry Partners Litigation Trusts were 3 New established, and litigation on behalf of the trusts was filed in New York State court. Greenwich Litigation Trustee, LLC has recently been appointed as Successor Trustee of the trusts. To narrow any dispute, the Trustee does not seek to unseal materials reflecting discovery produced by the plaintiffs or depositions of the plaintiffs. 2 Case See In re Greenwich Sentry, L.P. and Greenwich Sentry Partners, L.P., No. 10-16229 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.). See Walker, Truesdell, Roth & Assocs., Inc. v. GlobeOp Fin. Servs.Index Nos. LLC, 600469/2009 & 600498/2009 (Sup. Ct., NY Cnty. May 27, 2014) (dismissal motions granted), Ct., notices of appeal filed (Sup. NY Cnty., June 27, 2014). Discovery in the state cases has largely been coordinated with discovery in this action. Defendants in the state cases -- who also are defendants in this action -- are (i) PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V. (collectively, 4 and (ii) "PwC"), who served as the Domestic Funds’ outside auditors, Citco Fund Services (Europe) BV and Citco (Canada) Inc. (collectively, "Citco"), who served as administrators. As alleged in the state cases, the Domestic Funds sustained damages due to defendants’ wrongful conduct including, inter alia, PwC's failure to audit the Funds’ financial statements in accordance with generally accepted auditing standards, and Citco’s concealment of material information from the Funds. According to defendants, the state cases are "substantially similar" No. to this case.See Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., 15-792 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2015), Doc. 6see 2, Citco Rule 23(f) Petition at 15 n. 11; also id.,Declaration of Walter Rieman, Esq., 6 5 (attaching state complaints). On March 3, 2015, this Court (Marrero, J.) issued the Class Certification Decision, certifying a plaintiff class of investors in the Domestic Funds and other FOG-sponsored funds. petition filed, No. 15-792 (2d Cir Mar. 16, See ECF No. 1357, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27050, 2015). The Court found that "Plaintiffs have provided evidence that the Citco Defendants withheld the same material information from all of their clients or investors . . . ." ECF No. *77 1357 at 34-35, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27050, at (internal quotation marks and citation PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP was an auditor for both Domestic Funds, while PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V. was an auditor only for Greenwich Sentry, L.P. In fact, there are important differences between the state cases and this case. For example, the state cases are not subject to preclusion under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub, L. No. 105-353, 101, 112 Stat. 3227 (1998) ("SLUSA"). SLUSA’s applicability to See ECF No. 1376. Additionally, this case, however, is sharply disputed by the parties. defendants claim that the class members have no standing to assert some or all of their claims, arguing that only the funds (and not investors in the funds) were in privity with the defendants. 2 omitted). The Court also stated that, "among the material omissions Plaintiffs allege, and are support with common evidence, that Citco Defendants did not disclose that" about the veracity of the grave doubts (1) "its internal auditors had Funds' financial information and whether the Funds' assets existed"; (2) "it was not following its own, or industry-standard procedures, but was basing the NAY solely on unverified information from Madoff, never reconciling that information with "its an independent source"; (3) attempts to verify that the Funds' due to Madoff's lack of cooperation in assets existed failed doing nothingto supervise meetings with Citco"; (4) "it was Madoff as Citco's sub-custodian"; and "Fairfield Sentry was on (5) Citco's internal 'Watch List' as a 'high risk fund." See also ECF No. 1357 at 33-34, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27050,*76 (emphasis supplied). at ECF No. 1357 at 34 n.9, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27050,*77 n.9 ("Plaintiffs provide common at evidence in the record to support each of these omissions."). Although the Class Certification Decision is publically filed, the parties filed their papers in connection with that motion (including briefs and exhibits) under seal. shown below, the Trustee and members of the 6 As public enjoy a presumptive right to access to those documents under both the common law and the First Amendment; accordingly, the papers should be unsealed forthwith. ARGUMENT A. The Trustee Should be Permitted to Intervene for Limited Purposes A Rule 24(b) motion is the proper mechanism for a non-party seeking to intervene for the F.2d See limited purpose of unsealing court records. Martindell v. Int'l Tel. and Tel. Corp., 594 92 In 291, 294 (2d Cir. 1979); re Franklin Nat'l Bank Sec. Litig., F.R.D. 468, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), aff'd, 677 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1981). Rule 24(b) provides in pertinent part: 6 The Docket references various "sealed" documents (seeECF Nos. 1296, 1323, 1326 and 1327), which might include some of the materials at issue. (1) In General. On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who ... (B) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question of law or fact. (3) Delay or Prejudice. In exercising its discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original parties’ rights. Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b). Rule 24(b)’s requirements are easily satisfied here. First, the motion is timely, as the Trustee promptly requested, in accordance with Judge Marrero’s individual rules, a pre-motion conference on April 13, 2015 -- just weeks after the Court issued the Class Certification i.e., Decision (ECF No. 1366) -- and then filed the instant motion in accordance with the Court’s April 30, 2015 scheduling order (ECF No, 1371). Second, because the Trustee challenges the sealing of the class certification papers, its claim, as required by Rule 24(b)(1)(13), shares "a question of law or fact in common with the Pansy main action" -- namely, whether the papers should be sealed. v. Borough of Stroudsburg, seeCharles Wright, Arthur 23 F.3d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks omitted); Miller & Mary Kane, 7C Federal Practice and Procedure 3d 1911 at 468 (2007) ("[C]ourts generally have interpreted their discretion under the rule broadly and have held that it can be invoked by nonparties who seek to intervene for the sole purpose of challenging confidentiality orders."). Finally, limited intervention will not "unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the see original parties’ rights," Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(b)(3), as the Trustee does not seek to litigate the (seeECF merits of this action. The parties have proposed a January 4, 2016 trial date No. 1368 ri 7 and at 2, Letter of David Barrett, Esq. on behalf of the parties to the Court),the Trustee's 8 Accordingly, the Trustee limited intervention would not delay that date or create any prejudice. 9 should be permitted to intervene for the limited purposes of this motion. B. The Class Certification Papers Should be Unsealed 1. There is a Presumptive Right of Access to the Papers "The common law right of public access to judicial documents is firmly rooted in our 435 nation's history." Lugosch v. Pyramid Co. of Onondaga, F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 2006). United Stales v. Erie County, Indeed, that right "is said to predate even the Constitution itself." 44 United States v. Amodeo, F.3d 141, 145 (2d Cir. 763 F.3d 235, 239 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing 1995) ("Amodeo r')). As the Second Circuit has explained, the right "is based on the need for federal courts, although independent -- indeed particularly because they are independent - to have a measure of accountability and for the public to have confidence in the administration of 71 United States v. Amodeo, F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d justice." Lugosch,435 F.3d at 119 (quoting Cir. 1995)("Amodeo Ii"). "Judicial documents" are court filings that are "relevant to the performance of the judicial Amodeo I,44 Lugosch,435 F.3d at 119 (quoting function and useful in the judicial process." '' The letter's reference to a "January 4, 2015" trial date is a typographical error. 8 The fact that the Trustee -- but not the parties -- has sought to unseal the papers shows that the Trustee's interest is not adequately represented by the parties, further warranting permissive 283 intervention. See Dorsett v. Cnly. of Nassau, F.R.D. 85, 90 (E.D.N.Y. 2012). Even if the Trustee's request for limited intervention is denied, the Court should still unseal the See documents for the reasons set forth in the following section. Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. No. at Arrowoodlndemn. Co., 13 CV 3410 (FIB), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135869, *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 13, 2013) (granting motion to unseal, but denying motion to intervene as moot, explaining: unseal the records at issue irrespective of a motion to intervene."). sua sponte "The Court may 5 F.3d at 145). Here, the class certification papers qualify as "judicial documents" because they were relevant to the class motion, and the Court considered them in ruling on the motion. In addition to the common law right of access, the First Amendment provides the Trustee See United States v. a presumptive right of access to the class certification motion papers. at Green, No. 12 CR 83S, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48982, *2 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 14, 2015) ("The First Amendment access right extends to court dockets, records, pleadings, and exhibits, and establishes a presumption of public access that can only be overcome by specific, on-the-record findings that the public's interest in access to information is overcome by specific and compelling showings of harm."). Anwar plaintiffs needed to "establish the Fed. R. Civ. P. To obtain class certification, the 23 requirements bypreponderance of the evidence." Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps, Ret. Sys. v. Morgan a Stanley & Co., 772 F.3d 111, 119 (2d Cir. 2014) (emphasis supplied). Reflecting that heavy burden, the parties filed voluminous briefs and supporting exhibits that no doubt presented an 10 Indeed, the Anwar exhaustive presentation of their opposing positions on class certification. the exceeded burden that typically would be imposed on a plaintiffs' burden on the motion plaintiff opposing a summary judgment motion. Unlike a class certification motion, on a summary judgment motion the plaintiff would need to present evidence merely showing the see existence of a material issue of fact, Virgin Ati. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC, 257 F.3d 256, 262 (2d Cir. 2001); it would not need to prove anything by a preponderance of the evidence. Citco's pending Rule 23(f) petition to the Second Circuit alone comprises12 volumes. some No. 15-792 (2d Cir. Mar. 17, 2015), Doc. 6-2. See Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., no With respect to summary judgment motion papers, the Second Circuit has squarely held that "a presumption of immediate public access attaches under both the common law and the F.3d at 126. Given that holding, there can be no basis for First Amendment." Logusch, 435 refusing to recognize a First Amendment right of access to the class certification papers. Additional factors warrant recognition of a First Amendment right of access here. decidedthe class certification motion, and thus has already engaged in this Court has actually Compare extensive judicial decision-making in the context of an extraordinarily large record. with Logusch, 435 F.3d at 120-21 (holding that First Amendment right of access applied to Erie County, summary judgment motion papers, even though motion had not yet been decided); 763 F.3d at 240-43 (holding that First Amendment right of access applied to court-filed compliance reports, even though court had not yet taken any action with respect to the reports). Second, the Court issued its Class Certification Decision based solely on the papers without a public hearing. Had there been a hearing, it presumably would have been transcribed and open to the public. As the Second Circuit has instructed, "access to written documents filed in connection with pretrial motions is particularly important in the situation. . . where no hearing Logusch, is held and the court's ruling is based solely on the motion papers." 435 F.3d at 124 (ellipsis in original, citation omitted). Third, the critical importance of the Class Certification Decision in the overall context of this litigation warrants recognition of a First Amendment access right. "[D]enying or granting In re Hydrogen Peroxide class certification is often the defining moment in class actions," Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 310 (3d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted); indeed, parties may seek see interlocutory review of a class certification decision, Fed. R. Civ, P. 23(f) -- something the defendants have successfully done once and are pursuing again. 7 Fourth, recognition of a First Amendment right of access here is supported by the "experience and logic" analytical approach sometimes employed by the See Erie County, courts. 763 F.3d at 241. The "experience" factor "focus[es] on whether the documents are ones that Id. (citation omitted). "[T]he 'have historically been open to the press and general public." notion of public access to judicial documents is a capacious one: the courts of this country have long recognized a 'general right to inspect and copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents' in part because the public has an interest in a 'keep[ing] Id. (second brackets in original) (quoting watchful eye on the workings of public agencies." 597-98(1978)), 435 Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., U.S. 589, Experience shows that class certification motion papers historically have been publicly filed. See Linda Mullinex, Putting Proponents to Their Proof Evidentiary Rules at Class Certification, 82 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 606, 609 (May 2014) (describing "[t]he earlier era of driveSee generally Erie by class certifications or certifications based on the pleadings alone").' County, 763 F.3d at 241 (finding that First Amendment right of access applied to reports prepared by compliance monitors, where movant pointed to "several instances" where similar 293 In reports were publically accessible);re Providence Journal Co., F.3d 1, 10-13 (1st Cir. 371 F.3d 49, 58 (2d Cir. 2004) ("holding 2002), construed in Hartford Courant v. Pelligrino, that the District of Rhode Island's blanket policy of refusing to file memoranda of law that counsel were required to submit in connection with motions violated the First Amendment"). "Logic" also supports unsealing the documents, as the issues in this case "are manifestly Erie ones of public concern and therefore ones which the public has an interest in overseeing." County, 763 F.3d at 242. Madoffs scheme obviously is the subject of enormous public 1 4/07/Mullenix82_3_Redacted.pdf. "Available at http ://www. gwlr.org/wp-content/uploads/20 F.3d attention,see In re Bernard L. Madofflnv. Sec. LLC, 654 229, 231 (2d Cir. 2011), and has been described in this case as "the largest financial fraud yet witnessed in the record of human 728 F. Supp. 2d 372, 412 wrongdoing and tragedy." Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd., (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (Marrero, J.). Defendants themselves have emphasized "the broad public interest in the Madoff matter" and, specifically, the "broad public interest in full disclosure 6;12 regarding Madoff’s fraud so that the fraud cannot be repeated." Exhibit 1 hereto, Petition at see id.at 2 ("this [is] a matter of unique public interest"). PwC has even publically addressed the Madoff scheme in its marketing materials, calling it "the largest Ponzi scheme uncovered to date" with an estimated $50 billion in losses suffered by victims including "individual investors See and sophisticated institutions alike." PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, "Ponzi schemes: a 12 classic scam," Forensic eye opener, Exploring today's hottest issues in economic crime 10, (Summer 2013). Moreover, the evidence of Citco’s "grave doubts" about the funds’ assets and its failure to "follow[] its own, or industry-standard procedures" (ECF No. 1357 at 33-34, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27050, at *76) directly implicates defendants’ due diligence and monitoring activities -Exhibit 1 hereto, Mills Letter at 2 See clearly among the "critical issues" in this case. generally ("Among the critical issues in this case is whether Plaintiffs can prove that the Defendants 12 Exhibit 1 hereto is a copy of the August 19, 2013 Letter of Carl Mills, Esq. on behalf of defendants to The Honorable Frank Maas ("Mills Letter"). Exhibit A to the Mills Letter is a June 21, 2013 letter to the SEC and the Petition for Review of Decision to Deny Defendants’ Request to Depose Nine Current and Former Securities and Exchange Commission Employees In ("Petition"), excluding exhibits thereto, filed in re Subpoenas Served in Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Ltd. 13 Available at http://www.pwc.com/en CA/ca/risk/forensic-services/publications/pwc-forensic("[A]rming investors with the right tools and See eye-opener-summer-2013-en.pdf. also id. education to appropriately understand and evaluate investment opportunities will greatly reduce the impact of these schemes."). should have reasonably foreseen that the Fairfield defendants would fail to perform the expected due diligence and monitoring of the Funds’ investments held by BLMIS . . . Additionally, defendants’ roles with respect to the FGG..sponsored funds have attracted Forbes.com (Apr. 6, Halah Touryalai, Protection Racket, significant public attention.See, e.g., 2011) ("[A]mong [Citco’s] mix of clients have been tainted funds, including Fairfield Greenwich 14 The Group, which funneled $7 billion into Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities."); Madoff In 5 Michael J. de la Merced, Madoff's Afftuir, Frontline (May 12, 2009) (referencing Citco);’ Times (Dec. 21, 2008) ("PricewaterhouseCoopers Wake, Scrutiny of Accounting Firms, N.Y. was the main auditor for Sentry, the largest fund run by Fairfield Greenwich Group, the $14.1 billion investment manager that has lost the most money so far in the Madoff scandal. The $7.5 accounting firm was tasked with minding Sentry, which had about billion invested in Mr. Madoff’s firm."). 16 14 Available at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2011 /0425/features-citco-hedge-fund-keunen protection-racket.html. 15 I. Available at http ://www.pbs .org/wgbhlpages/frontline/madoff/interviews/cohen.html# 16 2/22/business/22accounting.html?_r’O. Also Available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/1 publically available are charges filed by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario’s Professional Conduct Committee against PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP’s engagement partner in charge of the Fairfield Sentry Limited audit, including charges that he "failed to obtain sufficient and appropriate audit evidence of the operating effectiveness of the internal controls of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, LLC . . . ."SeeInstitute of Chartered Accountants of Ontario, Allegations of Professional Misconduct against Stephen Wall (Oct. 12, 2012), 0 11 http://www.epaontario.ca/Public/CurrentHearings/Hearinglnfo/Ipage 16369 .pdf, at J 1 (vi), PwC Partner At MF Global Has Long, And Mixed, Track Francine McKenna, 2(vi). See also (June 7, 2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/francinemckenna/2013/06/07/ Record, Forbes. com pwc-partner-at-mf-global-has-long-and-mixed-track-record/) ("An independent review of Bernie Madoff Ponzi scheme litigation will show that PwC also audited the Kingate Global Funds, the Fairfield Greenwich Group of funds - the largest Madoff feeder fund family - and several other The funds that invested in Madoff."); Stephen Gandel, Madoff Fraud: How Culpable Were the Time.com(Dec. 17, 2008), http://content.time.com/time/business/article/ Auditors?, 0,8599,1 867092,00.html) ("[I]t now appears KPMG, along with the other auditors of the Madoff Footnote continued 10 See this Defendants' involvement in litigation itselfhas attracted press reporting. Chad Wall Bray, Fairfield Greenwich Founders to Settle Madoff Suit, St. J. (Nov. 6, 2012) (noting that FGG settlement "doesn't resolve claims against several firms that acted as the Sentry funds' auditor, custodian or administrator, including PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP and Citco Group Ltd."). 17 Even the Class Certification Decision has drawn public attention, further underscoring the public interest in this case. 18 Thus, a First Amendment right of access is amply supported by "experience and logic." In sum, the Trustee has a common law and First Amendment presumptive right of access to the class certification documents. feeder funds, did very little to ensure investors weren't being ripped off.") 17 103620671495 Available at http://www.wsj.com/artic1es/SBl000l424127887324894104578 Accounting Firms That Missed Fraud at Madoff lanthe Dugan & David Crawford, 216. See also May Be Liable, Wall St. J. (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1234916385 61904323 ("PricewaterhouseCoopers's Canadian affiliate has dismissed claims that it was negligent in its audit of Madoff feeder fund Fairfield Greenwich Group. . . . 'PwC was not the auditor for Bernard Madoff Investments where the alleged fraud occurred,' the Canadian affiliate said in a statement."). 18 Law360 SeeJoe Van Acker, Madoff Investors Win Class Cert, In Suit Against PwC, Citco, 1/madoff-investors-win-class-cert4n-suit(Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/62751 Back againstpwc-citco; Christine Vargas Coirney & Jonathan Sablone, in the saddle again: Madoff feeder fund plaintiffs closer to recovery from fund service providers Citco and Pricewaterhouse Coopers, Nixon Peabody LLP (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www. 174229_Private_Fund_Disputes_Alert_i 7MAR20 15 .pdf; Stephen R. nixonpeabody. corn/files! 1-lernick & Matthew C. Blickensderfer, Madoff lawsuit shows that individual issues of reliance Lexology (Apr. 24. 2015), will not doom class certification offraud claims in securities cases, http :!/www. lexology.com!library/detail . aspx?g=482b65 6b-ffe 1 -4a40-bbcf-c 1 dba 1 f5e973. 11 2. The Anwar Parties Bear the Heavy Burden to Overcome the Presumptive Right of Access Because a presumptive right of access attaches to the class certification documents, the Anwar parties bear the burden to overcome the presumption. To overcome the First Amendment presumptive right of access, the Anwar parties must demonstrate -- on a document-by-document, redaction-by-redaction basis -- "the most compelling reasons" warranting the continued sealing F.3d at 121, 123 (citation omitted); also Doe v. see of the documents. See Lugosch, 435 Ashcroft, 317 F. Supp. 2d 488, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (Marrero, J.) (in case implicating national security concerns, noting Government's burden to show "the specific and compelling reasons" for "each particular redaction," citing "exacting First Amendment standards"). Continued sealing "may be justified only with specific, on-the-record findings that sealing is necessary to preserve higher values and only if the sealing order is narrowly tailored to achieve that aim." *34 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 48982, at (granting motion to Logusch,435 F.3d at 124.See Green, restrict access to hearing transcript that identified government witnesses in criminal case, where detective's affidavit provided specific information showing that witnesses "have been subjected to intimidating behavior" and one witness had been "shot three times by unknown assailants"). The First Amendment presumption is "stronger" than the common law presumption, Erie County, 763 F.3d at 241; nonetheless, the common law presumption is still heavy, given "the role of the material at issue in the exercise of Article III judicial power and the resultant value of such information to those monitoring the federal courts." 239 (quoting Id. at Amodeo II, F.3d 71 at 1049). As Judge Marrero has explained, the burden to overcome the presumption of access is "at its peak" when the documents at issue are "submitted to and used by the Court": Judicial records presumptively are to be made available to the public. See United States v. Amodeo, F.3d 1044, 1047-51 (2d 71 12 Cir. 1995). The weight of the presumption varies according to the document at issue and "is at its strongest when the document in question, as here, has been submitted as a basis for judicial decision making." By contrast, the presumption is particularly weak if the document plays "no role in the performance of Article III functions, such as those passed between the parties in discovery." The party requesting that a matter be filed and kept under seal bears the burden of showing why the material should be kept from public view. Here, the presumption in favor of public access is at its peak because the documents at issue were submitted to and used by the Court in rendering this Decision." United States ex rel. Alcohol Foundation, Inc. v. Kalmanovitz Charitable Foundation, Inc., 186 F. Supp. 2d 458, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (emphasis supplied, various internal citations omitted). See also Eagle Star Ins. Co. v. Arrowood Indem. Co., 13 Civ. 3410 (FIB), 2013 U.S. Dist. No. LEXIS 135869, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2013) (because sealed materials "constitute 'the heart of what the Court is asked to act upon," "[t]he weight of the presumption of access therefore is correspondingly high") (citation omitted); re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liability Litig., In 104 F.R.D. 559, 572-73 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Once a court has relied on material, that material should be disclosed."), aff'd, 821 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1987); Manchanda v. Bose, 25 Civ. 9658 (LGS), No. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 965, at *5..6 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2015) (denying motion to seal various documents, including complaint and information revealed in motion to dismiss and accompanying exhibits, stating: "the circumstances here are not sufficiently extraordinary to outweigh the presumption in favor of public access."). 19 19 In Cochran v. Volvo Group North Am., LLC, F. Supp. 2d 931 735 (M.D.N.C. 2013), which involved a "potential class action," id.at 731, the court recognized a common law (but not a see First Amendment) presumptive right of access to class certification papers. Id. at 728-29. Even then, the presumption of access could be rebutted "only if countervailing interests 'heavily outweigh the public interest in access . . Id. at 731 (citation omitted).See generally id. . ." at 730 ("Because lawsuits filed on behalf of a class potentially affect the rights of persons who are not parties to the case, transparency has heightened value in class actions."); In re "Agent Orange," 104 F.R.D. at 572-73. 13 In this case, because actual evidence was "submitted to and used by the Court," the Alcohol Foundation,186 F. Supp. 2d at 465, even with presumption of access "is at its peak," See not respect to the materials that were referenced in the Class Certification Decision. 435 F.3d at 123 ("If the rationale behind access is to allow the public an opportunity to Logusch, should have assess the correctness of the judge's decision . . . documents that the judge considered or relied upon, but did not, are just as deserving of disclosure as those that actually entered into the judge's decision.' Moreover, 'once those submissions come to the attention of the district judge, they can fairly be assumed to play a role in the court's deliberation.") (emphasis in original, citations omitted) 3. The AnwarParties Cannot Satisfy their Burden Anwar parties cannot satisfy their burden to overcome the For several reasons, the 20 presumptive right of access. First, this case concerns events of many years ago prior to Madoff s arrest in i.e., -See December 2008 -- including PwC's and Citco's activities in 2002 and 2003, respectively. In Anwar, 728 F. Supp. 2d at 393 n.4, 395. Instructive here is Judge Kaplan's recent decision in No re Bank of New York Mellon Corp. Forex Transactions Litig., 12-md-2355 (LAK) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 30, 2015) (Exhibit 2 hereto), granting a motion to remove the defendant bank's i.e., confidentiality designations with respect to emails that were "old" --dating from 1997 to 2010. See id.at 1. As the Court explained, "from a competitive point of view, [the documents] 20 Because the class certification materials are subject to the First Amendment right of access, the Court need not determine whether Anwar parties have overcome the common law right of the 763 access.See Erie County, F.3d at 241 ("Since we find that the compliance reports are subject to a First Amendment right of access, which is stronger and can only be overcome under more stringent circumstances than the common law presumption, . . . we need not, and do not, engage Anwar in such a common law analysis."). In any event, the parties cannot satisfy the lower (albeit still heavy) burden to overcome the common law right of access. 14 appear quite stale in light of the events of the last several years relating to the matters here in 104 controversy." Id.2' See also In re "Agent Orange," F,R.D, at575 ("An important factor in determining whether disclosure will cause competitive harm is whether the information that the United States v. In! '1 Bus. Machines Corp.,F.R.D. 67 party seeks to protect is current or stale."); 39, 48-49 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). seepage 9 Second, the "broad public interest in the Madoff matter" (defendants' phrase, above) and the public interest in the Class Certification Decision itself weigh heavily in favor of unsealing the papers. See In re "Agent Orange," 104 F.R.D. at573-74; United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 F.R.D. 610, 612 (D.D.C. 1983) (unsealing documents where case was "of some public significance and has, in fact, already received considerable publicity," explaining that "the greater the public's interest in the case the less acceptable are restraints on the public's access to the proceedings"). Third, any possibility that disclosure of the documents may embarrass the defendants (or, more accurately, to any embarrassment already caused by the description of the evidence in add the Class Certification Order) would not warrant maintaining the seal, Joy v. North, See 692 F.2d 880, 884 (2d Cir. 1982) ("[A] naked conclusory statement that publication of the Report will injure the bank in the industry and local community falls woefully short of the kind of showing which raises even an arguable issue as to whether it may be kept under seal."); Bank of New York Mellon,Exhibit 2 hereto at 1 (unsealing emails even though some or all of them were "probably . . . embarrassing" to the defendant); Inv. Prot. Corp. v. Bernard L. Madofflnv. Sec. 21 Judge Kaplan found that the bank had not demonstrated "good cause" under the confidentiality order, and that its arguments "approach the outer limit of responsibility." at 1-2. Here, of See id. course, the Anwar parties need to do much more than merely show "good cause" to maintain the documents under seal. 15 *7 Sec. LLC,Adv, Pro. No. 08-01789 (BRL), 2011 Bankr, LEXIS 1390, at (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 2011) ("the Defendants have not adequately established any harm beyond merely ’embarrassing or prejudicial’ association with these Ponzi scheme proceedings, which is not sufficient cause for sealing"). Fourth, the parties anticipate a January 2016 trial date, at which time all of the evidence of defendants’ alleged misconduct will likely become public. Merely delaying the inevitable public disclosure serves no "higher values" sufficient to overcome the right of access at this F.3d at 124. juncture. See Logusch, 435 Fifth, the Anwar parties cannot meet their burden by relying on the outstanding Second Amended Stipulation and Order confidentiality stipulation and order.See generally Governing Confidentiality of Discovery Material, ECF No. 591 ("Discovery Order"). Under the Discovery Order, defendants could designate a document as confidential so long as it contained "non-public information." Id., 2. But simply because something is "non-public" does not come close to satisfying the stringent standard necessary to overcome the presumptive right of 22 assumes the judicial documents contain nonpublic that access here.Indeed, the right of access information but still should be unsealed. Moreover, the Discovery Order contemplates (Id., challenges to the confidentiality designations 9), thus eliminating any "reliance" argument 23 See Lugosch, F.3d at 126 ("[T]he mere existence of a 435 that theAnwar parties might assert. 22 The Discovery Order’s standard is even weaker than Rule 26(c)’s standard for a protective 821 F.2d 139, order. SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1);In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liability Litig., 147-48 (2d Cir. 1987) (noting that protective order in that case permitted parties to designate materials as confidential, even though they "never were required to show good cause as mandated by Rule 26(c)"). 23 The Discovery Order provides that, in the event of a challenge, the party seeking confidential treatment bears "the burden of demonstrating that the designated material should be protected under. . . the applicable law." Id. 9. 16 confidentiality order says nothing about whether complete reliance on the order to avoid Eagle disclosure was reasonable."); Star, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135869, at *8.9. Anwar parties cannot satisfy their burden to overcome the presumptive right In sum, the of access. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the Trustee's motion for permissive intervention, and enter an order unsealing the class certification papers. Dated: New York, New York May 11, 2015 Respectfully submitted, MILBERG LLP Is! Robert A. Wailner Robert A. Waliner Kristi Stahnke McGregor Charles Slidders One Pennsylvania Plaza New York, NY 10119 Tel: (212) 594-5300 rwallner@milberg.com kmcgregormilberg.com cslidders@milberg.com Attorneys for Proposed Intervenor New Greenwich of LLC, as Successor Trustee Litigation Trustee, Greenwich Sentry, L.P. and Greenwich Sentry Partners, L.P. Litigation Trusts 704361v1 17 [S4IIIfflt1 I I(IL(I (('S I Ii I.>Imrrl & Reed 1.1,1 1 Hughes Fiubbard One I arerv Park Plaza New York, New York 10004-1482 Telephone: 212-837-6000 Fax: 212-422-4726 h ugh i'shubbard.con) August 19, 2013 BY HAND The Honorable Frank Maas United States Magistrate Judge United States Courthouse 500 Pearl Street New York, New York 10007 Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Limited, Master File No. 09-CV -00118 (VM) (FM) Re: Dear Judge Maas: We write on behalf of defendants PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants N.V., PricewaterliouseCoopers LLP, and The Citco Group Limited and related entities (collectively, "Defendants") pursuant to your Honor's Individual Practice Rule LA. and Local Civil Rule 37.2 to request an informal conference to address the Security and Exchange Commission's (the "Commission" or "SEC") refusal to comply with Rule 45 subpoenas issued in this action and served on current and former SEC employees (the "Witnesses"). Procedural History On February 27, 2013, Defendants served subpoenas requesting the deposition testimony of nine current and former SEC employees who participated in the SEC's examinations and investigations into Madoff and BLM1S. Defendants and the SEC then engaged in a series of correspondence and calls, during which the SEC requested additional details regarding the information sought from the Witnesses, and Defendants provided information regarding the scope and purpose of the requested testimony. Among other things, Defendants informed the SEC that the Witnesses have direct knowledge of communications between Madoff, Fairfield individuals, and the SEC, and that the Witnesses' testimony regarding that knowledge is important to understanding the nature and extent of Madoffs deception, and Fairfield's involvement therein. Fairfield's conduct is critically important to defending against Plaintiffs' claims and assessing comparative fault. Additionally, Defendants stated that the Witnesses' personal knowledge is a source of evidence relevant to evaluating Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the potential effectiveness of any additional diligence that Plaintiffs allege Defendants should have performed. Additionally, the parties discussed a number of alternative arrangements, and Defendants offered to limit the number of depositions to four in order to lessen any perceived Nev York (,r)s44 w \Vashiogioo, D.C. m Los Angeles Miami w .Jerse\' City w Kaj isas (it N v 1 1,nrls m lOky() burden on the SEC. Following these discussions, on June 7, 2013, SEC Associate General Counsel Richard M. Humes sent Defendants a decision refusing to authorize any of the requested depositions on the grounds that preparing for such depositions was unduly burdensome (the ".June 7 Decision," attached as Exhibit 7 to Exhibit A). On June 14, Defendants timely submitted a Notice of Intent to Petition for Review of the Decision in accordance with SEC regulations. (Exhibit 7 to Exhibit A.) On June 21, 2013, Defendants filed their Petition for Review (the "Petition," attached as Exhibit A), which the SEC denied on August 5, 2013 (the "Aug. 5 Decision", attached as Exhibit B, together with the June 7 Decision, the "Decisions"). The Testimony is Relevant Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), "[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense." This Court, not the SEC, is the tribunal best suited to make determinations regarding whether the requested testimony is relevant. Indeed, this Court has already made determinations in this action regarding document and witness challenges, and is familiar with the various claims and defenses of the parties. The SEC should therefore not preempt the authority of this Court to establish the parameters of discovery in this case. The proposed testimony is critical to Defendants' ability to present their defenses. Under New York law, "a negligent tortfeasor is liable for any reasonably foreseeable risk that is 462 Kosymnka v. Polaris Inc/us., Inc.; F,3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. proximately caused by its action." 2006). Among the critical issues in this case is whether Plaintiffs can prove that the Defendants should have reasonably foreseen that the Fairfield defendants would fail to perform the expected due diligence and monitoring of the Funds' investments held by BLMIS, or that the brokerdealer regulatory regime, of which the SEC was a fundamental component, would exhibit the unprecedented breakdown and failure to uncover the Madoff fraud that is recounted in detail in the SEC's Office of Inspector General's Report entitled "Investigation of the Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoff's Ponzi Scheme." Two of the Witnesses spent more than two and a half months at BLMIS's offices, interacting with Madoff on a near-daily basis, and inquiring regarding many of the so-called "red flags" thatAnwar Plaintiffs allege should have alerted the the Defendants that something was amiss at BLMIS. All of the Witnesses had some interactions with Madoff, BLMIS employees, and/or FUG. Defendants' Petition stressed the Witnesses' central roles, noting that "Madoff's ability to conceal the fraud from even the most determined investigators and examiners is highly relevant to whether the Defendants could or should have uncovered Macloll's scheme." (Petition at 10.) Defendants further noted that the Witnesses' testimony "is important to understanding the nature and extent of Madoff's deception and Fairfield's involvement therein. Fairfield's conduct is critically important to the Defendants in defending against Plaintiffs' claims and assessing comparative fault." (Petition at 5.) The Witnesses' firsthand knowledge regarding the SEC's examinations and investigations is entirely relevant to Defendants in defending against See Plaintiffs' claims, and the Witnesses should be required to testify.In cc Us, Bioscience Sec. Litig., 150 F.R.D. 80 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (requiring FDA employees with firsthand Factual knowledge to testify). 62395 844_I The Depositions Will Not Impose An Undue Burden On The SEC 45, Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and district courts consider whether discovery requests would impose an undue burden on the recipient, and further consider a number of factors relevant to the question of undue burden, including: whether the discovery is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative"; whether the discovery sought is "obtainable from some other source that, is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive"; and whether "the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit., taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving Watts the issues. (June 7 Decision at 2-3 (quoting v. SEC,482 F,3d 501, 509 (D.C. Cir. 2007)), While the testimony the Defendants seek will not unduly burden the SEC, it will significantly aid in the full and fair resolution Anwar. The Decisions overstate the burden on of the SEC of allowing the depositions. Defendants' Petition noted that the requested depositions are narrow in scope. In correspondence with the SEC, the Defendants listed specific topics about 4 to which each witness would be examined. (Exhibit Exhibit A, Appendix A; Exhibit 5 to Exhibit A, Appendix A.) Such targeted discovery, propounded upon a limited number of See Jones deponents, regarding specified areas of examination, is not unduly burdensome. v. McMahon, No. 5:98-CV-0374, 2007 WL 2027910 (N.I).N.Y. July 11, 2007) (permitting nonparty depositions of 19 of 32 specifically identified non-party New York State Troopers). Contrary to the SEC's objections, the fact that agency attorneys would have to prepare the Witnesses for their deposition does not constitute an undue See Fagan i. burden. F.R.D. 5,7 (D.D.C. 199]) ("The mere fact that discovery requires Districi o/Columbia, 136 In ic Shopping work and may be time consuming is not sufficient to establish undue burden."); F.R.D. 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (incurring some burden or expense is "not Carts Antitrust Li g., 95 a valid objection where the information sought is relevant and material"). Furthermore, only three of the Witnesses are still employed by the SEC. Defendants have expressed willingnss to accommodate the Witnesses' schedules so that the depositions are as minimally disruptive as possible, even offering to reduce the number of depositions to minimize any impact on the SEC's resources and avoid taking cumulative or duplicative testimony. Such a compromise is the propel approach to minimizing the potential burden on the agency, rather than refusing to allow 05 Civ. any depositions at all. See Bridgeport Music Inc. v. UMG Recordings, Inc.. No. 6430 (VM)(JCF), 2007 WL 4410405 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2007) ("discovery should not simply be denied on the ground that the person or entity from whom it is sought is not a party to the action... A better approach is for the court to take steps to relieve a nonparty of the burden of compliance even when such accommodations might not be provided to a party."). Under the direction of this Court, the parties have successfully taken scores of depositions, including those of third-parties. The protocol that has been established has worked well to ensure that depositions are conducted fairly and efficiently. There is no reason to expect otherwise in this instance. 62395844! Respectfully submitted, Carl W. Mill cc: All Anwar counsel of record (via e-mail) Richard M. Humes, Esq. 62395844_I *4 1 4 800 TIirnD AVENUE NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10022 WWW}OEKM.COM NEW YORK LONDON HONGKONC WASHINGTON DC N I AM I CAYMAN I!,LANQS UVI TEL +1 212 488 1200 FAX +1 212 488 1220 June 21, 2013 VIA FACSIMILE AND FEDERAL EXPRESS Elizabeth M. Murphy Secretary U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission [00 F. Street, N. E. Washington, D.C. 20549-9612 Re: in Anwa,' v. PaiifieId (frew?wic/l Limited Subpoenas issued No. 09 Civ. 00118 (VM)(FM) (S.D.N.Y.) Dear Secretary Murphy: We represent GlobeOp Financial Services LLC ("UlobeOp") and write on behalf of GlobeOp, PricewaterhouseCoopers Accountants NN. ("PwC Netherlands"), PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP ("PwC Canada"), and The Citco Group Limited and related entities ("Ctto") (collectively, "Defendants") in the above -referencedaLtlOfl On June 7, 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") denied De:fi.ndants’ request depose nine eurrei it or former SEC employees. On June 14, 2013, to pursuant to Rule 430(b)(1) of the SEC’s Rules of Practice, Del ndants filed a notice of our Intention to petition for review this decision Pursuant to Rule 430(h)(2), we enclose our Petition for Review of the SEC’s June 7 decision, Sincerely, Jonathan D. Cogan Justin Sonimers +12124881200 cc: All An war Counsel UNITED STATES SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION In re Subpoenas Served in ANWAR e. cii. Master File No. 09cv- I 18 (VM) (S.D.N.Y.) V. FAIRFIELD GREENWICH LIMITED. ci cii. PETITION FOR REVIEW OF DECISION TO DENY DEFENDANTS' REQUEST TO IF S ANI) FX( IIANGF DEPOSE NINE CURRENT AND FORMER SECURITIES COMMISSION EMPLOYEES KOBRE & KIM LLP 800 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 + 1 212 488 1200 A i!o,iwys fi De/ndcini CJloicOp Financial Services LLC TABLE OF CONTENTS BACKGROUND A. The Anwar Action and SEC Investigations .......................................... 2 B. The Subpoenas and Decision ........................................................... 5 ILARGUMENT ..................................................................................... 6 A. The Subject iVat/et' of file Subpoenas is of Broad Public Interest ......................6 13, The Witnesses Testimony Is Relevant To The Anii'ar Action And Cannot Be Obtained From Any Other Source.............................8 C The Depositions Will No! Impose an Undue Burr/en on the SEC..... ........ ... ....I] 111. CONCLUSION.................................................................................15 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES P ng Cases ,.......... .... 7 728 Anwar v. Falifleid Greenwich Lid., F. Stipp. 2d 372 (S,D.N.Y, 20 10) ........ Aristocrat Leisure Lid. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Co. Americas, 262 F R D 293 (S D N Y 2009) 8 Baer v. United Slates, No. 11-1277,2011 6131789 (D.N.J. Dec 8, 2011), WL Feb. mol, to amend denied, 2012 WI, 296120 (.D.N.J 1, 2012) ...... ........ --- .......... ......... 14 Bianzbwg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) .........................................................................7 6430 Bridgeport Music Inc. v. UA’IG Recordings, Inc., No, 05 Civ. (VM)(JCF), 2007 WL 4410405 (S.D,N.Y, Dec. 17, 2007) .................................................................13 United States v. Biyan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950)......................................................................7 225 Conch! v, Duane, F.R.D. 100 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ...........................................................9 Comprehensive Nab/i/tat/on Sei’vs., Inv, v, Commerce Funding Corp., 240 F.R,D. 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) .........................................................................................8 F.2d Davis Enters. v. US. Env. Protection Agency, 877 1181 (3d Cir. 1989) ................12 DichterMad Family Partners, LI.? v. United States, 709 F.3d 749 (901 Cir. 2013), petition for cert. flied,May 21, 2013 (No. 12-1391) .......................................................14 Donahue v. United States, 870 F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2012) ..........................................7 Eugenia VI Venture Holdings, Ltd. v. Chabra, No, 05 Civ. 5277, 2006 WL 1293118 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2006) ... .......................................... .. ...... ............ 8 ... Pagan v. Districtof Columbia,136 F.R.D. 5 (D.D.C. 1991) ...........................................13 No. .Ines v. McM hon, 5:98-CV-0374,2007 WL 2027910 (NT,D.N.Y. July 11, 2007) 12 Lent v Signature Ti uck SyS Ina, No 06-CV-569S, 201 0 WL 1707998 (W,D.N.Y. Apr, 26, 2010) ....... .......... ...... ..... ........ .. ... ..... ........ ............ ........ ....... .......... 8,15 F.3d Molchcrtsky v. Un/fec! States, 713 159, 162 (2d Ci r. 2013) ......................................14 129 Moore v Amour Pharmaceutical Co,, F R D 551 (N .D. Ga 1 990) 12 Moore v. Am ur Pharmaceutical Co., 927 17.2d 1194. 1198 (1 Iii Cii. 199 1) ...........12, 13 111 Moran v. Pfizer, No. 99 civ. 9969, 2000 WL 1099884 (S.D.N,Y. 4, 2000) ............9 Aug. United Slates v, Nixon 418 US, 683 (1974) ............................. United Slates v. Peitz, No. 01 CR 852, 2002 WL 453601 ,,,,,................................ 7 (N.D. Iii. March 22, 2002) -12 In re Shopping Carts Antitrust Litig., 95 F.R.D. 299 (S.D.N.Y, 1982) €................... 13 SIPCv, Barbour, 421 U.S. 412 (1975)...............................................................................7 In re U.S. Bioscience Sec. Litig., 150 F.R.D. 80 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ......................................9 Waits v. SEC, 482 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. 2007) ..................................................................11 Rules 17 C.F.R. 201.430............................................................................................................ Fed. R. Civ. P. 26..........................................................................................................8, 11 Other Authorities 4 The Works a/Jeremy Benthcnn 320-21 (J. Browning ed. 1 843) .....................................$ Assessing the Madoff Pouzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the ises Subcomm on Capital Markets, Insurance, and GovLI nmcnt S ponsoi d Enterprises at the H Comm on Financial Services, 111th Cong (2009) (statement of Rep Paul B Knajoiski, Chairman, Subcomm on Capital Mkts , Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enters, of the U Comm on ......................... ....... ......... ....... ......................... ............................................... 7 Fin. Servs... ....... Exchange Act Release No, 9856, Impact and Monitoring .............. .. .......... ................. 7 How the Securities Regulatory System Jailed to Detect the Madolilnvcstmcnt Securities Fraud, the Extent to Which Securities Insurance will Assist Defrauded Victims, and the Need tot Reform Heating before the S Comm on Banking, Housing and Urban -fairs, 111th Cong (2009) (statement of Sen Christopher At ........ 7 J. Dodd, Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs)..... ........ flu Defendants GlobeOp Financial Services LLC, Citco Group Limited and related entities, t Pt iccwaterhoueCoopeic AtcounLrnL N V ( 'PwC Nethet ltnd' ) PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (PwC Canada), (collectively, "Defendants"), pursuant to 17 C.F.R. € 201,430(b)(2), hereby respectfully petition for review of the June 7, 201,3 decision (the "Decision") of the United States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or Commission") icJustng to authorize SEC employees Simon i Suh MLagll in Chcung, Peter Lomore, Mark Donohue, John Gentile, John McCarthy, William Ostrow, Erie Swanson, and Demetrios Vasilakis (the "Witnesses") to provide the testimony requested pursuant to subpoenas served on the SEC (the "Subpoenas"). 2 The Decision should be reversed for several reasons. First, there is a compelling public interest in having the Witnesses testify. TheAnwar Defindanis provided services to Fairfield Sentry Limited and affiliated Fairfield funds 3 (the "Funds"), which were Bernard L. Madofi Investment Securities, LLC's ( 'BLMIS") largest investment advisory clients, alleged to have held more than 5 billion with Madoff as of December 2008, The Anwar case is about whether the Defendants could have and should have uncovered and prevented Bernard d Madoff's Madoff') schemes The SEC investigated and examined BLMIS and Madoff a number of times during the period that the Defendants provided services to the Funds. Each of the Witnesses was directly involved in at least one of the investigations or examinations. In the course of the SEC's investigations and examinations, each of the Witnesses had direct contact with Bernard Macloff I 2 The Citco Group Limited Citco Fund Services (Europe) 13 V Citco (( amid ) Inc.,C two ( Iob1tI Custody N.V., Citco Fund Set-vices (I3crinudi) Limited and Cilco Bank Nederland N V Dublin Branch ( otkcttVel) the "Citco Defendants"). Enclosed is Exhibit I are copies of the deposition SUbpOUliS issued ut bum I on/,c/d uocc n,u ic/i Limited, No 09 Civ. 00118 (VM1 M) ($ D N Y ) and 1 Va/Ac, liw. ckI/ Roil, LW, etal., Index Nos, 600'169/2009, 600498/2009 (N.Y, Sup CL). 3 c( is soc inc ./o/' Op 1w ci i's The Funds include Fairfield entry Limited, Greenwich Sentry Limited, and Greenwich rh Stun y P irtnr s I P or other I3LMIS employees. Fairfield personnel were also a focus of the SECs attention - both during its later examinations and investigations, as well as during the Office of Inspector General's investigation into the SEC's failure to uncover Madofis fraud and certain of the Witnesses were personally involved in gathering infrmation from Fairfield personnel, The Witnesses thus have firsthand knowledge regarding the world's largest-ever Ponzi scheme, the SEC's investigations and examinations of Madoff and BLM IS, BLMJS's operations, and Fairfield's potential involvement in Madoffs scheme that is not available from any other source. Second, the requested testimony will not impose an undue burden on the Commission or the Witnesses. The ordinary burden of preparing witnesses frr testimony not is "undue," even where the proposed deponent is a nonparty. Here, nearly half of the Witnesses are no longer SEC employees, and any time these Witnesses expend preparing for their depositions will not have any material impact on the SEC's ability to carry out its business. The Decision makes no reference to the compromise offered by the Defendants of deposing only four of the nine Witnesses who were the subject of the Subpoenas. Furthermore, the Decision does not indicate that the SEC has been inundated with Madoff-related requests for testimony. And, in general, the same factors that make this a matter of unique public interest make it unlikely that allowing the Witnesses to testify will set a precedent that would overwhelm the SEC with similar requests for testimony in the future. There is only one largest-ever Ponzi scheme, f3LMIS had only one largest client, and there is only one relevant, related, pending litigation - the Anwar action in which the Witnesses were subpoenaed. I. BACKGROUND A. The Anwar Action and SEC Investiaatioiis The Anwar Plaintiffs purport to represent a class of investors in certain Funds established by the Fait field Greenwich Group ("I an ficid or "I GO' ) sonie ol which entrusted 3 substantially all of their assets to BLMIS. As the world now knows, Madoli was using IThMIS to run the largest Ponzi scheme in history. When Madoff contessed to the fraud in December 2008, it was revealed that the FOG funds did not possess the assets purportedly held by F3LMIS, and the value of Plaintiffs' investments in the funds was allegedly reduced to zero. Plaintiffs therearter brought directors and officers of the roo the Amvar putative dash action against not only the funds, but also against thud parties hired by those funds at various points in time to perihrm administrative services (certain Citco defendants and cJlobeOp), custodial services (certain Citco defendants), and auditing services (PwC Netherlands and PwC Canada). (Anwar v. Fairfield Greenwich Lie!., No,09 Civ, 00118 (VM)(FM) (S.D.N.Y. filed Jan 7, 2009).) Central to Plaintiffs' case is the issue of whether the Defendants were negligent for having failed to uncover Madoffs fraud. (Second Consol. Am. Conipi., Sept. 29, 2008, ECF No, 273 ("SCAC" or "Complaint") €j I, 433445, 505508, 554557.) Plaintiffs allege that the Defendants ignored or failed to investigate "red flags" that cast doubt on the legitimacy of BLMIS and the returns generated for the Funds, and that additional diligence regarding Madoff and/or site visits to I3LMIS would have uncovered MadofFs fraud. (SCAC 301, 302 4 315.) Plaintftfs' Complaint also puts the SEC's investigations squat ely at issue, As the Definddmts noted in art April 25, 2013 letter to the Commission, the Complaint makes specific reference to one of the SEC's BLIvIIS investigations, as well as to interviews that certain Witnesses conducted with individuals from Fairfield. (Ex. 4.) The Complaint alleges that certain "Fairfield Defendants sought and followed MadolVs instructions on how to approach their upcoming [SEC] testimony," and that "Madoff. . . . instruet[ed I the Fairfield Delndarts in 4. All docket c1aiiuns refer to entries ill ,1nu'a,' v, f"a!jield (Jreenwicls /1,/ri., No. 09 Civ, 0 118 (VM) (SONY.). IN 4 what to say and what not to say to the SEC" (SCAC 11234.) The Complaint firther alleges that the Fairfield individuals thereby "aided Madoff in deceiving the SEC." N. The Complaint goes on Ito allege that this deception had ripple effects beyond the SEC investigation, as "[tihe Fairfield Defendants ... cited] to the inconclusive resLilt of' the SEC investigation in their public statements to Fund investors as proof' that MadolT and manager and custodian of the Funds' assets." BIL1MIS could be trusted as [a] faithful Id. The ilnwar plaintiffs' allegations therefore put at issue the purpose, scope conduct and resolution of the SEC's investigation. Each of the Witnesses participated in one of the SEC's investigations or examinations of Madoff and/or BLMIS. For example, as part of the 1992 cause examination, investigators Gentile and Vasilakis spoke with Madof on the phone, sent document requests to BLMIS, and spent at Least one day at I3LMIS's offices. (OlG Repot-0 Ex. 100 at 5, 15, 010 Report Ex. 101 at 5.) During the SEC's 2004-2005 investigatIon. Latnure and Ostrow sent document requests to BLM IS and reviewed the documents BL MIS IS provided in response. Both Lamore and Ostrow spent more than two and a halt' months on-site at BL MIS, IS. intcrLlcling daily with Maclull h inisel 1. In connection with the investigation, I aniore and Ostrow spec i heal ly questioned Macloll about the consistency of' the split strike conversion sttai.cgy's returns and Madolis incredible ability to time the market. (010 Report Lx. 4$ at 2:5-44: I 65:16-22.) As part of the 2005-2006 investigation, I amore. Sub and Chcung inter' iew'cd I CC officers, including Am it Vijayvergiya (010 Report at 276), and took the depositions oh I ernud Maclam Frank Di Pascal i, and FGG CEO ,le lirey Tucker, (See 010 Report at 790. 293. 3 10,) The investigators directly inquired about the purported "red flags" that the 5 'mow- Plainti Uk allege. All citations to the "Olu Report'' mcI any exhib its thereto refer to the pub lie$ FC ( ) frice of or the version , Inspector General report"I nvestigation of Fnilure to Uncover ofthe SEC I3crn:rrd Mado if's Poll "inc." 1.1 Sch Report No. ()tG-509. 5 including the volume of Madoff's accounts at the options trading, and made inquiries regarding Madoff's Depository Trust Company. (See, e.g., 010 Report Ex. 48 at 238:48; 242:7-10) The investigators also contacted at least one individual at the Chicago Board Options Exchange. (010 Report Ex. 48 at 240:9-10.) Sub and Cheung sent document requests to both BLMIS and I an fkld, and reviewed the documents produced in response. (010 Report at 280 284.) As a result of these activities, including their frequent and substantive contact with Madoff, the Witnesses obtained firsthand knowledge regarding Mado if and [3CM IS s operations, and Fairfield's involvement therein, B. Ijeibpoenas and Decision On February 27, 2013, Defendants served the Subpoenas requesting the deposition testimony of nine former and current SEC employees who participated in the SEC's examinations and investigations into Madoff and I3LMIS. (Ex. 2.) On March 4, SEC Assistant General Counsel Melinda Hardy requested additional inrorniation regarding ding thc inlot in tion gat sought fiom the proposed Witnesses (Ex, 3. ) On April 25, De6endants provided Ms Hardy with additional i n formation regarding the scope and purpose of the requested testimony. (Ex. 4) ding Among other things, the Defendants stated that the Witnesses have direct knowledge of what Madoff and the Fairfield individuals said to the SEC, and that the Witnesses' testimony regarding that knowledge is important to understanding the nature and extent of Madoff's deception and Fairfield's involvement therein. Fairfield's conduct is critically important to the DeIenchntc in defending against Plaintiffs' claims and assessing comparative (wlt (Id at 2) Additionally, the letter stated that the Witnesses' personal knowledge is a source of evidence relevant to evaluating Plaintiffs' allegations regarding the potential effectiveness of any additional diligence that Plaintiffs now contend the Defendants should have performed. (fri.) A series of conference calls followed to discuss the depositions during which the parties discussed a number or alternative arrangements. As demonstrated in Defendants' letter dated May 31, Defendants offered to limit the number of depositions to four witnesses (Simona Suh, Peter Lamoi c, Mark Donohue and John Gentile) in order to lessen any put pot lcd burden on the SEC. (Ex. 5. ) The SEC also produced a small number oldocumenis to Defendants that had already been made public pursuant to a FOLA request. Following these discussions, on June 7 SEC Associate General Counsel Richard M. l'Iumes sent Defendants the Decision, refusing to authorize the requested depositions on the grounds that preparing for such depositions was unduly burdensome, (Ex. 6.) On June 14, Defendants timely submitted a Notice of Intent to Petition for Review of the Decision, (Ex. 7.) H. ARGUMENT As the Decision notes. SEC witnesses should be allowed to testily in response to a valid subpoena if disclosure is consistent with the public interest. The Decision asserts that the testimony the Defendants seek is contrary to the public interest because the testimony's relevance is outweighed by the burden the testimony would impose on the SEC (Ex 6 at 2.) The Decision's rationale (1) fails to take into aCCOLInt the broad public interest in the Madoff matter, (2) unduly minimizes the relevance of the testimony, and (3) overstates the burden on the Commission. A. The Subject Matef the Su J€JjasJQf Broad Public Interest There is broad public interest: in lull disclosure regarding Madoirs fraud so that the fraud cannot be repeated. MadofEs deception is Lill paullelcd in scope and scale 7 Congressional testimony and hearings described Madoff's fraud as A17111611' , extraordinary,U and in fudge Marrero described the fraud as "the largest linancial hand yet witnessed in the record of human wrongdoing and tragedy." 372, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 20 Anwar v. Faii:/iekl Greenwich Lkt,728 F. Supp. 2d 10).7 Although the Decision asserts that the SEC, in conducting its investigations and examinations of I3LMES, did not locus on verifying that BEM IS's customers' assets were sale (Decision at 3), protection of hrokendcaler customers' assets is certainly within the scope of the SEC's jurisdiction. See Exchange Act Release No, 9856, Impact and Monitoring ("Rule 1 50- 3 represents the first comprehensive program undertaken by the Commission to provide regulatory safeguards over customers' funds and securities held by broker-dealers."); see also 5IPC v, L?wbour, 421 U.S. 412 (I 975) SEC has "plenary (the authority" to supervise SIPC). Although the SEC's work is of unquestioned importance to the securities markets and the public at large, that does not relieve SEC employees of the responsibility to provide testimony when they have lusthand knowledge relevant to an action 339 S'cc tinited Stales v Bryan, U S 32, 31 (1950) (the public has a tight to every man's evidence") (quoting Wigmort, Evidence € 2192 (3d ed )) Llnied States v Nixon.418 U.S.683, 710 (1974) (exceptions "to the demand for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in derogation of the search fir truth"); Bran-burg v. [Ia,ves, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972) (holding that even "men of the first rank and consideration . men in 6. How the Securities Regulatory System Failed to Detcet the Madoff I nvestment Securities Fraud, the Extent to Which Securities Insurance will Assist Defrauded Victims and the Need lot Reform: Flearing hcloie tin. S of-San. Christopher J Dodd toph& Comm on Banking, Housing and Urban Af fairs, Ill iii C ont, (2009) (statement Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs), Congress opined that MadofPs fraud was "a case study to guide the work of the Financial Srvics Committee in reshaping and reforming our Nation's financial services regulatory system." Assessing the MadofiPouzi Scheme and Regulatory Failures: Hearing Before the Subcomm, on Capital Markets, Insurance, and Government Sponsored Enterprises ofthe H Comm on Financial Services, cs 111th Conk (009) (statement of s of thL II Rep Paul F Knajot ski Chairman, Sutcomm on Capital Mkts Ins., and Gov't Sponsored I mu Comm. on Fin. Servs.). I high office" must provide testimony) (quoting 4 The Works f Jeiviny Bentham 320-21 (i. Browning ccl. 1843)), 13. The Witnesses Testimony Is Relevant To The Obtained From Any Other Source Anwar Action And Cannot Be "The Decision expresses doubt that the testimony the Defendants seek to elicit is relevant in Anwar and describes the potential relevance of the testimony as that it "may show what may have happened if Defendants made certain inquiries." (Ex. 6 at 3.) First, relevant evidence is evidence "having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the action more probable or less probable than it would he without the evidence," Fed. R. Evict. 401, and discovery requests need only be reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Second, whether the testimony is Ultimately relevant is a determination left to the district court. See Scm's., mv. v, Commerce F'uncling Corp., F.R.D. 78, 240 Cciinprelwnsive Habiliiciiion 83-84 (S.D.N.Y.2006); tens' Signature Truck Sys,, Inc., 06-CV-569S, 2010 WE 1707998, at No. v. *3 (W.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2010). 8 This is especially true where, as here, the district court is very lam liar with the various claims and deflenses of the parties, having Supervised the use for more than four years, including addressing numerous motions to dismiss and reconsider, a motion for class ccrti flcation, and numerous discovery matters. Notably, the Decision does not assert that any of the Witnesses lack personal knowledge regarding the events at issue s or that they will be unable to provide adequate 5277, testimony. See Eugenia VI Venture olcfings, Lid. v. Chabra, No, 05 Civ. 2006 WI.. 129 3118 (S.D.N.Y. May 10, 2006) (holding that defendant could not seek discovery from Moreover, while relevance is one factor a court may consider, it "is not the controlling facror in an undue burden 1) analyst. tHo/a( [ ,sure / (d t' [)cui/ic Bank Trust Co tas 262 FAD. 291 300 ( D N V 2009) itnu 9 individual who had no personal knowledge) To the contrary, the Defiendants served Subpoenas only on those SEC personnel from each investigation or examination who have firsthand knowledge regarding how Madoff was able to carry out the fraud, and the lengths to which he went to conceal it. Defendants seek testimony regarding the Witnesses' personal knowledge of communications with thud parties, including M idoli, other 131 MIS employees, and individuals horn Fairfield, in connection with the SEC's BLMIS investigations and examinations. Madoirs deception, and the Witnesses' firsthand knowledge thereof, is not only relevant, it is a critical issue in Ann'ar. See Couch! v. Dunne, 225 F,R.D. 100, 105 (SD.N.Y. 2004) ("Although not unlimited, relevance, for purposes of discovery, is an extremely broad concept") (citations omitted). This is not a case where the Defendants are seeking to elicit "expert" testimony regarding the SEC's practices with respect to broker-dealer or investment advisor examinations or investigations.9 Rather, courts have required agency witnesses to testify where they had in unique, hirsthand knowledge of facts relevant to the ease, which is the case here. See i'e US, Bioeiece Sec. Lilig,, 150 F.R.D. 80 (Ed). Pa. 1993) (requiring FDA employees with flrsthand factual knowledge to tctily) In asserting that the Witnesses' testimony is not relevant inAnwar, the Decision focuses on one line of inquiry suggested in Defendants' May 31 letter, related to the fact that Madoff tokl SEC investigators that he was no longer trading options as part of his split strike conversion strategy. (Ex, 6 at 4.) The Decision suggests that because the Delndants were I' aware that MadolT was purporting to continue to trade options on behal oh' the Fairfield funds, 9. The Decision's citation of, for example, vluran v. P/a',', No. 99 civ. 9969, 2000 WL 1099884. at 3 (S,D.N,Y, Aug 4 2000) is therefore mapposiic In that caSL tlic Court found that ihcplaintiff '\ is attLmptlne to use the Dt Witnesses as a lice source of expert testimony thatis 'jyatlable to 1) 1 ai n ti rr elst,WhuL Id ,1 10 Madoif could not have misled the Defendants as he misled the investigators. Id The Decision misses the point, which is that for every audience, Madoft had a story, and for every story, Madoui had supporting facts, argurnents and documents MadofFs ability to conceal the flaud fi cm even the most determined investigators and examiners is highly relevant to whether De/ncfcirits could or the should have uncovered Madoff's scheme. Furthermore, the issue of Madof1s lies regarding options trading was only one example of what the Defendants seek to cover during the Witnesses' depositions. To clarify the scope of the subpoenas the Defendants provided specific topics for proposed deponent Peter Lamore, who, as discussed above, spent more than two and a half months at I3LMIS's offices, interacting with Madoff on a near-daily basis. (Even the fact that Madoft was the investigators' primary contact is relevant in Anwar, where the Defendants might have been met with a similar personal reception had they undertaken procedures at ELM IS.) During his time at BLMIS, Lamore made inquiries regarding many of the so-called "red flags" that the Anivar Plaintiffs now allege should have alerted the Defendants to the fact that something was amiss at ELM IS. For example, Lamorc made inquiries regardingding the consistency of"the split-strike Strategy'sreturns Madours ability to time the market to generate positive returns, and Madofrs ability to enter and exit the split-strike strategy without affecting the market. (Ex. 5, Appendix A.) Den if, as the Decision asserts, the SEC had a different "focus" than the Defendants (Lx. 6 at 3), the Witnesses were still privy to details about BLMIS's operations. The Witnesses monitored ELMIS during several critical periods, questioned ELMIS regarding the"red flags and still did not uncover Madoff' s fraud. Moreover, the proposed testimony is relevant because of the role that FGG, a named defendant in this action, played in the OIG's Investigation of the Failure of the SEC to Uncover Bernard Madoirs Ponzi Scheme Not only did tile SE com ill Lill C icitc with FOG in its earlier examinations and investigations, but the 010 reached out to FOG in 2009 for an onsite examination and information requests. Having sought information, testimony and documents fiorn FOG and its personnel in the past, tile, SEC cannot now protest that its actions have no relevance to this case, In order to allow Defendants a Full and t'air opportunity to gather evidence to present their defenses, it is necessary to obtain the deposition testimony of the Witnesses regarding the outward-facing aspects of the SEC's examinations and investigations. C. LIrden oil The Depositions Will Not Impose an Undue B The Decision notes that under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 and 45, district courts consider whether discovery requests would impose an undue burden on the recipient, and further consider a number of factors relevant to the question of undue burden, including: whether the discovery is "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative"; whether the discovery sought is . 'obtainable from some other source that is moic convenient less burdensome, or less expensive", and whether 'the burden or expense of thc proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of theissuesat stake in the litigation, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues. (Ex. 6 at 2-3 (quoting Wails v, SEC. 482 F.3d 501, 509 (DC, Cir. 2007)).) The discovery sought here is not "unreasonably cumulative or duplicative," nor is the Witnesses' testimony as to their interactions with Madofi, others at BLMIS, and Fairfield available from any other source. See Fed, R. Civ. P. 26, The Decision asserts that the information the Defendants seek is available in the 010 Report, as well as various transcripts and 12 other documents that the SEC has produced. The Decision does not address, however, Defendants' concerns regarding the admissibility of the 010 Report and other documents. Courts have noted that the potential inadmissibility of documLnts and prior testimony may be taken into account when considei ing whetherto allow deposition tctimony, Sec Dcivn Enlums. , 01 v U S Pnv Pi olec.iion Agency, r 2d 1181, 1183 (3d C ir. 1989) 6. ont(.Ici tag adm tstbi hty 877 documentary evidence in deciding whether district court abused its discretion in denying EPA depositions). Furthermore, thediscovery sought here will significantly benefit the Full and Eur resolution of the Anwar ease. The Decision overstates the burden on the SEC of allowing the depositions. The with the SEC, the Defendants requested depositions that are narrow in scope. In cotTespondellce Defendants listed specific topics about which each witness would be examined, (Ex. 4, Appendix. A; Ex. 5, Appendix A.) Such targeted discovery, propounded in advance on a limited number of deponents, regarding specified areas of examination, is not unduly burdensome. Sec Jones v. McMahon, No. 5:98-CV-0374, 2007 WL 2027910, at *17 (N.D.N.Y. July 11, 2007) (permitting nonparty depositions of 19 of 32 specifically identified nonparty New York State Troopers), € Given the narrow scope of the requested testimony, the Decision's citation to Moom v, Amour Pharmacewical Co., F.R.D. 551 (NJ). Ga, 1990), (Ex. 6 at 3 n.Z), is 129 inapposite. The Moore decision was appealed to the Eleventh Circuit, which upheld the district court's grant of a motion to quash subpoenas tbr the depositions of two CDC doctors. 927 F.2d 1194, 1198(11th Cir. 1991) The doctors were central to the (DC s AIDS research at the height No. Untied ,'iciIec v, Pc/i:, 01 ('R 852, tO. Courts have previously ordered the SEC to comply with subpoenas 2002 WL 45361)1, at 5 (NJ). III, March 22, 2002) (denying the SEC's motion to quash a subpoenas duces for documents where the SEC had information pertinent to criminal allegations tecum served on SEC attorneys against def)ndanl.) 13 of the AIDS epidemic, and the court noted that the subject matter about which the doctors' testimony was sought was overbroad, such that allowing their depositions "would be similar to asking a Federal Aviation Administration employee, in an airline crash case, to detail the evolution of airline safety since the Wright brothers." Ic!. This is hardly the case here. Moreover, the fact that agency attorneys would have to prepare the Witnesses i'or their deposition does not constitute an undue burden. See F'cgan r. District ol Colunthia, 136 F.R.D. 5, 7 (D,D,C. 1991) ("The mere fact that discovery requires work and may he time consuming is not sufficient to establish undue burden,"); In re Sliopping Car/s An/i/i Lilig., 95 -us! F.R.D. 299. 308 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (incurring some burden or expense is "not a valid objection where the information sought is relevant and material") (citation omitted). As the Decision acknowledges, fewer than halt' of the Witnesses still work at the SEC. Defendants have expressed willingness to accommodate the Witnesses' schedules so that the depositions are as minimally disruptive as possible. Furthermore, the Defendants offered to reduce the number of depositions from nine to four in order to minimize any impact on the Commission's resources and operations and avoid taking any cumulative or duplicative testimony. The reduction in the number of depositions would reduce any burden on the agency in preparing the Witnesses, would mitigate any potential impact on the SEC's ongoing operations, and would decrease the likelihood that any of the testimony would be cumulative. Such a compromise is the proper approach to minimizing the potential burden on the agency, rather than refusing to allow any depositions at all. See Bridgeporl Music Inc. v. UiVIC] Recordings, Inc., No, 05 Civ. 6430, at 3 (VM)(CF), 2007 WL 4410405 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2007) ("[D]iscovery should not simply be denied on the ground that the person or entity from whom it is sought is not a party to the action. . - A better 14 approach is for the court to take steps to relieve a nonparty of the burden of compliance even when such accommodations might not he provided to a party.") (citation omitted). , employees, this is While courts recognize the interest of agencies to protect their sLklng testimony horn SI C not the sort of case that will lead to a flood of private litigants employees. The Decision gives no indication that the SEC has been inundated with requests for its employees to testily in Madoff-related matters. Notably, the SEC has successfully rebuffed attempts by private litigants to sue it for its failure to uncover Madoff's fraud, See Mo/c/ia/sky t'. United S/a/es, 713 F.3d 159, 162 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding that the discretionary function exception to the Federal Torts Claims Act barred investor's claims against (he government based on the SEC's failure to discover Madoff's Ponzi scheme); Dichtc,'A1cid iam// Pw'ine;'s, LLP v, United States, 709 F.3d (9th Cir. 2013),petitionf/n' ccii. fl/cc!, May 2 I 2013 (No. 12-1391); 749 Donahue v. Un/Icc! Skites, F. Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2012) (same); l3aei' v. United Slates, No. 870 I 1-t 277, 2011 WE 6131789 (D.N,J. Dec. S. 2011), to amend denied, 2012 WL 296120 inot. in (D.N.J Feb. I, 2012). Nor would allowing testimony to be taken Anwar set a precedent that would force the Commission to allow testimony to be taken in all manner of other matters. Anwar is unique in that it involves the world's largest-ever Ponzi scheme, and B EM IS's single largest client by fat Allowing the Defendants to depose the Witnesses will not create precedent for depositions to be taken in lutue cases Rately, if ever, will the SEC stall have had such frequent, intimate contact with the mastermind of a fraud. Here, unlike in the vast majority of cases, the SEC's I3LMIS investigations and examinations were chronicled in a 400 page report issued by the Commission Office of the Inspector General that was based on 140 depositions and interviewsof 122 individuals, 15 Finally. the Decision does not take into account the amount in controversy in Anwar, Plaintiffs allege that their class-wide losses amount to more than $5 billion, (Pis.' Class Cert. Mern. at 2, 1/11/12, EiCF No, 776,) The importance of the ISSUeS at stake tiecessitate full discovery to explore Defendants' defenses and gain first-hand testimony regarding the BIMIS operations. III. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, Defendants respectfully request that the SEC reverse the Decision and authorize the Witnesses to provide deposition testimony. Dated: June 21, 2013 Respeci1i. Ely Submitted, ' Jonathan 1). Cogan Justin Sommers KOBIU & KIM H P 800 Third Avenue Now York, New York 10022 [ci -11 212488 1200 11712488 1220 Counsel for GlobeOp J'7noncia/ Services LW at II Sea Lent t', Signalwa 'fruckS,yvtamx, Inc., So. 06-c V-S&YS, 200 WI 1707998 (WD.N.Y i\pril 26, 2010), 4 (allowing addiionu! nonparty deposition ill tight of the complex issues, amount in contioversy, and multiple (Iclendanis in the case and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving issues related to plaintitts' theory orliability). CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE [, Justin Sommers, counsel for GlobeOp Financial Services LLC, hereby certify that on June 21, 2013, 1 filed the foregoing Petition for Review with the Secretary oithe United States Securities and Exchange Commission by Lacsimilc ((202) 772-9324) and Federal L\plcss A copy was also served on Assistant General Counsel Richard M Humes via facsnm1t Federal I xpicsc and electronic mail. EXHIBIT 2 Case 1:11-cv-09175-LAK Document 265 Filed 04/30/15 Page 1 of 2 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT RN SOUTHERN DIS I RE( i or NEW YORK ---------------------------x In re: BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON CORP. FOREX TRANSACTIONS LITIGATION ---------------------------x This Document Relates to: Louisiana Municipal Police Employees' Retirement System v. The BankNew York Mellon Coq)., of ii Civ, 9175 (LAK) ---------------------------x 12-md-2335 (LAK) USDS SDNIY DOCUMENT ELECTRONICALLY FILED DOC # DATE FILED: 'I (3o i 0 RI) ER I ,ivis A. K,\ lj\N, D isirict Juc/ge. This is a securities class action brought on belial I’ of persons who purchased Bank of New York Mellon ("BNYM") common stock during part of the period 2008 through 2011 The claim, which in substantial part underlies also a civil action by the United States as well as actions against BNYM by customers, turns in major part on the assertion that BN YM’ s standing instruction h)reign exchange ("FX") service was marketed as providing its customers with "best execution" for FX transactions when, in truth and in fact, it did not - it provided BNYM with exceptional profits, allegedly at customer expense. The government and customer cases, subject in some cases to court approval, have been settled for more than $700 million in the course of which BNYM in substance admitted the assertion regarding the standing instruction service and "best execution." This case, which claims that BNYM common stock purchasers were misled by BNYM’S actions, remains. It is before the Court on a motion by the Lead Plaintiff to eliminate confidentiality protection for a handful of the millions of documents that I3NYM designated as confidential pursuant to the Confidentiality Order entered in this action on June 20, 2012 (Dl 104). The eight documents in question consist of emails between and among BNYM personnel concerning a variety of matters relating to the standing instruction program and the pricing o:f:FX services thereunder. The Court has reviewed each of them. Some or all probably are embarrassing to BNYM. But they are old the earliest dates in part to 1997 and the most recent to 2010 -- and, from a competitive point of view, appear quite stale in light of the events of the last several years relating to the matters here in controversy. Parts of two of the emails in question have Reutersnews been made public by one or another state attorney general. One comments tersely on a story concerning another bank. All appear to relate to the fraud alleged in this ease and, in some respects at least, admitted in cases that are pending settlement approval proceedings. In the circumstances, the Court concludes that BN YM has not demonstrated good cause for maintaining these documents in confidence Indeed, its iguinL uts ippinacli the outer limit Case 1:11-cv-09175-LAK Document 265 Filed 04/30/15 Page 2 of 2 of responsibility. Lead Plaintiff's motion to dc-designate certain documents marked as confidential by I3NYM [12-md-2335, DI 53] is granted in all respects. SO ORi)ERJ1). Dated: April 30, 2015 Lew . aplan United States District Judge

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