Buckman v. Calyon Securities (USA) Inc. et al

Filing 56

OPINION AND ORDER re: Granting in its entirety 39 MOTION for Summary Judgment. filed by Calyon-New York Branch, Calyon Securities (USA) Inc. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion. (Signed by Judge Shira A. Scheindlin on 9/13/2011) (djc)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

._--------------------------------------------------

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JARVIS BUCKMAN,
OPINION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

09 CIV 6566 (SAS)

- againstCALYON SECURITIES (USA) INC. and
CALYON - NEW YORK BRANCH,

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Defendants.

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DATE. FIlE&.

91 MLll

SHIRA A. SCHEINDLIN, U.S.D.J.:

I.

INTRODUCTION

Jarvis Buckman brings this action against Calyon Securities (USA)
Inc. ("CSI") and Calyon - New York Branch (collectively, "Calyon") alleging (1)
race and national origin discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 ("Title VII") and the New York City Human Rights Law C'NYCHRL"); (2)
retaliation under Title VII and the NYCHRL; (3) breach of contract; (4) fraudulent
inducement; (5) unjust enrichment; and (6) violation of section 193 of the New
York Labor Law. Buckman's claims essentially fall into two categories: (1) that
Calyon terminated his employment due to his race (African-American) and
national origin (non-French) and (2) that CaJyon promised him a seven-figure
-1­

I
j

bonus if he met certain sales targets.
Calyon now moves for summary judgment on all claims pursuant to
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure arguing that (1) Buckman was
terminated as part of a reduction in force and there is no evidence permitting a
reasonable inference that Calyon terminated him for a discriminatory reason; and
(2) a written policy stating that bonuses are discretionary bars any attempt to
enforce an alleged oral promise to Buckman for a seven-figure bonus. For the
reasons discussed below, Calyon’s motion for summary judgment is granted in its
entirety.
II.

BACKGROUND
Buckman is a 31-year old African-American male.1 Calyon is a

corporate and investment bank, organized under the laws of France, and has
headquarters in Paris, capital markets business activities centered in London, and
offices in other locations including New York.2 During all relevant times, CSI was
a New York corporation and a registered U.S. broker-dealer.3
1

See Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (“Opp. Mem.”) at 1.
2

See Local Rule 56.1 Statement of Undisputed Facts by Defendants
Calyon Securities (USA) Inc. and Calyon – New York Branch (“Def. 56.1”) ¶¶ 89.
3

See id. ¶ 6.
-2-

A.

Buckman’s Background and CSI’s Recruitment
After Buckman received a dual degree in Economics and Industrial

Engineering from Columbia College in 2003, he was an analyst in JPMorgan
Chase & Co.’s credit hybrids structuring team for two years.4 In 2006, Buckman
joined Société Générale (“SocGen”) as a Vice President in the structured asset
sales group,5 where he marketed a variety of structured credit products.6 In
November 2006, a headhunter, Dean Han, approached Buckman concerning a
structured credit sales position at CSI.7 As a result, Buckman spoke with the
following CSI employees: Bertand Delaunay, the U.S. Head of Structured Credit
Sales; Zain Abdullah, the U.S. Head of Credit Markets and Collateralized Debt
Obligations (“CDOs”); and a few members of the New York structured credit
team.8 Delaunay and Buckman discussed Buckman’s concern that he would lose
his 2006 SocGen bonus if he joined CSI. To assuage that concern, Delaunay
offered Buckman a guaranteed $275,000 bonus for 2006 if Buckman lost his 2006
4

See 12/16/10 Deposition of Jarvis Buckman (“Buckman Tr.”), Exs. C,
D, E to 5/27/11 Affirmation of Bernard Weinreb, counsel to plaintiff (“Weinreb
Aff.”), at 20, 26-29.
5

See id. at 35:9-36:13.

6

See id. at 38:11-40:9.

7

See Def. 56.1 ¶ 24.

8

See id. ¶¶ 28-30.
-3-

SocGen bonus.9 Buckman also alleges that Delaunay made an oral promise that
Buckman would receive a “seven-figure bonus” for 2007 if he (Buckman)
generated $15 to $20 million in sales revenue; however, Delaunay does not recall
such a discussion.10
On January 11, 2007, Buckman received an offer letter from CSI for
the position of Vice President.11 Buckman requested several changes to the offer
letter – and Calyon accepted several of those changes – but no version of the offer
letter included any reference to a “seven-figure bonus.”12 Buckman testified that
the letter did not mention the seven-figure bonus because the necessary approvals
to get such a promise in writing could take up to a month, and CSI needed him to
start immediately.13 Buckman’s claim that he was promised a seven-figure bonus

9

See id. ¶¶ 32-33, 37.

10

See 5/18/11 Affidavit of Jarvis Buckman (“Buckman Aff.”) ¶ 6;
1/21/11 Deposition of Bertrand Delaunay (“Delaunay Tr.”), Ex. F to Weinreb Aff.,
at 50:4-8. To the extent there are factual disputes, I “‘construe the facts in the light
most favorable’” to Buckman. See Brod v. Omya, Inc., – F.3d –, No. 09 Civ. 4551,
2011 WL 2750916, at *7 (2d Cir. July 18, 2011) (quoting Williams v. R.H.
Donnelley, Corp., 368 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 2004)).
11

See Def. 56.1 ¶ 36.

12

See id. ¶¶ 38-39, 41-42; 4/20/11 Declaration of Donna Hayes, Senior
Human Resources Generalist at CSI (“Hayes Decl.”) ¶ 9.
13

See Buckman Tr. at 80:23-84:25.
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rests on his recollection of oral promises made by Delaunay and Abdullah.14
Specifically, Buckman told Abdullah that he “anticipate[d] making a million
dollars in 2007 [at SocGen] dot, dot, dot,” and Abdullah replied “not a problem.”15
Buckman’s headhunter did not recall any promise of a seven-figure bonus.16
Buckman also alleges that several other representations Calyon made
during the recruitment process were false. First, Buckman alleges that, despite
representations he would have established accounts to work on, Delaunay later told
Buckman that he (Buckman) would need to build new relationships or energize
relationships with which others were failing.17 Second, Buckman learned that
Calyon was struggling financially despite prior contrary representations by
Delaunay and Abdullah.18 Third, Calyon’s trading book of cash and synthetic
products was not well balanced – it had a large amount of unsold CDO bonds that
were losing value – contrary to prior representations by Delaunay and Abdullah.19
Fourth, Delaunay and Abdullah represented that Calyon had “robust risk
14

See Def. 56.1 ¶ 47.

15

Id. ¶ 50.

16

See id. ¶ 51.

17

See Buckman Aff. ¶ 10.

18

See id. ¶¶ 11-12.

19

See id. ¶ 11.
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management processes”; however, this was not the case.20
Buckman began work at CSI on January 25, 2007. On his first day,
he signed a document stating that he would review and comply with the Calyon
Employee Handbook (“Handbook”).21 It is disputed which of two versions of the
Handbook Buckman received.22 Both versions provided that “[m]anagement . . .
may, in its discretion, grant a bonus to any or all of its employees . . . . Payment of
a bonus is not guaranteed; management may choose to grant or not grant a bonus at
year-end to any or all of its employees.”23 It is disputed whether the version of the
Handbook Buckman received stated that “[n]o one is authorized to change the
employee’s at-will status or to make any promises of compensation or bonus,
unless such a promise is contained in a written agreement signed by an authorized
representative.”24
B.

Buckman’s Colleagues
Buckman worked with four other salespersons in structured credit at

20

Id. ¶ 15.

21

Def. 56.1 ¶ 54.

22

See id. ¶ 57; Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Rule 56.1 Statement
(“Pl. 56.1”) ¶ 57.
23

Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 54-55.

24

See id. ¶ 57; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 57.
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CSI in New York – Aseem Srivastava, Bruce Mulder, Carl Schuman, and
Delaunay.25 In July 2007, Buckman requested that CSI hire a trader for the index
tranche business, and CSI hired David Galludec, who is Caucasian and French.26
In November 2007, David Perry was moved to sales. After Buckman told
Delaunay that he (Buckman) thought that Perry was a poor performer, Delaunay
allegedly responded “but he does look the part right? . . . Well, he’s white. And a
lot of our clients are white, so at least he has that working for him.”27
Throughout Buckman’s time at CSI, he repeatedly complained about
the behavior of two French traders located in London – Marc Benamran and
Sebastien Boucard.28 Buckman attributes Benamran’s and Boucard’s treatment of
him to race and national origin discrimination because “they had no other basis”
and “the only reason I could come up with is that I was so conspicuously different
from them.”29 Buckman alleges that Abdullah used the word “discrimination” in
reference to the treatment of Benamran and Bouchard.30 Specifically, Buckman
25

See Def. 56.1 ¶ 59.

26

See id. ¶¶ 69-70.

27

See Buckman Tr. at 306:16-307:3.

28

See Def. 56.1 ¶ 79.

29

Id. ¶¶ 80-81.

30

Buckman Aff. ¶ 32.
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complained that Benamran and Bouchard (1) sent messages in French in a
Bloomberg chat room and did not switch immediately to English when Buckman
requested they do so; (2) permitted an intern to act “very disrespectful[ly]” to
Buckman; and (3) prevented the intern from writing trade tickets for New York
transactions.31
Towards the end of 2007, Buckman also had a dispute with David
Eline in which each complained to Delaunay that the other was attempting to
poach clients.32 On January 25, 2008, Delaunay attempted to resolve the dispute
by having Buckman and Eline work as a team and split sales credit for accounts
they both covered.33
C.

Buckman’s Prohibited Transaction
On January 8, 2008, Buckman executed a transaction with a

counterparty, Swiss Re Financial Products Corporation (“Swiss Re”). He
inadvertently failed to notice that Swiss Re was on Calyon’s “Do Not Trade List”
and did not obtain permission for the trade.34 Buckman may have believed the

31

See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 84, 86.

32

See id. ¶ 92. Buckman denies attempting to poach Eline’s clients. See
Buckman Aff. ¶ 22.
33

See Def. 56.1 ¶ 94.

34

See id. ¶¶ 99, 101; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 99.
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Swiss Re trade was permissible because Schuman had recently completed a trade
involving Swiss Re after receiving permission from management.35 As a result of
Buckman’s policy violation, he signed a warning letter acknowledging that he
“breach[ed] . . . Calyon’s policies and procedures” and that “[a]ny further breach
will lead to disciplinary action, up to [and] including the termination of . . .
employment.”36 Buckman claims that Calyon did not require Tom Goodale, a
Caucasian bond salesperson in London, to sign a warning letter after a “Do Not
Trade” violation.37
D.

The Financial Crisis: Bonuses and Layoffs at Calyon
As a result of the crisis in the credit markets beginning in the summer

of 2007, Calyon and its affiliates lost billions of dollars in 2007 and 2008.38 Due to
$350 million in trading losses, CSI’s chief executive officer, Abdullah, and others
were terminated in the fall of 2007.39 Despite this climate, Buckman was not
worried about his job and did not contribute to Calyon’s losses.40 Buckman
35

See Def. 56.1 ¶ 108.

36

Id. ¶¶ 112-113.

37

See id. ¶ 114.

38

See id. ¶¶ 121-122.

39

See id. ¶ 123.

40

See Buckman Aff. ¶¶ 28-29.
-9-

performed his job well and generated $21.9 million in revenue in 2007.41 During
the same year, Schuman generated $74 million and Delaunay generated $69.5
million.42 Buckman received a bonus of $102,848 for 2007, the highest
discretionary amount awarded to a New York structured credit employee.43
Srivastava produced revenue similar to Buckman and received the same bonus.44
Delaunay and Schuman received no bonuses for 2007.45
In April 2008, Guy Laffineur, the Head of Global Credit Market
Activity, instructed Delaunay to lay off employees in New York focusing on
synthetic credit products, and specifically index tranches, because Calyon and CSI

41

See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 71, 73.

42

See id. ¶¶ 74-75. Plaintiff responded that he “does not possess
sufficient information to admit or deny th[ese] assertions.” Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 74-75. This
is impermissible. Local Rule 56.1 provides that each statement of fact “will be
deemed admitted for purposes of the motion unless specifically controverted” by
the opposing party. Local Rule 56.1(c). Plaintiff had ample opportunity during
discovery to determine the accuracy of the relevant facts and may not now claim
that he lacks sufficient information. See Delphi-Delco Elecs. Sys. v. M/V Nedlloyd
Europa, 324 F. Supp. 2d 403, 425 n.13 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). Accordingly, 56.1
statements not explicitly denied by plaintiff are deemed admitted. See Stepheny v.
Brooklyn Hebrew Sch. for Special Children, 356 F. Supp. 2d 248, 255 n.4
(E.D.N.Y. 2005).
43

See Def. 56.1 ¶ 129.

44

See id. ¶ 130.

45

See id. ¶ 131.
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were exiting these businesses.46 As a result, Calyon discharged six employees in
New York – including Buckman, Galludec, and Schuman – as well as employees
in offices across Europe.47 Although Calyon asserts that it stopped marketing
index tranches, Buckman claims that Benamran and Boucard continued to market
index tranches.48 Benamran and Bouchard played no role in Buckman’s
discharge.49
III.

LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is

no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.”50 “‘An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. A fact is material
if it might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.’”51
“The moving party bears the burden of establishing the absence of any

46

See id. ¶¶ 135-136.

47

See id. ¶¶ 143-144.

48

See id. ¶ 146; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 146.

49

See Def. 56.1 ¶ 83.

50

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).

51

Fincher v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 720 (2d
Cir. 2010) (quoting Roe v. City of Waterbury, 542 F.3d 31, 35 (2d Cir. 2008)).
-11-

genuine issue of material fact.”52 “When the burden of proof at trial would fall on
the nonmoving party, it ordinarily is sufficient for the movant to point to a lack of
evidence to go to the trier of fact on an essential element of the nonmovant’s
claim.”53 In turn, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party
must raise a genuine issue of material fact. To do so, the non-moving party “‘must
do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material
facts,’”54 and “‘may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated
speculation.’”55
In deciding a motion for summary judgment, a court must “‘construe
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and must resolve all
ambiguities and draw all reasonable inferences against the movant.’”56 However,
“‘[c]redibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of
52

Zalaski v. City of Bridgeport Police Dep’t, 613 F.3d 336, 340 (2d Cir.

2010).
53

Cordiano v. Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 204 (2d Cir.

2009).
54

Brown v. Eli Lilly & Co., – F.3d – , No. 10 Civ. 512, 2011 WL
3625105, at *10 (2d Cir. Aug. 18, 2011) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)).
55

Id. (quoting Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 607
F.3d 288, 292 (2d Cir. 2010)).
56

See Brod, 2011 WL 2750916, at *7 (quoting Williams, 368 F.3d at

126).
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legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.’”57
“‘The role of the court is not to resolve disputed issues of fact but to assess
whether there are any factual issues to be tried.’”58
“‘[S]ummary judgment is appropriate even in discrimination cases,
for . . . the salutary purposes of summary judgment – avoiding protracted,
expensive and harassing trials – apply no less to discrimination cases than to other
areas of litigation.’”59 Indeed, “‘[i]t is now beyond cavil that summary judgment
may be appropriate even in the fact-intensive context of discrimination cases.’”60
“Because direct evidence of an employer’s discriminatory intent
will rarely be found,” motions for summary judgment in
employment discrimination actions should be evaluated with
caution. “However, even in the discrimination context, a plaintiff
must provide more than conclusory allegations of discrimination

57

Kaytor v. Electric Boat Corp., 609 F.3d 537, 545 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000))
(emphasis removed).
58

Brod, 2011 WL 2750916, at *7 (quoting Wilson v. Northwestern Mut.
Ins. Co., 625 F.3d 54, 60 (2d Cir. 2010)).
59

Lu v. Chase Inv. Serv. Corp., 412 Fed. App’x 413, 415 (2d Cir. 2011)
(quoting Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 2000), superseded
by statute on other grounds as stated in Ochei v. Coler/Goldwater Mem’l Hosp.,
450 F. Supp. 2d 275, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)). Accord Abdu-Brisson v. Delta Air
Lines, Inc., 239 F.3d 456, 466 (2d Cir. 2001).
60

Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting
Abdu-Brisson, 239 F.3d at 466).
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to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”61
“Courts ‘must . . . carefully distinguish between evidence that allows for a
reasonable inference of discrimination and evidence that gives rise to mere
speculation and conjecture.’”62
“[T]he plaintiff must produce not simply some evidence, but
sufficient evidence to support a rational finding that the legitimate,
non-discriminatory reasons proffered by the defendant were false,
and that more likely than not discrimination was the real reason
for the employment action . . . . To get to the jury, it is not enough
. . . to disbelieve the employer; the factfinder must also believe the
plaintiff’s explanation of intentional discrimination.”63
IV.

APPLICABLE LAW
A.

Title VII
1.

Unlawful Discharge

Title VII proscribes discrimination against or termination of an
61

Gear v. Department of Educ., No. 07 Civ. 11102, 2011 WL 1362093,
at * 2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2011) (quoting Schwapp v. Town of Avon, 118 F.3d 106,
110 (2d Cir. 1997)).
62

Fall v. New York State United Teachers, 289 Fed. App’x 419, 420 (2d
Cir. 2008) (quoting Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435, 448 (2d Cir. 1999)).
Accord Cameron v. Community Aid for Retarded Children, Inc., 335 F.3d 60, 63
(2d Cir. 2003) (“‘[P]urely conclusory allegations of discrimination, absent any
concrete particulars,’ are insufficient” to satisfy an employee’s burden on a motion
for summary judgment.) (quoting Meiri v. Dacon, 759 F.2d 989, 998 (2d Cir.
1985)).
63

Tori v. Marist Coll., 344 Fed. App’x 697, 699 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
Weinstock, 224 F.3d at 42) (original emphasis removed).
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individual on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”64 “To
withstand a motion for summary judgment, a discrimination plaintiff must
withstand the three-part burden-shifting [analysis] laid out by McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.”65 “Under this framework a plaintiff must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination.”66 To do so, a plaintiff must show that “(1) he is a
member of a protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position he held; (3) he
suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the adverse action took place
under circumstances giving rise to [an] inference of discrimination” based on his
membership in the protected class.67 Title VII, however, “‘does not set forth a
general civility code for the American workplace.’”68
If the plaintiff succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, then the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

64

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

65

McPherson v. New York City Dep’t of Educ., 457 F.3d 211, 215 (2d
Cir. 2006) (citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
66

Ruiz v. County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 2010).

67

Id. at 492.

68

McGullam v. Cedar Graphics, Inc., 609 F.3d 70, 76 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)).
Accord Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 546.
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for the adverse employment action.69 Finally, if the employer articulates a nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged action, the burden shifts back to the
plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant’s explanation was pretextual.70
Courts carefully consider whether a “stray remark” is sufficient to
support a reasonable inference of discrimination because
“the more remote and oblique the remarks are in relation to the
employer’s adverse action, the less they prove that the action was
motivated by discrimination . . . . The more a remark evinces a
discriminatory state of mind, and the closer the remark’s relation
to the allegedly discriminatory behavior, the more probative that
remark will be.”71
Although no factor is determinative, courts consider
“(1) who made the remark (i.e., a decision-maker, a supervisor, or
a low-level co-worker); (2) when the remark was made in relation
to the employment decision at issue; (3) the content of the remark
(i.e., whether a reasonable juror could view the remark as
discriminatory); and (4) the context in which the remark was made
(i.e., whether it was related to the decision-making process).”72
2.

Hostile Work Environment

69

See Ruiz, 609 F.3d at 492.

70

See id.

71

Henry v. Wyeth Pharm., 616 F.3d 134, 149 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting
Tomassi v. Insignia Fin. Grp., 478 F.3d 111, 115 (2d Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, —
U.S. —, 131 S. Ct. 1602 (2011).
72

Id.
-16-

An employee seeking to bring a hostile work environment claim must
demonstrate the following: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he suffered
unwelcome harassment; (3) he was harassed because of his membership in a
protected class; and (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work environment.73
In order to prevail on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff
must make two showings: (1) that “the harassment was
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the
victim’s employment and create an abusive working environment”
and (2) that there is a “specific basis for imputing the conduct
creating the hostile work environment to the employer.”74
Evaluating a hostile environment involves reviewing the totality of the
circumstances, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance;
and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.”75
The question is whether a reasonable person would have found the environment to

73

See Monterroso v. Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, 591 F. Supp. 2d 567,
584 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
74

Duch v. Jakubek, 588 F.3d 757, 762 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Feingold,
366 at 149-50).
75

Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
-17-

be hostile and if the plaintiff perceived it as such.76 “[A] plaintiff need not show
that h[is] hostile working environment was both severe and pervasive; only that it
was sufficiently severe or sufficiently pervasive, or a sufficient combination of
these elements, to have altered h[is] working conditions.”77
3.

Retaliation

“Title VII also makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate
against an employee ‘because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful
employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge . . . in an
investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.’”78 To establish a
prima facie case of retaliation, the plaintiff must show: “(1) that []he participated in
an activity protected by Title VII, (2) that h[is] participation was known to h[is]
employer, (3) that h[is] employer thereafter subjected h[im] to a materially adverse
employment action, and (4) that there was a causal connection between the
protected activity and the adverse employment action.”79 “Title VII’s anti-

76

See Mormol v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 364 F.3d 54, 58 (2d Cir.

2004).
77

Pucino v. Verizon Wireless Commc’ns, 618 F.3d 112, 119 (2d Cir.

2010).
78

Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 552 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)).

79

Id.
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discrimination and anti-retaliation provisions ‘are not coterminous;’ anti-retaliation
protection is broader and ‘extends beyond workplace-related or employmentrelated retaliatory acts and harm.’”80
“Proof of causation can be shown either: (1) indirectly, by
showing that the protected activity was followed closely by
discriminatory treatment, or through other circumstantial evidence
such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in
similar conduct; or (2) directly, through evidence of retaliatory
animus directed against the plaintiff by the defendant.”81
The three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis also
applies to retaliation claims.82 “At the summary judgment stage, if the plaintiff
presents at least a minimal amount of evidence to support the elements of the
claim, the burden of production shifts to the defendant to proffer a legitimate nonretaliatory reason for the adverse employment action.”83 “If the employer produces
such evidence, the employee must, in order to avoid summary judgment, point to
evidence sufficient to permit an inference that the employer’s proffered nonretaliatory reason is pretextual and that retaliation was a ‘substantial reason for the

80

Hicks v. Baines, 593 F.3d 159, 165 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 548 U.S. at 67).
81

Id. at 170 (quoting Gordon v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 232 F.3d
111, 117 (2d Cir. 2000)).
82

See Kaytor, 609 F.3d at 552.

83

Id. at 552-53.
-19-

adverse employment action.’”84
B.

New York City Human Rights Law
The NYCHRL provides, in relevant part,
[i]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice . . . [f]or an
employer or an employee or agent thereof, because of the actual
or perceived age, race . . . national origin, [or] gender. . . of any
person, to . . . discharge from employment such person or to
discriminate against such person in compensation or in terms,
conditions or privileges of employment.85
“City HRL claims have typically been treated as coextensive with

state and federal counterparts. However, the New York City Council has rejected
such equivalence.”86 By means of the Local Civil Rights Restoration Act of 2005
(“Restoration Act”),87 the City Council “confirm[ed] the legislative intent to
abolish ‘parallelism’ between the City HRL and federal and state antidiscrimination law.”88 The city law must be construed “independently from similar

84

Id. at 553 (quoting Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp., 420 F.3d 166,
173 (2d Cir. 2005)).
85

N.Y.C. Code § 8-107(1)(a).

86

Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 582 F.3d 268, 278 (2d Cir.

2009).
87

N.Y.C. Local Law No. 85 (2005).

88

Loeffler, 582 F.3d at 278.
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or identical provisions of New York state or federal statutes.”89 “Interpretations of
New York state or federal statutes with similar wording may be used to aid in
interpretation of the New York City Human Rights Law, viewing similarly worded
provisions of federal and state civil rights laws as a floor below which the City’s
Human Rights law cannot fall.”90 “‘As a result of [the Restoration Act], the City
HRL now explicitly requires an independent liberal construction analysis in all
circumstances, even where state and federal civil rights laws have comparable
language.’”91 For both discrimination and retaliation claims under the NYCHRL,
courts apply the McDonnell Douglas framework.92
C.

Breach of Contract
To make out a breach of contract claim under New York law,

plaintiffs must show “(1) the existence of an agreement, (2) adequate performance
of the contract by the plaintiff, (3) breach of contract by the defendant, and (4)

89

Local Law 85, § 1.

90

Id.

91

Loeffler, 582 F.3d at 278 (quoting Williams v. New York City Hous.
Auth., 872 N.Y.S.2d 27, 31 (1st Dep’t 2009)).
92

See Bernard v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 08 Civ. 4784, 2010 WL
423102, at *9, *15 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2010), aff’d, 408 Fed. App’x 465 (2d Cir.
2011).
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damages.”93 New York courts have held that a written policy clearly stating that
bonus compensation is discretionary bars breach of contract claims based on oral
bonus promises.94
D.

Fraudulent Inducement
In order to prove fraudulent inducement under New York law, a
plaintiff must prove “(1) that the defendant made a representation,
(2) as to a material fact, (3) which was false, (4) and known to be
false by the defendant, (5) that the representation was made for the
purpose of inducing the other party to rely upon it, (6) that the
other party rightfully did so rely, (7) in ignorance of its falsity (8)

93

Eternity Global Master Fund v. Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 375 F.3d
168, 177 (2d Cir. 2004) (quotation marks omitted).
94

See, e.g., Hunter v. Deutsche Bank AG, N.Y. Branch, 866 N.Y.S.2d
670, 671 (1st Dep’t 2008) (“Plaintiffs’ claims for breach of contract lack merit in
view of the unambiguous language of their contracts and the employee handbook
plainly making bonus awards solely and completely a matter of defendant’s
discretion.”); Smalley v. Dreyfus Corp., 832 N.Y.S.2d 157, 162 (1st Dep’t 2007)
(“It is well settled that ‘[a]n employee’s entitlement to a bonus is governed by the
terms of the employer’s bonus plan.’”) (quoting Hall v. United Parcel Serv. of Am.,
76 N.Y.2d 27, 36 (1990)), rev’d on other grounds, 10 N.Y.3d 55 (2008); Kaplan v.
Capital Co. of Am., 747 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1st Dep’t 2002) (“Given the clearly
expressed policy of the company that bonuses were to be paid solely at the
company’s discretion, and the provision requiring a writing executed by specified
persons on the company’s behalf to alter the terms of the employment relationship,
plaintiff has no sustainable claim that defendant company entered into an
enforceable agreement entitling him to bonus compensation.”). But see Xu v. J.P.
Morgan & Co., No. 01 Civ. 8686, 2003 WL 25964617, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 24,
2003) (“[T]he Incentive Plan is not enforceable as a contract, and therefore does
not preclude the existence of a separate oral [bonus] contract such as the one
alleged to have been made in this case.”). To the extent Xu conflicts with the
decisions of the New York state courts on questions of New York contract law, I
am bound by the decisions of the New York state courts.
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to his injury.”95
“Where a party asserts fraudulent inducement to an employment
agreement, he must show: (1) that the alleged inducing misrepresentation was
collateral to the agreement; and (2) was not inconsistent with the agreement.”96
The Second Circuit has drawn a distinction between “‘promissory statement[s] as
to what will be done in the future,’ which give rise only to a breach of contract
claim, and . . . ‘false representation[s] of present fact,’ which give rise to a
separable claim of fraudulent inducement.”97 Thus, an oral bonus promise
potentially gives rise to a breach of contract action, not a fraudulent inducement
action.98

95

Computerized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp., 786 F.2d 72, 76
(2d Cir. 1986) (quoting Brown v. Lockwood, 432 N.Y.S.2d 186, 193 (2d Dep’t
1980)).
96

Rehman v. State Univ. of N.Y. at Stony Brook, 596 F. Supp. 2d 643,
659 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
97

Stewart v. Jackson & Nash, 976 F.2d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting
Deerfield Commc’ns Corp. v. Chesebrough-Pond’s, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 954, 956
(1986)).
98

See Kaplan, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 504; Zolotar v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
576 N.Y.S.2d 850, 854 (1st Dep’t 1991) (“‘[A] failure to perform promises of
future acts is merely a breach of contract to be enforced by an action on the
contract. A cause of action for fraud does not arise when the only fraud charged
relates to a breach of contract.’”) (quoting Tesoro Petroleum Corp. v. Holborn Oil
Co., 484 N.Y.S.2d 834, 835 (1st Dep’t 1985).
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[S]tatements will not form the basis of a fraud claim when they
are mere “puffery” or are opinions as to future events.
Nonetheless, a relatively concrete representation as to a
company’s future performance, if made at a time when the speaker
knows that the represented level of performance cannot be
achieved, may ground a claim of fraud.99
E.

Unjust Enrichment
“A claimant seeking relief under a theory of unjust enrichment in New

York must demonstrate ‘(1) that the defendant benefitted; (2) at the plaintiff’s
expense; and (3) that equity and good conscience require restitution.’”100 New
York courts have refused to impose liability on a quasi-contractual theory, such as
unjust enrichment, where the “plaintiff had no contractual right to a bonus and was
clearly apprised of, and acknowledged in writing that he understood, the company
policy that the payment of bonus compensation was purely discretionary.”101
F.

Section 193 of the New York Labor Law
Buckman argues that the alleged promise for a seven-figure bonus

constituted ‘wages’ under New York law and that withholding the bonus is an
impermissible deduction from wages in violation of section 193. Section 193
99

Cohen v. Koenig, 25 F.3d 1168, 1172 (2d Cir. 1994). Accord Sheth v.
New York Life Ins. Co., 709 N.Y.S.2d 74, 75 (1st Dep’t 2000).
100

Leibowitz v. Cornell Univ., 584 F.3d 487, 509 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting
In re Mid-Island Hosp., Inc., 276 F.3d 123, 129 (2d Cir. 2002)).
101

Kaplan, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 506.
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prohibits employers from making deductions from an employee’s wages other than
those expressly permitted.102 Wages are defined as “the earnings of an employee
for labor or services rendered” and also include “benefits or wage supplements as
defined in section one hundred ninety-eight-c of this article.”103
Addressing the issue of which types of payments might constitute
wages, the New York Court of Appeals indicated that “the statute, in expressly
linking earnings to an employee’s labor or services personally rendered,
contemplates a more direct relationship between an employee’s own performance
and the compensation to which that employee is entitled.”104 Accordingly, the
nature of the disputed payment is important. The question of whether a bonus
constitutes “wages” hinges on “whether the compensation is vested and mandatory
as opposed to discretionary and forfeitable.”105 A bonus does not fall within the
statutory definition of “wage” where the bonus is “entirely discretionary and
subject to the non-reviewable determination of the employer.”106
102

See N.Y. Labor Law § 193.

103

Id. § 190(1).

104

Truelove v. Northeast Capital & Advisory, Inc., 95 N.Y.2d 220, 224
(2000) (noting the legislative history of § 190(1) (defining wages) generally and
specifically addressing the issue of bonuses).
105

Id.

106

Id.
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V.

DISCUSSION
A.

Title VII Claims
1.

Unlawful Termination

For the purposes of this motion, Calyon concedes that Buckman
satisfies the first three elements of the McDonnell Douglas test – (1) he is a
member of a protected class; (2) he performed his job satisfactorily; and (3) he
suffered an adverse employment action.107 However, Calyon asserts that Buckman
has not offered evidence permitting a reasonable juror to conclude that Calyon
terminated Buckman under circumstances giving rise to an inference of
discrimination.108 Buckman relies on the following facts to establish an inference
of discrimination – (1) Delaunay’s alleged comment that Perry was a good fit for
sales because “[w]ell, he’s white. And a lot of our clients are white, so at least he
has that working for him,”109 (2) Abdullah’s use of the word “discrimination” in
connection with the behavior of Benamran and Bouchard, and (3) Calyon’s
retention of only Caucasian structured credit employees.110 These facts are

107

See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for
Summary Judgment (“Def. Mem.”) at 17.
108

See id.

109

Buckman Tr. at 306:16-307:3.

110

See Opp. Mem. at 19-20.
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insufficient to survive a summary judgment challenge.
First, Delaunay’s isolated alleged comment that Perry was a good fit
for sales because he is white, although inappropriate, is not probative of whether
Buckman was discharged because of his race. The balance of the “stray remark”
factors111 weigh against considering this remark – (1) Delaunay allegedly made the
comment, and although Delaunay was a supervisor, Laffineur made the decision to
terminate index tranche business employees; (2) the remark was made in isolation
five months before Buckman’s discharge; and (3) there are no facts connecting
Delaunay’s comment to Buckman’s discharge. Although a reasonable juror could
find that the remark itself was discriminatory, it was too remote in time and context
to support a reasonable inference that Buckman’s discharge was a result of race
discrimination.112
Second, Abdullah’s comment similarly does not support a finding that
Buckman was discharged because of his race or national origin. Buckman’s
recollection of Abdullah’s uttering the word “discrimination” cannot be used to
prove that Benamran and Boucard discriminated against Buckman. Under the

111

See Henry, 616 F.3d at 149-50.

112

See, e.g., Dixon v. International Fed’n of Accountants, 416 Fed.
App’x 107, 110 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that “an isolated derogatory remark” did
not “create an inference of discrimination”).
-27-

hearsay rule, a statement by a non-declarant may not be offered to prove the truth
of the statement.113 Whether Abdullah thought Benamran and Boucard were
discriminating against Buckman is irrelevant because even if Benamran and
Boucard had discriminatory feelings against Buckman, they played no part in his
termination.114 Thus, Buckman fails to connect any supposed discrimination by
Benamran and Boucard to his (Buckman’s) termination.
Third, Buckman’s allegations concerning the race and national origin
of terminated (and remaining) employees also fails to raise a reasonable inference
of discrimination. Buckman states that “all the structured credit employees who
were laid off, except for one, were not French.”115 However, the French employee
laid off was the only French employee in Buckman’s small group; Calyon could
not have laid off more French employees in Buckman’s group. In addition,
Buckman argues that “all of the structured credit employees who were retained by
Defendants were white.”116 At the time, Buckman was the only non-Caucasian
employee in his group. Although this fact is not a testament to diversity at Calyon,

113

See Fed. R. Evid. 802.

114

See Henry, 616 F.3d at 149-50.

115

Opp. Mem. at 20.

116

Id.
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the retention of only Caucasian employees is not indicative of any trend, other than
the termination of Buckman himself, as well as two other Caucasian employees.
Buckman has failed to satisfy his burden on summary judgment – to
offer evidence crossing the line beyond “mere speculation and conjecture.”117
Buckman can only point to a stray remark, hearsay, and a distorted view of the
impact of the April 2008 reduction in force on protected groups. Accordingly,
Buckman’s race and national origin discrimination claims based on his termination
fail.
2.

Hostile Work Environment

Buckman points to several facts, in addition to those previously
mentioned, in support of his claim that he was subjected to a hostile work
environment – (1) management singled him out for punishment in relation to the
Swiss Re transaction; (2) Delaunay forced Buckman to work with Eline after Eline
attempted to poach Buckman’s clients; and (3) Benamran and Boucard treated him
(Buckman) with hostility.118 Although some Calyon employees may not have
shown the highest degree of professionalism in their conduct towards Buckman,
Title VII “‘does not set forth a general civility code for the American

117

Fall, 289 Fed. App’x at 420 (quoting Bickerstaff, 196 F.3d at 448).

118

See Opp. Mem. at 21.
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workplace.’”119 Buckman has failed to present evidence such that a reasonable
juror could conclude that Buckman was subject to a hostile work environment.
First, Buckman’s reprimand for the Swiss Re trade is not indicative of
a hostile work environment. Buckman had an obligation to ensure that
counterparties were not on the “Do Not Trade” list. He failed to do so.120
Although Buckman claims that a Caucasian trader in London was not required to
sign a warning letter after a do-not-trade violation, Buckman offers no evidence to
support an inference that this distinction was a result of race discrimination rather
than differing Human Resources policies in London and New York.121 Mere
speculation is insufficient to survive a summary judgment motion.122
Second, Delaunay’s decision to have Buckman and Eline split sales
proceeds is also not indicative of a hostile work environment. People must
occasionally share credit for accomplishments they believe are their own – this
does not give rise to a hostile work environment cause of action under Title VII.
Buckman has failed to offer evidence showing that the split sales arrangement was

119

McGullam, 609 F.3d at 76 (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,
548 U.S. at 68).
120

See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 99-100.

121

See id. ¶¶ 114-116; Pl. 56.1 ¶¶ 114-116.

122

See Brown, 2011 WL 3625105, at *10.
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due to his race or national origin or that the arrangement interfered with his work
performance.123
Third, the slights of Benamran and Boucard are insufficient to sustain
a hostile work environment claim. The alleged conduct – writing messages in a
Bloomberg chat room in their native French language, which Buckman could not
understand; permitting a London intern to act disrespectfully to Buckman and not
write trade tickets for him; and generally not acting “in a civil way” towards
Buckman – consists of “offensive utterance[s]”124 and uncivil treatment,125 neither
of which creates a hostile work environment.
In sum, the totality of the circumstances indicate that while Buckman
may have faced petty slights, there is no evidence of “severe or pervasive”
behavior that altered the conditions of Buckman’s employment.126 Accordingly,
Buckman’s hostile work environment claim fails as a matter of law.
3.

Retaliation

Buckman’s Opposition Memorandum contains no arguments in

123

See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.

124

Id.

125

See McGullam, 609 F.3d at 76.

126

See Monterroso, 591 F. Supp. 2d at 584.
-31-

support of his retaliation claim. Presumably, Buckman bases his retaliation claims
on a July 17, 2007 meeting with Abdullah, Spitz, and Delaunay where Buckman
complained about “the antagonistic behavior” of Benamran and Boucard.127
Buckman testified that he told his managers “I’m not French enough or something
like that, something to basically let them know that I feel like I am being put to the
outside because I’m not like these guys, you know, on the face.”128
Regardless of whether Buckman is able to establish that his complaint
to Abdullah, Spitz, and Delaunay constituted a protected activity under Title VII,
Buckman has failed to establish any causal connection between his complaint
about Benamran and Boucard and his discharge. The lapse of nine months
between Buckman’s complaint and his termination is far longer than courts in this
Circuit have permitted to infer a causal relationship.129 Moreover, Buckman has
pointed to no facts that would permit a reasonable juror to infer that Buckman was
discharged as a result of his complaints about Benamran and Boucard. To the

127

Buckman Tr. at 188:7-11.

128

Id. at 188:22-189:2.

129

See, e.g., Ruhling v. Tribune Co., No. 04 Civ. 2430, 2007 WL 28283,
at *23 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2007) (“[D]istrict courts in this Circuit have consistently
held that a passage of two months between the protected activity and the adverse
employment action seems to be the dividing line.”); Ponicelli v. Zurich Am. Ins.
Grp., 16 F. Supp. 2d 414, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (two-and-a-half months).
-32-

contrary, Calyon attempted to remedy Buckman’s complaints about Benamran and
Boucard.130 Thus, Buckman’s retaliation claim is unsupported by any evidence and
fails as a matter of law.
B.

New York City Human Rights Law
Although I must consider liability under the NYCHRL independently

and under more liberal standards than Title VII, Buckman’s claims under the
NYCHRL must fail for the same reasons as his Title VII claims. As discussed
earlier,131 Buckman has produced no evidence that would support a reasonable
inference that his termination was a result of race or national-origin discrimination.
Nor is there any permissible evidence to support Buckman’s claim that his
termination was a result of unlawful retaliation or that he was subjected to a hostile
work environment. Buckman has not made any argument why his NYCHRL
claims should survive. Thus, even under the more liberal standard of the
NYCHRL, Buckman has not supported his discrimination claims with any
evidence that can defeat a summary judgment motion.132
130

See Buckman Tr. at 188:3-9. Although there is a dispute whether
management’s efforts to resolve Buckman’s complaints about Benamran and
Boucard were successful, Abdullah did attempt to address the dispute. See Def.
56.1 ¶ 82; Pl. 56.1 ¶ 82.
131

See supra Part V.A.

132

See Bernard, 2010 WL 423102, at *9.
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C.

Breach of Contract
Buckman claims that Calyon owes him a seven-figure bonus due to

representations made by Delaunay and Abdullah during the recruitment process.
Buckman argues that the alleged promise is enforceable, despite the discretionary
bonus policy in the Handbook, because “the promise of a specific bonus in not
inconsistent with the provision that management may generally, but is not required
to, pay bonuses.”133
New York state courts have consistently held that a written
discretionary bonus policy bars an action for an alleged oral bonus promise.134
Here, Buckman signed a form acknowledging that he would review and comply
with the Handbook, which contained the discretionary bonus policy.135 Although
there is a dispute as to whether the Handbook contained language stating that the
policy could only be modified in writing by an authorized official, Buckman
concedes that there was no promise for a seven-figure bonus in his written offer
letter because it would take a month to get the necessary approvals.136 Thus,

133

Opp. Mem. at 12.

134

See, e.g., Hunter, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 671; Smalley, 832 N.Y.S.2d at 162;
Kaplan, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
135

See Def. 56.1 ¶¶ 54-55.

136

See id. ¶ 42.
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Buckman was on notice that management had not approved a seven-figure bonus
for him, regardless of whatever assurances Delaunay and Abdullah allegedly gave.
Where there is a written discretionary bonus policy and the employee
is aware that representatives do not have the authority to modify that policy orally,
a breach of contract claim for breach of an alleged oral bonus agreement must fail
under New York law.137 Accordingly, summary judgment is granted for Calyon on
Buckman’s breach of contract claim.
D.

Fraudulent Inducement
In addition to the promise of a seven-figure bonus, Buckman alleges

that several other representations made to him when Calyon recruited him were
false – (1) Buckman would have established accounts to work on; (2) Calyon was
financially sound; (3) Calyon’s trading book of cash and synthetic products was
well balanced; and (4) Calyon had sound risk management processes. However,
the plaintiff’s arguments on fraudulent inducement focused solely on the promise
of the seven-figure bonus.138
Because Buckman’s breach of contract claim has failed, so too must
137

See Hunter, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 671; Smalley, 832 N.Y.S.2d at 162;
Kaplan, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
138

See Def. Mem. at 13-14; Opp. Mem. at 18-19; Defendants’ Reply
Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Their Motion for Summary Judgment
at 1-7.
-35-

his claim of fraudulent inducement based on the alleged promise of a seven-figure
bonus. Buckman cannot use a fraudulent inducement theory to recover on a barred
breach of contract action.139 Likewise, Buckman offers no evidence to support a
fraudulent inducement action on the other grounds listed above. Statements that
Calyon was financially sound, had a balanced trading book, and had sound risk
management processes are not “concrete representation” about the company’s
performance, but rather “puffery” insufficiently concrete to induce reasonable
reliance as a matter of law.140 Finally, the alleged promise that Buckman would
have established accounts to work on cannot sustain the fraudulent inducement
claim. A promise for something to be done in the future is grounds for a breach of
contract action, not a fraudulent inducement action.141 Therefore, Buckman’s
claim for fraudulent inducement fails as a matter of law.
E.

Unjust Enrichment
Buckman claims that he is entitled to recover for unjust enrichment as

an alternative theory for recovery of the seven-figure bonus. However, for the

139

See Kaplan, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 504.

140

See Cohen, 25 F.3d at 1172; Sheth, 709 N.Y.S.2d at 75 (dismissing
fraud claims based on statements that were “conclusory and/or constitute[d] mere
puffery, opinions of value or future expectations.”).
141

See Stewart, 976 F.2d at 89.
-36-

reasons stated earlier,142 Calyon retained complete discretion over whether – and
for how much – to award Buckman a bonus. Because New York courts have
refused to permit litigants to use a quasi-contractual theory as a backdoor to
enforce an unenforceable oral bonus promise,143 Buckman’s unjust enrichment
claims fail.
F.

Section 193 of the New York Labor Law
Finally, Buckman contends that Calyon has violated section 193 of

the New York Labor Law because the promised bonus was based on Buckman’s
personal productivity and therefore constitutes “wages” for purposes of section
193.144 However, this claim fails as well. Because Buckman’s bonus was
completely discretionary and subject to a non-reviewable determination by Calyon,
it does not constitute “wages” for purposes of section 193.145
VI.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment

is granted in its entirety. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this motion

142

See supra Part V.C.

143

See Kaplan, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 506.

144

See Truelove, 95 N.Y.2d at 220.

145

See id. at 224.
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[docket #39] and this case.

Dated:

New York, New York
September 13, 2011

-38­

- Appearances For Plaintiff:
Bernard Weinreb, Esq.
2 Perlman Drive, Suite 301
Spring Valley, New York 10977
[phone]
Christine Ann Palmieri, Esq.
Liddle & Robinson, LLP
800 Third Avenue, 8th Floor
New York, New York 10022
[phone]
For Defendants:
Barbara M. Roth, Esq.
Christopher Nicholas Franciose, Esq.
Nicole Civita, Esq.
Hogan Lovells US LLP
875 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
[phone]

-39-