Anderson v. The City of Mount Vernon
Filing
79
OPINION AND ORDER re: 74 SECOND MOTION for Summary Judgment; 72 SECOND MOTION for Summary Judgment: For the reasons set forth above, Defendants' motion for summary judgment is DENIED in its entirety. The parties are directed to appear for a status conference on February 15, 2018, at 10:30 a.m. at the United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, Courtroom 619, New York, NY 10007. The Clerk of the Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion, Doc. 72, Doc. 74. (Status Conference set for 2/15/2018 at 10:30 AM in Courtroom 619, 40 Centre Street, New York, NY 10007 before Judge Edgardo Ramos.) (Signed by Judge Edgardo Ramos on 1/23/2018) (jwh)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MICHAEL ANDERSON,
Plaintiff,
OPINION AND ORDER
09 Civ. 7082 (ER)
- against CITY OF MOUNT VERNON and POLICE OFFICER
SEAN BLUTE, individually and in his official capacity
as a City of Mount Vernon police officer,
Defendants.
Ramos, D.J.
Michael Anderson brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State
law against the City of Mount Vernon (the “City”) and police officer Sean Blute. Plaintiff asserts
claims for, among other things, false arrest, malicious prosecution, and assault and battery.
Before the Court is Defendants’ second motion for summary judgment. For the reasons
discussed below, Defendants’ motion is DENIED.
I.
Factual and Procedural Background
Plaintiff initially filed his complaint in New York Supreme Court in Westchester County
on July 7, 2009, bringing claims for assault and battery, false arrest, false imprisonment, and
malicious prosecution under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and New York State law against police officer
“John Doe,” and a Monell claim and New York State law claims against the City. Doc. 1 at 7–
17. Plaintiff alleged that on August 30, 2008, he was “confronted, beaten, and arrested” by the
John Doe police officer after leaving a night club in Mount Vernon. Id. ¶ 12. On August 11,
2009, the City removed the case to federal court and the case was assigned to the Honorable
Cathy Seibel. Id. at 1–3. Following the close of discovery, the City moved for summary
judgment with respect to all of Plaintiff’s claims on January 6, 2011. Doc. 14; Doc. 16. In his
response to the City’s motion, Plaintiff withdrew his Monell claim, leaving only state law claims
remaining against the City. Doc. 17 at 1; Doc. 19 at 12. Plaintiff also cross-moved to amend the
complaint to replace the “John Doe” defendant with Officer Blute. Doc. 17 at 2. Judge Seibel
granted Defendants’ motion with respect to Plaintiff’s Monell claim, but denied summary
judgment with respect to Plaintiff’s other claims. Doc. 19 at 13. Judge Seibel also granted
Plaintiff’s motion to amend. Id. at 2–6. On December 16, 2011, Plaintiff filed an amended
complaint naming Officer Blute as a defendant, Doc. 20 (“Am. Compl.”), and the case was
subsequently reassigned to the undersigned shortly thereafter, Doc. 23.
On June 19, 2012, Plaintiff sought leave to conduct additional discovery and depose all
officers who were on the scene when he was arrested in order to investigate whether Sergeant
Michael Marcucilli—and not Officer Blute, who was the arresting officer—had actually beaten
him outside the night club. Doc. 31, 32. The Court denied Plaintiff’s motion on December 14,
2012. Doc. 38. Plaintiff then moved to file a second amended complaint naming Sergeant
Marcucilli as a defendant on April 12, 2013. Doc. 44. Plaintiff sought to allege that while
Officer Blute confronted him outside the night club and ultimately arrested him, it was Sergeant
Marcucilli who beat and injured him. Doc. 47 at 2; Doc. 47-1 ¶¶ 12–17. The Court referred the
issue to Magistrate Judge Paul Davison, who recommended that Plaintiff’s motion to amend be
denied. Doc. 51. Specifically, Judge Davison determined that Plaintiff’s proposed claims
against Sergeant Marcucilli were futile because (1) they were time-barred, and (2) Plaintiff failed
to demonstrate that the claims related back to the date of his original pleading. Id. at 7–11. The
Court adopted Judge Davison’s report and recommendation on March 28, 2014. Doc. 57.
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On April 12, 2017, Defendants filed a second motion for summary judgment. Doc. 72.
Defendants contend that because Plaintiff no longer has a federal claim against the City, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against the City.
Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of its Second Motion for Summary Judgment (“Defs.’
Mem.”) at 13–14. Defendants also contend that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s claims
against Officer Blute because Plaintiff concedes that Officer Blute did not beat him outside the
night club. Id. at 14–15.
II.
Discussion
A. Claims against the City
Defendants contend that the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the City because
Plaintiff no longer has a federal claim against the City and there is no other basis for federal
jurisdiction. Defs.’ Mem. at 13–14. Defendants removed this action on the ground that it raises
questions of federal constitutional law. See Doc. 1 at 1–2. Thus, Plaintiff’s state law claims are
before the Court as a matter of supplemental jurisdiction because they form part of the same
controversy as Plaintiff’s federal law claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (federal district courts
have supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims “that are so related to” federal claims “that
they form part of the same case or controversy”).
Supplemental jurisdiction is “discretionary,” City of Chicago v. International College of
Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173 (1997), and a district court “may decline to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over a claim” if it “has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction,”
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Here, although the Court has dismissed the single federal claim against the
City, federal claims still exist against co-defendant Officer Blute, as the Court discusses below.
The Second Circuit has held that “a district court may not decline to exercise supplemental
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jurisdiction over state law claims where federal claims remain against other defendants and the
state law claims ‘form part of the same case or controversy.’” Mejia v. Davis, 16 Civ. 9706
(GHW), 2018 WL 333829, at *6–7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 2018) (emphasis added) (quoting
Ciambriello v. County of Nassau, 292 F.3d 307, 325 (2d Cir. 2002)); Briarpatch Ltd. v. Phoenix
Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 308 (2d Cir. 2004) (stating that a federal court has supplemental
jurisdiction over a state law claim that forms part of the same controversy as a federal claim
“even if the state law claim is asserted against a party different from the one named in the federal
claim.”). State and federal law claims form part of the same controversy if they “derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact.” Briarpatch, 373 F.3d at 308 (citation omitted). As Judge
Seibel noted in her December 2011 Opinion and Order denying Defendants’ first motion for
summary judgment, Plaintiff’s state law claims against the City are based on a respondeat
superior theory, and thus necessarily derive from the same nucleus of operative fact as his
federal claims against Officer Blute. See Doc. 19 at 12. Accordingly, the Court must exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims against the City, and Defendants’
motion for summary judgment is DENIED.
B. Claims against Officer Blute
Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Blute must be dismissed
because he concedes that it was Sergeant Marcucilli who beat him, “essentially abandon[ing]”
his claims against Officer Blute. Defs.’ Mem. at 2, 14–15. Defendants, however, ignore that
Plaintiff’s claims against Officer Blute go beyond the alleged beating. Plaintiff brings claims for
false arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious prosecution based on Officer Blute’s role as the
arresting officer. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 12, 24–35; Doc. 47-1 ¶¶ 12–17, 20–39. Moreover, despite
Plaintiff’s concession that Officer Blute was not the person who beat him, Plaintiff still claims
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