Sykes v. Mel S. Harris and Associates LLC et al
Filing
123
OPINION: For the reasons stated above, plaintiffs' motion for class certification is granted. Accordingly the Court certifies(1) the Rule 23(b) (2) injunctive and declaratory relief class comprised of all persons who have been or will be sued by the Mel Harris defendants as counsel for the Leucadia defendants in actions commenced in New York City Civil Court and where a default judgment has been or will be sought --to resolve the equitable portion of plaintiffs' RICO I GBL and Judiciar y Law claims; and (2) the Rule 23(b) (3) liability class --comprised of all person who have been sued by the Mel Harris defendants as counsel for the Leucadia defendants in actions commenced in New York City Civil Court and where a default judgment h as been entered against them --to resolve the issues of whether defendants' actions violated the FDCPA, RICO, New York GBL § 349, and New York Judiciary Law § 487. Plaintiffs shall submit a proposed order on notice within fourteen days hereof. (Signed by Judge Denny Chin on 9/4/2012) (cd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-x
MONIQUE SYKES et al.,
Plaintiffs ,
OPINION
- against MEL HARRIS AND ASSOCIATES 1 LLC ,
al. ,
09 Civ. 8486 (DC)
Defendants.
- - -
- - -
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(See last page)
APPEARANCES:
CHIN, Circuit Judge
In this case, four plaintiffs allege that a debt-buying
company, a law firm, a process service company, and others
engaged in a scheme to fraudulently obtain default judgments
against them and more than 100,000 other consumers in state
court.
Defendants allegedly acted in concert to defraud these
consumers in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
(the "FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C.
§
1692
~,
the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C.
New York General Business Law (IIGBL")
Judiciary Law
§
487.
§
349 1
§
1961
et~,
and New York
Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief,
declaratory relief, and damages on behalf of themselves and other
similarly situated individuals.
They move for class
certification.
The motion is granted.
The record before the Court
establishes that defendants obtained tens of thousands of default
judgments in consumer debt actions, based on thousands of
affidavits attesting to the merits of the action that were
generated en masse by sophisticated computer programs and signed
by a law firm employee who did not read the vast majority of them
and claimed to, but apparently did not, have personal knowledge
of the facts to which he was attesting.
The record also shows
that on hundreds of occasions the defendant process servers
purported to serve process at two or more locations at the same
time.
As discussed more fully below, defendants' unitary course
of conduct purportedly to obtain default judgments in a
fraudulent manner presents common questions of law and fact that
can be resolved most efficiently on a class-wide basis.
BACKGROUND
A.
The Facts
I make the following findings of fact based upon the
depositions, declarations, and exhibits submitted by the parties
in connection with this motion.
I resolve factual disputes to
-2
the extent necessary to decide the class certification issue. 1
See In re Initial Pub. Offering (IIIPOII) Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24,
27, 41-42 (2d Cir. 2006)
certification
l
(when adjudicating motion for class
lIall of the evidence must be assessed as with any
other threshold issue ll
;
lithe judge [must] resolve factual
disputes ll relevant to class certification). Certain factual
assertions relate to the merits; I do not resolve these factual
issues now, but state them as the parties' assertions.
1.
The Parties
Plaintiffs Monique Sykes, Rea Veerabadren, Kelvin
Perez, and Clifton Armoogam are New York City residents who were
each sued by various defendants in debt collection actions
commenced in New York City Civil Court between 2006 and 2010.
(See Jain Decl. Exs. AI E, I, Mi Third Am. Compl.
~~
10-13) .
Each denies being served with a summons and complaint in their
respective action.
(See Third Am. Compl. ~~ 117, 138, 169, 201).
To the extent the Court has received depositions,
declarations, and exhibits designated as confidential under the
Protective Order entered into by the parties (see 2/1/11
Protective Order), it finds that some limited disclosure of the
information contained therein is necessary to make findings and
resolve factual disputes related to class certification. What is
recited below is limited to information that is or otherwise
would be public and/or does not reveal proprietary trade secrets,
non-public financials, or sensitive personal information.
1
-3
Defendants, nevertheless, were able to obtain default judgments
against them.
(See Jain Decl. Exs. D, H, L, P).
Defendants are:
(1) various subsidiaries of Leucadia
National Corporation ("Leucadia") that purchase and collect
consumer debti
(2)
Mel S. Harris and Associates LLC ("Mel
Harris"), a law firm specializing in debt collection litigation;
(3) Samserv, Inc.
("Samserv ll ) , a process service company; and (4)
various affiliates and associates of each of the foregoing
entities (the "Leucadia defendants,lI the IIMel Harris defendants,lI
and the "Samserv defendants," respectively).2
Compl.
2.
"
(See Third Am.
14-38).
The Alleged Scheme
Plaintiffs allege that the Leucadia and Mel Harris
defendants entered into joint ventures to purchase debt
portfolios, and then filed debt collection actions against the
Specifically, the "Leucadia defendants" include
Leucadia, L-Credit, LLC, LR Credit, LLC, LR Credit 10, LLC, LR
Credit 12, LLC, LR Credit 14, LLC, LR Credit 18, LLC, and LR
Credit 21, LLC, Joseph A. Orlando, Philip M. Cannella, and LR
Credit John/Jane Does 1-20.
(See Third Am. Compl. " 22-31).
The "Mel Harris defendants" include Mel Harris, Michael Young,
David Waldman, Kerry Lutz, Todd Fabacher, and Mel Harris
John/Jane Does 1-20.
{See id. " 14-21}. The "Samserv
defendants" include Samserv, William Mlotok, Benjamin Lamb,
Michael Mosquera, John Andino, and Samserv John/Jane Does 1-20.
(See id. " 32-38).
2
-4
alleged debtors with the intent to collect millions of dollars
through fraudulently-obtained default judgments.
Compl. ~~ I, 3-7, 91).
(Third Am.
The Leucadia and Mel Harris defendants
regularly hired Samserv to serve process.
According to plaintiffs, Samserv routinely engaged in "sewer
service" whereby it would fail to serve the summons and complaint
but still submit proof of service to the court.
93).
After a debtor failed to appear in court for lack of notice
of the action, the Leucadia and Mel Harris defendants would then
apply for a default judgment by providing the court with,
inter alia, an "affidavit of merit" attesting to their personal
knowledge regarding the defendant's debt and an affidavit of
service as proof of service.
(rd. ~~ 4, 6, 92-94).
The Leucadia
and Mel Harris defendants had limited proof to substantiate the
claims made in their
fidavits of merit because they typically
did not possess documentation of the underlying debt, and
moreover, because the affiant lacked "personal knowledge" of such
claims, contrary to what is stated in the affidavit.
104-10).
Plaintiffs further allege that the affidavits of
service were also false because defendants regularly engaged in
sewer service.
(rd. ~~ 93 94).
-5
3.
Default Judgments 3
Between 2006 and 2009, various Leucadia entities filed
124,838 cases in New York City Civil Court.
3-4).
(De Jesus Decl.
~~
In 99.63 percent of those cases, Mel Harris defendants
acted as counsel.
(Id.).
The "vast majority" of such cases were
adjudicated without appearance by the defendant debtors,
indicating the likelihood that a default judgment was entered.
(Id.
~
5).
Between 2007 and 2010 various Leucadia entities
obtained default judgments in 49,114 cases in New York City civil
Court.
4.
(Coffey Decl.
~~
3-7).
Service of Process
Between January 2007 and January 2011, Samserv
defendants performed service of process in 94,123 cases filed by
Mel Harris in New York City Civil Court, 59,959 of which were
filed on behalf of Leucadia defendants.
~~
2-4);
(7/31/11 Egleson Decl.
Records maintained by defendants reveal hundreds of
instances of the same process server executing service at two or
(~ ~~
more locations at the same time.
occasions, defendants Mosquera,
Lamb~
9-11, Ex. A).
and Andino, alone
On 517
l
claimed
Defendants do not dispute the accuracy of the figures
cited in this section.
(See Defs.' Sur-Reply Br. at 2-3;
Leucadia Defs.' Br. at 10-12; Mel Harris Defs.' Br. at 6) .
3
-6
to be have performed service in two or more places at the same
time.
(Id.
~
II, Ex. A).
For example, Mosquera claimed to have
performed service at four different locations at 1 p.m. on
September 17, 2008.
(Id.
~
10).
Lamb claimed to have performed
service at two different locations at 6:59 p.m. on November 28,
(Id.).
2007.
Andino claimed to have performed service at nine
different locations at 4 p.m. on March 29, 2007.
(Id.).
There
were also many other occasions where multiple services were
purportedly made so close in time that it would have been
impossible for the process server to travel from one location to
the other as claimed.
These facts,
(Id.
~~
13-23, Ex. B).
together with the high number of default
judgments obtained by defendants, provide substantial support for
plaintiffs' assertion that defendants regularly engaged in sewer
service.
5.
Affidavits of Merit
The affidavits of merit submitted by the Mel Harris and
Leucadia defendants in New York City Civil Court follow a uniform
format.
(See Jain Decl. Exs. C, G, K,
E, F, G, H, I).
OJ
Brinckerhoff Decl. Exs.
Defendant Todd Fabacher, the director of
information technology for Mel Harris (4/14/11 Egleson Decl. Ex.
A, 8:10-12 ("3/1/11 Fabacher Dep."), serves as the affiant.
-7
(See, e.g., Jain Decl. Ex. C).
In each affidavit, he attests
that he is "an authorized and designated custodian of records"
for the plaintiff, one of many Leucadia debt collection entities.
(See, e.g., id.).
He further states that he "maintain[s] the
daily records and accounts [for the collection entity]
in the
regular course of business, including records maintained by and
obtained from [the collection entity's] assignor.
,,4
(Id.).
Fabacher affirms that he is "thereby fully and personally
familiar with, and [has] personal knowledge of, the facts and
proceedings relating to the [debt collection action]."
(Id. ) .
Each affidavit then provides information on the underlying debt,
including the relevant account number, original creditor, and
outstanding balance.
(See, e. g., id.).
In preparing the affidavits of merit, Fabacher uses
various database and software programs to import, sort, and check
the completeness of "electronic data" received by the Leucadia
The Court takes note that in two affidavits of merit
submitted as exhibits by plaintiffs, Fabacher identifies himself
as the "authorized and designated custodian of records for the
plaintiff's assignor."
(See Jain Decl. Ex. Gi Brinkerhoff Decl.
Ex. Ii see also 11/21/11 Fabacher Dep. at 113-17).
In those two
instances, the particular entities assigning the debt to the
plaintiff Leucadia debt collection entities were Sears and Chase
Manhattan Bank, entities at which Fabacher was apparently not
employed.
(See Jain Decl. Ex. Gi Brinkerhoff Decl. Ex. Ii see
also 11/21/11 Fabacher Dep. at 113-17).
4
-8
defendants from the various creditors and debt sellers from whom
they purchase debt.
(11/21/11 Fabacher Dep. at 23-26, 34)
5
Typically, Fabacher does not receive the original credit
agreements between the account holders and the creditors.
at 37).
(Id.
Instead, he receives a bill of sale for the portfolio of
debts purchased that includes "sample" credit agreements and
"warranties" made by the seller regarding the debts in the
portfolio.
(Id. at 37-38).
do not exist.
In many instances, such agreements
(Id. at 125:18-21).
If they do exist, Fabacher's
"standard practice" does not entail reviewing them before
endorsing an affidavit of merit.
{~
at 156:3-17; see also id.
5
To the extent defendants argue that the Court should
not consider Fabacher's November 21, 2011 deposition because it
was taken after briefing and oral argument on the class
certification motion (see Mel Harris Defs.' 12/21/11 Ltr.;
Leucadia Defs.' 12/19/11 Ltr.), I reject this argument. At oral
argument, I raised a number of questions regarding Fabacher's
practices in signing the affidavits of merit.
(See 10/11/11 Hr'g
Tr. at 48-49). Although the answers apparently were not in the
record, I observed that the information "would be useful to me."
(Id. at 49). Both the Leucadia and Mel Harris defendants
responded to plaintiffs' submission of Fabacher's deposition
(See Mel Harris Defs.' 12/21/11 Ltr.;
transcript to the Court.
Indeed, the Mel Harris
Leucadia Defs.' 12/19/11 Ltr.).
defendants' submission was substantial and included a nine-page
declaration by Fabacher.
I have read the parties' submissions,
and I deem this discovery relevant to class certification and the
resolution of related factual disputes.
Cf. In re IPO, 471 F.3d
at 41 (discussing, inter alia, district court's "ample discretion
to circumscribe
. the extent of discovery concerning Rule 23
requirements") .
-9
at 167:5-17).
He instead relies on the warranties made by the
original creditor and the information contained in the database
programs.
(See id. at 123 24, 156-58, 167, 169).
Fabacher uses the database and software programs to
create "judgment packet[s]" that include an affidavit of merit
and are ultimately used to obtain a default judgment in the debt
collection action.
D).
at 103-07i see. e.g., Jain Decl. Exs. C,
The documents are generated using "templates" with an "open
standard format."
(11/21/11 Fabacher Dep. at 107:12-23).
The
template functions like a "mail merge" or a "fixed document with
fields ll into which the software program nplugs ll the relevant
information.
(Id. at 107:12-108:11) .
Fabacher produces the affidavits of merit for signature
in batches of up to 50 at a time.
(~
at 159-60).
He "quality
check[s]" one affidavit in each batch and if it is accurate, he
signs the remaining affidavits in the batch without reviewing
them.
(Id.).
The quality check consists of ensuring that
information printed on the affidavit matches the information
stored in the Debt Master database.
(Id. at 160-62).
In any
given week, Fabacher signs as many as 350 affidavits of merit.
(See id. at 180).
10
Hence, Fabacher signs hundreds of affidavits a week,
purportedly based on personal knowledge, purporting to certify
that the action has merit
l
without actually having reviewed any
credit agreements, promissory notes, or underlying documents,
and, indeed, without even reading what he was signing.
B.
Procedural History
Plaintiff Monique Sykes commenced this action on
October 6, 2009 against some of the Leucadia, Mel Harris
1
and
Samserv defendants, alleging only FDCPA and New York GBL claims.
On December 28 1 2009, Rea Veerabadren and two others joined the
action as plaintiffs, and class allegations and RICO claims were
added.
Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint on March 31
2010, adding Kelvin Perez and three additional plaintiffs and a
New York Judiciary Law claim.
moved to dismiss the action
l
On May 7, 2010, the defendants
and I denied their motion in a
decision dated December 29, 2010.
S¢e Sykes v. Mel Harris &
Assocs., LLC, 757 F. Supp. 2d 413 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
Plaintiffs
moved for class certification and to amend their complaint once
more on April 14, 2011.
and on April 18, 2011
favor.
2011
1
1
Five plaintiffs accepted settlements
l
I entered Rule 68 judgments in their
After I held a conference with the parties on April 26,
the parties stipulated to plaintiffs' filing a Third
-11
1
Amended Complaint and adding Clifton Armoogam as a plaintiff and
LR Credit 21, LLC as a defendant.
I heard oral argument on
plaintiffs' class certification motion on October II, 2011 and
received additional submissions from the parties in December
2011.
DISCUSSION
A.
Applicable Law
A plaintiff seeking class certification must meet the
prerequis
Procedure
of Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
- numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of
representation.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
If the prerequisites of
Rule 23(a) are met, the court then must determine whether the
putative class can be certified and maintained under anyone of
the three subsections of Rule 23(b).
F.3d 467, 475-76 (2d Cir. 2010).
See Brown v. Kelly, 609
Here, plaintiffs seek class
certification pursuant to subsections (b) (1) (A),
(b) (2), and/or
(b) (3) of Rule 23.
The party seeking class certification bears the burden
of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
requirements of Rule 23 are met.
Teamsters Local 445 Freight
Div. Pension Fund v. Bombardier. Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 201-04 (2d
-12
Cir. 2008).
The Second Circuit has clarified the standards
governing adjudication of a motion for class certification:
(1) a district judge may certify a class only
after making determinations that each of the
Rule 23 requirements has been metj (2) such
determinations can be made only if the judge
resolves factual disputes relevant to each
Rule 23 requirement and finds that whatever
underlying facts are relevant to a particular
Rule 23 requirement have been established and
is persuaded to rule, based on the relevant
facts and the applicable legal standard, that
the requirement is metj (3) the obligation to
make such determinations is not lessened by
overlap between a Rule 23 requirement and a
merits issue, even a merits issue that is
identical with a Rule 23 requirementj (4) in
making such determinations, a district judge
should not assess any aspect of the merits
unrelated to a Rule 23 requirementj and (5) a
district judge has ample discretion to
circumscribe both the extent of discovery
concerning Rule 23 requirements and the
extent of a hearing to determine whether such
requirements are met in order to assure that
a class certification motion does not become
a pretext for a partial trial of the merits.
In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at
41j
accord Shahriar v. Smith &
Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 251 (2d Cir. 2011).
1.
Rule 23(a) Prerequisites
All four prerequisites of Rule 23(a) as well as an
additional requirement that the class be "ascertainable" must be
met.
Brown v. Kelly, 609 F.3d 467, 475 (2d Cir. 2010)
v. Kelly, 257 F.R.D. 396, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
-13
j
Casale
a.
Numerosity
Rule 23(a) (1) requires the putative class to be "so
numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable."
Civ. P. 23(a) (1).
Fed. R.
Courts do not require "evidence of exact class
size or identity of class members."
931, 935 (2d Cir. 1993).
Robidoux v. Celani, 987 F.2d
If there is any dispute as to the size
of the proposed class, however, the court must resolve it and
make a finding as to the approximate size.
In re IPO Sec.
Litig., 471 F.3d at 41.
b.
Commonality
Rule 23{a) (2) requires that there be "questions of law
or fact common to the class."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (2).
The
Rule does not require all questions of law or fact to be common.
Indeed, even a single common question will suffice.
Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v .. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2556 (2011); Marisol A.
v. Giuliani, 126 F.3d 372, 376 (2d Cir. 1997)
(liThe commonality
requirement is met if plaintiffs' grievances share a common
question of law or of fact.").
The common question must lend
itself to "classwide resolution" such that "determination of its
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the
validity of each one of the claims in one stroke."
S. Ct. at 2551.
Wal-Mart, 131
Therefore, what matters is "'the capacity of a
-14
classwide proceeding to generate common answers apt to drive the
resolution of the litigation.'
(quoting Richard A. Nagareda
Aggregate Proof
I
l
II
Id.
(emphasis in original)
Class Certification in the Age of
84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 97
Importantly
I
1
132 (2009)).
Rule 23(a) (2) does not require that the
claims of the lead plaintiffs "be identical to those of all other
plaintiffs."
Lapin v. Goldman Sachs & CO'
(S.D.N.Y. 2008).
I
254 F.R.D. 168, 176
Indeed, "'factual differences in the claims of
the class do not preclude a finding of commonality. '"
Newman v.
RCN Telecom Servs.( Inc., 238 F.R.D. 57, 73 (S.D.N.Y. 2006)
(quoting 5 Moore's Federal Practice
§
23.23[2]).
Commonality may
be found were the plaintiffs' alleged injuries "derive from a
unitary course of conduct by a single system."
Marisol A., 126
F.3d at 377.
c.
Typicality
The commonality and typicality requirements of Rule
23(a) tend to merge such that similar considerations inform the
analysis for both prerequisites.
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551
n.S; Marisol A., 126 F.3d at 376.
Rule 23(a) (3) requires that
"the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of [those] of the class."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3).
The
typicality requirement "'is satisfied when each class member's
-15
claim arises from the same course of events and each class member
makes similar legal arguments to prove the defendant's
liability. '"
Robinson v. Metro-North Commuter R.R. Co., 267 F.3d
147, 155 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Marisol A., 126 F. 3d at 376),
abrogated on other grounds by Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2541, as
recognized in Hecht v. United Collection Bureau, Inc. --- F.3d
2012 WL 3538269, at *4 (2d Cir. Aug. 17, 2012); see In re
Flag Telecom Holdings, Ltd. Sec. Litig., 574 F.3d 29, 35 (2d Cir.
2009)
(quoting Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 936).
"[M]inor variations
in the fact patterns underlying [the] individual claims" do not
preclude a finding of typicality.
Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 936-37.
By contrast, "unique defenses" that "threaten to become the focus
of the litigation" may preclude such a finding.
In re Flag
Telecom, 574 F.3d at 40 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted) .
d.
Adequacy of Representation
Rule 23(a) requires that the class representatives will
"fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class."
R. Civ. P. 23(a) (4).
This question involves an inquiry as to
whether: "1) plaintiff's interests are antagonistic to the
interest of other members of the class and 2) plaintiff's
attorneys are qualified, experienced and able to conduct the
-16
Fed.
litigation."
Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp.,
222 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 2000).
This inquiry "serves to uncover conflicts of interest
between the parties and the class they seek to represent."
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).
Not
every conflict, however, precludes a finding of adequacy.
"The
conflict that will prevent a plaintiff from meeting the Rule
23(a) (4) prerequisite must be fundamental, and speculative
conflict should be disregarded at the class certification stage."
In re Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124, 145
(2d Cir. 2001)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted),
abrogated on other grounds by In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at
24.
e.
Ascertainability
Finally, courts have added an "implied requirement ll
that the class be ascertainable.
See In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471
F.3d at 30; In re Bank of Am. Corp. Secs .. Deriviative. and ERISA
Litig., 281 F.R.D. 134, 140 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
at 406.
i
257 F.R.D.
Under this requirement, the class must be "identifiable"
such that "its members can be ascertained by reference to
objective criteria."
In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE")
Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. 323, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
17
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Although the
membership of the class must be ascertainable "at some point in
the case," it does not necessarily have to be determined prior to
class certification.
omitted)
2.
Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks
In re IPO Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d at 45.
i
Rule 23(b)
Certification must be appropriate under one of the
three subsections of Rule 23(b).
a.
Brown, 609 F.3d at 476.
Certification under 23(b) (2)
A class may be certified under Rule 23(b) (2) if "the
party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
that apply generally to the class, so that final injunctive
relief or corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (2).
"The key to the (b) (2) class is 'the indivisible nature of the
injunctive or declaratory remedy warranted -- the notion that the
conduct is such that it can be enjoined or declared unlawful only
as to all of the class members or as to none of them. '"
Wal
Marti 131 S. Ct. at 2557 (quoting Nagareda, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at
132) .
Where plaintiffs moves "for (b) (2) class certification
of a claim seeking both injunctive relief and non-incidental
-18
monetary damages, the district court must . . . assess whether
(b) (2) certification is appropriate in light of the relative
importance of the remedies sought, given all the facts and
circumstances of the case."
Robinson, 267 F.3d at 164 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court may
allow (b) (2) certification if it finds "that (1) the positive
weight or value [to the plaintiffs] of the injunctive or
declaratory relief sought is predominant even though compensatory
or punitive damages are also claimed .
.
. and (2) class
treatment would be efficient and manageable, thereby achieving an
appreciable measure of judicial economy."
and quotation marks omitted).
Id.
(internal citation
Certification under (b) (2) is not
appropriate, however, where "the monetary relief is not
incidental to the injunctive or declaratory relief."
Wal-Mart,
131 S. Ct. at 2557.
b.
Certification under 23(b) (3)
A class action may be maintained under Rule 23(b) (3) if
"the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy."
Fed. R. civ. P. 23(b) (3).
-19
The predominance requirement is satisfied "if
resolution of some of the legal or factual questions that qualify
each class member's case as a genuine controversy can be achieved
through generalized proof, and if these particular issues are
more substantial than the issues subject only to individualized
proof."
Myers v. Hertz Corp., 624 F.3d 537, 547 (2d Cir. 2010)
(quoting Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d 1247, 1252 (2d Cir.
2002))
(internal quotation marks omitted).6
That an affirmative
defense may arise that affects different class members
differently "does not compel a finding that individual issues
predominate over common ones."
In re Nassau Cnty. Strip Search
Cases, 461 F.3d 219, 225 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citation and internal
quotation marks omitted) .
Together with the "superiority" requirement, the
predominance requirement "ensures that the class will be
certified only when it would 'achieve economies of time, effort,
and expense, and promote .
. uniformity of decision as to
persons similarly situated, without sacrificing procedural
"Rule 23(b) (3) requires that the district court
determine what 'questions of law or fact [are] common to the
members of the class." Cordes & Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A.G.
Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91, 106 (2d Cir. 2 007) (qu oting
Fed. R. civ. P. 23 (b) ( 3)) .
-20
fairness or bringing about other undesirable results.
111
Cordes &
Co. Fin. Servs., Inc. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 502 F.3d 91,
104 (2d Cir. 2007)
(quoting Amchem Prods., 521 U.S. at 615).
Considerations relevant to finding superiority include
the following:
(A) the class members I interests in
individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions; (B) the extent
and nature of any litigation concerning the
controversy already begun by or against class
membersi (C) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the
litigation of the claims in the particular
forumi and (D) the likely difficulties in
managing a class action.
Fed. R. civ. P. 23(b) (3) (A)-{D) i see also In re WorldCom, Inc.
Sec. Litig., 219 F.R.D. 267, 304
(S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Further, where injunctive and declaratory relief is
sought in addition to substantial monetary damages, "due process
concerns militate strongly against maintaining a mandatory (b) {2}
class action without the procedural safeguards of notice and the
opportunity to opt-out that are provided to members of a
damages class."
(b) (3)
Charron v. Pinnacle Grp. N.Y. LLC, 269 F.R.D.
221, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
i
see also Robinson, 267 F.3d at 165-67;
Casale, 257 F.R.D. at 408 & n.90.
In such circumstances, the
court may proceed in at least one of three ways:
-21
(1) certify the
class under Rule 23(b) (3) for all proceedings;
(2) certify
separate Rule 23(b) (2) and (b) (3) classes addressing equitable
relief and damages, respectively; or (3) certify the class under
Rule 23(b) (2) for both equitable and monetary relief but provide
all class members with notice and opportunity and opt-out
pursuant to the court's authority under Rule 23(c) (2) (A) and
(d) (1) (B).
See Charron, 269 F.R.D. at 237-38; Casale, 257 F.R.D.
at 408.
B.
Application
In this case, plaintiffs seek certification of two
classes. 7
23(b) (1) (A)
The first class, for certification under Rule
"and/or" 23(b) (2), is defined as "all persons who
have been or will be sued by the Mel Harris defendants as counsel
In their Notice of Motion for Class Certification,
dated April 15, 2011, plaintiffs phrased their certification
request in such a way that could be construed as seeking
certification of only one class under any or all of the listed
subsections of Rule 23(b).
(See Notice of Mot. for Class Cert.
at 2 (seeking certification of "a plaintiff class, pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (1) (A), 23(b) (2) and/or 23(b) (3), consisting
of all persons who have been or will [sic] sued by the Mel Harris
defendants, as counsel for the Leucadia defendants, in actions
commenced in New York City Civil Court and where a default
judgment has been obtained, or will be sought. II)) .
In light of
plaintiffs' more precise wording in their Third Amended
Complaint, subsequently filed on May 16, 2011 (see Third Am.
Compl. ~~ 333, 337), I read plaintiffs' request to seek
certification of two separate classes.
7
-22
for the Leucadia defendants in actions commenced in New York City
Civil Court and where a default judgment has been or will be
sought."
(See Third Am. Compl.
~
333).
The second class, for
certification under Rule 23(b) (3), is nearly identical to the
first except that it is limited to only persons who "have been
sued" by the foregoing entities and who have had, as a result, a
default judgment entered against them.
(See id.
~
337).
For the reasons stated below, I conclude that the named
plaintiffs meet the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) for both proposed
classes and certify two separate classes: the first seeking
equitable relief under Rule 23(b) (2) and the second seeking
damages under Rule 23(b) (3).8
See, e.g., Charron, 269 F.R.D. at
238, 240-42 (certifying separate 23(b) (2) and (b) (3) classes»;
Casale, 257 F.R.D. at 415 (same).
1.
The Rule 23(a} Requirements Are Satisfied
a.
Numerosity
There can be no dispute as to numerousity.
Although
the numbers discussed in Background Sections A(3)-(5), supra, do
not indicate a definitive number of putative class members, they
8
As plaintiffs seek certification of the equitable
relief class under Rule 23 (b) (1) (A) "and/or" (b) (2) (see Third
Am. Compl. ~ 333), I decline to address certification under Rule
23 (b) (1) (A) .
-23
at the very least establish that the proposed classes will
consist of hundreds, if not thousands, of members.
Defendants do not dispute the accuracy of these
numbers.
Rather, they contend that such numbers do not
sufficiently demonstrate the precise number of default judgments
obtained by defendants, much less the number of default judgments
obtained through allegedly false affidavits of merit and/or
service.
(See Defs.
I
Sur-Reply Br. at 2-3; Leucadia Defs.' Br.
at 10-12i Mel Harris Defs.
I
Br. at 6).
I disagree.
Contrary to what the Mel Harris defendants suggest (see
Mel Harris Defs.' Br. 5), this is not an instance where
numerosity rests on a single "bare and speculative allegation."
Huntley v. Law Office of Richard Clark. PLLC, 262 F.R.D. 203, 205
{E.D.N.Y. 2009}
(finding plaintiff failed to establish numerosity
based on plaintiff's contention that because defendant made a
threatening phone call to him, defendant must have made similar
phone calls to others) i see also Wilner v. OSI Collection Servs.,
Inc., 198 F.R.D. 393, 396-97 {S.D.N.Y. 2001}
(finding plaintiff
failed to establish numerosity" [a]bsent one iota of evidence as
to the number of people" who may have received a debt collection
letter from defendant).
The tens of thousands of default
judgments obtained by defendants coupled with the hundreds of
-24
instances of process servers appearing to serve process in two or
more different locations at the same time support the conclusion
that the proposed classes are sufficiently numerous.
Accordingly, I find by a preponderance of the evidence
that the putative classes are comprised of hundreds, if not
thousands, of members, and that it is sufficiently numerous such
that joinder of all such parties would be impracticable.
See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1).
b.
Commonality
Plaintiffs meet the commonality requirement of Rule
23(a) (2).
Their overarching claim is that defendants
systematically filed false affidavits of merit and, in many
instances, false affidavits of service to fraudulently procure
default judgments in New York City Civil Court.
Whether a false
affidavit of merit or a false affidavit of service or both were
employed in a particular instance, the fact remains that
plaintiffs' injuries derive from defendants' alleged "unitary
course of conduct," see Marisol A., 126 F.3d at 377, that is,
fraudulently procuring default judgments.
Thus,
II
[p]laintiffs
have identified a unifying thread that warrants class treatment."
Charron, 269 F.R.D. at 231.
-25
Inherent in this alleged course of conduct are common
questions of law and fact.
For example, with respect to the
affidavits of merit, there is a central issue as to the veracity
of the affiant's uniform statement of "personal knowledge ll of the
underlying debt when, in fact, defendants' computer systems
automatically generate the affidavits and the affiant signs as
many as 50 at a time, performing a "quality check" on one and not
reviewing the remaining 49.
Further, there is a question of law
as to whether making false representations in court, rather than
to the debtor, violates the FDCPA. 9
There is also a question of
The Mel Harris defendants' citation to O'Rourke v.
Palisades Acquisition XVI. LLC, 635 F.3d 938, 944 (7th Cir.
2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1141 (2012), for the notion that
communications in state court are not covered by the FDCPA (Mel
Harris Defs.' Br. at 13 & n.7) does not render this issue moot.
First, their contention belies the fact that plaintiffs allege
liability for defendants' in-court representations under several
statutes, one of which is the FDCPA.
Second, O'Rourke is not the
settled law of this Circuit, and indeed, other circuit courts
have conflicting views on lithe extent to which a debt collection
lawyer's representations to the consumer's attorney or in court
filings during the course of debt collection litigation can
violate [the FDCPA]." Hemmingsen v. Messerli & Kramer. P.A., 674
F.3d 814, 818 (8th Cir. 2012) (collecting cases and noting that
II [t]hough
rarely made 'directly' to the consumer debtor, such
[in-court] representations routinely come to the consumer's
attention and may affect his or her defense of a collection
claim. ") i see also Kuria v. Palisades Acquisition XVI. LLC, 752
F. Supp. 2d 1293, 1302-03 (N.D. Ga. 2010) (finding actionable
FDCPA claims where debt-buyer allegedly did not intend to take
claims to trial to prove their merit, but instead intended only
to obtain default judgment or pursue settlement) i Midland Funding
9
-26
whether such conduct is sufficient to establish a violation of
New York's GBL or Judiciary Law.
Addressing these questions on a
classwide basis would provide common answers relevant to each
putative class member's claim and would necessarily "drive the
resolution of the litigation."
Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2551
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted)
.10
LLC v. Brent, 644 F. Supp. 2d 961, 966-70 (N.D. Ohio 2009)
(holding affidavit attesting to personal knowledge of outstanding
debt to be false and misleading under the FDCPA where affiant
signs automatically-generated form affidavits and only verifies
the contents of a small percentage of them).
Similarly, defendants' citation to the affidavit upheld
in Hasbrouck v. Arrow Fin. Servs. LLC, No. 09-CV-748 (MAD/RFT),
2011 WL 1899250 (N.D.N.Y. May 19, 2011)
Mel Harris Defs.'
10/10/11 Ltr.), is not dispositive on this point. There, the
affiant asserted facts regarding the outstanding debt based on
"information and belief" and not "personal knowledge" as alleged
by the plaintiff. Hasbrouck, 2011 WL 1899250, at **1, 6
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Indeed, as the court
observed, II nowhere in the affidavit does [the affiant] make such
an assertion [of personal knowledge] , I I Id. at *6. The point is
that this is a legal issue -- common to the proposed classes -
that must be decided.
10
It is instructive that courts throughout this Circuit
have routinely found that putative classes alleging debt
collection schemes that employ false or misleading language in
mailings sent to debtors satisfy the commonality requirement of
Rule 23(a) (2) and warrant class certification under Rule 23(b).
See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, 276
F.R.D. 174 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) i Ellis v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 274
F.R.D. 53 (D. Conn. 2011) i Leone v. Ashwood Fin., Inc., 257
F.R.D. 343 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) i Ayzelman v. Statewide Credit Servs.
Corp., 238 F.R.D. 358 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) i In re Risk Mgmt.
Alternatives, Inc., Fair Debt Collection Practices Act Litiq.,
208 F.R.D. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) i Labbate-D'Alauro v. GC Servs.
27
Defendants argue that significant factual differences
exist as to whether each class member relied on the affidavits
filed, whether defendants acted with intent to defraud each
putative class member, and whether each member was, in fact,
properly served.
That may be true to some extent, but on balance
I conclude that none of these issues preclude a finding of
commonality.
First, with respect to reliance, defendants primarily
raise this argument in the context of RICO.
Defs.' Br. at 8-10, 13).
(See Mel Harris
Reliance, however, is not required to
establish a civil RICO claim based on mail fraud.
Bridge v.
Phoenix Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639, 653 (2008).
Second, to
the extent that defendants contend that plaintiffs' RICO
allegations require an individualized showing of specific intent
to defraud with respect to each member of the putative class, I
disagree.
The alleged course of conduct is sufficiently uniform
here such that generalized proof of scienter may be adequate.
Ltd. P'ship, 168 F.R.D. 451 (E.D.N.Y. 1996). Here, the alleged
course of conduct is similarly uniform such that a finding of
commonality under Rule 23{a) {2} should be no different. See
Petrolito v. Arrow Fin. Servs" LLC, 221 F.R.D. 303, 308 (D.
Conn. 2004) ("Most FDCPA classes involve some routine collection
effort, like a form letter, the contents of which violate one of
the specific provisions of the FDCPA.").
-28
Third, for the purposes of Rule 23(a) (2), individualized proof of
service or lack thereof is not fatal to the prerequisite of
commonality.
Here, defendants' uniform course of conduct was to
file an allegedly false affidavit of merit and, at least in some
instances, an allegedly false affidavit of service.
The evidence
offered by plaintiffs indicates that form affidavits of merit
were used as part of a standard practice with respect to each
putative class member.
Factual differences as to whether a
particular class member was also properly served are not enough
to overcome the common factual nexus of the affidavits of merit.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth above, I find
that plaintiffs have satisfied their burden with respect to Rule
23(a) (2) 's commonality requirement.
c.
Typicality
I find that plaintiffs meet the typicality requirement
for many of the same reasons they meet the commonality
requirement.
Here, the named plaintiffs assert claims reflective
of those of the members of the putative classes -- specifically,
that defendants fraudulently obtained default judgments against
them by filing false affidavits of merit and, in many instances,
false affidavits of service in New York City Civil Court.
Defendants, having briefed commonality and typicality together,
-29
raise arguments already addressed in the above section.
To the
extent they assert additional points more germane to typicality!
I address those here.
Defendants primarily argue that the following issues
preclude a finding of typicality:
(1) factual differences
relating to the underlying debts of the named plaintiffsi
(2)
varying circumstances surrounding service of the named
plaintiffsi and (3) unique defenses with respect to certain named
plaintiffs! including! applicable statutes of limitations and
bonafide error.
With respect to factual differences surrounding the
underlying debts of the named plaintiffs! defendants contend that
various named plaintiffs'
(1) admissions to incurring the debt on
which the default judgment was obtained,
(2) claims that the debt
was incurred as a result of identity theft, or (3) assertions
that there was mistaken identity as to the actual debtor render
the named plaintiffs' claims atypical of those of the putative
class.
I disagree.
Such issues amount to no more than "minor
variations" in the facts underlying plaintiffs' individual claims
and do not preclude a finding of typicality.
at 936-37.
Robidoux! 987 F.2d
But more importantly! they are not relevant to the
litigation at hand.
At the crux of plaintiffs' claims is
-30
defendants' uniform action to fraudulently obtain default
judgments by submission of false affidavits in New York City
Civil Court.
The various claims of the named plaintiffs as to
the validity or existence of the underlying debts are not at
issue here.
Liability under the FDCPA can be established
irrespective of whether the presumed debtor owes the debt in
question.
See Fedotov v. Peter T. Roach & Assocs.! P.C., 354 F.
Supp. 2d 471, 477 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(II [T]he
[FDCPA] protects
consumers from 'unscrupulous debt collectors, regardless of
whether a valid debt actually exists. '"
(quoting Baker v. G.C.
Servs. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 777 (9th Cir. 1982)).
Regarding service of the named plaintiffs, evidence
offered by defendants that some of the named plaintiffs may have
been properly served does not defeat typicality.
As previously
discussed, see Discussion Section B(l) (b), supra, the alleged
deception occurred by the filing of a purportedly false affidavit
of merit and, in many instances, also a purportedly false
affidavit of service.
Therefore, any named plaintiff that
appears to have been properly served still shares with the
putative class the common fact of having fallen victim to an
allegedly false affidavit of merit.
-31
For the purposes of
satisfying the Rule 23(a) (3) prerequisite, that is sufficient.
See Robidoux, 987 F.2d at 936-37.
As to unique defenses, the Mel Harris defendants argue
that some of the named plaintiffs' FDCPA and RICO claims may be
time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations, and
further, whether those plaintiffs may invoke the equitable
tolling doctrine presents unique issues atypical of the putative
class members.
(See Mel Harris Defs.' Br. at 7 n.3, 16-17).
In
addition, the Leucadia defendants further argue that the bona
fide error defense, which they only raise in connection with
Armoogam, precludes a finding of typicality.
Defs.' Br. at 15-16).
(See Leucadia
I conclude that such claims and defenses
do not "threaten to become the focus of the litigation."
In re
Flag Telecom, 574 F.3d at 40 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Moreover, as I have previously noted, use of
sewer service and false affidavits of service may warrant
equitable tolling.
Sykes, 757 F. Supp. 2d at 422.
Even
still, though, the Court can address such issues at later stages
of the litigation if necessary.
See In re Visa Check, 280 F.3d
at 141.
Therefore, based on the foregoing,
I find that
plaintiffs have met the typicality requirement of Rule 23(a) (3).
-32
d.
Adequacy of Representation
Here, the lead plaintiffs are adequate representatives
of the putative class and class counsel is qualified to conduct
the litigation.
11
The class representatives present no
fundamental " conflict with, In re Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 145,
or interest lIantagonistic ll to, Baffa, 222 F.3d at 60, the claims
of the proposed classes.
Moreover, I find the combined
experience of class counsel in class action litigation and
consumer advocacy to be more than sufficient to continue to act
on behalf of the classes in this litigation.
Defendants' assertion that various class
representatives demonstrated an insufficient understanding of the
case -- regardless of its truth adequacy.
does not preclude a finding of
See id. at 61 (disapproving of "attacks on the
adequacy of a class representative based on the representative's
ignorance ll ) .
Moreover, the deficiencies defendants cite in that
regard do not indicate that the class representatives
11
'have so
little knowledge of and involvement in the class action that they
would be unable or unwilling to protect the interests of the
class against the possibly competing interests of the
attorneys. '"
COol
Id.
(quoting Maywalt v. Parker & Parsley Petroleum
67 F.3d 1072, 1077-78 (2d Cir. 1995)).
-33
Further, defendants'
arguments with respect to factual variations in and unique
defenses to the class representatives' underlying claims are not
relevant to the inquiry of adequacy of representation.
See id.
at 60.
e.
Ascertainability
The proposed classes are sufficiently ascertainable.
Class members are "identifiable" pursuant to "objective
criteria," see In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 209 F.R.D. at 337
-- specifically, whether each has been or will be sued in New
York City Civil Court by the Mel Harris defendants acting as
counsel for the Leucadia defendants and whether a default
judgment was obtained or will be sought as a result.
Class
members can be readily identified using this criteria through
records maintained by defendants and filed in New York City Civil
Court.
2.
See Casale, 257 F.R.D. at 413.
The Rule 23(b) (2) Class
Certification of a class under Rule 23(b) (1) to address
the equitable relief sought by plaintiffs is appropriate.
As
neither injunctive nor declaratory relief is available under the
FDCPA, however, see Dunn v. Advanced Credit Recovery Inc., No. 11
Civ. 4023 (PAE) (JLC) , 2012 WL 676350, at *2 n.4
2012)i Sparkman v.
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 1,
Zwicker & Assocs.( P.C., 374 F. Supp. 2d 293,
-34
299 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), In re Risk Mgmt. Alternatives. Inc., 208
F.R.D. at
503j
see also 15 U.S.C. § l692k, this class is limited
to equitable relief sought for plaintiffs' GBL, Judiciary Law,
and RICO claims.
Here, defendants are alleged to have acted "on grounds
specifically, defendants'
that apply generally to the class"
uniform filing of false affidavits in state court to fraudulently
procure default judgments against the putative class members -
such that injunctive and declaratory relief with respect to the
class as a whole would be appropriate.
23(b) (2).
See Fed. R. Civ. P.
That plaintiffs are seeking substantial monetary
damages is of no concern given the Court's certification of
separate Rule 23(b) (2) and (b) (3) classes addressing equitable
relief and damages, respectively.
See Charron, 269 F.R.D. at
237-38; Casale, 257 F.R.D. at 408.
3.
The Rule 23(b) (3) Class
Finally, certification of a separate liability class
under Rule 23(b) (3) is warranted because plaintiffs' proposed
class satisfies the predominance and superiority requirements of
Rule 23 (b) (3) .
-35
a.
Predominance
The common issues of law and fact presented in this
litigation predominate over any individual ones.
In addition to
what is discussed above with respect to commonality, see
Discussion Section B(l) (b), supra, such common issues also
include, without limitation:
(1) whether defendants' practice of
filing affidavits of merit and/or affidavits of service with
respect to the plaintiff class members violates the FDCPAi
(2)
whether defendants collectively constitute a RICO enterprise
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C.
§
1961(4}
i
(3) whether defendants
have engaged in a pattern of racketeering activity in connection
with the collection of debt in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)
and (d)i
(3)
whether defendants have used deceptive acts and
practices in the conduct of their businesses in violation of New
York GBL
§
349j
and (4) whether the Mel Harris defendants have
engaged in deceit and collusion with intent to deceive the courts
and any a party therein in violation of New York Judiciary Law
§
487.
Every potential class member's claim arises out of
defendants' uniform, widespread practice of filing automatically
generated, form affidavits of merit based on "personal knowledge ll
and, in many instances, affidavits of service, to obtain default
-36
judgments against debtors in state court.
violates the FDCPA 1 New York GBL
§ 487
1
§
Whether this practice
New York Judiciary Law
349 1
and/or constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) and (d) does not depend on
individualized considerations.
See. e.g'
l
Labbate-D'Alauro
l
168
F.R.D. at 458 (" [C]ases regarding the legality of standardized
documents and practices often result in the predomination of
common questions of law or fact and are l
therefore 1 generally
appropriate for resolution by class action."
(collecting FDCPA
cases) ) .
The Court recognizes that should defendants be found
liable on some or all of these claims
l
individual issues may
exist as to causation and damages as well as to whether a class
member's claim accrued within the applicable statute of
limitations.
This
l
however 1 does not preclude a finding of
predominance under Rule 23(b) (3).
See Cordes
1
502 F.3d at 108
("Even if the district court concludes that the issue of
injury-in-fact presents individual questions
1
however, it does
not necessarily follow that they predominate over common ones and
that class action treatment is therefore unwarranted.")
i
In re
Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 139 ("Common issues may predominate when
liability can be determined on a class-wide basis, even when
-37
there are some individualized damage issues.").
Indeed, the
Court has "a number of management tools available . . . to
address any individualized damages issues that might arise in a
class action," including, inter alia,
"appointing a magistrate
judge or special master to preside over individual damages
proceedings," "decertifying the class after the liability trial
and providing notice to class members concerning how they may
proceed to prove damages," "creating subclasses," or "altering or
amending the class."
b.
In re Visa Check, 280 F.3d at 141.
Superiority
A class action is also the superior method for
resolving this litigation.
See In re Risk Mgmt. Alternatives,
Inc., 208 F.R.D. at 507 ("Suits brought under the FDCPA such as
this case [concerning the use of standardized documents]
regularly satisfy the superiority requirement of Rule 23.").
It
is/ without question, more efficient than requiring thousands of
debtors to sue individually.
Indeed/ the class members'
interests in litigating separate actions is likely minimal given
their potentially limited means with which to do so and the
prospect of relatively small recovery in individual actions.
See
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 (b) (3) (A); Casale, 257 F.R.D. at 415 (limited
means of class members to litigate individually)
-38
i
Petrolito, 221
F.R.D. at 314
(prospect of small recovery).
Moreover l as the
alleged conduct occurred in New York City Civil Courtl
concentrating the litigation of these claims in this particular
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) (C).
forum is desirable.
as discussed above
FinallYI
any difficulties likely to arise in managing
I
this class action l see Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3)
(D)I
are not
beyond the realm of the "management tools" the Court has at its
disposal
I
see In re Visa Check l 280 F.3d at 141.
Therefore
I
certification of plaintiffs' proposed
liability class is appropriate under Rule 23(b) (3).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above
class certification is granted.
I
plaintiffs' motion for
AccordinglYI the Court certifies
(1) the Rule 23(b) (2) injunctive and declaratory relief class
comprised of all persons who have been or will be sued by the Mel
Harris defendants as counsel for the Leucadia defendants in
actions commenced in New York City Civil Court and where a
default judgment has been or will be sought -- to resolve the
equitable portion of plaintiffs' RICO I GBL and Judiciary Law
claimsi and (2) the Rule 23(b) (3) liability class -- comprised of
all person who have been sued by the Mel Harris defendants as
counsel for the Leucadia defendants in actions commenced in New
-39
York City Civil Court and where a default judgment has been
entered against them -- to resolve the issues of whether
defendants' actions violated the FDCPA, RICO, New York GBL
and New York Judiciary Law
§
487.
Plaint
§
349,
fs shall submit a
proposed order on notice within fourteen days hereof.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
New York, New York
September 4, 2012
united States Circuit Judge
Sitting by Designation
-40
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiffs:
EMERY CELLI BRINKERHOFF & ABADY LLP
By: Matthew D. Brinckerhoff, Esq.
Elisha Jain, Esq.
75 Rockefeller Plaza, 20th Floor
New York, New York 10019
NEIGHBORHOOD ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ADVOCACY PROJECT
By: Claudia Wilner, Esq.
Susan Shin, Esq.
Josh Zinner, Esq.
176 Grand Street, Suite 300
New York, New York 10013
- and
MFY LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
By: Carolyn E. Coffey, Esq.
Andrew Goldberg, Esq.
Anamaria Segura, Esq.
299 Broadway, 4th Floor
New York, New York 10013
For Mel Harris Defendants:
KAUFMAN DOLOWICH VOLUCK & GONZO LLP
By: Brett A. Scher, Esq.
Yale Pollack, Esq.
135 Crossways Park Drive, Suite 201
Woodbury, New York 11797
For Leucadia Defendants:
MCELROY, DEUTSCH, MULVANEY & CARPENTER, LLP
By: Lewis H. Goldfarb, Esq.
Ryan P. Mulvaney, Esq.
Philip W. Lamparello, Esq.
88 Pine Street, 24th Floor
New York, New York 10005
-41
For Samserv Defendants:
BABCHICK & YOUNG, LLP
By:
Jordan Sklar, Esq.
200 East Post Road, 2nd Floor
White Plains, NY 10601
-42
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