United States Polo Association, Inc. et al v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc.
Filing
125
OPINION re: 105 MOTION to Intervene filed by JRA Trademark Company, Ltd., 98 MOTION for Sanctions and Contempt filed by PRL USA Holdings, Inc. Based upon the facts and conclusions set forth above, the motion of JRA to intervene and the mot ion of PRL to hold USPA in contempt for violation of the Injunction are granted. PRL is granted any profits arising out of the sales of the USPA Parties' eyewear bearing the Double Horsemen Mark sixty days after the entry of this Order. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 3/5/2013) (cd)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----x
UNITED STATES POLO ASSOCIATION, INC.,
and USPA PROPERTIES, INC.,
PI
iffs,
09 Civ. 9476
-against
OPINION
PRL USA HOLDINGS, INC., and
L'
USA, INC.,
Defendants.
x
A P PEA RAN C E S:
Attorneys for
aintiffs United States Polo
Association, Inc.
BAKER & HOSTETLER LLP
45 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, NY 10111
By: Gerald J. Ferguson, Esq.
John D. Parker, Esq.
David Sheehan, Esq.
for Defendant L'Oreal USA
Inc.
PAUL, HASTINGS, JANOFSKY & WALKER, LLP
75 East 55th Street
New York, NY 10022
Robert L. Sherman, Esq.
Inc.
KELLEY DRYE & WARREN LLP
101 Park Avenue
New York, NY 10178
By: William R. Golden, Jr., Esq.
1
John M.
lagy, Esq.
Andrea L. Calvaruso, Esq.
Matthew D. Marcotte, Esq.
Attorneys for JRA Trademark Company, Ltd.
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI, P.C.
1301 Avenue of the Americas, 40th Floor
New York, NY 10019
By: Michael S. Sommer, Esq.
Jessica L. Margolis, Esq.
Scott D. Tenley, Esq.
2
Sweet, D.J.
Defendant PRL USA Holdings, Inc.
("PRL" or the
"Defendant") has moved to hold plaintiffs United States Polo
Association, Inc.
("USPA") and USPA Properties, Inc.
("USPAP")
(collectively, the "USPA Parties" or the "Plaintiffs") in
contempt for violating the Permanent Injunction and Final
Judgment entered in this action on March 5, 2012
(the
"Injunction") and the Final Order, Judgment and Decree entered
on December 6, 1984 (the "1984 Order").
Company, Ltd.
Non-party JRA Trademark
("JRA") has moved to intervene pursuant to Rule 24
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
This is the latest outbreak of a twenty-eight year
trademark war between PRL and its predecessor! possessors of the
highly-successful Ralph Lauren Polo
ayer Logo! and the USPA, a
national association dedicated to the promotion
polo and the
products.
e
the sport of
products which are designated as polo
The parties have conducted this feud in various
battlegrounds with tenacity! ability and assisted by eminent and
high skilled counsel.
The outcome of these battles has not
produced the clarity to compel the termination of the conflict.
What follows is the outcome of another skirmish which involves a
3
dispute over the USPA's parties' use of variants of
Horsemen Mark and
u.s.
s Double
POLO ASSN. marks on eyewear.
On the facts and conclusions set forth below, JRA'
motion to intervene is considered first to allow for
consideration of its opposition, and is granted.
PRL's motion
contempt and appropriate sanctions is also granted.
I. Preceding Litigations and Prior Proceedings
In 1984, USPA and its licensees commenced an action
against PRL
a declaratory judgment that various articles of
merchandise bearing a mounted polo player symbol did not
infringe PRL's Polo Player Logo.
trademark infringement.
PRL counterclaimed for
matter came before the Honorable
Leonard B. Sand.
In
for a judgment
s 1984 Order, Judge Sand denied USPA's request
non infringement, found that USPA and its
licensees infringed PRL's Polo
ayer Logo, POLO, POLO BY RALPH
LAUREN trademarks and PRL's trade dress, and engaged
competition.
unfair
See U.S. Polo Ass'n v. Polo Fashions, Inc., No. 84
Civ. 1142 (LBS), 1984 WL 1309 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1984).
4
The 1984 Order enjoined USPA and its licensees from
ringing PRL's marks, including the Polo Player Logo and the
word "POLO," but not from engaging
did not use the infringing trademarks.
a licensing program that
Specifically, the 1984
Order included the following provisions enjoining the USPA
parties and those in concert with them from the following:
a.
using any of the Polo Marks or any name or mark
or symbol which is confusingly similar thereto,
in connection with the sale or offering for sale
of any goods or the rendering of any servicesi
b.
manufacturing, distributing, advertising,
promoting, importing, licensing, authorizing,
sponsoring, holding for sale or selling any
goods, labels, tags, logos, decals, emblems,
signs and other forms of markings, any packaging,
wrappers, containers and receptacles and any
jacquard cards, catalogs, price lists,
promotional materials and the like bearing an
infringement or colorable imitation of any of the
Polo Marksi
c.
using for any commercial purposes whatsoever any
symbol, logo, trade name or trademark which may
be calculated to or has the effect of falsely
representing that the services or products of or
licensed by plaintiffs are sponsored or
authorized by, or
any way associated with
defendants, Ralph Lauren or any entity affiliated
with any of themi
d.
using for any commercial purposes whatsoever, the
name "United States Polo Association," or any
other name which emphasizes the word POLO (or the
words U.S. POLO) separate, apart and distinct
from such name in a manner which likely to cause
confusion with defendants, Ralph Lauren or any
entity affiliated with any of them.
5
(Cal. Dec. Ex. BI , 8).
The 1984 Order
l
however
to conduct a retail licensing program using
polo
I
permitted USPA
s name
"a mounted
I
ayer or equestrian or equine symbol which is distinctive
from
[PRL/
perspect
II
S]
polo player symbol in its content and
and other trademarks that refer to the sport of
polo, subject to certain conditions and restrictions set forth
in the 1984 Order.
Id.
The USPA Parties did not appeal the
1984 Order.
In 2000
1
PRL brought a lawsuit in the Southern
District of New York against the USPA and its master licensee
filiates
l
seeking to bar the use of USPA's name, the Double
Horsemen Mark and other logos on apparel and related products.
PRL USA HoI
10199 (GBD)
Inc. v. U.S. Polo Ass'n
(S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(the "Apparel
Inc., No. 99
tigation
ll
)
•
On September 5, 2003, the PRL and USPA Parties entered
into a settlement agreement that partially settled the claims
made by PRL against the USPA Parties in the Apparel Litigation
(the "2003 Settlement Agreement").
The 2003 Settlement
Agreement set forth terms for the USPA to use its name and
certain other logos, designs and packaging on apparel, leather
goods and watches.
It
so incorporated by reference the 1984
6
Order and provided a mechanism for PRL to raise complaints and
objections regarding packaging that it believed was infringing
its rights or in violation of the 2003 Settlement Agreement.
However, the parties
iled to resolve whether
right to use four of
USPA had a
ants of its Double Horsemen Mark.
Instead, the parties agreed to resolve that issue though a trial
before the Honorable George B. Daniels, and that
result of
the trial would be incorporated into the 2003 Settlement
Agreement.
On October 20, 2005, a jury verdict concluded that
three out of the four versions of the Double Horsemen Mark did
not infringe PRL's single horseman mark when used on
1
goods and watches.
I,
PRL USA Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Polo
Ass'n, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10199 (GBD) , 2006 WL 1881744, at *1
(S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2006).
ly,
Specif
"the jury found (1)
[USPA Parties'] solid double horseman mark infringed PRL's Polo
pI
Symbol trademarksi and (2)
horseman mark with 'USPA,' outl
outl
Polo
double horseman mark, and
double horseman mark with 'USPA' did not infringe PRL's
Symbol trademarks./I
considering post-t
Judge
[USPA Parties'] solid double
els denied PRL's motion
7
briefing by the parties,
a new trial in July 2006.
PRL appealed the jury{s verdict{ which the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld.
See PRL USA Holdings {
Inc. v. U.S. Polo Ass{n{ Inc.{ 520 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 2008).
On November 13{ 2009{ the USPA Parties filed a
complaint for declaratory judgment that sought the right to
license and sell in the United States fragrance products bearing
U.S. POLO ASSN. { the Double Horsemen Marks and "1890{" the year
of the founding of the U.S. Polo Assn.
Litigation").
(Dkt. No.1).
licensee{ L{Oreal USAf Inc.
action without objection.
brought various countercl
sought a
iminary
(the "Fragrance
PRL and its exclusive fragrance
("L{Oreal") { intervened in the
(Dkt. No. 12).
PRL and L{Oreal
against the USPA Parties and
unction barring the use of the Double
Horsemen Logo on March 2{ 2010.
(Dkt. Nos. 11{ 14{ 15).
parties agreed that the preliminary
unction
hearing would be consolidated with a trial on the merits. After
a bench t
all an opinion was entered on May 13{ 2011 by
Court (the "May 13 Opinion") determining that the USPA Part
use of a confusingly similar logo consisting
players
s
s{
two mounted polo
their use of composite word marks in which the word
"POLO" predominated{ infringed the PRL Marks with respect to
8
fragrance products.
USA
Inc'
----------~~------
l
(Dkt. No. SO) i see U.S. Polo Ass/n v. PRL
SOO F. Supp. 2d 515 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
The May 13 Opinion held that PRL/s federally
registered Polo Player Logo and POLO trademarks (collectivelYI
the "PRL Marksll) on fragrance products were valid and "extremely
strong
ll
and were ent
from infringement.
led to a substantial degree of protection
Id. at 527-2S.
The May 13 Opinion also
found that the similarity between PRL/s Polo Player Logo and
USPA s Double Horsemen Mark was "apparent [I] II
I
Id. at 52S
1
noting that l
Both marks are similar in perspective
containing a polo player on horseback l facing
slightly to the viewerls leftl leaning forward
with a polo mallet raised. Both are displayed in
embossed metallic or glossy material
with PRL/s
appearing in a number of colors including silver
and gold l and USPA/s appearing in a light gold.
The primary difference between the marks is that
the PRL/s logo conta
one playerl while USPA/ S
contains two one with mallet raised and the
other with mallet lowered l which significantly
overlap.
In USPA/s mark l the front horseman is
displayed in solid metallic inkl while the rear
horseman is only outlined l such that the
background packaging shows through.
This gives
front
mallet raised
horseman more visual
prominence while the torso of the rear horseman
can be said to fade into the background. Both of
USPA/s horsemen share the same directional
perspective and overlap to a degree that it can
be difficult to discern if there is one horse or
two.
l
I
9
Id. at 528-529.
The May 13 Opinion also found that the USPA acted in
bad faith in adopting the Double Horsemen Mark for fragrances
and that "USPA's use
the Double Horsemen Mark along with the
word mark 'U.S. POLO ASSN.' in the context of men's fragrances
created a strong likelihood of confusion with the PRL Part
products."
s'
Id. at 538.
On March 5, 2012, PRL's motion for attorneys' fees was
denied and the Injunction was entered.
(Dkt. Nos. 94, 95).
Injunction provided that the USPA Parties were permanently
enjoined and restrained from:
a.
Using the Double Horsemen Mark,
. alone or in
combination with any name, symbol, device or other
word(s) in connection with the advertising, promotion,
offering for sale or sale of fragrances or related
products such as cosmetics, personal care products and
beauty productsi
b. sing the word "POLO" alone or in combination with any
U
name, symbol, device or other word(s) in connection
with the advertising, promotion, offering for sale or
sale
fragrances or
ated products such as
cosmetics, personal care products and beauty products;
c. Using the PRL marks or any other name or mark,
including the image of one or more mounted polo
players, that constitutes a colorable imitation of or
is confusingly similar to PRL's Polo Player Logo.
or "POLO" word mark in connection with the sale or
10
The
offering for sale of any goods or rendering of any
services;
d. Using for any commercial purpose whatsoever any
symbol, logo, trade name, trademark, or trade dress
which is calculated to or has the effect of
representing that the products or services of or
licensed by the USPA Parties are associated with,
sponsored, endorsed, or authorized by, or are in any
way connected or associated with the PRL Parties or
any entity
filiated with them.
(Injunction
~~
3 (c)
(d)).
On April 3, 2012, the USPA Parties appealed the May 13
Opinion and
96).
Injunction to the Second
rcuit.
(Dkt. No.
On February 11, 2013, the Second Circuit affirmed this
Court's judgment of dismissal and entry of permanent injunction.
U.S. Polo Ass'n v. PRL USA
Inc., No. 12 Civ. 1346, 2013
WL 490796 (2d Cir. Feb. 11, 2013)
(the "USPA Appeal").
On August 21, 2012, PRL brought the instant motion for
sanctions and contempt of the I
unction, based upon the USPA
Parties' sale of eyewear bearing logos, which according to PRL,
are colorable imitations of PRL's Polo Player Logo.
After learning of PRL's motion for contempt and
sanctions, JRA contacted the USPA Parties to seek its consent
for JRA to intervene in this action for the purpose of defending
11
against PRL's motion and the interpretation of the Injunction on
Wednesday, August 22, 2012.
27, 2012.
That consent was given on August
The next day, JRA requested PRL's consent for its
intervention.
On August 29, 2012, PRL notified JRA that it
would not consent to JRA's intervention because that
intervention would cause undue delay.
In response, JRA agreed
to be bound by whatever schedule the named parties agreed to
submitted
s opposition for consideration should its motion to
intervene be granted.
Both motions were heard and marked fully submitt
on
October 3, 2012.
II.
The Applicable Facts
Since 1978, PRL has marketed eyewear and sunglasses,
which
its Polo Player Logo and other trademarks.
Sales of
PRL's eyewear products have generated nearly $300 million in
United States since 2007.
According to PRL, it and its
licensees have spent approximately $17 million in the last five
years to advertise and promote eyewear bearing the PRL Marks.
In July 2010, USPAP's President and CEO David Cummings
("Cummings") provided deposition testimony that eyewear was
12
being sold in the U.S. market with the Double Horsemen Mark and
also testified during the trial of this action stating the same.
The USPA Parties presented evidence at trial that included 49
computer-assisted designs
("CADs") for sunglasses bearing the
Double Horsemen mark and that the
u.s.
POLO ASSN. name that had
been approved for sale in the United States by the USPA.
According to the USPA Parties, since 2009, more than 987,000
pairs of sunglasses bearing the USPA's trademarks have been sold
in the United States, with more than $1 million in sales each
year from 2010 through 2012.
In April 2011, the USPA Parties filed an intent to-use
application with the United States Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO") to register the Double Horsemen Mark for "eyewear,
namely, ophthalmic eyewear frames, reading glasses, sunglasses,
eyeglass cases and covers, sun clips in the nature of eyewear."
(the "USPA Eyewear Application").
On December 21, 2011, PRL
filed a notice of opposition to the registration of the USPA
Eyewear Application with the Trademark Tri
("TTAB")
1
and Appeal Board
alleging that the USPA's Double Horsemen Mark as
applied to eyewear was so similar to PRL's Polo Player Logo that
it was likely to cause confusion.
USPA did not contest PRL's
notice of opposition but instead asked PRL to consent to the
withdrawal of the USPA Eyewear Application.
13
PRL refused.
On May 30, 2012, the USPA abandoned
USPA Eyewear
Application, resulting in a TTAB order sustaining PRL's
opposition with prejudice (the "TTAB Order").
The USPA withdrew
the trademark application limited to the Double Horsemen Mark,
and re-filed applications (Serial Nos. 85695036 and 85695059)
eyewear with the composite mark of the Double Horsemen Mark
and "USPA" on August 3, 2012.
The USPA Parties are promoting and selling at least 11
different styles
sunglasses bearing the Double Horsemen Mark
through major retail locations, including Kohl's, TJ Maxx,
Burlington Coat Factory and Ross stores[ as well as at its own
retail outlets.
The USPA Parties' sunglasses are sometimes sold
with a navy blue case bearing the Double Horsemen Mark colored
in silvery cream or very light gold with the words "U.S. POLO
ASSN." underneath.
monochromat
A navy blue hang tag displaying a
gold Double Horsemen Mark on the front is attached
to the USPA sunglasses.
Recently at the 2012 London Olympic Games, PRL was an
official outfitter for Team USA, and holds a license from the
United States Olympic Committee (the "USOC") to use certain
Olympic symbols, labels, and trademarks (the "USOC Commerci
14
Marks") in connection with the licensed merchandise, including
sunglasses.
Under its USOC license, PRL has produced products
for Team USA and its fans,
the USOC Commercial Marks
including sunglasses, which display
ther with the PRL Marks.
PRL also created a special Olympic Polo Player Logo,
whi
is displayed exclusively on Olympic products.
logo
was prepared for the 2012 Olympics and consists of PRL's Polo
Player Logo in white on a blue background, enc
led by a red
band with white borders, with "RALPH LAUREN" and "2012"
appearing within the band (the "Olympic Polo Player Logo") .
Beginning with the 2008 Olympic Games, PRL had used
the Olympic Polo Player Logo, altered to include the applicable
year of the then current games, on products donated to Team USA
and sold to consumers.
The Olympic Polo Player Logo was also
used on products promoted and sold in connection with the
Olympic Games held in Canada in 2010.
To date, in 2012, sales
of PRL products bearing the Olympic Polo Player Logo and the
USOC Commercial Mark have exceeded several mill
According to PRL, the USPA Parties'
sunglasses style
Polo Player Logo.
dollars.
"Cape Cod"
a colorable imitation of PRL's Olympic
USPA's logo consists of a sold white colored
15
Double Horsemen Mark on a blue background, encircled by a red
band with white borders, with "U.S, POLO ASSN." appearing in the
red band and is displayed on the temple portion of the frame
next to the hinge. 1
PRL contends that the Double Horsemen mark
imprinted on these sunglasses blur together, making it
difficult, without close inspection, to decipher whether there
is one horseman or two.
In addition, PRL asserts that the shape
this style of the USPA Parties' sunglasses is similar to the
PRL Olympic sunglasses.
According to PRL, the use of the USPA Double Horsemen
Mark on their sunglasses is a violation of
~
3(c)
(d) of the
Injunction and constitutes contempt of the Injunction.
In
opposition, the USPA contends that the Injunction is limit
to
fragrance products only, that there is no evidence of confusion,
and that PRL has been aware of the conduct complained of since
July 2010 but did not act until over five month after the entry
of the Injunction.
JRA, as the exclusive licensee for the USPA Marks in
the United States, avers that they have a significant and
1 During 2010 and 2011,
the USPA used blue and gold trade dress in the United
States and its Cape Cod style sunglasses were among the sunglasses included
in the evidence admitted at trial in this action in 2011.
16
compelling interest in the outcome of the instant motion and the
appropriate use of the contested marks.
III. JRA's Motion to Intervene is Granted
Rule 24(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
provides for intervention as a matter of right when certain
specific circumstances are met. 2
To demonstrate a right to
intervene under Rule 24(a), a prospective intervener must show
that "(1) the motion is timely;
(2) the applicant asserts an
interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action;
(2) the applicant is so situated that
without intervention, disposition of the action may, as a
practical matter, impair or impede the applicant's ability to
protect its interest; and (4) the applicant's interest is not
adequately represented by the other parties."
MasterCard Int'l.
Inc. v. Visa Int'l Servo Ass'n, Inc., 471 F.3d 377, 389 (2d Cir.
2006) .
2
On timely motion, the court must permit anyone to intervene who:
(1)
is given an unconditional right to intervene by a federal statute, or
(2) claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action and is so situated that disposing of the action may as
a practical matter impair or impede the movant's ability to protect its
interest, unless existing parties adequately represent that interest.
Fed. R. civ. P. 24(a).
17
Alternatively, even if a court concluded that a party
could not intervene as of right, Rule 24(b) provides for
permissive intervention. 3
Under Rule 24(b) (1) (B), a court has
the discretion to "permit anyone to intervene who
. has a
claim or defense that shares with the main action a common
question of law or fact."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (b) (1) (B).
In
addition, Rule 24 (b) (3) states that "[i] n exercising its
discretion, the court must consider whether the intervention
will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the original
parties' rights.
1I
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (b) (3).
Within this discretion, courts have held that Rule
24(b) (2) is to be liberally construed in favor of intervention.
~S_e_e__
e_.~~__~~__l_·n r_e_i_d__ _ _R i ___ ,
__
v_. __
(S.D.N.Y. 2006)
i
417 F. Supp.2d 403, 407
Williston v. Feliz, No. 04 Civ. 4454, 2005 WL
1669008, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2005).
Additional relevant
factors considered by courts "'include the nature and extent of
the intervenors' interests,' the degree to which those interests
are 'adequately represented by other parties,' and 'whether
3
On timely motion, the court may permit anyone to intervene who:
(a)
is
a conditional right to intervene by a federal statute; or
(b) has a claim or defense that shares with the main action a common question
of law or fact.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 24 (b) (1) .
18
parties seeking intervention will significantly contribute to
[the] full development of the underlying factual issues in the
suit and to the just and equitable adjudication of the legal
questions presented.'"
Diversified Group Inc. v. Daugerdas, 217
F.R.D. 152, 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2003);
v. Siemens Med.
(citing H.L. Hayden Co. of N.Y.
Inc., 797F.2d85, 89 (2dCir. 1986».
------------------~~~------
While JRA may have an absolute right
the issue need not be reached because permiss
warranted under Rule 24(b).
intervention,
intervention is
As an initial matter, JRA moved to
intervene promptly and in a manner calculated to effectively
eliminate any delay caused by its intervention.
While
timeliness "defies precise definition," in determining whether a
motion to intervene is timely, courts generally consider:
"(1)
how long the applicant had notice of the interest before it made
the motion to intervene;
resulting from any delay;
(2) prejudice to
sting parties
(3) prejudice to the applicant if the
motion is denied; and (4) any unusual circumstances militating
for or against a finding of timeliness."
Pi
Bowes
Inc., 25 F.3d 66, 70
United States v.
(2d Cir. 1994).
Here, JRA commenced its efforts to intervene on August
22, 2012, one day after PRL filed its motion for contempt and
sanctions.
Promptly thereafter, within a week, JRA contacted
19
counsel for the parties seeking consent to intervene.
When PRL
refused to consent, and rejected JRA's briefing schedule, JRA
commenced its instant motion.
Any delay was minimal and thus,
JRA made a timely motion.
JRA's
e purpose is to manufacture and
ng the USPA Marks.
JRA has invested mill
1 products
of dollars
into the USPA brand and derives substantial revenue from the
products currently threatened by the pending lit
ion.
The
majority of the administrative and financial burden of complying
with the Court's decision would also fallon JRA, giving it
greater incentive to limit the scope of any adverse decision or
reporting requirement.
Thus, JRA has a sufficient significant
interest as a potential intervenor.
In addition, courts have charact
zed the "adequacy
of interest" requirement of Rule 24(a) as "minimal."
Trbovich
v. United Mine Workers of America, 404 U.S. 528, 538, 92 S. Ct.
630, 30 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1972)
("The requirement of the Rule is
satisfied if the applicant shows that representation of his
erest 'may be' inadequate; and
burden
showing should be treated as minimal.").
making that
While the USPA Parties
and JRA share some similar interests and both seek to defeat
PRL's motion, the part
s do not have ident
20
1 interests.
JRA
has contractual and business concerns involving agreements with
sub-licensees for the design and production of USPA products,
including eyewear.
JRA and its sub-licensees also employ
thousands of individuals who perform all of the functions
necessary to bring USPA products to the marketplace in the
United States.
Thus, JRA, not the USPA Parties, will bear the
primary burden of complying with the outcome of PRL's motion.
Moreover, contrary to PRL's assertion that JRA's
intervention would result in a delay in the final resolution of
its contempt motion and complicate the proceedings, JRA has
already briefed its opposition for consideration as to avoid
such concerns.
Resolution of JRA's motion has also not required
any additional discovery that would cause any delay or
prejudice.
See
r v. United States, No. 10 Civ.
3888 (ADS) (ARL) , 2012 WL 1486758, at *4
(E.D.N.Y. May 5, 2012)
(holding that no prejudice to existing parties to litigation
where no additional discovery needed by putative intervener).
Instead, there is no
sk
undue delay or prejudice here, and
permitting JRA to intervene will ensure "that all relevant
parties to the dispute are present before the Court.H
Louis
Inc. v. State Bank of India, 802 F. SUpp. 2d 482,
489
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
21
Taken together, JRA has demonstrated that it has a
substant
I
interest in the outcome
this proceeding, and is
therefore permitted to intervene for the limited purpose of
defending against PRL's contempt motion.
IV.
PRL's Motion for Contempt is Granted
A) The Standard For Civil Contempt
Rule 6S(d) states that "[e]very order granting an
injunction and every restraining order must: state the reasons
why it issued; state its terms specifically; and describe in
reasonable detail
and not by referring to the complaint or
other document - the act or acts retrained or required."
R. Civ. P. 6S(d).
"
Fed.
As the Supreme Court noted, this rule
lects Congress' concern with the dangers inherent in the
threat
a contempt citation for violation of an order so vague
that an enjoined party may unwittingly and unintentionally
transcend its bounds."
Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n, Local 1291
v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 76, 88 S. Ct.
201, 19 L. Ed. 2d 236 (1967)).
Thus, the clarity of the order
must be such that it enables the enjoined party "to ascertain
from the four corners of the order precisely what acts are
forbidden."
Dry Wall Tapers and Pointers of Greater New York,
22
Local 1974 v. Local 530 of Operative Plasterers and Cement
Masons Intll Assln l 889 F.2d 389
1
395 (2d Cir. 1989).
Ambiguities are usually resolved in favor of the party charged
with contempt.
Am., AFL-CIO
I
See e.g., N.Y. Tel. Co. v. Commc'ns Workers of
445 F.2d 39
1
48
(2d Cir. 1971).
A contempt order is a "potent weapon to which courts
should not resort where there is a fair ground of doubt as to
the wrongfulness of the defendantls conduct. R
Tactica Intll,
Inc. v. Atl. Horizon Intll l Inc., 154 F. Supp.2d 586, 609
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
Thus, the prerequisites for a finding of civil contempt are as
follows:
(1) the order which has been violated must be clear and
unambiguous;
(2) the violation must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence; and (3) the violating party has not made a
diligent effort to comply with the terms of the order. See,
Benham Jewelry Corp. v. Aron Basha Corp.
1997 WL 639038 at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 151 1997)
I
No. 97 Civ. 384,
(citing cases);
Paramedics Electromedicina Comercial l Ltda. v. GE Med. Sys.
Info. Tech.
I
Inc., 369 F.3d 645 t
655
(2d Cir. 2004).
of contemptt however t does not require a court to find
willfulness. Paramedics
I
369 F.3d at 655.
23
A finding
The clear and convincing standard "requires a quantum
proof adequate to demonstrate a 'reasonable certainty' that a
violation occurred."
Levin v. Tiber Holding Corp., 277 F.3d
243, 250 (2d Cir. 2002)
i
see
- - - -so Hart Schaffner & Marx v.
-
Alexander's
't Stores Inc., 341 F.2d 101, 102-103 (2d Cir.
---------~------~---1965)
(per curiam)
("A civil contempt order will not issue
unless there is 'clear and convincing' proof of violation of a
court decree; a bare preponderance of the evidence will not
suffice.").
The moving party must demonstrate that the enjoined
party "had knowledge of and
sobeyed a clear, explicit and
lawful order of the court and that the offending conduct
prejudiced the right of the opposing party."
Levin, 277 F.3d at
251.
B) The USPA Has Violated The Injunction
Although the USPA Parties and JRA have contended that
the Injunction is limited to fragrance products and that the
context of the underlying action was 1
confusion (USPA Opp. at 13-15),
not so limited.
ted to proof of
Injunction by its terms is
PRL has also produced clear and convincing
evidence demonstrating non compliance with the Injunction.
24
i.
The Injunction Clearly and Unambiguously Bars the
Double Horseman Mark
The Injunction prohibits the USPA Parties from, among
other things, use
"the image of one or more mounted polo
players, that constitutes a colorable imitation of or is
confusingly similar to PRL's Polo Player Logo.
. or 'POLO'
word mark in connection with the sale or offering for sale of
any goods or rendering of any services," and/or "any symbol,
logo, trade name, trademark, or trade dress which is calculated
to or has the effect of representing that the products or
services of or licensed by the USPA Parties are associated with,
sponsored, endorsed, or authorized by, or are in any way
connected or associated with the PRL Parties," "for any
Injunction ~~ 3(c-d).
commercial purpose whatsoever."
The injunctive provisions in the 1984 Order are
similar to their counterparts in the Injunction.
(See
Comparison Table attached to the Calvaruso Dec. as Exhibit G) .
This resemblance is especi
ly evident with respect to the
provisions against the USPA Parties' expansion of the use
infringing marks to other items.
WL 490796 at *4
the
See also U.S. Polo Ass'n, 2013
(finding that that the Injunction "merely tracks
the language of the 1984 Order, to which USPA was already
25
subject.").
Both the Injunction and the 1984 Order sought
appropriately to eliminate the source of future controversy
between the parties.
The USPA Parties' and JRA contend that the Injunction
made no reference to any of the eyewear designs and trade dress
about which PRL now complains.
They aver that the specificity
of the prohibitions in ~~ 3(a) and (b) of the Injunction, which
states that the Double Horseman Mark and marks using the word
POLO may not be used on fragrance products, logically implies
that the ~~ 3(c) and (d) cannot be interpreted to include
eyewear.
(USPA Opp. at 12).
According to the USPA Parties,
such an interpretation of ~~ 3(c) and (d) would render the first
two paragraphs ftextraneous and unnecessary," a result that is
ftpresumptively invalid."
Id. at 12).
Their argument suggests
that the Injunction must be limited to fragrance products alone
and that the prohibition against the use of a colorable
imitation of the Polo Player Logo on any other product requires
proof similar to that addressed in the trial of this action.
Such an interpretation, however, would ignore the
plain text of the Injunction and negate the latter two
paragraphs completely.
.L.
Supp.2d 364, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
Min. Co.,
544 F.
(stating the fundamental rule
26
that "a contract should be interpreted in a manner that gives
meaning to every provision.").
Despite the USPA's
protestations, there is no contradiction between the first and
latter two provisions of ~ 3 of the Injunction or ambiguity in
the wording of the prohibitions.
Instead, the plain meaning of
the words "the sale or offering for sale of any goods, or
rendering of
services" neither restricts the Injunction to
fragrances only nor fails to include eyewear within the meaning
of the words "any goods."
Injunction
~
3(c).
Courts have repeatedly rejected arguments similar to
the USPA Parties' that ~~ 3(c) and 3(d) cannot serve "as a basis
for holding a party in contempt as to goods, marks or trade
dress that were not before the Court in this or any prior
proceeding
"
(USPA Opp. at 13).
For an injunction to be
"clear and unambiguous," it need only be "specific and definite
enough to apprise those within its scope of the conduct that is
being proscribed."
-_...... ,
State Nat'l
886 F.2d 1339, 1352 (2d Cir. 1989).
. for Women v.
"This does not mean
that every conceivable example of the prohibited conduct must be
spelled out in the text of the order."
Accessories
Inc. v.
Eminent, Inc., No. 07 Civ. 3219 (LTS) (DF) , 2008 WL 2355826, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. May 29, 2008).
27
In Bear U.S.A., Inc. v. Kim, for example, the Court
found an injunction to be clear and unambiguous where the
language prohibited defendants from using plaintiff's trademark
and from "manufacturing, importing, financing, circulating,
selling, offering for sale, moving or otherwise disposing
any
product bearing any simulation, reproduction, counterfeit, copy,
colorable imitation or confusingly similar imitation [of] the
trademarks."
71 F. Supp. 2d 237, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
The
defendant suggested that the language of the judgment was
insufficiently clear as to whether only the genuine trademark,
but not the modified version, was prohibited.
In rejecting the
defendant's contention, the Court reasoned that "[i]njunctions
necessarily rely on descriptive language," and that "[i]t is not
necessary [for an injunction] to anticipate and name every
variation on a trademark that a creative infringer might use in
order to skirt a judgment[.]"
Id.
Similarly, in GMA Accessories, the Court held a
defendant in contempt of a consent injunction which prohibited
the defendant from "using the mark CHARLOTTE or any marks
similar to or substantially indistinguishable therefrom,
including the mark CHARLOTTE SOLNICKI."
2008 WL 2355826, at *1.
Soon after, the defendant contended that the injunction did not
clearly prohibit its use of the mark CHARLOTTE RONSON and that
28
it was unclear whether its new mark was "similar to" the
CHARLOTTE mark.
In rejecting defendant's argument, the Court clarified
that the injunction "was unambiguously broad enough to cover
other marks - including two-word marks that were 'similar to'
the 'CHARLOTTE' mark."
Id. at *9.
The Court noted that
although it "did not expressly rule that 'CHARLOTTE RONSON' was
covered by the injunction, the plain suggestion of the Court's
ruling .
was that the mark likely fell within the
injunction's proscriptions."
Id.
Further, the Court stated
that "the case law makes plain that merely broadening an
injunction to prohibit the use of marks 'similar tot an
infringing mark does not render the injunction ambiguous for
purposes of avoiding a contempt sanction." Id. at *3.
The structure of
Injunction, which starts with
narrow prohibitions and moves to broader ones, is also typical
of those used in trademark infringement suits.
See 1984 Order;
see also Jon Devlin Dancercise v. Dancersize, Inc., 525 F. Supp_
973, 975 (D.C.N.Y. 1981)
(entering an injunction barring a mark
on specific goods including "dance exercise record albums and
dance exercise services" as well as "any goods or services.") .
29
In addition, the use of the words "colorable
imitation" in the Injunction does not render it overly vague.
See Scandia Down Corp. v. Euroquilt, Inc., 772 F.2d 1423, 1432
(7th Cir. 1985)
(stating that such language "are words of legal
art," which do not require "a torrent of words when more words
would not produce more enlightenment about what is forbidden.").
Nor is the scope of the Injunction too broad.
Ass'n, 2013 WL 490796 at *4 (
See U.S. Polo
discussing the scope of the
Injunction, stating that "[t]he breadth of the challenged
injunction is particularly warranted given that the 1984 Order
had explicitly barred USPA's confusing use of either the word
"polo" or any mark confusingly similar to the PRL logo, and the
district court founds that USPA had violated that injunction.")
(emphasis in original).
The Second Circuit also noted that
"[t]his case presents no concerns akin to those raised in
Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 170 F.3d 286 (2d Cir. 1999) "
Id.
In that case,
Second
rcuit held that the
district court had abused its discretion because the injunction
exceeded the scope of the jury's findings, which were limited to
the use
the Starter Star marks alone and not those "
combination with any other words or designs[,]" which conclusion
the jury did not reach.
Starter Corp., 170 F.3d at 300.
30
The
Court also noted that the different marketplaces in which the
parties directed their goods would produce "little likelihood of
confusion where two entities use the same trademark in different
though related markets."
Id.
(stating that the parties had
"virtually conceded that there would be no 'likelihood that
purchasers of the product may be misled in the future. I"
(citing
Burndy Corp. v. Teledyne Industries l Inc.! 748 F.2d 767
772
1
(2d
Cir.1984)).
Both the 1984 Order and the outcome of the Fragrance
Litigation made clear that "both courts recognized the fact that
the USPA Parties maYI having no judicially granted right to do
SOl
enter the marketplace just as any other may so long as they
do not infringe the PRL Parties! marks or otherwise violation
the terms of injunctions."
Inc.! No. 09 Civ. 9476
2012).
1
U.S. Polo Assln v. PRL USA Holdings l
2012 WL 697137, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 5,
Here, not only are the instant parties competing for the
same market, but the Double Horsemen Mark now being used by the
USPA Parties on the
eyewear is virtually identical to the
Double Horsemen Mark previously held to be a colorable imitation
of the Polo Player Logo in the context of fragrances.
Taken together, the plain language of the Injunction
communicated what was and is forbidden and imposed a duty on the
31
USPA Parties to use a distinctively different mark from PRL's
Polo Player Logo on "any goods or rendering of any services[,]"
as
from those found to be non-infringing ln the Apparel
Litigation, which had issue-preclusive effect now and at the
time of the draft
of the Injunction.
The case law and scope
of the Injunction also supports a finding that the Injunction
was clear and unambiguous to be enforceable in the instant case.
ii. PRL Has Sufficiently Demonstrated the USPA Parties'
Non-Compliance
It is well-established that the eight factors set
forth in
~~a~r~o~i~d~C~o~r~pL-.__
v_.~P~o~l_a_r_a_d~~_e~c~t~s~.__
C~o~r~p~.,
287 F.2d 492
(2nd Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 820, 82 S. Ct. 36, 7
L.Ed.2d 25 (1961), cont
likelihood of confus
Circuit.
the analysis of whether there is a
in trademark infringement cases in this
"When, however, the Court is only
led upon to
determine whether an injunction prohibiting certain trademark
use has been violated, the Court faces a much narrower
question."
GMA Accessories, Inc., 2008 WL 2355826 at *4.
A de
novo examination of the question of likelihood of confusion or
examination of the Polaroid facts is neither appropriate nor
necessary on a motion for contempt.
v. Wella
cs
~~
_ _~L-
, Wells
Inc., 37 F.3d 46, 48 (2d Cir.
~~~~~~~~~~--~~~~~~----~
1994)
(finding that the district court erred in considering the
32
Polaroid factors in making its contempt determination) i Wolfard
Glassblowing Co. v. Willy Vanbrangt, 118 F.3d 1320, 1322 (9th
Cir. 1997)
(stating that following Wella, the only question for
the court was whether, given the language of the injunction,
defendant's product was a "colorable imitation" of plaintiffs) .
Accordingly, the only question
this Court is
whether PRL has demonstrated, by clear and convincing evidence
that
Double Horsemen Mark is a "colorable imitation" or is
"confusingly similar" to PRL's Polo Player Logo.
The USPA Part
have not disputed their sale of
eyewear displaying the Double Horsemen Mark on the sunglasses,
tags, and packaging, and a depiction of a single mounted polo
player with raised mallet on the
ide of some of
tags.
The USPA Parties' sunglasses are often sold with a navy blue
carrying case bearing the Double Horsemen Mark in a silvery
cream or light gold color above the term "U.S. POLO ASSN."
Kaplan Dec. Ex. 1-3, 5-7).
See
The navy blue hang tag on the USPA
Parties' sunglasses also bears a monochromatic gold Double
Horsemen Mark.
See id. Ex. 1-3, 5 7, 9-12, 14-15, 17 24).
The USPA Parties contend that " [n]either this Court
nor any prior court heard evidence or made findings that PRL has
33
trade dress rights in blue pouches or hangtags on eyewear or any
such rights have been infringed."
(USPA Opp. at 19).
However,
the trade dress, shape, or design of the USPA eyewear, standing
alone, is not what constitutes contempt or violates the
Injunction.
Rather, the May 13 Opinion, upon which the
Injunction is based, determined that the similarities between
the Double Horsemen Mark and PRL's Polo Player Logo were
"apparent," and that "[t]he similarity of the marks
substantially increases the likelihood of confusion between the
USPA Parties' and PRL Parties' products."
F. Supp.2d at 528 - 530.
U.S. Polo Ass'n, 800
Specifically, this Court noted that,
Both marks are similar in perspective - containing a
polo player on horseback, facing slightly to the
viewer's left, leaning forward with a polo mallet
raised. Both are monochrome logos that are similar in
the
level of abstraction. Both are displayed in
embossed metallic or glossy material-with PRL's
appearing in a number of colors including silver and
gold, and USPA's appearing in a light gold. (citing to
PRL Exs. 16, 22, 23, 25-35, USPA Ex. 52).
Id. at 528-29.
In addition, the shape a'nd style of the frames of
USPA's "Cape Cod
II
sunglasses are similar to that of PRL's
Olympic style sunglasses.
The temples of the sunglasses frames
each bear a design of a white colored Double Horsemen Mark on a
34
blue background, encircled by a red band with white borders,
with "U.S. POLO ASSN. ll inserted in the band in white type.
Thus, unl
Starter Corp., there is a plausible likelihood
here that
se goods may mislead purchasers.
170 F.3d at 300.
reviewed both parties' marks as displayed in
the accompanying exhibits, PRL has shown by
ear and convincing
evidence that the Double Horsemen Mark, which the USPA is using
on its sunglasses, packaging and attached
and colorable
, is a simulation
tation of the Polo Player Logo prohibited by
the Injunction.
iii. The USPA Parties' Efforts to Comply with the
I unction
The Injunct
4, 2012, the USPA Part
was entered on March 6, 2012.
s timely submitted a compl
On April
report
(the "Compliance Reportll) that detailed the actions
with respect to the fragrance products.
took
However, the USPA
Parties continued to sell a broad selection of sunglasses
bearing the Double Horsemen Mark, which is a colorable imitation
of and confusingly similar to PRL's Polo Player Logo, and marks
emphasizing the word POLO to department stores, specialty
lers and at their own
I stores.
No evidence has been
shown of any attempts by the USPA Parties to alter the marks or
35
logos of their retail sunglasses.
In fact, the USPA commenced
the sale of sunglasses bearing marks similar to PRL Olympic Polo
Player Logo after the Injunction was issued.
Accordingly, the
USPA Parties did not diligently comply with the Injunction.
iv.
Determination of Violat
Although PRL has contended that the USPA Parties are
in contempt of the 1984 Order, this action is not the
appropriate forum for such a determination.
A civil contempt
proceeding regarding a permanent injunction is a continuation of
the case in which the injunction is issued. See Leman v.
Krentler-Arnold
Last Co., 284 U.S. 448, 452, 52 S. Ct.
--------------------~~----------
238, 76 L. Ed 389 (1932)
(citing Gompers v. Buck Stove & Range
Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444, 31 S. Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed 797 (1911))
("Proceedings for civil contempt [based on a violation of an
injunction in a patent infringement case] are between the
original parties, and are instituted and tried as a part of the
main cause.");
Corp.), 168 B.R. 285, 288 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994)
("Civil
contempt proceedings are instituted primarily on the motion of
the plaintiff and are part of the underlying action.").
As this
Court is an inappropriate forum for adjudication as to whether
36
the USPA Parties are in contempt of the 1984 Order, no such
determination is made here.
C) The Appropriate Sanctions For Any Continued Violation Is
The Loss Of Future Profits
The USPA Parties submitted a Compliance Report
specifying actions taken by USPA with respect to the sale of
USPA Fragrance Products only.
PRL did not contend upon
receiving the report that the Court's Order required the USPA
Parties to take any actions with respect to eyewear.
Thus, the
position taken by PRL on the instant motion with respect to the
USPA Parties' sale of eyewear containing the Double Horsemen
Mark was not included in the prior proceedings, although
evidence of such sales had been presented.
During Cummings' testimony in the trial of this
action, the USPA Parties offered evidence of products bearing
the Double Horsemen mark that had been approved for sale in the
United States, including the designs for sunglasses that are the
subject of this motion.
Both PRL and L'Oreal objected to the
admission of this exhibit.
PRL obtained knowledge of the USPA Parties' sales of
eyewear bearing the Double Horsemen mark no later than July
37
2010, when these sales were testified to Cummings in deposition.
PRL never filed a litigation challenging use of the USPA
Parties' marks on eyewear, nor did PRL seek to amend its
counterclaims in the Fragrance Litigation to include eyewear
products.
prior acquiescence by PRL is relevant to the
consideration of an appropriate sanction.
See, e.g., Get
Petroleum Corp. v. Shore Line Oil Co., 642 F. Supp. 203, 206
(E.D.N.Y. 1986)
(plaintiff had
1 knowledge for over a year
that defendant had delivered unleaded gas to certain gas
stationsi plaintiff had therefore acquiesced to such conduct and
its contempt motion was denied) i Derek & Constance Lee Corp. v.
Kim
Co., 467 F. App'x 696, 697-98
(9th Cir. 2012)
(affirming denial of contempt order as barred by laches because
plaintiff knew for at least a year that defendant was violating
the injunction and waited another five months to bring contempt
proceeding a
er discovering product in market) .
Because of PRL's prior acquiescence and the
controversy concerning the application of the Injunction, PRL is
entitled only to the future profits of any sales of sunglasses
containing the Double Horsemen Mark sixty days following the
date
this order.
38
V.
Conclusion
Based upon the facts and conclusions set forth above,
the motion of JRA to intervene and the motion of PRL to hold
USPA in contempt
PRL is
the USPA Parties'
days after the entry
violation of the Injunction are granted.
any profits arising out of the sales of
bearing the Double Horsemen Mark sixty
this Order.
It is so
New York, NY
March ~, 2013
U.S.D.J.
39
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