Briese Lichttechnik Verttriebs GmbH v. Langton et al
Filing
193
MEMORANDUM & ORDER re: 180 MOTION To Find Documents Intentionally Withheld by Defendants Deemed Admitted Pursuant to Rule 37 filed by Hans-Werner Briese, Briese Lichttechnik Verttriebs GmbH. Plaintiffs' motion is granted to the extent that we have indicated. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael H. Dolinger on 10/6/2011) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (ft)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----x
BRIESE LICHTTECHNIK VERTRIEBS
GmbH and HANS-WERNER BRIESE,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
Plaintiffs,
o9
against-
Ci v . 97 9 0 ( LTS) (MHD)
BRENT LANGTON, B2PRO, KEY
LIGHTING, INC.
SERGIO
ORTIZ,
Defendants.
------ x
MICHAEL H. DOLINGER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE;
In March of this year, in
2011
order
imposing
sanctions
discovery derelictions,
int
wake of this court's January 10,
on
defendants
plaintiffs'
for
a
variety
counsel obtained a
of
trove
corporate documents from an independent contractor who had
worked for
fendant B2Pro until August 2010. Assert
documents had been improperly wi
ld by defendants and that they
contain significant evidence
have moved
that these
defendants'
profits,
an order deeming these documents to
iffs
admissible,
presumably at trial or on a summary judgment motion.
Defendants oppose
are
part
non
aintiffs' motion, although their arguments
sequiturs
and
1
are
partly
based
on
a
s
mischaracteriz
ion of a prior court order. They argue principally
that they produced these documents or their functional equivalent
in discovery (Defs.' Mem. of Law at 2-7)
previously
precluded
purportedly as
a
compl
the
about
documents.
general
plaintiffs
discovery
means
(Langton Decl.
complaints
of
from
sanction.
by
~~
which
2-3,
discovery
complaints that we have previously
and that the court has
using
at
(Id.
such
documents,
7 - 8).
They also
plaintiffs
6-7).
obtained
nally,
shortcomings
they
by
these
terate
pla
iffs,
ected. (Defs.' Mem. of Law at
7 8).
The pertinent facts may be briefly stated. The source of the
documents, a man named Ken Robinson, worked as Manager of Equipment
for defendant B2Pro from February until August 2010, and as part of
his job had routine access to the B2Pro computer system.
Decl.
~~
3-4). In July and August 2010 he downloaded onto
laptop a large quantity
lists,
(Robinson
including
umbrellas;
prices
product orders
B2Pro documents.
for
for
the
a
alleged
portion
sown
These reflect price
infringing
2010 i
reflector
summaries of
revenues for various B2Pro product groups for 2007 to 2010; and
revenues by product category for 2009 and part of 2010.
& Ex. A).
~~
7-9
Soon thereafter he was subpoenaed by plaintiffs for a
deposition (id.
~
5), and on August 19, 2010 he gave testimony that
2
severely undercut
the
credibility of
defendant
Notably, he testified that Mr. Langton had
Brent
Langton.
iberately withheld
from inspection by plaintiffs the umbrella reflectors that are the
subject of this lawsuit and that Mr. Langton had thereafter sought
to persuade him to defy the deposition subpoena served on him by
plaintiffs or to testify falsely at his deposition.
Lichttechnik Vertriebs
GmbH
v.
Langton,
2011
WL
See
280815,
*1 2
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011). According to Mr. Robinson, Mr. Langton
fired him soon after his deposition
(Robinson Decl.
~
6),1
and
aintiffs report that at some unspecified point thereafter he was
hired by plaintiff Briese.
(PIs.' Reply Mem.
Law at 10 n.5). In
early March 2011, he provided to plaintiffs' counsel copies of the
documents that he had downloaded from the B2Pro computer system
(Robinson Decl.
~~
11-13),
leading
to
the
pending
request
by
plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs seek relief under Rule 37 (b) (2)
Mem.
of Law at 6),
defendants
plaintiffs'
(see pIs.' Reply
on the premise that discovery misconduct by
as previously found by
court -- so prejudiced
ability to prove their case at trial that the court
'Langton disputes this assertion, claiming that by September
2010 there was insufficient business to justify his continued
services with the company. (Langton Decl. ~ 8).
3
should deem the new documents "admitted",
trial because they will assist
that
aintiffs
lS,
admissible at
in demonstrating the
magnitude of defendants' infringing profits and also provide grist
for challenging defendants' credibility.
(PIs.' Mem. of Law at 2,
5 6i PIs.' Reply Mem. of Law at 2 7). In this respect, plaintiffs
argue that the sanctions already imposed by the court on defendants
including
barring
defendants
from
using
any
documents
not
produced to plaintiffs during discovery and providing the trier of
fact with findings about the deliberate withholding of documents by
the
defendants
are
attendant on defendants'
insufficient
to
remedy
the
judice
rtinent financial
failure to provide
documents, and that the use of the Robinson-supplied documents will
leviate that injury.
We view the issue in somewhat simpler terms. Putting to one
side
whether
the previously imposed sanctions
remedy whatever
demonstrated
will
suffice
to
judice plaintiffs may have suffered from the
withholding
of
documents
and
false
testimony
by
defendants, we conclude that the initial question is whether the
proffered documents would ordinarily be admissible at trial
hence on summary judgment).
(and
That question turns principally on
whether the party proffering the documents can satisfy the twin
requirements
of
authentication
and
4
relevance.
See
Rodriguez
l
364 F.3d 4241
requirements
======1
of
Fed.
436
R.
(2d Cir.
Evid.
401
2004)
and
243 F.3d 635 1 658 (2d Cir. 2001)
(applying relevancy
402);
(discussing requirement
authenticity as condition precedent to admissibility) .
aintiffs
rest their authentication showing on a declaration by Mr. Robinson
who
recounts
his
downloading
of
the
documents
from
the
l
B2Pro
computer system and his preservation of the documents free from
tampering until he delivered them to counsel. (Robinson Decl.
13) . Regardless
~~ 7
whether that showing by itself would suffice for
admissibility purposes (assuming Mr. Robinson so testified at t
or
on
summary
judgment)
I
defendants
l
responding
confirm the authenticity of these documents.
Langton and defendants
I
papers
Indeed
l
1
amply
through Mr.
they observe that the documents
counsell
came from the B2Pro computer system
l
and indeed premise much of
their argument for exclusion on the contention that Mr. Robinson
misbehaved in appropriating the company s documents. (Langton Decl .
I
~~
2-3 /
67;
Defs.1
Mem.
of Law at
1/5-7).
plainly suffice to authenticate the documents.
R.
Evid.
901 (a) ("The
requirement
of
generally Fed.
authentication
satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a
matter
These admissions
is
finding that the
question is what its proponent claims.")2; United States
2 Effective December 11 2011 1 the quoted wording will change
slightlYI to state that "the proponent must produce evidence
5
v. Pluta, 176 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 1999).
As for relevance, at the very least the documents reflecting
price
lists
or
revenue
derived
from
the
lease
of
reflector
umbrellas are pertinent to the issues in the case. In addition, to
the extent that defendant Langton previously represented to the
court that his company's finances were in a purportedly parlous
state
(Mullally
Reply
Decl.
Ex.
5),
documents
indicating
the
substantial scale of the company's revenue stream, which was in the
millions of dollars, is potentially usable to impeach Mr. Langton's
credibility.
In seeking to resist plaintiffs' application, defendants argue
that they provided equivalent documentation in discovery_ It does
appear that
some
the documents that
defendants produced to
plaintiffs and that they used in deposition questioning reflected
income from the leasing of some B2Pro equipment
some period of
time, but that does not demonstrate that defendants complied with
the
1 extent
the
they had done so -- which
discovery obligations. Moreover, even if
ainly they have not, see Briese, 2011
sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the
proponent claims it is." This amendment would not alter our
analysis.
6
II
such a finding would not preclude the admission
WL 280815 at *9
aintiffs by
of relevant corporate documents belatedly provided to
a non-party.
As
fendants'
for
argument
that
the
court
previously
precluded plaintiff from using such documents, it is so wide
mark as to suggest
unfortunate
the
,not uncharacteristically -
that defendants'
counsel is engaging in bad-faith argumentation.
The January 24,
2011 memorandum and order to which defendants'
counsel refers did not preclude plaintiffs from using the type of
documents
at
issue
here
that
is,
documents
pertaining
to
defendants' earnings. The pertinent passage addressed a complaint
by defendants that plaintiffs had failed to produce
1 documents
reflecting or relating to plaintiffs' profits from their reflector
umbrella, and since plaintiffs had apparently not produced some of
their cost documents (apparently partly because they contemplated
seeking
profits),
the
infringers'
we held that
profits
rather
they would be
than
ir
limited at
t
own
al
lost
to the
profits-related documents that they had produced to defendants.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~=-~~~~~~~~,
(S.D.N.Y.
2011).
This
of
course
did not
272 F.R.D. 369, 374
speak
to
evidence
of
defendants' profits, which is the subject to which the currently
disputed documents relate. Indeed, it would have made no sense for
7
Iii
the court to limit plaintiffs' use
we had found that defendants had
defendants' documents since
iled to produce pertinent and
requested documents.}
In
sum,
authentic
we
that
the
documents
in
question
are
that is, they came from the document retention system
of defendants
mentioned,
conclude
and that they appear, in the respects that we have
to be
evant. We see no need at t
s time to parse
relevance
any more specific terms than we have done here, since
the part
will have ample opportunity on summary judgment or at
t
al to argue the relevance of specif
Finally,
should not
documents.
4
though defendants seem to argue that the documents
allowed into evidence because they were obtained by
underhanded means through Mr.
Robinson,
this argument is a non
starter. Defendants offer no legal authority for t
legal premise
At one point defendants argue in general terms that the
currently disputed documents, or some unspecified portion of
them, were never requested by plaintiffs. (Defs.' Mem. of Law at
5 6). This too is plainly incorrect.
3
4We also note that plaintiffs have not sought leave to re
open discovery in order to question defendants' principals about
these documents, and are presumably prepared to explain the
details of those documents, and to of
whatever basis of
relevance may be required, if defendants choose to challenge
their prof
on summary judgment or at trial.
8
underlies their argument, see,
~,
Go SMiLE, Inc. v. Levine,
769 F. Supp.2d 630, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (refusing to
clude use of
documents allegedly stolen by former employees of the
United States v. Knoll,
(Fourth
Amendment
ly
does
purloined
16 F.3d 1313, 1319 20
not
bar
Government
by non-government
event, since defendants fai
aintiff)
(2d
use
actors),
1994)
r.
of
documents
and
in
any
to produce the documents at issue
in contravention of their I
obligations -- they can scarcely
rely on their own misconduct as a means of precluding
use of
documents to which plaintiffs were entitled to have access.
CONCLUSION
For
extent
i
reasons stated, pIa
iffs' motion is granted to
we have indicated.
Dated: New York, New York
Oc
r 6, 2011
\.h-.. . .
MICHAEL H. DOLINGER
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
9
Copies of the forego
to:
Memorandum and Order have been mail
M. Veronica Mullally, Esq.
Hogan Lovells US LLP
875 Third Avenue
New York, New York 10022
Edward Kelly, Esq.
oloff & Kelly LLP
Chrysler Building
405 Lexington Avenue
37 th
oor
New York, New York 10174
Edward C. Schewe, Esq.
Schewe & Assocs.
1600 Rosencrans Avenue
4th Floor
Manhattan
, Calif
90266
10
today
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