Briese Lichttechnik Verttriebs GmbH v. Langton et al

Filing 193

MEMORANDUM & ORDER re: 180 MOTION To Find Documents Intentionally Withheld by Defendants Deemed Admitted Pursuant to Rule 37 filed by Hans-Werner Briese, Briese Lichttechnik Verttriebs GmbH. Plaintiffs' motion is granted to the extent that we have indicated. (Signed by Magistrate Judge Michael H. Dolinger on 10/6/2011) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (ft)

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK ----x BRIESE LICHTTECHNIK VERTRIEBS GmbH and HANS-WERNER BRIESE, MEMORANDUM & ORDER Plaintiffs, o9 against- Ci v . 97 9 0 ( LTS) (MHD) BRENT LANGTON, B2PRO, KEY LIGHTING, INC. SERGIO ORTIZ, Defendants. ------ x MICHAEL H. DOLINGER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE; In March of this year, in 2011 order imposing sanctions discovery derelictions, int wake of this court's January 10, on defendants plaintiffs' for a variety counsel obtained a of trove corporate documents from an independent contractor who had worked for fendant B2Pro until August 2010. Assert documents had been improperly wi ld by defendants and that they contain significant evidence have moved that these defendants' profits, an order deeming these documents to iffs admissible, presumably at trial or on a summary judgment motion. Defendants oppose are part non aintiffs' motion, although their arguments sequiturs and 1 are partly based on a s mischaracteriz ion of a prior court order. They argue principally that they produced these documents or their functional equivalent in discovery (Defs.' Mem. of Law at 2-7) previously precluded purportedly as a compl the about documents. general plaintiffs discovery means (Langton Decl. complaints of from sanction. by ~~ which 2-3, discovery complaints that we have previously and that the court has using at (Id. such documents, 7 - 8). They also plaintiffs 6-7). obtained nally, shortcomings they by these terate pla iffs, ected. (Defs.' Mem. of Law at 7 8). The pertinent facts may be briefly stated. The source of the documents, a man named Ken Robinson, worked as Manager of Equipment for defendant B2Pro from February until August 2010, and as part of his job had routine access to the B2Pro computer system. Decl. ~~ 3-4). In July and August 2010 he downloaded onto laptop a large quantity lists, (Robinson including umbrellas; prices product orders B2Pro documents. for for the a alleged portion sown These reflect price infringing 2010 i reflector summaries of revenues for various B2Pro product groups for 2007 to 2010; and revenues by product category for 2009 and part of 2010. & Ex. A). ~~ 7-9 Soon thereafter he was subpoenaed by plaintiffs for a deposition (id. ~ 5), and on August 19, 2010 he gave testimony that 2 severely undercut the credibility of defendant Notably, he testified that Mr. Langton had Brent Langton. iberately withheld from inspection by plaintiffs the umbrella reflectors that are the subject of this lawsuit and that Mr. Langton had thereafter sought to persuade him to defy the deposition subpoena served on him by plaintiffs or to testify falsely at his deposition. Lichttechnik Vertriebs GmbH v. Langton, 2011 WL See 280815, *1 2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 10, 2011). According to Mr. Robinson, Mr. Langton fired him soon after his deposition (Robinson Decl. ~ 6),1 and aintiffs report that at some unspecified point thereafter he was hired by plaintiff Briese. (PIs.' Reply Mem. Law at 10 n.5). In early March 2011, he provided to plaintiffs' counsel copies of the documents that he had downloaded from the B2Pro computer system (Robinson Decl. ~~ 11-13), leading to the pending request by plaintiffs. Plaintiffs seek relief under Rule 37 (b) (2) Mem. of Law at 6), defendants plaintiffs' (see pIs.' Reply on the premise that discovery misconduct by as previously found by court -- so prejudiced ability to prove their case at trial that the court 'Langton disputes this assertion, claiming that by September 2010 there was insufficient business to justify his continued services with the company. (Langton Decl. ~ 8). 3 should deem the new documents "admitted", trial because they will assist that aintiffs lS, admissible at in demonstrating the magnitude of defendants' infringing profits and also provide grist for challenging defendants' credibility. (PIs.' Mem. of Law at 2, 5 6i PIs.' Reply Mem. of Law at 2 7). In this respect, plaintiffs argue that the sanctions already imposed by the court on defendants including barring defendants from using any documents not produced to plaintiffs during discovery and providing the trier of fact with findings about the deliberate withholding of documents by the defendants are attendant on defendants' insufficient to remedy the judice rtinent financial failure to provide documents, and that the use of the Robinson-supplied documents will leviate that injury. We view the issue in somewhat simpler terms. Putting to one side whether the previously imposed sanctions remedy whatever demonstrated will suffice to judice plaintiffs may have suffered from the withholding of documents and false testimony by defendants, we conclude that the initial question is whether the proffered documents would ordinarily be admissible at trial hence on summary judgment). (and That question turns principally on whether the party proffering the documents can satisfy the twin requirements of authentication and 4 relevance. See Rodriguez l 364 F.3d 4241 requirements ======1 of Fed. 436 R. (2d Cir. Evid. 401 2004) and 243 F.3d 635 1 658 (2d Cir. 2001) (applying relevancy 402); (discussing requirement authenticity as condition precedent to admissibility) . aintiffs rest their authentication showing on a declaration by Mr. Robinson who recounts his downloading of the documents from the l B2Pro computer system and his preservation of the documents free from tampering until he delivered them to counsel. (Robinson Decl. 13) . Regardless ~~ 7­ whether that showing by itself would suffice for admissibility purposes (assuming Mr. Robinson so testified at t or on summary judgment) I defendants l responding confirm the authenticity of these documents. Langton and defendants I papers Indeed l 1 amply through Mr. they observe that the documents counsell came from the B2Pro computer system l and indeed premise much of their argument for exclusion on the contention that Mr. Robinson misbehaved in appropriating the company s documents. (Langton Decl . I ~~ 2-3 / 67; Defs.1 Mem. of Law at 1/5-7). plainly suffice to authenticate the documents. R. Evid. 901 (a) ("The requirement of generally Fed. authentication satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a matter These admissions is finding that the question is what its proponent claims.")2; United States 2 Effective December 11 2011 1 the quoted wording will change slightlYI to state that "the proponent must produce evidence 5 v. Pluta, 176 F.3d 43, 49 (2d Cir. 1999). As for relevance, at the very least the documents reflecting price lists or revenue derived from the lease of reflector umbrellas are pertinent to the issues in the case. In addition, to the extent that defendant Langton previously represented to the court that his company's finances were in a purportedly parlous state (Mullally Reply Decl. Ex. 5), documents indicating the substantial scale of the company's revenue stream, which was in the millions of dollars, is potentially usable to impeach Mr. Langton's credibility. In seeking to resist plaintiffs' application, defendants argue that they provided equivalent documentation in discovery_ It does appear that some the documents that defendants produced to plaintiffs and that they used in deposition questioning reflected income from the leasing of some B2Pro equipment some period of time, but that does not demonstrate that defendants complied with the 1 extent the they had done so -- which discovery obligations. Moreover, even if ainly they have not, see Briese, 2011 sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims it is." This amendment would not alter our analysis. 6 II such a finding would not preclude the admission WL 280815 at *9 aintiffs by of relevant corporate documents belatedly provided to a non-party. As fendants' for argument that the court previously precluded plaintiff from using such documents, it is so wide mark as to suggest unfortunate the ,not uncharacteristically -­ that defendants' counsel is engaging in bad-faith argumentation. The January 24, 2011 memorandum and order to which defendants' counsel refers did not preclude plaintiffs from using the type of documents at issue here that is, documents pertaining to defendants' earnings. The pertinent passage addressed a complaint by defendants that plaintiffs had failed to produce 1 documents reflecting or relating to plaintiffs' profits from their reflector umbrella, and since plaintiffs had apparently not produced some of their cost documents (apparently partly because they contemplated seeking profits), the infringers' we held that profits rather they would be than ir limited at t own al lost to the profits-related documents that they had produced to defendants. ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~=-~~~~~~~~, (S.D.N.Y. 2011). This of course did not 272 F.R.D. 369, 374 speak to evidence of defendants' profits, which is the subject to which the currently disputed documents relate. Indeed, it would have made no sense for 7 Iii the court to limit plaintiffs' use we had found that defendants had defendants' documents since iled to produce pertinent and requested documents.} In sum, authentic we that the documents in question are that is, they came from the document retention system of defendants mentioned, conclude and that they appear, in the respects that we have to be evant. We see no need at t s time to parse relevance any more specific terms than we have done here, since the part will have ample opportunity on summary judgment or at t al to argue the relevance of specif Finally, should not documents. 4 though defendants seem to argue that the documents allowed into evidence because they were obtained by underhanded means through Mr. Robinson, this argument is a non­ starter. Defendants offer no legal authority for t legal premise At one point defendants argue in general terms that the currently disputed documents, or some unspecified portion of them, were never requested by plaintiffs. (Defs.' Mem. of Law at 5 6). This too is plainly incorrect. 3 4We also note that plaintiffs have not sought leave to re open discovery in order to question defendants' principals about these documents, and are presumably prepared to explain the details of those documents, and to of whatever basis of relevance may be required, if defendants choose to challenge their prof on summary judgment or at trial. 8 underlies their argument, see, ~, Go SMiLE, Inc. v. Levine, 769 F. Supp.2d 630, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (refusing to clude use of documents allegedly stolen by former employees of the United States v. Knoll, (Fourth Amendment ly does purloined 16 F.3d 1313, 1319 20 not bar Government by non-government event, since defendants fai aintiff) (2d use actors), 1994) r. of documents and in any to produce the documents at issue in contravention of their I obligations -- they can scarcely rely on their own misconduct as a means of precluding use of documents to which plaintiffs were entitled to have access. CONCLUSION For extent i reasons stated, pIa iffs' motion is granted to we have indicated. Dated: New York, New York Oc r 6, 2011 \.h-.. . . MICHAEL H. DOLINGER UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 9 Copies of the forego to: Memorandum and Order have been mail M. Veronica Mullally, Esq. Hogan Lovells US LLP 875 Third Avenue New York, New York 10022 Edward Kelly, Esq. oloff & Kelly LLP Chrysler Building 405 Lexington Avenue 37 th oor New York, New York 10174 Edward C. Schewe, Esq. Schewe & Assocs. 1600 Rosencrans Avenue 4th Floor Manhattan , Calif 90266 10 today

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