Kirkland v. Cablevision Systems
Filing
93
MEMORANDUM & ORDER: granting in part 80 Motion for Reconsideration re 77 Order Adopting Report and Recommendations. filed by Cablevision Systems. Defendants motion for reconsideration [dkt. no. 80] is GRANTED in part. The Court vacates the porti on of its September 30th Order denying Defendants motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs Title VII and NYSHRL retaliation claims and hereby dismisses those claims. Additionally, the Court declines to continue exercising supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiffs NYCHRL claims and said claims are dismissed without prejudice. (Signed by Judge Loretta A. Preska on 8/23/2013) (djc) Modified on 8/23/2013 (djc).
USDCSDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECfR ONICAILY FILED
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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DOC #:
DATE FiLED: ~ . 9 2>- \.3
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GARRY KIRKLAND,
o9 Ci v. 1 023 5 ( LAP) (KNF)
Plaintiff,
MEMORANDUM & ORDER
v.
CABLEVISION SYSTEMS,
Defendant.
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LORETTA A. PRESKA, Chi
United States District Judge:
On September 30, 2012, this Court denied in its
entirety Plaintiff Garry Kirkland's ("Kirkland" or
"Plaintiff") motion for summary judgment and granted in
part and denied in part Defendant Cablevision Systems New
York
ty Corporation's ("Cablevision" or "Defendant")l
See Order Adopting Report &
motion for summary judgment.
Recommendation ("Sept. 30th Order")
[dkt. no. 77], at 11.)
Defendant has moved for reconsideration of aspects of that
Order pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and
Local Rule 6.3
[dkt. no. 80].2
For the reasons set forth
below, Defendant's motion is GRANTED in part, and
Defendant is identified in Plaintiff's amended complaint
as "Cablevision Systems."
2 The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are
set forth in Magistrate Judge Fox's Report and
Recommendation (the "Report") with respect to Plaintiff's
and Defendant's cross motions for summary judgment [dkt.
no. 55] and this Court's September 30th Order adopting the
Report, familiarity with which is assumed.
1
1
Plaintiff’s remaining claims brought under the laws of New
York City are dismissed without prejudice.
I.
DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Motions for reconsideration are strictly evaluated and
generally are “denied unless the moving party can point to
controlling decisions or data that the court overlookedmatters, in other words, that might reasonably be expected
to alter the conclusion reached by the court.”
Shrader v.
CSX Transp., Inc., 70 F.3d 255, 257 (2d Cir.1995).
“The
major grounds justifying reconsideration are an intervening
change of controlling law, the availability of new
evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent
manifest injustice.”
Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. Nat'l
Mediation Bd., 956 F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir.1992).
Rule 60(b) states in relevant part that “[o]n motion
and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence,
surprise, or excusable neglect . . . or (6) any other
reason that justifies relief.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
In
deciding whether to grant a motion for reconsideration
brought under Rule 60(b), the Court must strike “a balance
between serving the ends of justice and preserving the
finality of judgments.”
Nemaizer v. Baker, 793 F.2d 58, 61
2
(2d Cir. 1986).
Generally, relief is granted “only upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances.”
Mendell v. Gollust,
909 F.2d 724, 731 (2d Cir. 1990), aff’d, 501 U.S. 115
(1991).
“A motion for reconsideration is an extraordinary
remedy, and this Court will not reconsider issues already
examined simply because Petitioner is dissatisfied with the
outcome of his case.
To do otherwise would be a waste of
judicial resources.”
Matura v. United States, 189 F.R.D.
86, 90 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).
Under Local Rule 6.3, a motion for reconsideration may
be granted if the moving party demonstrates that there were
matters or decisions overlooked by the Court, see S.D.N.Y.
Local R. 6.3; Shrader, 70 F.3d at 257, or when there has
been “an intervening change in controlling law,” Henderson
v. Metro. Bank & Trust Co., 502 F. Supp. 2d. 372, 376
(S.D.N.Y.).
In fact, “[b]ecause the law is constantly
evolving, a new decision clarifying the applicable
substantive law may justify reexamining a denial of summary
judgment.”
Caribbean Wholesales & Serv. v. U.S. JVC Corp.,
101 F. Supp. 2d 236, 240 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
In its motion, Defendant proffers that the Court
overlooked Defendant’s arguments that Plaintiff’s
retaliatory discharge claims must fail because Plaintiff
3
cannot establish pretext.3
Upon review, the Court has
determined that Defendant’s motion on this ground is
meritorious.4
Admittedly, Defendant first raised this particular
argument in its objections to Magistrate Judge Fox’s
Report.
(See Def.’s Memo. of Law in Supp. of Its
Objections [dkt. no. 56], at 9-11.)
3
In response, this
As the Court set forth in its September 30th Order, in
order to survive summary judgment on a retaliation claim
brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as
amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e, et seq. (“Title VII”) and
Section 296(1) of the New York Executive Law (the “New York
State Human Rights Law” or “NYSHRL”), Plaintiff must offer
sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to find
that (1) he engaged in a protected activity known to
Defendant; (2) Defendant took an adverse employment action
against him; and (3) that “a causal connection exists
between the protected activity and the adverse action,
i.e., that a retaliatory motive played a part in the
adverse employment action.” Kessler v. Westchester Cnty
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 205-06 (2d Cir. 2006)
(citation omitted). Retaliation claims are analyzed under
the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973). See
Gorzynski v. JetBlue Airways Corp., 596 F.3d 93, 110 (2d
Cir. 2010). If Plaintiff establishes a prima facie case,
Defendant may proffer a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason
for the alleged adverse employment action. If Defendant
meets this burden, Plaintiff must then establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant’s stated
reasons are merely pretext for retaliation. See id. at
111.
4
Defendant also proffers that this Court should reconsider
its denial of Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on
all of Plaintiff’s claims brought under Section 8-107 of
the New York City Administrative Code (the “New York City
Human Rights Law” or “NYCHRL”). As explained below, the
Court declines to consider this argument, however, for
jurisdictional reasons.
4
Court aimed to address Defendant’s objection in its
September 30th Order.
(See Sept. 30th Order, at 8-10.)
Specifically, the September 30th Order clarified why
Plaintiff had carried his burden with respect to the causal
element of his retaliation claims by explaining why the
temporal proximity of Plaintiff’s complaints and his
termination was sufficient to sustain the causation element
of Plaintiff’s prima facie retaliation case.
(See id. at
9-10.)
The Court now recognizes, however, that upon
determining that Plaintiff made out a prima facie case of
retaliation, its September 30th Order conflated Defendant’s
objection on the causation element with its objection
regarding pretext and, consequently, overlooked the
Report’s failure to shift the burden and complete the
analysis under McDonnell Douglas.
Because the Court has
yet to determine formally whether Defendant proffered
legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for Plaintiff’s
discharge and, if so, whether Plaintiff has presented any
evidence demonstrating that Defendant’s stated reasons are
merely pretext for retaliation, the Court undertakes that
endeavor now.
As noted in the Report, and as adopted by this Court
through its September 30th Order,
5
[D]efendant
proffers,
as
its
reasons
for
terminating
Kirkland’s
employment,
that
he
failed, over time, to establish a working
relationship
with
the
store
managers
he
supervised, failed to improve his performance,
after being counseled by his supervisors and the
defendant’s
employee
relations
and
human
resources personnel, and did not follow the
defendant’s
policies.
Cablevision’s
dissatisfaction with Kirkland’s job performance
is a non-discriminatory legitimate reason for its
action.
(Report at 23.)
Thus, Defendant has sustained its burden
of proffering legitimate, non-retaliatory reasons for
Plaintiff’s termination, and it falls to Kirkland to prove
that the reasons offered by Cablevision for his termination
are pretext.
“At the pretext stage, mere temporal proximity is
insufficient, standing alone, to withstand summary judgment
‘where the defendant proffers a legitimate reason for the
plaintiff’s discharge with evidentiary support therefor.’”
Bagley v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., No. 10 Civ. 1492 (PGG),
2012 WL 2866266, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 12, 2012) (quoting
Galimore v. City Univ. of N.Y. Bronx Cnty. Coll., 641 F.
Supp. 2d 269, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)).
Here, Plaintiff
attempts to overcome this limitation by stating that
“Defendant replaced [him] with Kathryn Nivins[,] an
individual outside of [Plaintiff’s] protect[ed] class, that
was not minimally qualified for the position” and by
6
stating that Nivins was promoted “over a more qualified
Black candidate.” (See Pl.’s Memo. of Law in Opp’n to
Def.’s Notice of Mot. for Recons. [dkt. no. 86], at 6.)
By adopting the Report’s conclusions with regards to
Plaintiff’s efforts to show pretext in the context of his
discrimination claims, (see Sept. 30th Order, at 4-5),
however, the Court has already found that Plaintiff “has
not presented evidence that shows that: (a) his store
managers and he had a good working relationship and that
the store managers did not complain to Cockerill about his
performance as an AOM, in 2008, after Kirkland had
completed the PIP[] and (b) he always complied with
[Cablevision’s] policies,” (Report, at 24.).
As such, the
Court has already determined that Plaintiff has failed to
present sufficient evidence at the pretext stage to
undermine Defendant’s non-discriminatory explanations for
his termination.
Therefore, applied to Plaintiff’s retaliation claims,
it follows that Plaintiff’s being replaced by Nivins
(evidence tending to bear on his discrimination claims) and
the mere temporal proximity of Plaintiff’s complaints and
subsequent discharge are insufficient to carry his burden
at the pretext stage on his retaliation claim.
Because
Kirkland offers no additional evidence purporting to show
7
that he was terminated in retaliation for engaging in a
protected activity, the Court holds that Plaintiff cannot
establish by a preponderance of the evidence that
Defendant’s stated reasons are merely pretext for
retaliation.
Consequently, the Court vacates the portion
of its September 30th Order denying Defendant’s motion for
summary judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII and NYSHRL
retaliation claims and hereby grants summary judgment on
those claims in favor of Defendant.
II.
PLAINTIFF’S REMAINING NYCHRL CLAIMS
A review of Plaintiff’s amended complaint [dkt. no.
17] demonstrates that Plaintiff and Defendant are citizens
of New York and that jurisdiction was conferred upon this
Court because his Title VII claims involved a Federal
question of law.
Because this Court has granted summary
judgment in favor of Defendant on all of Plaintiff’s claims
over which it has original jurisdiction, (see Sept. 30th
Order, at 11; supra Part I), and because Plaintiff’s only
remaining claims raise complex issues of non-Federal law,5
5
Although the Court of Appeals recently has attempted to
provide district courts with guidance on how to properly
analyze NYCHRL, see Mihalik v. Credit Agricole Cheuvreux
North America, Inc., 2013 WL 1776643 (2d Cir. Apr. 26,
2013), there continues to be a lack of clarity with regards
to just how much more liberally claims should be evaluated
under the NYCHRL as compared with their treatment under
Title VII and the NYSHRL.
8
the Court hereby declines to continue exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s NYCHRL claims.
See 28 U.S.C § 1367(c); see also Carnegie-Melon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350, n.7 (1988) (“in the usual case
in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before
trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the
pendent jurisdiction doctrine—judicial economy,
convenience, fairness, and comity—will point toward
declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining
state-law claims”).
As such, Plaintiff’s NYCHRL claims are
dismissed without prejudice.
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III. CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motion for reconsideration [dkt. no. 80]
is GRANTED in part.
The Court vacates the portion of its
September 30th Order denying Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s Title VII and NYSHRL retaliation
claims and hereby dismisses those claims.
Additionally,
the Court declines to continue exercising supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s NYCHRL claims and said claims
are dismissed without prejudice.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
August 23, 2013
New York, New York
__________________________
LORETTA A. PRESKA
Chief U.S. District Judge
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