Guzman v. The City of New York et al

Filing 23

OPINION AND ORDER: The defendants' February 13, 2011 motion to dismiss is granted. The Clerk of the Court shall close the case. (Signed by Judge Denise L. Cote on 7/7/2011) Copies Sent By Chambers. (ab)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------X
:
ARMANDO GUZMAN, SR.,
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-v:
:
THE CITY OF NEW YORK and RAYMOND KELLY, :
Commissioner, City of New York Police
:
Department,
:
Defendants.
:
:
----------------------------------------X

10 Civ. 1048 (DLC)
OPINION & ORDER

APPEARANCES:
For plaintiff:
Armando Guzman, Sr., pro se
955 East 163rd Street
Apartment #2B
Bronx, NY 10459
For defendants:
Brian Jeremy Farrar
NYC Law Department
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007

DENISE COTE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Armando Guzman, Sr. (“Guzman”), proceeding pro
se, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against The
City of New York (“the City”) and Commissioner of Police Raymond
Kelly (“Kelly”).

Guzman alleges that the defendants violated

his constitutional rights by, inter alia, failing to respond to
allegations of police misconduct and promulgating official
policies that promoted unconstitutional conduct by subordinates.

The defendants have moved to dismiss the complaint.

For the

following reasons, the motion to dismiss is granted.

BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the plaintiff’s
complaint, and assumed to be true for the purposes of this
motion.

LaFaro v. New York Cardiothoracic Group, PLLC, 570 F.3d

471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).

On July 9, 2007,

Guzman was involved in a physical altercation with an unknown
man, later identified as Felix Guzman (“FG,” no relation to the
plaintiff).
apartment.
weapon.

Around midnight, FG attempted to enter the Guzman
Initially rebuffed, FG returned brandishing a

After a fight, Guzman ejected FG from the apartment.

A

short time later, when Guzman was outside his apartment complex,
FG snuck up on him.
time in the head.

In self-defense, Guzman struck FG a single
When FG fell back, hit his head on the

sidewalk, and did not move, Guzman asked his family to call an
ambulance.
The next day, New York City Police Department (“NYPD”)
detectives from the 48th Precinct went to the Guzman apartment to
interview Guzman.

Guzman learned of the visit and called the

48th Precinct to convey his intent to cooperate with the police.
The same day, two NYPD detectives returned to the Guzman
apartment and gained entry by threatening Guzman’s young step-

2

son.

When Guzman’s wife arrived, she told the detectives that

Guzman would talk to them on his “own time table and not that of
the police time table.”

The detectives then took Guzman’s

spouse and two other family members to the 48th Precinct for
questioning.

Guzman’s family was not allowed anything to drink

or given an opportunity to talk to an attorney.
On July 11, 2007, Guzman was arrested.

On July 12, Guzman

was charged with manslaughter in the first degree and assault in
the first degree.

The charge required “an intent to cause

serious physical injury by means of a deadly weapon or a
dangerous instrument.”

There was, however, no evidence that

Guzman had used such a weapon when he struck FG.

Guzman alleges

that NYPD detectives, in collusion with Assistant District
Attorney Danny Kraft (“Kraft”), gave false testimony.

On August

3, Guzman was informed that a Grand Jury had indicted him with a
single count of manslaughter in the first degree.

Guzman was

detained nearly three years.
On August 7, 2007, Guzman forwarded to the Bronx County
District Attorney (“DA”) Robert Johnson (“Johnson”) a grievance
filed with the Civilian Complaint Review Board regarding the
NYPD’s mistreatment of Guzman’s family.

Guzman later received

threats that if he did not withdraw the grievance, his family
would “undergo an unspecified form of hardship.”

The complaint

does not specify how these threats were received or who might

3

have sent them.

Guzman immediately filed a grievance with the

New York Supreme Court Appellate Division disciplinary panel
against Kraft.

On November 7, Guzman, having concluded that DA

Johnson was covering up Kraft’s misconduct, filed an application
with the Office of the New York State Attorney General for the
appointment of a special prosecutor to investigate the NYPD
detectives who had interviewed Guzman’s family.

On November 14,

Guzman filed a Freedom of Information Act request with the NYPD
seeking the names of the NYPD detectives who had interrogated
his family.

Guzman sent a copy of this request to Kelly but

received no response from him.

Guzman alleges that Kelly

instructed an unnamed records access officer to withhold this
information.
On January 5, 2008, Guzman filed a formal grievance with
the NYPD directly addressed to Kelly.

It demanded an

investigation into collusion between the NYPD and the Bronx
County DA’s Office and the filing of false charges against
Guzman.

He never received a response from Kelly.

Guzman

alleges that Kelly pursued a cover-up.
On May 12, 2009, Guzman filed a grievance with the Chief of
the Civil Rights Unit of the United States Attorney’s Office for
the Southern District of New York, alleging collusion between
the NYPD and the Bronx County DA’s Office to falsely charge
Guzman.

4

On February 9, 2010, Guzman commenced this lawsuit, seeking
injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and more than $30 million
in compensatory, punitive, and special damages for his loss of
liberty, financial support, and companionship to his family.
On July 14, this case was stayed pending the outcome of
Guzman’s criminal trial.

In a December 13 letter, the

defendants informed the Court that Guzman was acquitted at
trial.

On December 15, Guzman’s claims of prosecutorial

misconduct against Johnson were dismissed and Guzman was given
until January 14, 2011 to submit any amended complaint.

See

Guzman v. City of New York, No. 10 Civ. 1048 (DLC), 2010 WL
5129066 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 15, 2010).

In addition, an Order of

December 16, 2010 directed Guzman to provide an up-to-date
address to this Court’s Pro Se Office.
Guzman did not file an amended complaint, nor did he update
his address information.

On February 13, the defendants moved

for dismissal of all claims against the two remaining
defendants.

In an order dated February 28, Guzman’s complaint

was dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute.
On March 4, the Court received a letter dated January 2
from Guzman indicating that he wished to continue to pursue his
claim.

By an Order of March 8, the Court reopened the case and

ordered Guzman to file any opposition to the defendants’ motion
to dismiss by April 1.

Guzman did not submit any opposition.

5

DISCUSSION
Defendants have moved to dismiss Guzman’s complaint on two
grounds.

First, that the plaintiff fails to state a claim

against Kelly.

Second, that any municipal claims against the

City fail as a matter of law.
“Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), a pleading
must contain a ‘short and plain statement of the claim showing
that the pleader is entitled to relief.’”
129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).

Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

To survive a motion to dismiss,

“a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as
true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
Id. (citation omitted).

Applying this plausibility standard is

“a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to
draw on its judicial experience and common sense.”

Id. at 1950.

When considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a
trial court must “accept all allegations in the complaint as
true and draw all inferences in the non-moving party’s favor.”
LaFaro, 570 F.3d at 475.

Moreover, pleadings filed by pro se

plaintiffs are to be construed liberally.

Chavis v. Chappius,

618 F.3d 162, 170 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

The rule

favoring liberal construction of pro se submissions is
especially applicable to civil rights claims.

See Weixel v. Bd.

of Ed. of the City of New York, 287 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir.
2002).

A complaint must do more, however, than offer “naked

6

assertions devoid of further factual enhancement,” and a court
is not “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual allegation.”

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949-50.

Accordingly, a court may disregard “threadbare recitals of a
cause of action’s elements, supported by mere conclusory
Id. at 1940.

statements.”

I.

Claims Against Kelly
The defendants contend that the claims against Kelly fail

to provide sufficient factual support for his personal
involvement in any constitutional wrongdoing.

Broadly

construed, the complaint alleges that Kelly failed to respond to
Guzman’s grievances about police misconduct and malicious
prosecution, instructed a subordinate to withhold from the
plaintiff the identity of certain NYPD officers, and promulgated
a policy that promoted discriminatory and unconstitutional
conduct by police officers against racial minorities and persons
of low-income.

Because the complaint’s assertions neither

constitute a violation of § 1983, nor plead sufficient facts of
Kelly’s personal involvement beyond “naked assertions devoid of
further factual enhancement,” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949,
Guzman’s claims against Kelly must be dismissed.

7

Section 1983 provides in part that
[e]very person who, under color of any statutes,
ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State .
. . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States . . . to deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws shall be liable to the party
injured.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.

“To state a claim under Section 1983, a

plaintiff must allege facts indicating that some official action
has caused the plaintiff to be deprived of his or her
constitutional rights.”

Zherka v. Amicone, 634 F.3d 642, 644

(2d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).

A defendant’s conduct must

be a proximate cause of the claimed violation in order to
support a claim that the defendant deprived the plaintiff of his
rights.

Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980).

It

is “well settled” that “personal involvement of defendants in
alleged constitutional deprivations is a prerequisite to an
award of damages under § 1983.”

Farid v. Ellen, 593 F.3d 233,

249 (2d Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).

As a consequence, “the

doctrine of respondeat superior . . . does not suffice to impose
liability for damages under section 1983 on a defendant acting
in a supervisory capacity.”

Hayut v. State Univ. of N.Y., 352

F.3d 733, 753 (2d Cir. 2003).
In Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F.3d 865 (2d Cir. 1995), the
Second Circuit identified five ways in which a supervisory

8

official may be personally involved in a violation of
constitutional rights.

Id. at 873.

Liability may attach to a

supervisor who
(1) [d]irectly participated in the violation,
(2) failed to remedy the violation after being
informed of it by report or appeal, (3) created a
policy or custom under which the violation occurred,
(4) was grossly negligent in supervising subordinates
who committed the violation, (5) was deliberately
indifferent to the rights of others by failing to act
on information that constitutional rights were being
violated.
Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 152-53 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing
Colon, 58 F.3d at 873), rev’d on other grounds, Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. 1937.
In Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that “[b]ecause vicarious
liability is inapplicable to . . . § 1983 suits, a plaintiff
must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the
official’s own individual actions, has violated the
Constitution.”

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1948 (emphasis supplied).

The Court rejected the argument that “a supervisor’s mere
knowledge of his subordinate’s discriminatory purpose amounts to
the supervisor’s violating the Constitution,” because that
“conception of supervisory liability is inconsistent with [the
principle that supervisors] may not be held accountable for the
misdeeds of their agents.”

Id. at 1949.

“Absent vicarious

liability, each Government official, his or her title

9

notwithstanding, is only liable for his or her own misconduct.”
Id. 1
Guzman has not asserted that Kelly was personally involved
in the police or prosecutorial misconduct that Guzman alleged in
the complaint.

To the extent that Guzman’s claims rest on

allegations that Kelly failed to respond or investigate Guzman’s
grievances, they must be dismissed for failure to allege a claim
against Kelly under § 1983.
[A]fter the fact notice of a violation of an
[individual’s] right is insufficient to establish a
supervisor’s liability for the violation. Receiving
post hoc notice does not constitute personal
involvement in the unconstitutional activity and
cannot be said to have proximately caused the
[constitutional violation] suffered by [Guzman].
Rahman v. Fischer, No. 09 Civ. 4368 (DLC), 2010 WL 1063835, at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2010) (citation omitted).

Accordingly,

Guzman’s § 1983 claims against Kelly for deliberate indifference
are dismissed.
As to Guzman’s claim that Kelly instructed an unnamed
subordinate to withhold information in order to thwart Guzman’s
submission of grievances, the complaint fails to allege
sufficient factual material beyond “mere conclusory statements.”

1

The Supreme Court’s decision in Iqbal arguably casts doubt
on the continued viability of some of the categories set forth
in Colon v. Coughlin. For the purposes of this case, however,
it is not necessary to explore this issue because the complaint
fails to plead personal involvement under any of the Colon
categories.
10

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940.

The complaint contains only the bare

assertion that Kelly ordered an unnamed subordinate to withhold
information, and the conclusion that Kelly “obviously pursued a
cover-up of the entire reported complaint matter.”

Without

additional factual support, these statements do not rise above
the speculative level to plausibility and are thus insufficient
to support a § 1983 claim.

Id.

Finally, Guzman’s claim that Kelly promulgated policies and
practices that allowed unconstitutional conduct by subordinate
officers also fails.

The complaint principally alleges that

Kelly promoted police officers’ infringement of the
constitutional rights of racial minorities and the poor by
refusing to pursue investigations or sanction subordinates.

The

complaint contains only the bare assertion that a policy exists,
and the conclusion that Kelly was responsible for it.

Without

“sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face,” id., the claim must be
dismissed.

II.

Municipal Liability
Guzman also asserts a § 1983 claim against the City,

alleging that the City promulgated a policy and custom of
falsification of police reports and discrimination against
racial minorities.

The complaint alleges that the City failed

11

to train and supervise its police officers, thereby promoting
such constitutional violations.
“Section 1983 ‘imposes liability on a government that,
under color of some official policy, “causes” an employee to
violate another’s constitutional rights.’”

Okin v. Village of

Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t., 577 F.3d 415, 439 (2d Cir.
2009) (quoting Monell v. Dep’t. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,
692 (1978)).
Monell does not provide a separate cause of action for
the failure by the government to train its employees;
it extends liability to a municipal organization where
that organization’s failure to train, or the policies
or customs that it has sanctioned, led to an
independent constitutional violation.
Id. (citation omitted).
single action.

Municipal liability may spring from a

See, e.g., Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford,

361 F.3d 113, 125 (2d Cir. 2004).
Here, other than merely repeating that the City failed to
train and supervise its police officers, Guzman has failed to
make any specific allegations to support the existence of any
policy or practice.

Instead, the complaint contains boilerplate

allegations of unconstitutional policies and practices.

As

articulated above, “threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s
elements, supported by mere conclusory statements” are
insufficient to plead a claim.

Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1940.

Consequently, Guzman’s claim against the City is also dismissed.

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CONCLUSION
The defendants' February 13, 2011 motion to dismiss is
granted.

The Clerk of the Court shall close the case.

SO ORDERED:
Dated:

New York, New York
July 7, 2011

DE ISE COTE
United States District Judge

13

Copies sent to:

Armando Guzman, Sr.
955 E. 163rd St. Apt. 2B
Bronx, New York 10459

Brian J. Farrar
City of New York Law Department
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007