Kaplan et al v. Al Jazeera
Filing
30
OPINION AND ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs' federal law claims are dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and the Court will not exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs' Israeli law claims. Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed wi thout prejudice and with leave to amend the complaint. By Friday June 17, 2011, at 12:00 p.m., Plaintiffs shall submit to the Court a letter stating whether they intend to file a second amended complaint. So Ordered (Signed by Judge Kimba M. Wood on 6/7/2011) (js)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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:
CHAIM KAPLAN, et al.,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-against:
:
AL JAZEERA,
:
:
Defendant.
:
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10 Civ. 5298
Opinion & Order
WOOD, U.S.D.J.:
I.
Overview
A group of American, Israeli, and Canadian civilians (“Plaintiffs”) bring this action
against Al Jazeera (“Defendant”), alleging claims under the Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2333,
under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and under Israeli law for negligence and
vicarious liability.
Defendant moves to dismiss Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 12(b)(6)”). For the reasons that
follow, the Court GRANTS Defendant’s motion in part, and declines to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ remaining Israeli law claims.
II.
Background
The following facts are drawn from Plaintiffs’ Complaint, and are taken as true for the
purposes of Defendant’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555-56 (2007).
A.
The Parties
1
Plaintiffs are a group of United States, Canadian, and Israeli citizens who were injured in
a series of rocket and missile attacks carried out in Israel by the Hezbollah organization
(“Hezbollah”)1 between July 12, 2006 and August 14, 2006; Plaintiffs also include the family
members and personal representatives of the estates of one American citizen and four Israeli
citizens who were killed in those attacks. (FAC ¶¶ 1-12.)
Defendant is a television network incorporated in Qatar, which conducts business in the
United States. (FAC ¶ 13.)
B.
Facts
Between July 12, 2006 and August 14, 2006, Hezbollah fired thousands of rockets and
missiles at civilians in northern Israel (referred to by Plaintiffs as the “Hezbollah Rocket
Barrage”). (FAC ¶ 34.) The Hezbollah Rocket Barrage resulted in the deaths of at least fortythree civilians and injured hundreds of others. (FAC ¶ 35.)
Plaintiffs state that it was “extremely difficult” for Hezbollah to aim its rockets during the
Hezbollah Rocket Barrage, because Hezbollah’s rockets had no internal guidance system. (FAC
¶ 36.) Plaintiffs state that the only way for Hezbollah to aim its rockets accurately was for it to
obtain information regarding the precise locations where other rockets had already landed, and to
then adjust the trajectory of subsequently fired rockets accordingly. (FAC ¶ 37.) Plaintiffs
allege that such information (i.e. where Hezbollah’s rockets had landed) was broadcast by
Defendant. (FAC ¶¶ 39-41.)
1
Plaintiffs describe Hezbollah as a “radical Islamic terrorist organization” that seeks to
“destroy[] the State of Israel by carrying out terrorist attacks against Israel and Israeli targets,
including Israeli civilians.” (FAC ¶¶ 17, 19.)
The United States has designated Hezbollah a “Specially Designated Terrorist,” a
“Foreign Terrorist Organization,” and a “Specially Designated Global Terrorist.” (FAC ¶ 28.)
2
Specifically, Plaintiffs state that, during the course of the Hezbollah Rocket Barrage,
Defendant’s employees, while located in Israel, “repeatedly and intentionally recorded and
transmitted to Al Jazeera’s broadcast facilities real-time audiovisual footage . . . describing and
depicting the precise impact locations in Israel of rockets fired by Hezbollah, and [that] those
transmissions were broadcast in real-time to the public by Al-Jazeera.” (FAC ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs
state that Defendant’s recording, transmission, and broadcast of the impact locations of
Hezbollah’s rockets was done pursuant to “the official organizational policies” of Defendant.2
(FAC ¶ 40.)
Plaintiffs state that Defendant broadcast the impact locations of Hezbollah’s rockets “for
the specific purpose and with the specific intention of assisting Hezbollah to more accurately aim
its rockets, and thereby inflict more and greater harm” on Israel and the United States. (FAC
¶ 42.)
In this action, Plaintiffs assert five claims against Defendant. First, those Plaintiffs with
United States citizenship claim that Defendant’s news broadcasts of the Hezbollah Rocket
Barrage constitute “acts of international terrorism” under the Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C. §
2333(a). (See FAC ¶¶ 113-25.) Second, those same Plaintiffs claim that Defendant aided and
abetted Hezbollah’s “international acts of terrorism” under the Antiterrorism Act. (See FAC ¶¶
2
In 2003, the Israeli military issued standing orders to news organizations forbidding them from
reporting real-time information regarding the impact locations of Hezbollah’s rockets. Those
standing orders were distributed to all news organizations with representatives in Israel,
including Defendant. (FAC ¶ 38.) The standing orders were reissued when the Hezbollah
Rocket Barrage began in 2006. Defendant received the standing orders at that time. (FAC ¶ 38.)
Defendant’s employees were arrested on several occasions by Israeli authorities for
violating the standing orders, by broadcasting footage depicting the impact locations of rockets
fired by Hezbollah. (FAC ¶ 39.) Plaintiffs do not allege that Defendant or Defendant’s
employees were ever convicted of any violation of these standing orders or any other censorship
law.
3
126-35.) Third, those Plaintiffs who do not have United States citizenship3 claim that Defendant
aided and abetted Hezbollah’s war crimes and violations of the law of nations within the
meaning of the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. (See FAC ¶¶ 136-44.) Finally, all
Plaintiffs bring claims under Israel’s Civil Wrongs Ordinance for negligence and vicarious
liability. (See FAC ¶¶ 145-64.)
Defendant moves to dismiss all of Plaintiffs’ claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). (See Dkt.
Entry No. 22.)
III.
Legal Standard
In order to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must have pleaded sufficient
factual allegations “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at
570. A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, -- U.S. --, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Where a plaintiff has not “nudged
[his or her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be
dismissed.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570; see also Starr v. Sony BMG Music Entm’t, 592 F.3d
314, 321 (2d Cir. 2010) (“‘[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the Court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct,’ however, dismissal is appropriate.”) (quoting Iqbal, 129
S. Ct. at 1950).
The Court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint, and
“draw[ ] all inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Allaire Corp. v. Okumus, 433 F.3d 248, 249-50
3
One of these plaintiffs, Ester Lelchook, is an Israeli citizen, not a United States citizen.
However, she is the widow of David Marti Lelchook, a United States citizen, and the complaint
refers to her at times as an “American plaintiff.” (See FAC at 5 n1.)
4
(2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotations omitted). However, “the tenet that a court must accept as true
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Iqbal, 129 S.
Ct. at 1949. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere
conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (noting that a
court is “not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation” (quoting
Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986))).
Finally, the requirement to plead facts rather than legal conclusions applies to allegations
of a defendant’s intent as well as allegations about a defendant’s conduct. See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1954 (“Respondent finally maintains that the Federal Rules expressly allow him to allege
petitioners’ discriminatory intent ‘generally,’ which he equates with a conclusory allegation. . . .
But the Federal Rules do not require courts to credit a complaint’s conclusory statements without
reference to its factual context.”).
IV.
Analysis
A.
Plaintiffs’ Antiterrorism Act Claim
Those Plaintiffs with United States citizenship claim that Defendant’s news broadcasts of
the Hazbollah Rocket Barrage constitute “acts of international terrorism,” under the
Antiterrorism Act (“ATA”), 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a). (See FAC ¶¶ 113-25.) Defendant has moved
to dismiss Plaintiff’s Section 2333(a) claim, arguing that the complaint fails to plead a plausible
claim under the under Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiffs
have failed to sufficiently plead a violation of Section 2333(a).
1.
Applicable Law
The ATA creates a private right of action for any national of the United States who is
“injured in his or her person, property, or business by reason of an act of international terrorism.”
5
18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (emphasis added). Acts of international terrorism are defined as “activities”
that:
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the
criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if
committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;
(B) appear to be intended-(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;
(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or
kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons
they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators
operate or seek asylum;
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A)-(C) (emphasis added).
The parties devote much of their papers to discussing whether Plaintiffs have plausibly
pled a predicate violation of a criminal law pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A). More important,
however, is the fact that, “irrespective of which statute . . . provides the basis for a finding that
defendant engaged in international terrorism, plaintiffs must still meet the scienter requirements
of § 2333(a) itself in order to hold defendant liable under that statute.” Goldberg v. UBS AG,
660 F. Supp. 2d 410, 427-28 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (citing Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst. and Holy
Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 291 F.3d 1000, 1016 (7th Cir. 2002) [hereinafter “Boim I”].
Although Section 2333(a) does not explicitly contain a state of mind requirement, courts
have interpreted the statute “to include a requirement that there be some deliberate wrongdoing
by the defendant, in light of the fact that the statute contains a punitive element (i.e. treble
damages).” Goldberg, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 428; see also Rothstein v. UBS AG, 08 Civ. 4414,
2011 WL 70354, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 2011) [hereinafter “Rothstein II”] (stating that Section
6
2333(a) “expressly require[s] intent”). Indeed, in perhaps the most comprehensive decision to
date addressing Section 2333(a), the Seventh Circuit, sitting en banc, held that, “since section
2333 provides for an automatic trebling of damages[,] it . . . require[s] proof of intentional
misconduct.” Boim v. Holy Land Found. for Relief and Dev., 549 F.3d 685, 692 (7th Cir. 2008)
[hereinafter “Boim II”]. The Seventh Circuit reasoned that:
Punitive damages are rarely if ever imposed unless the defendant is found to have
engaged in deliberate wrongdoing. Something more than the mere commission of a tort
is always required for punitive damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or
outrage, such as spite or “malice,” or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the
defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that the
conduct may be called wilful [sic] or wanton.
Id. (citing W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts § 2, pp. 9-10 (5th
ed.1984)) (emphasis added).
2.
Application of Law to Facts
Plaintiffs have alleged (1) that, because Hezbollah’s rockets had no internal guidance
system, Hezbollah needed to see where its rockets had already landed in order to aim its
subsequent rockets more accurately; (2) that Defendant broadcast news of the Hezbollah Rocket
Barrage; and (3) that Defendant was known by others to have an anti-American and anti-Israeli
bias. Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts suggesting (1) that Defendant intended for Hezbollah
to view its broadcasts; (2) that Hezbollah actually viewed Defendant’s broadcasts; and (3) that
Defendant knew that Hezbollah was viewing its broadcasts. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ claim is
simply that Defendant broadcast information that may have been helpful to Hezbollah in
achieving its organizational goals. This claim lacks the elements of both intent and proximate
cause that are necessary for Plaintiffs’ Section 2333(a) claim.
a.
Intent
7
The gravamen of Plaintiffs’ complaint is that Defendant broadcast the Hezbollah rocket
attacks “with the intention of assisting Hezbollah to improve its aiming ability.” (See Pl. Opp. at
8 (original emphasis)); see also FAC ¶ 41 (“Al Jazeera repeatedly recorded, transmitted, and
broadcasted the impact locations of Hezbollah rockets . . . with the specific intention of assisting
Hezbollah to harm Israel and the United States, consistent with and pursuant to Al Jazeera’s
support for Hezbollah and its goals.”).
Plaintiffs’ allegation of Defendant’s wrongful intent must be supported by “sufficient
factual matter” in order for Plaintiff to survive Defendant’s motion to dismiss. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct.
at 1949. Plaintiffs’ complaint must “allege facts that are not merely consistent with the
conclusion that the defendant violated the law, but which actively and plausibly suggest that
conclusion.” Port Dock & Stone Corp. v. Oldcastle Northeast, Inc., 507 F.3d 117, 121 (2d Cir.
2007) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).
The Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to meet this burden. To support their claim of
wrongful intent, Plaintiffs assert that Defendant has an official “anti-American and anti-Israel
organizational policy.” (FAC ¶ 33.) In support of this assertion, Plaintiffs cite to eight
statements and three actions made or taken by third parties. (See FAC ¶ 33.) Plaintiffs contend
that these statements and actions show that others found Defendant’s news coverage to favor
Hezbollah, and to be biased against Israel and/or the United States. (Id.) For example, Plaintiffs
state that United States officials filed a diplomatic complaint against Defendant, accusing
Defendant of having an anti-American slant, and objecting to Defendant describing Palestinian
suicide bombers as “martyrs.” (FAC ¶ 33(a).) Plaintiffs also cite an opinion piece in the New
York Times that stated that Defendant’s coverage of the September 11, 2001 attacks, and the
8
United States’ war against terrorism more generally, has been “entirely from the Taliban point of
view.” (FAC ¶ 33(b).)
Assuming that all of those statements were made, and that those actions were taken—and
that others found Defendant’s news reports to be biased—Plaintiffs have still failed to allege any
facts suggesting that Defendant broadcast news of the Hezbollah Rocket Barrage with the
intention of assisting Hezbollah. Only three of Plaintiffs’ eleven citations even refer to
Hezbollah. (See FAC ¶ 33(i)-(k).) Only one of those three citations asserts that Defendant has
any bias in favor of Hezbollah specifically—and even that says nothing about any “official
organization policy” that Defendant may have had, let alone any intention Defendant may have
had to aid Hezbollah. (See FAC ¶ 33(k) (“Al-Jazeera has a bias towards . . . Hizballah.”).)
Finally, only one of the statements cited by Plaintiffs is made on Defendant’s behalf; it consists
of Al Jazeera’s spokesman’s statement that: “[m]oney is not of paramount importance. We
believe we have a mission.” (FAC ¶ 33(d).) That statement—“[w]e believe we have a
mission”—suggests nothing about what Defendant’s mission actually is, and Plaintiffs offer no
facts to elucidate that statement. (See FAC ¶ 33(d).) As Defendant notes, this spokesman could
be referring to any number of missions, including simply a news organization’s “mission” to
accurately report the news. (Def. Mem. at 11-12 n.6.)
Plaintiffs assert that they have met their burden of pleading intent, because Section
2331(1)(B) requires only the appearance of intent, which is “a matter of external appearance
rather than subjective intent.” See Pl. Opp. at 22-23 (citing Boim II, 549 F.3d at 694); see also
18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(B)). Plaintiffs cite the Seventh Circuit’s en banc decision in Boim II to
support their argument. Id. In Boim II, parents of a United States citizen who was fatally shot in
Israel by gunmen allegedly working for the Hamas terrorist organization brought a Section
9
2333(a) claim against three organizations, claiming that those organizations provided financial
support to Hamas before their son’s death. 549 F.3d at 687-88. After finding that Section
2333(a) requires “proof of intentional misconduct,” the Seventh Circuit held that, a “knowing
donor to Hamas—that is, a donor who knew the aims and activities of the organization” would
know that “by augmenting Hamas’s resources, [they] would enable Hamas to kill or wound . . .
people in Israel.” Id. at 693-94. The Court concluded that, “given such foreseeable
consequences, such donations would ‘appear to be intended ... to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population’ . . . as required by section 2331(1).” Id. at 694 (emphasis added); see also Goldberg,
660 F. Supp. 2d at 428 (“[I]t is sufficient to show that [the defendant] knew the entity had been
designated as a terrorist organization, and deliberately disregarded that fact while continuing to
provide financial services to the organization with knowledge that the services would in all
likelihood assist the organization in accomplishing its violent goals.”) (emphasis added).
By making this comparison to Boim II, Plaintiffs seem to be suggesting that Defendant’s
broadcast of the Hezbollah Rocket Barrage constitutes a provision of material support to
Hezbollah—akin to the money given to Hamas in Boim II—and that the foreseeable
consequence of that broadcast was to enable Hezbollah to aim its rockets more accurately at
targets.
This suggestion strains credulity. When a person donates money to an organization, like
in Boim II, the “foreseeable consequence” of that action is that that money will be used to further
the goals of the organization, or to “augment” the organization’s resources. Boim II, 549 F.3d at
693-94. Here, Plaintiffs have offered no facts suggesting that Defendant broadcast news of the
rocket attacks “with knowledge that the services [i.e. its broadcast] would in all likelihood assist
the organization in accomplishing its violent goals.” Goldberg, 660 F. Supp.2d at 428. In fact,
10
Plaintiffs have offered no facts suggesting that Defendant even knew that it was providing
anything to Hezbollah. This is a far cry from donating money to a terrorist organization.
Unlike a financial donation to a terrorist organization, news coverage of the activities of a
terrorist organization can serve an entirely different and acceptable purpose, namely, delivering
important information to the public.4 See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567 (discussing an “obvious
alternative explanation” to the claim being advanced). For all of these reasons, Plaintiffs have
failed to plausibly plead the element of intent that is necessary for their Section 2333(a) claim.
b.
Proximate Cause
Plaintiffs have also failed to plead the element of proximate cause necessary for a Section
2333(a) claim. Section 2333 provides redress to victims who demonstrate that they were injured
“by reason of an act of international terrorism.” 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (emphasis added). “The
‘by reason of’ language, ultimately derived from the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914[,] . . . has
typically been construed as synonymous with ‘proximate cause.’” Rothstein v. UBS AG, 647 F.
Supp. 2d 292, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) [hereinafter “Rothstein I”]; see also Goldberg, 660 F. Supp.
2d at 429 (“The words ‘by reason of’ have been interpreted to express Congress’s intent to
require a showing of proximate causation.”). “Establishing a proximate causal relationship
between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries is an indispensable element of a
Section 2333(a) civil damages claim.” Rothstein II, 2011 WL 70354, at *4 (emphasis added);
see also Stutts v. De Dietrich Group, No. 03-CV-4058, 2006 WL 1867060, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Jun.
30, 2006) (finding that the “by reason of international terrorism” language “implies a proximate
4
Plaintiffs do not appear to dispute the fact that the Hezbollah rocket attacks were covered by all
three of the major United States news networks, as well as CNN, Fox News, and multiple
international news organizations. (See Def. Reply Mem. at 10.)
11
cause requirement such that it must be reasonably foreseeable that a defendant’s conduct is likely
to result in violent criminal acts”) (citations omitted).
Plaintiffs have not alleged any facts suggesting that Defendant’s broadcasts were used by
Hezbollah to better target their rockets. Plaintiffs have offered no facts suggesting that
Hezbollah viewed Defendant’s broadcasts (rather than another network’s broadcasts or no
broadcasts at all).5
c.
Conclusion
In sum, the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard “asks for more than a sheer possibility
that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949. For these reasons stated
above, Plaintiffs’ first claim under the ATA must be dismissed.6
5
Plaintiffs cite the Supreme Court’s decision in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct.
2705 (2010), in arguing that Defendant’s conduct proximately caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. (See
FAC at ¶¶ 102-12.) Citing to an Executive Branch finding, the Supreme Court in Holder noted
that, “[g]iven the purposes, organizational structure, and clandestine nature of foreign terrorist
organizations, it is highly likely that any material support to these organizations will ultimately
inure to the benefit of their criminal, terrorist functions-regardless of whether such support was
ostensibly intended to support non-violent, non-terrorist activities.” Id. at 2727.
Holder is inapposite. First and most significantly, Holder dealt with 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B, which makes it a federal crime to “knowingly provide material support or sources to a
foreign terrorist organization.” The instant proximate cause analysis involves 18 U.S.C. §
2333(a), not 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Second, Holder involved organizations and individuals that
were seeking to “provide support for” the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan and the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Ealam, but claimed that they “could not do so for fear of prosecution under § 2339B.”
Id. at 2714. Thus, those organizations and individuals were admittedly intending to give support
to particular organization, whereas here, there are no facts suggesting that Defendant intended to
aid Hezbollah.
6
Because the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to plausibly plead intent and proximate
causation, the Court need not address whether Plaintiffs have adequately pled a predicate
criminal violation pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2331(1)(A).
12
B.
Plaintiffs’ Aiding and Abetting Terrorism Claim
Those Plaintiffs with United States citizenship also claim that Defendant aided and
abetted Hezbollah’s “international acts of terrorism” under the ATA. (See FAC ¶¶ 126-35.) For
the reasons that follow, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for aiding and
abetting terrorism.
In Boim II, the Seventh Circuit held that a defendant in an ATA action cannot be held
liable on an aiding and abetting theory. See 549 F.3d at 689 (finding that Congress’s “statutory
silence on the subject of secondary liability [in the ATA] means there is none”). The Court
explicitly relied on the fact that “section 2333(a) authorizes awards of damages to private parties
but does not mention aiders and abettors or other secondary actors.” Id.
The Second Circuit does not appear to have addressed this precise issue of whether a
defendant in an ATA action can be held liable on an aiding and abetting theory. However, even
assuming arguendo that a defendant in an ATA action can be held liable for aiding and abetting,
Plaintiffs would be required to make “adequate allegations that the defendant not only knew that
its funds would be used to sponsor terrorist acts by [the terrorist organization] . . . but also [that
it] intended to do so.” Rothstein II, 2011 WL 70354, at *2 (citations omitted). Indeed, the Court
in Boim II noted that “the aiding and abetting standard . . . conditions liability on proof that a
defendant knew of the organization's illegal purposes and had the intent to further those purposes
when that defendant joined and/or aided the organization.” Boim II, 549 F.3d at 685 (citations
omitted).
The Court therefore need not also address a recent dispute that has arisen with respect to
whether Plaintiffs can properly submit post-complaint briefing on the applicability of various
state criminal laws without first amending their complaint.
13
The Court therefore need not resolve whether aiding and abetting liability exists for
violations of Section 2333(a). For the reasons stated above,7 the Court finds that Plaintiffs have
asserted no facts that plausibly suggest that Defendant knew its broadcasts “would be used to
sponsor terrorist acts.” See Rothstein II, 2011 WL 70354, at *2. Nor have Plaintiffs asserted
facts that suggest that Defendant “intended” for its broadcast to be used to support terrorist acts.
See id. For these reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have failed to state a claim for aiding
and abetting terrorism under the ATA.
C.
Plaintiffs’ Alien Tort Statute Claim
Those Plaintiffs who do not have United States citizenship claim that Defendant aided
and abetted Hezbollah’s war crimes and violations of the law of nations within the meaning of
the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”), 28 U.S.C. § 1350. (See FAC ¶¶ 136-44.)
Plaintiffs’ claim fails as a matter of law and must be dismissed. The Second Circuit has
held that corporations cannot be held liable for violations of customary international law. See
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 145 (2d Cir. 2010). In Kiobel, the Second
Circuit concluded that:
Because corporate liability is not recognized as a “specific, universal, and obligatory”
norm . . . it is not a rule of customary international law that we may apply under the
ATS. Accordingly, insofar as plaintiffs in this action seek to hold only corporations
liable for their conduct in Nigeria (as opposed to individuals within those corporations),
and only under the ATS, their claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
7
See supra Section IV.A.2.a.
14
Id. (citation omitted). Here, Plaintiffs are seeking to hold Defendant, a corporation, liable for war
crimes and violations of the law of nations under the ATS. Accordingly, this Court does not have
subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ ATS claim.8
D.
Plaintiffs’ Israeli Law Claims for Negligence and Vicarious Liability
Finally, all Plaintiffs assert claims for negligence and vicarious liability under Israel’s
Civil Wrongs Ordinance (the “CWO”). (See FAC ¶¶ 145-64.)
In their opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Plaintiffs now acknowledge that the
statute of limitations has run on the negligence and vicarious liability claims of all adult
Plaintiffs. (See Pl. Op. at 29 (“[P]laintiffs are constrained to agree that the Israeli causes of
action asserted by the adult plaintiffs must be dismissed as time-barred.”).) Therefore, Plaintiffs
maintain their negligence and vicarious liability claims only with respect to those Plaintiffs who
are minors. (Id.)
Both Defendant and Plaintiffs have stated in their submissions that they prefer that, in the
event that all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims are dismissed, the Court not exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Israeli law claims. (See Pl. Op. at 30; Def. Mem. at 25.)
Accordingly, because the Court had dismissed all of Plaintiffs’ federal claims, the Court will not
exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ non-federal, Israeli law claims.
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ federal law claims are dismissed pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6), and the Court will not exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ Israeli law claims.
8
Plaintiffs recognize that they are bound by the Kiobel decision. (Pl. Opp. at 29.) They state
that they continue to assert their ATS claim only “in the hope and expectation that the majority
holding in Kiobel will be reversed.” (Id.)
15
Plaintiffs' claims are dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend the complaint.
By Friday June 17,2011, at 12:00 p.m., Plaintiffs shall submit to the Court a letter stating
whether they intend to file a second amended complaint.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: New York, New York
JuneL,2011
(~ nv. UJtyr:/
Kimba M. Wood
United States District Judge
16
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