Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al

Filing 295

DECLARATION of Gregory J. Radomisli in Opposition re: 290 MOTION to Amend/Correct .. Document filed by Jamaica Hospital Medical Center. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit C part 1, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit C part 2, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit D, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit E part 1, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit E part 2, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit E part 3, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit F, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit G, # 11 Exhibit Exhibit H, # 12 Exhibit Exhibit I, # 13 Exhibit Exhibit J, # 14 Exhibit Exhibit K, # 15 Exhibit Exhibit L, # 16 Exhibit Exhibit M, # 17 Exhibit Exhibit N, # 18 Exhibit Exhibit O, # 19 Exhibit Exhibit P, # 20 Exhibit Exhibit Q, # 21 Exhibit Exhibit R, # 22 Exhibit Exhibit S, # 23 Exhibit Exhibit T, # 24 Exhibit Exhibit U, # 25 Exhibit Exhibit V, # 26 Exhibit Exhibit X)(Osterman, Brian)

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 1 of 14

USDCSDNY
DOCUMENT

ELECI'RONlCALLY FILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED: .!l IIJ l I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN
STRICT OF NEW YORK

-x
ADRIAN SCHOOLCRAFT,
Plaintiff,
10 Civ. 6005
- against ­

OPINION
THE CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL.,
Defendants.

---x

Sweet, D.J.

On October 12, 2010, Defendant Jamaica Hospital Medical
Center ("Defendant" or "JHMC") filed a motion to dismiss
iff Adrian Schoolcraft's ("Plaintiff" or "Schoolcraft")
aims against it.

On February 2, 2010, JHMC also filed a motion

to stay discovery pending resolution of the its motion to
dismiss.

For

following reasons, Defendant's motion to

dismiss is granted in part and denied in
motion to stay discovery is denied.

I.

Prior Proceedings

1

, and Defendant's

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 2 of 14

On August 10, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint aga
the City of New York, several members of the New York City Pol
Department ("NYPD fI
others.

)

I

JHMC, two doctors employed by JHMC, and

On September 13, 2010, Plaintiff filed an amended
("AC").

compl

On October 12, 2010, JHMC fi

motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against it.
considered fully submitted on January 26, 2011.

the present
The motion was
On February 2,

2010, JHMC filed a motion to stay discovery pending resolution of
smiss.

its motion to

This motion was considered fully

submitted on March 2, 2011.

II.

Statement of Facts

New York

Schoolcraft joined

ty Police Department

in July 2002, working at the 81st precinct until October 31,
2009.

(AC

~~

26 27).

He all

s that, in response to his refusal

to adhere to and later attempts to expose the strict enforcement
an illegal quota policy in his precinct, defendant NYPD
ficers inst
rd. at

~~

ed a campaign to intimidate and discredit him.

34 170).

Plaintiff alleges

he was arrested, forcibly removed from

, on October 31, 2009,
s home, transported to

JHMC, and wrongfully committed against his will for six days
under NYPD's classification as an Emotionally Disturbed Person
(hereinafter "EDP").

(AC at

~

171)
2

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 3 of 14

days of

Plaintiff alleges that he spent the first

his confinement at JHMC in the psychiatric emergency room where
NYPD officers kept watch over him, physically and emotionally
abused him, and handcuffed both of
(AC at

~~

171 79).

s arms tightly to a gurney.

During that time he claims that he was not
world, and he was not provided a

allowed contact with the outs
proper bed to sleep in.

(AC at

~~

171 79).

Plaintiff alleges

that, even though there was no medical basis to detain him and
that hospi

records clearly indicate that he was lucid,

rational,

ly coherent, and posed no risk to himself or others,

JHMC held PIa

iff against his will at the urging

the NYPD.

(AC ~~ 184 90, 201-02).

At the end of his sixth day of confinement at JHMC,
School

was allegedly released despite no change of

circumstances concerning his psychiatric state, and without
explanat

(AC

~

192).

Plaintiff claims

JHMC acted under

the coercion of and in concert with the NYPD to facilitate the
constitutional violations

licted upon him, and in furtherance

of the NYPD's ultimate attempt to silence and

scredit him.

Plaintiff has submitted three claims against JHMC.

See Claims Seven, Eight, and Nine, AC
3

~~

270 284).

Plaintiff

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 4 of 14

alleges that:
U.S.C.

§

(a) JHMC violated his civil rights pursuant to 42

1983 by involuntarily hospitaliz

New York Mental Hygiene Law

§

him in violation of

9.39, thereby depriving Plaintiff

of his substantive and procedural due

ss rights as set forth

in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
270-276) i

(b) JHMC conspired with

civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
(c) JHMC violated his rights to due
§

Constitution (AC

~~

NYPD to violate Plaintiff's
§

1983

(AC

~~

277 282) i and,

pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

1983 by involuntarily hospitalizing him without notice, hearing

or an opportunity to be heard or to challenge his confinement, in
violation of the Fifth and
Constitution (AC

~~

Amendments to the

283 284).

III. Applicable Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (a) (2) requires "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.

To
pleadings

II

a motion to dismiss and for judgment on
to Rules 12 (b) (6) and 12 (c) 1,

"a complaint

1 The
standard used to decide a motion for judgment on the
made pursuant to Rule 12(c) is identical to the standard used to decide a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6).
See,
Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126
r. 2001) (collecting cases) .

4

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 5 of 14

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'ff
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
Corp. v.

~wombly,

550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007».

(quoting Bell Atl.
Though the court

must accept the factual allegations of a complaint as true, it is
Unot bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual

legation.

550 U.S. at 555).

II

Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly,

Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to

"nudge [ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible."

IV.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

Discussion

Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claims against it
should be dismissed on three grounds.

First, Plaintiff's

§

1983

claims should be dismissed because JHMC cannot be liable through
the doctrine of respondeat superior and is not liable directly.
Second, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that JHMC was a
state actor under

§

1983.

Third, after dismissing Plaintiff's

federal claims brought under

§

1983, the Court should decline to

exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining
state law claims against JHMC.

5

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 6 of 14

a. Plaintiff Has Failed to Establish JHMC's Liability
Under § 1983
While Defendant contends that

aintiff cannot rely

upon the doctrine of respondeat superior to render JHMC liable
for Plaintiff's injuries, Plaintiff contends that his allegations
are against JHMC as a state actor 2

ly.

The question then

becomes whether Plaintiff may pursue JHMC directly, or whether it
would have to approach JHMC through the acts of its employees.

Section 1983 provides

no person may deprive

another, under color of state law, of rights secured by the
Constitution or the laws of
In assessing liability under
between the government it
alleged to be state actors.

United States.
§

42 U.S.C.

§

1983.

1983, courts do not distinguish

f and private entities who are
See Allen v. Mattingly, No. 10 Civ.

667, 2011 WL 1261103, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2011)
private entity to be state actor for purposes of

§

(finding

1983).

See

2 As noted above, Defendants contend that JHMC is not a state actor and that
Plaintiff fails to suf
conspiracy under § 1983. Because
Plaintiff's claims
even if JHMC is a state actor or
conspired with the NYPD, the Court does not need to decide this issue. That
having been stated, it does appear that JHMC is a state actor based on
Plaintiff's al
that the hospital's employees acted under the
compulsion of, and in concert with, the NYPD. Sybalski v. Independent Group
546 F.3d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 2008). Furthermore,
that JHMC was used as a detention facility, JHMC
can be seen as a state actor through its assumption of a traditional
government function.
Plaintiff also appears to sufficiently plead a §
1983 conspiracy by al
that JHMC's employees formed an agreement with
NYPD officers to collaborate in depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional
rights and acted pursuant to that agreement. See
200
6

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 7 of 14

also Whalen v. Allers, 302 F. Supp. 2d 194, 202

(S.D.N.Y. 2003)

(holding that a private corporate employer found to be a "state
actor" for purposes of § 1983 cannot be held vicariously liable
under § 1983 since "there is no tenable reason [ ] to distinguish
a private employer from a municipality.") i Temple v. Albert, 719
F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)

(neither the Supreme Court nor

the Second Circuit have directly addressed the issue of whether a
private entity can

held liable under

1983 on a respondeat

§

superior theory, but that numerous other courts have relied on
Monell to find that there is no tenable reason to distinguish a
private entity hired by a municipality from the municipality
itself)

Dolan v. Richards, No. 10 Civ. 5809, 2011 WL 1197462, at

i

*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011).

ke government entities, private corporations "can act
only through natural persons," and their
conduct of their employees.

through
ViI

§

1983 liability arises

Coward v. Town and

of Harrison, 665 F. Supp. 2d 281, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)

(quot

of St. Louis v.

(1988)) .

k, 485 U.S. 112, 122

Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)

I

depended on

s rationale in finding that governments will be

held responsible for the acts of their employees only where
"their official pol
F.3d 65,

72

(2d Cir.

ies cause their employees to violate another

1999).

7

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 8 of 14

person's constitutional rights."

-----"---­

, 485 U.S. at 122

(discussing the rationale of Monell

Therefore, Defendant is correct in asserting that, as
state actors, "[p]rivate employers are not liable under

1983

§

for the constitutional torts of their employees unless the
plaintiff proves that action pursuant to of
nature caused a constitutional tort."
Store

cial policy of some

Rojas v. Alexander's Dep't

Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 1990)

marks and citations omitted).

See
so
-----

(internal quotation

Allen, 2011 WL 1261103,

at *16 n. 20 ("liability under Section 1983 cannot be based on
respondeat superior")
U.S. 658, 694

(citing Monell v.

't of Soc. Servs., 436

(1978); Jett v. Dallas I

School District,

491 U.S. 701, 736 (1989».

State actors "may be sued directly under § 1983 for
constitutional deprivations

licted upon private individuals

pursuant to [the state actor's] custom, policy, ordinance,
regulation, or decision."
397 (2d Cir. 1983)
Adam v. Met

Batista v.

z, 702 F.2d 393,

(citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978»
Authori

891441, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2011)

i

see also

No. 07 Civ. 8807, 2011 WL
(same);

ttle v.

Cor:rections Corp. of America, 103 Fed. Appx. 898, 900-01 (6th
Cir. 2004)

(dismissing claim where the pIa
8

iff failed to

lege

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 9 of 14

that private state actor was liable through a policy or custom)
Bradl

i

of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1106, 2009 WL 1703237,

at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 18, 2009)

(dismissing claim where conspiracy

was adequately pleaded because employee actions were not pursuant
to policy or custom).
under

§

Thus,

~[t]o

hold a

[state actor] liable

1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a

plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements:

(1) an

official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be
subjected to (3) a deni
irmer & Co.

of a constitutional right."

Inc., No. 08 Civ. 11368, 2009 WL 4333457, at

*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2009)
see

so Adams v. Ci

Kahn v.

(quoting Batista

702 F.2d at 397);

of New York, No. 08 Civ. 5263, 2010 WL

743956, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2010) i Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d
610, 622 (7th Cir. 2010)

("Generally, to maintain a viable § 1983

action against a municipality, a government agent (such as [a
private corporation]), or individual policymaking defendants in
their offi

al capacities_, a

aintiff must demonstrate that a

constitutional deprivation occurred as the result of an express
policy or custom promulgated by that entity or an individual with
policymaking authority. II) •

"The Supreme Court has identified at least two
situations that constitute a municipal policy:

(1) where there is

an officially promulgated policy as that term is generally
9

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 10 of 14

understood

i.e., a formal act by the municipality's governing

body), and (2) where a single act is taken by a municipal
employee who, as a matter of State law, has final policymaking
authority in the area in which the action was taken."

Coward,

665 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (quoting Newton, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 271)
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, and Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 81 (1986)).

"A municipal 'custom,'

on the other hand, need not receive formal approval by the
appropriate decisionmaker ...
Supp. 2d at 271).

Instead,

/I

Id.

(quoting Newton, 566 F.

"an act performed pursuant to a

'custom' that has not been formally approved by an appropriate
decisionmaker may

rly subject a municipality to liability on

the theory that the relevant pract
the force of law."

Id.

is so widespread as to have

(quoting Board of

Commissioners of

Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404

(1997)).

To

prevail on this theory of municipal liability, however, a
plaintiff must prove that the custom at issue is well settled.
See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (the Supreme Court "has long
recognized that a plaintiff may be able to prove the existence of
a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written
law or express municipal policy, is 'so permanent and well
settled as to const
1aw.'ff)

e a "custom or usage" with the force of

(quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress

68 (1970)).
10

&

Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167­

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 11 of 14

Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that JHMC's
employees acted pursuant to an official JHMC policy, the
direction of a JHMC policymaker, or JHMC custom when they
part

ipated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional

rights.

In fact, Plaintiff appears to allege that the hospital's

employees defied its standard practices in taking orders from
and/or collaborating with the NYPD to deprive him of his
constitutional rights.
JHMC's liability under

Therefore, Plaintiff f
§

Is to establish

1983, and his federal claims against

JHMC are dismissed.

b. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's State
Law Claims Against JHMC is Appropriate
Defendants contend that, with Plaintiff's federal
claims against JHMC dismissed, the Court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims
against JHMC.

28 U.S.C.

§

1367 provides as follows:

[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution.
Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder or
intervention
additional parties.

11

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 12 of 14

See also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Products
Liabil

ion, 510 F. Supp. 2d 299, 320

(S.D.N.Y. 2007)

("In passing the statute, Congress gave district courts

jurisdiction over claims and parties over which the court lacked

original jurisdiction under sections 1331 and 1332, so long as

all of the claims arise out of the same case or controversy under

Article 111.11).

Federal and state claims form satisfy

§

1367(a)

if they "derive from a common nucleus of operative facts or when

both claims would normally be expected to be tried
judicial proceeding./I

Id. at 331,

a single

(quoting Achtman v.

McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 2006))

Plaintiff contends that

s federal claims against the

NYPD and JHMC doctors arise from the same set of facts as his
remaining state law claims against JHMC.

Plaintiff's

allegations, that the NYPD removed him from his horne and forcibly
detained him at JHMC for approximately six days, and that JHMC
and its employees violated federal and state laws through their
complicity in the NYPD's actions and failure to satisfy their
duties to Plaintiff, arise from a common nucleus of overlapping
facts.

See Id. at 322

("'In determining whether two disputes

arise from a common nucleus of operative fact, we have
traditionally asked whether the facts underlying the federal and
state claims substantially overlapped. ..
12

[or] the federal claim

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 13 of 14

necessarily brought the facts underlying the state claim before
the court.'")

(quoting Achtman, 464 F.3d at 335)

quotations omitted).

(internal

Furthermore, under these circumstances,

considerations of judic

economy warrant exercising

supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims
against JHMC.

See United Mine workers of America v. Gibbs, 383

U. S. 715, 726 (1966)
justification lies

(" [Supplemental jurisdiction's1
considerations of judicial economy,

convenience and fairness to litigants") .

Defendant points to

§

1367(c) and contends that the

court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
because it would be "fundamentally unfair" to keep JHMC in the
case and harm its reputation when only two of their doctors have
been identified as Defendants.

Section 1367(c) (4) provides that

the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if,
"in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction."

18 U.S.C.

§

1367(c) (4).

Defendant

has not established that sufficiently exceptional circumstances
exist here.

13

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 60 Filed 05/06/11 Page 14 of 14

c.

The Motion to Stay Discovery is Moot

Defendant's motion to stay discovery while the Court
considered Defendant's motion to dismiss is moot, as the motion
to dismiss has now been ruled upon.

V.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons,

aintiff's

§

1983 claims

against JHMC are dismissed without prejudice, but the Court shall
exercise supplemental jurisdiction to retain Plaintiff's state
law claims against JHMC.

JHMC's motion to stay discovery is

denied.

It is so ordered.

New

May

Yo~

'6

I

NY

2011

14