Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al

Filing 307

RULE 56.1 STATEMENT. Document filed by Adrian Schoolcraft. (Smith, Nathaniel)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-----------------------------------------------------------X
ADRIAN SCHOOLCRAFT,
Plaintiff,

10-CV-6005 (RWS)

-againstPLAINTIFF’S
RULE 56
STATEMENT
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------------------------X
Pursuant to the Local Rules of the Court, Plaintiff submits that the
following are the material and undisputed facts which entitle the Plaintiff to
summary judgment in his favor as a matter of law.
1.

On July 1, 2002, Officer Schoolcraft joined the New York City
Police Department (“NYPD”), and for most of his career, he was
assigned as a Patrol Officer in the 81st Precinct, which is located in
the Bedford Stuyvesant neighborhood of Brooklyn. 1

2.

The 81st Precinct is one of ten Precincts that are located in the
geographical area known as “Patrol Borough Brooklyn North.”
As a Patrol Officer, Officer Schoolcraft was a fine officer who

1

Plaintiff’s Motion Exhibit 1 (hereinafter “PMX”) at NYC 0001 (oath of office, dated 71-02).
1

ably and satisfactorily performed his duties and received
satisfactory or better performance reviews for most of his career. 2
3.

In October of 2006, the NYPD assigned Defendant Steven
Mauriello to be the Executive Officer of the 81st Precinct. 3 As the
Executive Officer, Mauriello was the second in command at the
81st Precinct. According to Mauriello, he requested that transfer
because it was his stated desire to become a commanding officer
of an NYPD Precinct. 4

4.

After Defendant Mauriello’s arrival at the 81st Precinct, Officer
Schoolcraft and other officers at the 81st Precinct began getting
increasingly greater pressure at roll calls to achieve quotas on their
number of arrests, summons and stops and to falsify
documentation about the receipt of training during roll calls. 5

5.

Because Officer Schoolcraft had concerns about the lawfulness
of these directions, he eventually began tape recording roll calls at

2

PMX 1: NYC 005-007 (fine officer with great potential); 043-44 (“extremely
competent” and an “asset for the department); 045-46 (“highly competent”); 087-91
(“fine officer with great potential”); 176-81 (“well-rounded officer” and a “steady and
reliable performer”). For the years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006, Officer Schoolcraft
received yearly performance evaluations of 3.5, 4.0, 3.5 and 3.5, respectively. (NYC
398-400, 171-72; 176-78 & 179-81.) It was only in 2007, after Defendant Mauriello
became the Executive Officer and then the Commanding Officer of the 81st Precinct in
2007 and 2008 that Officer Schoolcraft’s yearly performance ratings dropped to 3.0 in
2007 and 2.5 in 2008. (NYC 186-88 & 173-75.)
3
PMX 2: SM 340-43.
4
PMX 34: Mauriello Tr. 48:15 (“I wanted to go back to be an XO and earn my way back
up again.”)
5
PMX 4: Schoolcraft Tr. 29:13-30:12 & 32:24-33:5.
2

the 81st Precinct. 6
6.

Coincident with Defendant Mauriello’s arrival at the 81st
Precinct, Officer Schoolcraft’s performance evaluations began to
decline. 7 For 2007, Officer Schoolcraft received a 3.0 rating,
which was the equivalent of a marginally satisfactory rating. 8

7.

In that evaluation, Officer Schoolcraft was criticized for not
achieving “activity goals” and “performance goals,” which are
coded phrases that refer to numerical quotas imposed on Patrol
Officers. 9

8.

After being the Executive Officer at the 81st Precinct for one
year, “One Police Plaza” made the decision on December 1, 2007
to promote DI Mauriello to the position as Commanding Officer of
the 81st Precinct, and later he received a promotion to the title of
Deputy Inspector (“DI”). 10

9.

Under the command of DI Mauriello, the pressure to maintain

6

Id.
See n. 2 supra.
8
PMX 1: NYC 065-69.
9
See generally Floyd v City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 590, 596, 599 & n. 264
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (increase in stops achieved by pressure on commanders at CompStat
meetings to increase numbers and commanders in turn pressures mid-level mangers and
line officers to generate numbers; abundant evidence that supervisors directed officers to
meet numerical goals for stops, arrests and other enforcement activity as well as threating
officers with negative consequences if they did not achieve those goals; “supervisors
must evaluate officers based on their activity numbers, with particular emphasis on
summons, stops, and arrests, [and] officers whose numbers are too low should be subject
to increasingly serious discipline if their low numbers persist”)
10
PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 51:12-25.
7

3

numbers increased and Officer Schoolcraft’s performance
evaluations came under even greater scrutiny.
10.

During the course of second, third and fourth quarters of 2008,
Officer Schoolcraft’s supervisors persistently criticized him for his
low “activity” and his failure to meet activity standards. 11

11.

Based on these criticisms, in January of 2009, DI Mauriello
gave Officer Schoolcraft a failing evaluation of 2.5. 12

12.

Tracking the negative comments during the course of the year,
DI Mauriello’s 2008 performance evaluation recommended that
Officer Schoolcraft be transferred because of his “poor activity,”
for his “approach to meeting the performance standards” and for
his disregard of the “activity standards” of an NYPD Police
Officer.13

13.

Officer Schoolcraft objected to this evaluation and informed his
superiors that he wanted to appeal the failing evaluation. 14

14.

The appeal process involved the transmission of paperwork to
the next level of the command structure, which was the Brooklyn

11

PMX (PX 21): NYC 106 (as of May 2, 2008, “needs improvement in area of activity”);
NYC 110 (as of July 4, 2008, “activity is still substandard and is unacceptable” and was
instructed “on productivity expectations’); NYC 116 (as of October 1, 2009, “does not
meet activity standards” and has been told about his “low activity”); NYC 122 (as of
January 1, 2009, Officer Schoolcraft has been counseled on “his poor activity which is
unacceptable”).
12
PMX 5 (PX 51); PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 190:23-196:25.
13
PMX 5 (PX 51) at NYC 071)
14
PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 190:18.
4

North Patrol Borough, headed by Defendant Chief Gerald Nelson
and Defendant Deputy Chief Michael Marino. 15
15.

At around this time, a poster appeared on Officer Schoolcraft’s
locker containing the words: “IF YOU DON’T LIKE YOUR
JOB, THEN MAYBE YOU SHOULD GET ANOTHER JOB.” 16

16.

Another handwritten note that later appeared on his locker
stated: “shut up, you idiot.” 17

17.

On February 25, 2009, Officer Schoolcraft met with several
supervisors at the 81st Precinct, including DI Mauriello, and his
new Executive Officer, Defendant Captain Theodore Lauterborn. 18

18.

During the meeting, Officer Schoolcraft confirmed his intent to
appeal the failing 2008 performance evaluation and repeatedly
asked for information about what numbers are required of him. 19

19.

At the end of the meeting, another of the 81st Precinct
supervisors, Defendant Steven Weiss specifically asked Officer
Schoolcraft if he was recording the meeting. 20

15

PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 192:4 (“Chief Marino has an appeal board with borough
inspectors”).
16
PMX 1: NYC 12003.
17
PMX 1: NYC 12005.
18
PMX 1: NYC 191.
19
PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 190:18.
20
PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 326; PMX 6: Weiss Tr. 111:7-114;12 (recalls believing that
Schoolcraft was recording and recalled asking Schoolcraft if he was recording the
meeting in February 2009 about the appeal but denies ever discussing that belief with
Mauriello or Executive Officer Lauterborn or Lieutenant Caughey).
5

20.

In either late February or March of 2009, Mauriello went to the
main office for Patrol Borough Brooklyn North with Sergeant
Weiss from the 81st Precinct and met with Deputy Chief Marino
about Officer Schoolcraft’s appeal of his failing 2008 evaluation
and about Mauriello’s wish to transfer Schoolcraft out of the
Precinct. 21

21.

DI Mauriello requested that Officer Schoolcraft be transferred,
and Deputy Chief Marino denied that request at that time for lack
of paperwork. 22

22.

On March 11, 2009, a labor attorney for Officer Schoolcraft,
James A. Brown, Esq., wrote DI Mauriello a letter about Officer
Schoolcraft’s appeal of his failing evaluation. 23 Among other
things, the letter documented previously-raised concerns about
“numerical goals” being used improperly in performance
evaluations: “We are concerned that our client’s negative
evaluation is based not on the factors set forth in Patrol Guide 20548, but rather on his alleged lack of ‘activity’ related to his number
of arrests and summons issued. 24

21

PMX 6: Weiss Tr. 178:12-181:4; PMX 7: Marino Tr. 196:13-200:6; PMX 3:
Mauriello Tr. 276:15-277:15.
22
Id.
23
PMX 8 (PX 57 & 22).
24
PMX 8: Id. at p. 2.
6

23.

After receiving the letter, DI Mauriello told Chief Nelson about
it and forwarded it to Patrol Borough Brooklyn North as part of the
appeal process. 25

24.

A few days later, on about March 15, 2009, while Officer
Schoolcraft was on patrol, Defendant Weiss issued to Officer
Schoolcraft a command discipline for being “off post” and having
“unnecessary conversation” with another patrol officer. 26

25.

Officer Schoolcraft believed that he was being punished for the
letter from his lawyer and for appealing his evaluation, and as a
result, made a formal request on his radio that the Duty Captain for
Patrol Borough Brooklyn North respond to the scene. 27

26.

In response, Defendant Lauterborn, who claimed to have been
the Duty Captain at the time, had Officer Schoolcraft brought back
to the 81st Precinct. According to Officer Schoolcraft’s recording
of the meeting with Captain Lauterborn, Lauterborn told Officer
Schoolcraft that after the February meeting at the 81st Precinct to
discuss his appeal, he should not be surprised by the fact that he
was going to get a lot more “supervision” by the 81st Precinct
supervisors and that the 81st Precinct supervisors were now paying

25

PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 247:11-254:16.
PMX 9 at NYC 00081 (PX 168 ).
27
PMX 6: Weiss Tr. 98:2-19; PMX 10: Lauterborn Tr. 177:12-21 & 183:19-186:12
26

7

“closer attention” to him. 28
27.

Captain Lauterborn also told Officer Schoolcraft that “this is
gonna go on;” that he has “a long road ahead” of him; that going
forward, he needs to “cross your t’s and dot your i’s;” and that the
“supervision” was “coming down hard” on him not just in the past
two nights but since the day he walked out of the appeal meeting
in February of 2009. 29

28.

The same day that Officer Schoolcraft spoke to Captain
Lauterborn, Sergeant Weiss began reviewing police procedures on
how to have Officer Schoolcraft psychologically evaluated. 30

29.

Shortly after that, Sergeant Weiss contacted the NYPD’s Early
Intervention Unit and reported that he was “concerned” about the
level of Office Schoolcraft’s “mental distress.” 31

30.

Sergeant Weiss also did Internet research on Officer Schoolcraft
and found a news article in a local upstate newspaper about a
burglary at his father’s home and forwarded that article to the
Early Intervention Unit. 32

31.

Within a week or two of Sergeant Weiss’ contacting the Early

28

PMX 11: WS.310M_16MARCH2009_Report_Retaliation at 0:15-2:15, 5:45__28:5031:30. The recording is attached at part of a compact disk accompanying this motion
together with other records relevant to the motion.
29
PMX 11: Id. at 30:00-31:30.
30
PMX 6: Weiss Tr. 120:6-121:2.
31
PMX 6: Weiss Tr. 99:14-101:4.
32
PMX 6: Weiss Tr. 103:6-109:3
8

Intervention Unit, Officer Schoolcraft was placed on modified or
restricted duty without any law enforcement or patrol duties and
his gun and shield were removed. 33
32.

According to the NYPD psychologist who testified that she was
directly involved in the decision to place Officer Schoolcraft on
limited duty, Officer Schoolcraft was suffering from the physical
manifestations of stress. 34 Based on that opinion, she
recommended cognitive behavioral therapy or stress management
training to improve coping skills and to reduce the physical
symptoms of stress. 35

33.

The NYPD psychologist did not recommend any medication,
did not believe that Officer Schoolcraft was psychotic, and did not
believe that Officer Schoolcraft was dangerous to himself or
others. 36

34.

As a result of being placed on limited duty, Officer Schoolcraft
was assigned to work at the 81st Precinct as the Telephone
Switchboard operator, essentially taking calls to the Precinct and
handling walk-ins by members of the public. 37

33

PMX
PMX
35
PMX
36
PMX
37
PMX
34

6: Weiss Tr. 101:24-102:10.
12: Lamstein Tr. 172:21-174:20
12: Lamstein Tr. 105:22-107:4.
12: Lamstein Tr. 113:15-115:2, 153:10-17, & 285:3-23.
13: Huffman Tr. 46:10-25.
9

35.

He held that position from April 2009 through the end of
October 2009.

36.

While on limited duty, Officer Schoolcraft continued his
attempts to challenge his failing 2008 performance evaluation. 38

37.

He also started reporting misconduct by his supervisors at the
81st Precinct.

38.

On August 20, 2009, Officer Schoolcraft reported to the Internal
Affairs Bureau (“IAB”) on “corruption involving the integrity
control program” at the 81st Precinct by the Integrity Control
Officer, Defendant Lieutenant Caughey and Assistant Integrity
Control Officer, Defendant Weiss. 39

39.

In addition, on August 31, 2009, a former member of the
service, David Dirk, reported that Officer Schoolcraft was the
victim of retaliation by his supervisors. 40

40.

On September 2, 2009, Officer Schoolcraft spoke with IAB and
reported that DI Mauriello was pressuring his staff to downgrade
or suppress crime reporting and that under the direction of DI

38

On September 2, 20109, Officer Schoolcraft wrote a memorandum to DI Mauriello
requesting (again) that his appeal be processed and Mauriello testified that he received
the memorandum and forwarded it to the Sergeant at Patrol Borough Brooklyn North
who handled the paperwork for appeals. (PMX 14: (PX 58) & PMX 3: Mauriello Tr.
269:4-274:14).
39
PMX 15: Schoolcraft Report (PX 40).
40
PMX 15 (NYC 4785-86) (Attorneys’ Eyes Only (“AEO”) designation, filed under
seal).
10

Mauriello police officers were being directed to make arrests and
issue summonses “in violation of people’s civil rights.” 41
41.

According to the IAB report, Officer Schoolcraft also stated
that he received his failing evaluation “because he doesn’t believe
in summons and arrest quotas” and that police officers “are being
forced to sign the training log even though they don’t get the
necessary training.” 42

42.

On October 7, 2009, Officer Schoolcraft met with investigators
from the NYPD’s Quality Assurance Division (“QAD”). 43 At the
meeting, Officer Schoolcraft reported in greater detail about the
nature of the downgrading and suppression of major crime
reporting at the 81st Precinct. 44

43.

While QAD undertook to conduct an investigation into those
allegations, it also referred Officer Schoolcraft’s other misconduct
allegations to IAB. 45

44.

By the end of October of 2009, it was common knowledge with
the 81st Precinct that the Precinct was under investigation and that
Officer Schoolcraft was involved in reporting the misconduct that

41

PMX 16 (NYC 4316-18) (Confidential designation, filed under seal).
Id.
43
PMX 16 at NYC 5158 (PX 169; NYC 5153-5248).
44
Id. at 5158-60.
45
Id. at 5159 & 5220.
42

11

led to that investigation.
45.

Sometime earlier that year, Captain Lauterborn learned from DI
Mauriello of a QAD investigation of the 81st Precinct. 46

46.

In addition, towards the end of October, an 81st Precinct
Sergeant told DI Mauriello that QAD was calling down officers
and based on that tip, DI Mauriello called up an Inspector from
QAD, who confirmed that there was an investigation. 47

47.

Earlier in the year, there was persistent speculation at the 81st
Precinct that Officer Schoolcraft was tape recording at the
Precinct. 48

48.

In addition, Captain Lauterborn testified that as the QAD
investigation was heating up, he allegedly received complaints
from other officers interviewed by QAD that Officer Schoolcraft
was asking them questions about their QAD interviews and
informed DI Mauriello about Officer Schoolcraft’s alleged
conduct. 49

49.

Moreover, supervisors at the 81st Precinct knew from their
practice of inspecting or “scratching” memo books that Officer

46

PMX 10: Lauterborn Tr. 278:17-280:19
PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 330:15-332:23 & 450:22-452:18.
48
PMX 10: Lauterborn Tr. 278:17-280:19.
49
PMX 10: Lauterborn Tr. 86:22-95:2. While Officer Schoolcraft denies doing this, the
fact that it was stated by Defendant Lauterborn goes to his state of mind and beliefs about
Officer Schoolcraft.
47

12

Schoolcraft’s memo book contained the name of an IAB officer. 50
Finally, on October 19th Lieutenant Caughey issued a written order
to all officers in the command that all inquiries from IAB must be
reported directly to him. 51
50.

On October 31, 2009 – the last day that Officer Schoolcraft
reported to the 81st Precinct – he worked the day tour and
conducted his regular duties at the Telephone Switchboard desk.

51.

During the course of that morning, Lieutenant Caughey took
Officer Schoolcraft’s memo book to “scratch it” and instead, kept
it for several hours. 52

52.

While in his office, Lieutenant Caughey made two photocopies
of the entire memo book because he saw “unusual” entries in it. 53
Lieutenant Caughey kept one copy for himself and put the other
copy in DI Inspector Mauriello’s office desk. 54

53.

When he returned the memo book to Officer Schoolcraft later
that day, Officer Schoolcraft noticed (and became alarmed) that
several pages of the memo book containing his entries about

50

PMX 10: Lauterborn Tr. 86:22-99:20 & 114:14-118:16
PMX 17 (Caughey Memo).
52
PMX 4: Schoolcraft Tr. 202:22-203:20; PMX 18: Caughey Tr. 120:18-121:19.
53
PMX 18: Caughey Tr. 122:11-20.
54
PMX 18: Caughey Tr. 127:24-128:15.
51

13

corruption or misconduct were earmarked or folded down. 55
54.

Officer Schoolcraft grew more alarmed during the course of the
day when Lieutenant Caughey started acting toward Officer
Schoolcraft in a menacing manner. 56

55.

One of the civilian workers at the Precinct, Police
Administrative Aide (“PAA”) Curtis Boston, saw Lieutenant
Caughey walk by Officer Schoolcraft that day in an unusual
manner and twice during the course of that morning PAA Boston
and Officer Schoolcraft discussed Lieutenant Caughey’s unusual
behavior toward Officer Schoolcraft. 57

56.

PAA Boston specifically recalled that Officer Schoolcraft told
her that he felt uncomfortable about Lieutenant Caughey’s
behavior and that Officer Schoolcraft asked her to document her
reasons for why she believed Lieutenant Caughey was acting in a
suspicious manner. 58

57.

About one hour before the end of his scheduled day, Officer
Schoolcraft told his supervisor, Sergeant Huffman that he was not
feeling well and was going home. 59 At the time, Sergeant

55

PMX 4: Schoolcrfaft Tr. 202:22-203-11.
PMX 4: Schoolcraft Tr. 118:3-25-120:10;
57
PMX 19: Boston Tr. 64:17-65:5 & 77:15-86:13.
58
PMX 19: Boston Tr. 77:15-86:13 & 109:16-112:5.
59
PMX 13: Huffman Tr. 66:20-67:2 & 71:3-75:9.
56

14

Huffman told Officer Schoolcraft that that was “okay.” 60
58.

Officer Schoolcraft also submitted to Sergeant Huffman a sick
report, which could have been a basis for authorizing him to take
“administrative sick” for the day. 61

59.

As Officer Schoolcraft was leaving the precinct, however,
Sergeant Huffman told Officer Schoolcraft that he could take “lost
time” 62 and Officer Schoolcraft told her that that would be fine,
although he would have preferred sick time. 63

60.

At about 3:30 pm, Officer Schoolcraft got home, which was
located at 82-60 Eighty-Eighth Place, Queens, New York, and
telephonically notified IAB of Lieutenant’s Caughey’s menacing
behavior. 64

61.

Officer Schoolcraft specifically informed IAB that he felt
threatened, retaliated against, and in danger as a result of
Lieutenant Caughey’s menacing behavior. 65

62.

About one hour later, at about 4:20 pm, a Sergeant Krohley,
from the 104th Precinct, went to Officer Schoolcraft’s home with

60

PMX 13: Huffman Tr. 74:11-19.
PMX 13: Huffman Tr. 68:6-15 (administrative sick can be approved by the desk
sergeant); PMX 20: Valenti Tr. 14:20-16:13 (same).
62
PMX 13: Huffman Tr. 80:12-20.
63
PMX 4: Schoolcraft Tr. 123:23-124:14
64
PMX 4: Schoolcraft Tr. 126:3-127:18. The call to IAB is also recorded and
identified as DS.50_31October2009_Notify_IAB_Lt.Cauhey_Menacing.wma; PMX 11.
65
Id. at 19:40-26:10.
61

15

his driver. Sergeant Krohley rang the bell for Officer
Schoolcraft’s apartment, which was on the second floor of a
three-family house, and when there was no answer, he spoke to
the landlady, Carol Stretmoyer, who told him that she believed
that Officer Schoolcraft had left about thirty minutes ago. 66
63.

Stretmoyer also informed Sergeant Krohley that Officer
Schoolcraft has a car, which was parked on the street. Sergeant
Krohley determined that the car was registered in the name of
Officer Schoolcraft’s father. 67

64.

At about 5:00 pm, Lieutenant Broschart from the 81st Precinct
arrived at the scene, and Sergeant Krohley briefed Lieutenant
Broschart on the facts he had determined since arriving at the
scene. 68

65.

Lieutenant Broschart was under orders from DI Mauriello and
Captain Lauterborn to go to Officer Schoolcraft’s home and bring
him back to the Precinct. 69

66.

After arriving at the scene, Lieutenant Broschart also knocked
on the door, and when there was no answer, he updated Captain

66

PMX 16 (NYC 4643) (AEO designation).
Id.
68
PMX 16: (NYC 4643) (AEO designation); see also PMX 11:
DS.50_31October2009_Notify_IAB_Lt.Cauhey_Menacing.wma at 40:52 (noting that at
4:18 pm a black Impala in front of Officer Schoolcraft’s house and his door bell being
rung).
69
PMX 20: Broschart Tr. 87:17-88:20.
67

16

Lauterborn by telephone that Officer Schoolcraft was not home
and that the landlady had told him that he might have left. 70
67.

Captain Lauterborn told Lieutenant Broschart to stand by and
wait to see if Officer Schoolcraft returned. 71

68.

Later that evening, Captain Lauterborn spoke with NYPD
Psychologist Lamstein. According to Psychologist Lamstein’s
notes of the call, Captain Lauterborn told her that Officer
Schoolcraft left early that day and the “underlying issue” was that
Officer Schoolcraft “has made allegations against others” and the
“dept’s investigation of those allegations picked up this week & it
snowballed from there.” 72

69.

Psychologist Lamstein told Captain Lauterborn that she had
seen Officer Schoolcraft just a few days ago and that she “had no
reason to think [Officer Schoolcraft] was a danger to himself or
others.” 73

70.

At about 7:40 pm that night, after speaking with Psychologist
Lamstein, Captain Lauterborn also called Officer Schoolcraft’s
father and told the father that Officer Schoolcraft left without

70

PMX 20: Broschart Tr. 100:25-104:20.
Id.
72
PMX 22 at NYC 282(PX 29); PMX 12: Lamstein Tr. 327:13-328:4.
73
PMX 12: Lamstein Tr. 319:24-25; see also PMX 23 Lauterborn Report (PX 16), 1031-09 at p. NYC 00095 (“She stated that although she did not believe he was an
immediate threat to himself or others his firearms were removed because of emotional
distress caused by issues of anger and resentment against the Department.”).
71

17

permission and had to return to the 81st Precinct that night. 74
71.

The father told Captain Lauterborn that he spoke to his son
earlier that day, that his son told him he felt sick in his stomach
with a tummy ache and was going home and would call him
when he woke up. 75

72.

Lauterborn told the father that he needs to “physically talk to”
Officer Schoolcraft and “resolve things” and the situation is not
going to “wait until the morning.” 76 Lauterborn insisted that he
had to talk to Officer Schoolcraft “in person” and not “over the
phone.” 77 He also stated that the “situation was going to escalate
as the night goes on ” and that “no one is going in or out of that
house he lives in because there are police all over it.” 78 If Officer
Schoolcraft was there, Captain Lauterborn said that “eventually
we are going to make our way in.” 79

73.

Although the father assured Captain Lauterborn that his son
was fine and was probably sleeping, Captain Lauterborn insisted
that it was not going to “end here” and that Officer Schoolcraft

74

PMX 11: WS.331M_31October2009_LCS_ReturnPhoneCall to Capt. Lauterborn at
3:38-5:15.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 6:20-37.
77
Id. at 8:00-05.
78
Id. 9:55-10:06
79
Id. at 10:10-20.
18

should report to the Lieutenant on the scene outside his home. 80
74.

At 9:45 pm that night, after waiting five hours outside Officer
Schoolcraft’s home, the NYPD took a key from the landlord and
entered his home. 81

75.

That entry, which was made without a warrant, was made by at
least ten supervisory NYPD officers.

76.

The entry team was led by three Emergency Services Unit
officers, who were followed by Deputy Chief Marino, DI
Mauriello, Captain Lauterborn, Lieutenant Broschart, and three
members of the Brooklyn North Investigation Unit (Lieutenant
William Gough, Sergeant Kurt Dunkin, and Sergeant Raymond
Hawkins). 82

77.

At the time of their entry, the house was also surrounded by
numerous other members of the NYPD, including DI Keith
Green, the commanding officer of the 104th Precinct, Lieutenant
Thomas Crawford (81st Precinct); Sergeant Kevin Scanlon (104th
Precinct); and several Police Officers who were acting either as
drivers for the supervisors at the scene or had set up a barricade

80

Id. at 10:55-11:00.
PMX 16 at NYC 00432 (2145 entry made into apartment).
82
PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 349:13-350:21.
81

19

to block off street traffic. 83
78.

Also responding to the scene was FDNY Lieutenant Hanlon
and two Jamaica Hospital Emergency Medical Technicians
(“EMT”). 84

79.

According to Deputy Chief Marino and DI Mauriello, the
warrantless entry into Officer Schoolcraft’s home was justified
by their concerns for his “well-being.” 85

80.

Deputy Chief Marino admitted that he had no information that
Officer Schoolcraft had threatened to hurt himself or others, 86

81.

Psychologist Lamstein had told Captain Lauterborn that
evening that to her knowledge he was not a threat to himself or
others, they allegedly believed that he was “possibly” an
emotionally disturbed person because he had been sent (by them)
to psychological services earlier that year, had been put on
restricted duty without a gun and had left work early, allegedly
against orders. 87

82.

Upon entry, the Emergency Services Unit officers moved into

83

Id. at NYC 000429.
PMX 16 at NYC 431.
85
PMX 7: Marino Tr. 255:15 (“I was thinking about Schoolcraft’s safety”) & 256:9-18
(believed there was “a possibility of” him being an emotionally disturbed person); but see
id. at 258:5-16 (no information that Officer Schoolcraft had threatened to hurt himself or
others). PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 357:24-358:22 (entry made out of concern for his wellbeing and safety).
86
PMX 7: Marino Tr. at 258:5-16.
87
PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 357:24-358:22.
84

20

Officer Schoolcraft’s’ bedroom with their guns drawn, wearing
bulletproof vests and helmets and carrying tactical shields. 88
83.

Officer Schoolcraft was lying on his bed and it appeared that
he was either watching TV or had just woke up. 89

84.

As reflected by the first moments of a recording captured by
Officer Schoolcraft’s voice-activated digital recorder, one of the
Emergency Service Unit officers asked Officer Schoolcraft, “You
okay?” to which Officer Schoolcraft replied, “Yeah, I think so.”

85.

Once DI Mauriello entered his bedroom, he ordered Officer
Schoolcraft to return to the 81st Precinct. 90

86.

As reflected by the recording, Officer Schoolcraft refused to
return to the Precinct, notwithstanding numerous threats and
orders. Eventually, however, Officer Schoolcraft succumbed to
threats by Captain Lauterborn and Lieutenant Gough, and said he
would go under protest. 91

87.

Then a few moments later, Officer Schoolcraft stated that he
had to sit down because he was not feeling well and agreed to

88

PMX 24: Duncan Tr. 119:4-120:19; PMX 25: Gough Tr. 141:4-25.
PMX 24: Duncan Tr. 127:11-20 (laying there on his bed watching TV); PMX 3:
Mauriello Tr. 359:2-5 (the TV was on).
90
PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 356:11-357:15; PMX 11: (DS.50_31October
2009_HomeInvasion.wma at 2:48).
91
PMX 11: DS.50_31October 2009_HomeInvasion.wma at 5:15-8:40
89

21

receive medical attention. 92
88.

While Officer Schoolcraft was being examined by Jamaica
Hospital EMT Salvatore Sangeniti, who had previously
responded to the scene with an FDNY EMT supervisor, Deputy
Chief Marino returned to Officer Schoolcraft’s bedroom and
berated Officer Schoolcraft about feeling sick. 93

89.

And at the very moment when EMT Sangeniti started taking
Officer Schoolcraft’s blood pressure, Deputy Chief Marino, in a
loud and angry tone of voice, suspended Officer Schoolcraft. 94

90.

Based on the circumstances confronting Officer Schoolcraft,
he agreed to go to the hospital associated with his primary care
physician, which was Forest Hills Hospital, to have his blood
pressure checked out. 95

91.

When it became clear to Officer Schoolcraft, however, that the
NYPD was going to take him to Jamaica Hospital (which has a
psychiatric ward), Office Schoolcraft refused further medical
attention and went back to his apartment. 96

92

PMX 11: DS.50_31October 2009_HomeInvasion.wma at 5:15-8:40.
PMX 11:DS.50_31October 2009_HomeInvasion.wma at 9:07-12:12.
94
PMX 11: DS.50_31October 2009_HomeInvasion.wma at 11:00-12:12; PMX 26:
Sangeniti Tr. 144:16-148:3 (Sangeniti confirming that at the point when Deputy Chief
Marino suspends Officer Schoolcraft he was taking his blood pressure; testimony based
on the sounds made when taking blood pressure).
95
PMX 11: DS.50_31October 2009_HomeInvasion.wma at 13:00-14:10.
96
PMX 4: Schoolcraft Tr. 149:7-151:2.
93

22

92.

As reflected in the second part of the recording of the events in
his home that time, Officer Schoolcraft returned to his apartment,
laid back down in his bed and refused further orders first by
Captain Lauterborn and then by Deputy Chief Marino who
returned again to his home and entered without permission. 97

93.

Deputy Chief Marino declared Officer Schoolcraft an
“emotionally disturbed person” (also known as an “EDP”) and
Captain Lauterborn, Lieutenant Broschart, Lieutenant Gough and
Sergeant Duncan grabbed Officer Schoolcraft from his bed, threw
him on the floor of his bedroom and cuffed him with his hands
behind his back. 98

94.

While Officer Schoolcraft was prone on the floor and Gough
and Duncan were forcing his wrists into handcuffs, Broschart
stepped on the backs of his legs, Lauterborn held him down with
his hands, and Deputy Chief Marino put his boot on Officer
Schoolcraft’s face as he tried to turn his neck around to see what
was being done to his body. 99

95.

After the handcuffs were secured, Officer Schoolcraft was then

97

PMX 4: Schoolcraft Tr. 1:4-155:8 (Lauterborn pursued Schoolcraft back into his
apartment and physically prevented him from shutting the doors behind him as he
returned); PMX 11: DS.50_31October 2009_HomeInvasion.wma at 17:50-22:00.
98
PMX 11: DS.50_31October 2009_HomeInvasion.wma at 21:30 -23:51.
99
PMX 4: Schoolcraft Tr. 166:21-168:19; PMX 21: Broschart Tr. 167:16-169:17; PMX
10: Lauterborn Tr. 322:23-323:9.
23

forced into an ESU chair, taken to the ambulance, placed on a
stretcher with his hands cuffed behind his back, and driven to
Jamaica Hospital by the two Jamaica Hospital EMTs.
96.

Lieutenant Broschart rode in the back of the ambulance to
maintain custody of Officer Schoolcraft. 100

97.

While the NYPD officers were in his apartment, they
searched his person and his apartment and seized a voiceactivated digital recorder taken from his pocket as well as several
files belonging to Officer Schoolcraft, including copies of crime
reports reflecting the downgrading of crimes he reported to IAB
and notes in a folder marked “Report to the Commissioner. 101

98.

Officer Schoolcraft arrived at Jamaica Hospital’s Emergency
Room later that night and spent the night handcuffed to a gurney
in the Emergency Room.

99.

Hospital medical records or the “chart” reflect that he was in
custody of the NYPD the entire time. 102

100. Officer Schoolcraft was cuffed and under the custody of
Lieutenant Broschart until the Lieutenant was relieved at about
midnight by Defendant, Sergeant James, who was also from the
100

PMX 11: DS.50_31October 2009_HomeInvasion.wma at 22:00-28:27; .
PMX 4: Schoolcraft Tr. 173:12-177:17.
102
PMX 27: Jamaica Hospital Chart (PX 69 at JHMC 58) (Emergency Department
Nursing Notes). Plaintiff’s counsel has paginated the chart as “JHMC _.”
101

24

81st Precinct, and Sergeant James remained there until the
morning. 103
101. On November 1, 2009,Defendant, Sergeant Frederick Sawyer,
another supervisor from the 81st Precinct, was sent to Jamaica
Hospital to relieve Sergeant James. When Sawyer got to the
hospital, he saw Officer Schoolcraft on the telephone and,
according to Sawyer, he ordered him to get off the telephone. 104
102. When Officer Schoolcraft did not comply with that order,
Sergeant Sawyer, Sergeant James, and their two drivers
physically forced Officer Schoolcraft onto the gurney and
handcuffed his other hand to the gurney, leaving him in a fully
shackled position on the gurney. 105
103. When Sawyer applied the cuffs to Officer Schoolcraft, he used
both hands to squeeze the cuffs tighter and said “this is what
happens to rats.” 106
104. Later that morning, the two sets of handcuffs were removed
and Officer Schoolcraft was wheeled into the Jamaica Hospital
Psychiatric Emergency Room to be held against his will for

103

PMX
PMX
105
PMX
106
PMX
104

28: James Tr. 53:18-20, 59:17-60:16 & 67:14-71:16 .
29: Sawyer Tr. 139:25-146:15.
29: Sawyer Tr. 139:25-146:15 & 153:14-156:16.
4: Schoolcraft Tr. 186:11-22..
25

further “observation.” 107
105. On November 3, 2009, Doctor Bernier ordered Officer
Schoolcraft’s involuntary hospitalization.
106. Dr. Bernier’s decision was made even though there was
nothing in the chart that suggested that Officer Schoolcraft was
dangerous.
107. After the paperwork was filled out, Officer Schoolcraft was
taken from the Psychiatric Emergency Room to a psychiatric
ward in the hospital. 108
108. On November 4, 2009, Doctor Isakov, who was an attending
doctor on the psychiatric ward, confirmed Dr. Bernier’s decision
to involuntarily hospitalize Officer Schoolcraft. 109
109. That decision was reached even though there was nothing in
the chart that suggested that Officer Schoolcraft was dangerous to
himself or others. 110
110. Doctor Bernier and Doctor Isakov testified at their depositions
that they admitted Officer Schoolcraft on the ground that any
possible or potential risk of dangerousness was a sufficient basis

107

PMX 27: Medical Chart (PX 69) at JHMC 45.
Id. at 91.
109
PMX 27 (PX 69) at p. 46.
110
See PMX 30: Report of Dr. Roy Lubit at p. 13-14.
108

26

for their commitment decision. 111
111. Dr. Dhar, who was the Jamaica Hospital witness in this action,
also testified that it was the policy and practice of the hospital to
involuntarily commit a patient based on any possibility that the
person was dangerous. 112
112. On November 6, 2009, after a forced stay lasting six days,
Jamaica Hospital released Officer Schoolcraft from its custody,
the same day that insurance coverage for his forced stay
expired. 113
113. After Officer Schoolcraft was released from Jamaica Hospital,
he moved to Johnstown, New York and for the next six months
was relentlessly harassed by the NYPD, which sent NYPD and
local police officers on at least twelve separate occasions to bang
on his door, spy on him, and videotape him or his father.
114. In January 2010 and in February 2010, Lieutenant Gough and
Sergeant Duncan traveled with others north over 200 miles to his
home to deliver papers to him that could have just as easily been
sent to him by certified mail. 114

111

PMX 31: Bernier Tr. 248-49; PMX 32: Isakov Tr. 94-98
PMX 33: Dhar Tr. 132-35.
113
PMX 27 (Medical Chart) at JHMC 128 (“The case is certified from 11/3/09 through
11/6/09. Next review will be with Dan of Aetna….”).
114
PMX 16 at 3876.
112

27

115. DI Mauriello was a witnesses in the stop and frisk case
recently tried in this Courthouse before District Court Judge Shira
A. Scheindlin, Floyd v. City of New York, 08-cv-1034 (SAS)
(Dkt. # 298). In that testimony, DI Mauriello stated that after the
quota allegations were made against him as the commanding
officer of the 81st Precinct, he was transferred on July 3, 2010 to
become the Executive Officer of Transit Borough Brooklyn and
Queens. According to DI Mauriello’s testimony before Judge
Scheindlin, at the time of the transfer, the Chief of Patrol for the
entire NYPD told DI Mauriello that he was doing a “really good
job at the 81st Precinct” and that he wanted to reward him with
the new position. 115
116. While Mauriello did not claim then that the transfer was a
promotion, he did considered it a transfer to a position as “second
commander to more officers.” 116
117. While technically not a “promotion,” it was “a reward for the
job [he] did at the 81st Precinct.” 117
118. Mauriello has not suffered any damage to his status at the
NYPD.

115

PMX 35: Mauriello Floyd Testimony (PX 48) at 1829:25-1831:11.
Id. at 1831:17.
117
Id. at 1836:25.
116

28

119. In his deposition in this case, DI Mauriello testified that soon
after the news broke in a February 2010 Daily News article about
the investigation into downgrading major crimes at the 81st
Precinct, he attended a Patrol Borough Brooklyn North
supervisors meeting. At the meeting his direct supervisor,
Deputy Chief Marino, told DI Mauriello not to worry about the
negative press because he did not believe it. 118
120. In addition, according to Mauriello, Deputy Chief Marino and
the thirty-five other supervisors in the room told DI Mauriello
that they supported him. 119
121. Mauriello does not claim that he was denied some specific
position or promotion. At his deposition, DI Mauriello testified
that he has not made any efforts to change his position at the
NYPD since October 2009 and that he has not made any requests
for any changes in his position since October 2009. 120
122. The only information that Mauriello could provide at his
deposition was that he had discussions in the summer of 2011
with his now-retired supervisor, Transit Bureau Chief Diaz, and
his successor, Joseph Fox, who told him that any transfers or

118

PMX 3: Mauriello Tr. 98:12-103:25.
Id. at 103:16-25
120
Id. at 419:4-420:10.
119

29

promotions would likely have to wait until the case is over and
that until then they could not “push for him.” 121
123. Mauriello has no evidence that Officer Schoolcraft’s
statements to QAD or IAB were made for the sole purpose of
intentionally inflicting harm on Mauriello or that Officer
Schoolcraft used wrongful means to inflict that harm.
124. Mauriello’s Counterclaims say that Officer Schoolcraft was
motivated by a lawsuit.
125. Official findings by two NYPD investigative agencies – IAB
and QAD – show that DI Mauriello personally committed
misconduct and improperly permitted rampant downgrading and
suppression of crime reporting at the 81st Precinct while under his
command.
126. After October 31, 2009, IAB began an investigation into
whether DI Mauriello knew about or suspected at the time of his
entry into Officer Schoolcraft’s home that IAB or QAD was
investigating the 81st Precinct. IAB also made investigation into
whether Mauriello knew about the contents of Officer
Schoolcraft’s memo book at the time he forced his way into his
apartment.

121

Id. at 466:11-470:9.
30

127. During the course of those investigations, DI Mauriello was
required to be interviewed under oath by IAB, and at his
interview DI Mauriello made materially false statements about
his knowledge about the existence of an investigation into his
Precinct and Officer Schoolcraft’s memo book. 122
128. IAB has recommended that formal charges against Mauriello
be filed, and those charges are still pending.
129. In 2010, QAD issued a report on its investigation, stating:

REDACTED FILED UNDER SEAL 123

Dated: December 22, 2014
s/NBS
___________________
Nathaniel B. Smith
111 Broadway – Suite 1305
New York, NY 10006
212-2227-7062

122

PMX 15 (PX 144) (confidential designation)
PMX 16 (PX 169) at NYC 5205 (AEO designation; filed under seal) (redacted ECF
version).

123

31