Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al

Filing 347

DECLARATION of Brian E. Lee in Support re: 334 MOTION to Dismiss and for other relief.. Document filed by Isak Isakov. (Attachments: # 1 Exhibit Exhibit A: Second Amended Complaint, # 2 Exhibit Exhibit B: Answer to 2nd Amended Complaint, # 3 Exhibit Exhibit D: Deposition excerpts, # 4 Exhibit Exhibit E: Exceprts 1 of 5, # 5 Exhibit Exhibit E: Exceprts 2 of 5, # 6 Exhibit Exhibit E: Exceprts 3 of 5, # 7 Exhibit Exhibit E: Exceprts 4 of 5, # 8 Exhibit Exhibit E: Exceprts 5 of 5, # 9 Exhibit Exhibit F: 3rd Amended Complaint, # 10 Exhibit Exhibit G: Order of Judge Sweet 1-16-15)(Lee, Brian)

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 1 of 19

ll

- :· .· :. '. "--~:..~~-· ."''"" . . _

v ._ [.. -~...

, i-:;J.
r 'I

1')"'<• .
I i ~ '" i..~ LJ lVi {_'"

OUNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------ -- -- ------------X

.

~·~~ :·-:~::.~-:-:- ~

:·
f

· · 1 .../iJ-,r'!(' :'-·
-!
~-~-,j'-

i_

--··-·--··-··
~t

1
'1
;

.:y

I

,_
l-~ \f\f':T§" 4,...

I

!!

r
, ' ,#; __,_·· ·'
. ? fn ;"
/I uA.1b i·1i r.'j· ··r·+~-· r ....

!,

i

i..:_....::::::-..:::::···~-~~5. ...:=-:·~·. : •
-.-....-K__ . :"<=.,.: ·.
.

ADRIAN SCHOOLCRAFT,

.:,::~

Plaintiff,
10 Civ. 6005
- against OPINION
CITY OF NEW YORK, ET AL.,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------x
A P P E A RAN C E S:
Attorney for the Plaintiff
LAW OFFICE OF NATHANIEL B. SMITH
111 Broadway
Suite 1305
New York, NY 10006
By:
Nathaniel B. Smith, Esq.

Attorney for the City Defendants
ZACHARY W. CARTER
CORPORATION COUNSEL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK
100 Church Street
New York, NY 10007
By:
Suzanna P. Mettham, Esq.

Attorneys for Defendant Jamaica Hospital Medical
Center
MARTIN CLEARWATER & BELL, LLP.
220 East 42nct Street
New York, NY 10017
By:
Gregory J. Radomisli, Esq.

(RWS)

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 2 of 19

Sweet, D. J.

Plaintiff Adrian Schoolcraft ("Schoolcraft" or
"Plaintiff") moves for an order allowing him to amend the
operative Second Amended Complaint ("SAC") pursuant to Rule 15
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

For the reasons set out below,

Plaintiff's motion is

granted in part and denied in part, and Plaintiff may file a
Third Amended Complaint ("TAC")

in keeping with this Opinion.

Prior Proceedings

A detailed recitation of the facts of the underlying
case is provided in this Court's opinion dated May 6, 2011,
which granted in part and denied in part Defendant Jamaica
Hospital Medical Center's motion to dismiss.

See Schoolcraft v.

City of New York, 10 Civ. 6005, 2011 WL 1758635, at *l (S.D.N.Y.
May 6, 2011).

Familiarity with those facts is assumed.

The

action involves claims brought by Schoolcraft in the SAC against
the City, several members of the New York City Police Department
("NYPD"), collectively the "City Defendants"), and Jamaica
Hospital Medical Center ("JHMC"), two doctors employed by JHMC,
and others,

(collectively with the City Defendants, the
1

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 3 of 19

"Defendants") .

Through the instant motion, Plaintiff seeks to:
1.

Remove four of the named Defendants: Police

Officers Sondra Wilson ("Wilson"); Richard Wall ("Wall"); Robert
O'Hare ("O'Hare"); and Thomas Hanley ("Hanley");
2.
42

u.s.c.

§

Remove a redundant claim for relief brought under
1983;

3.

Add Officers Steven Weiss ("Weiss") and Rafel A.

Mascol ("Mascol") as named Defendants and amend the case caption
accordingly;
4.

Reassert claims brought under 42 U.S.C.

§

1983

against JHMC;
5.

Add a claim for injunction and declaratory

relief, seeking an order:

(a)

finding that all of the

Defendants' conduct with respect to their treatment of
Schoolcraft was unlawful;

(b) and directing the expungement of

Schoolcraft's medical and personnel records to the extent that
those records suggest that Schoolcraft was properly admitted to
a psychiatric ward, that he suffers from a mental illness, that
his condition required his commitment to a psychiatric hospital,
and that he is dangerous to himself or others; and
6.

Modifying the phrasing of numerous factual

allegations in the SAC.
2

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 4 of 19

The instant motion was marked fully submitted on
December 31, 2014.

Applicable Standard

Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
directs that leave to amend a pleading be given freely when
justice requires.

Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 10-cv-6005,

2012 WL 2161596, at *l

(S.D.N.Y. June 14, 2012).

"If the

underlying facts or circumstances relied upon by a plaintiff may
be a proper subject of relief, he ought to be afforded the
opportunity to test his claim on the merits."

Id.

Williams v. Citigroup,

(2d Cir. 2011)).

"However,

Inc.,

659 F.3d 208, 213

[a] district court has discretion to deny leave for

good reason,

including futility,

bad faith,

undue prejudice to the opposing party."
v. Dunn & Bradstreet Corp.,

undue delay, or

Id.

482 F.3d 184, 200

see also Zahra v. Town of Southold,
1995)

(quoting

(quoting McCarthy
(2d Cir. 2007));

48 F.3d 674,

686

(2d Cir.

(upholding the denial of a motion to amend the complaint

that was filed 2 1/2 years after commencement of the action, and
three months prior to trial); Ansam Assocs.,
Petroleum Ltd.,

760 F.2d 442,

446

Inc. v. Cola

(2d Cir. 1985)

(upholding

denial of a motion to amend a complaint when discovery had been

3

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 5 of 19

completed and motions for summary judgment had been filed).

With respect to futility,

a proposed amendment is

evaluated on a motion to dismiss standard.
L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc.,

See Anderson News,

680 F.3d 162, 185 (2d Cir. 2012);

Mina Inv. Holdings, Ltd. v. Lefkowitz, 184 F.R.D. 245, 258
(S.D.N.Y. 1999).

To determine whether there would be undue

prejudice from a proposed amendment, a court must consider
whether the new aspects of the proposed pleading would "(i)
require the opponent to expend significant additional resources
to conduct discovery and prepare for trial;

(ii)

significantly

delay the resolution of the dispute; or (iii) prevent the
plaintiff from bringing a timely action in another
jurisdiction."
F.3d 275, 284
omitted).

Monahan v. New York City Dep't of Corrs., 214
(2d Cir. 2000)

(internal quotations and citations

Delay alone, in the absence of a showing of undue

prejudice or bad faith,

typically provides an insufficient basis

for denying a motion to amend.
Mut. Ins. Co.,

See Rachman Bag Co. v. Liberty

46 F.3d 230, 234-35

Teachers Ret. Bd. v. Fluor Corp.,

(2d Cir. 1995)

(citing State

654 F.2d 843, 856 (2d Cir.

1981); cf. Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326, 339
(2d Cir. 2000)

("despite the lenient standard of Rule 15(a), a

district court does not abuse its discretion in denying leave to
amend the pleadings after the deadline set in the scheduling
4

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 6 of 19

order where the moving party has failed to establish good
cause.").

Furthermore, "the adverse party's burden of

undertaking discovery,

standing alone, does not suffice to

warrant denial of a motion to amend a pleading."

United States

v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 889 F.2d 1248, 1255
(2d Cir. 1989).

Nor is "undue prejudice" established by

allegations that an amendment will require the expenditure of
additional time, effort, or money.
Assocs.,

Block v. First Blood

988 F.2d 344, 351 (2d Cir. 1993).

The Four Named Defendants Are Removed

Plaintiff moves, at the Defendants' request, to remove
Officers Wilson, Wall, O'Hare, and Hanley as Defendants.
Mem. in Supp't 3-5.

Pl.' s

As this part of the motion is unopposed,

these individuals are hereby removed.

See City Defs.' Mem. in

Opp' n 1.

The First Claim Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Is Stricken

Plaintiff moves, at the Defendants' request, to strike
its first claim under Section 1983 against all Defendants except
JHMC.

Pl.'s Mem. in Supp't 5.

As this part of the motion is

unopposed, that claim is stricken.

5

See City Defs.' Mem. in

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 7 of 19

Opp' n 1.

Two Additional Defendants May Not Be Added to the Complaint

Plaintiff moves, over Defendants' objection, for leave
to add Officers Weiss and Mascol as Defendants.

See Pl.'s Mem.

in Supp't 1-2.; City Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n 2-11.

Under federal law, which determines the accrual of a
Section 1983 claim, a claim accrues "when the plaintiff knows or
has reason to know of the injury which is the basis of his
action."

See Howard v. City of New York, et al., 02-CV-1731,

2006 WL 2597857, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. September 6, 2006).

As to

Plaintiff's federal claims against Officers Weiss and Mascol,
the limitations period for

§

1983 claims brought in New York

state is three years from date of accrual, i.e., October 31,
2012.

See Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45,

488 U.S. 235

(1989).

47

(2d Cir. 1987), aff'd

Those federal claims are therefore barred.

Plaintiff's state law claims are also barred.

"[I]n a

federal court, state notice-of-claim statutes apply to state law
claims."

Hyde v. Arresting Officer Caputo, 98 Civ. 6722, 2001

WL 521699, at *4

(E.D.N.Y. May 11, 2001).

Section 50-i of the

New York General Municipal Law requires a notice of claim to be

6

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 8 of 19

filed when bringing an action against the City of New York.
N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. §50-i.

Section 50-e of the statute requires a

plaintiff to "file a notice of claim within ninety days after
the claim arises and commence the action within one year and
ninety days from the date the cause of action accrued."
2001 WL 521699, at *4; N.Y. Gen. Mun. L. §50-3.

Hyde,

A plaintiff's

"failure to comply with the mandatory New York statutory noticeof claim requirements results in dismissal of his claims."
Warner v. Village of Goshen Police Dep't, 256 F.Supp.2d 171, 175
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); see also Mejia v. City of New York, 119 F.
Supp. 2d 232, 255-56 (E.D.N.Y. 2000)

(suits for torts arising

from conduct of police officers in the course of their
employment must be filed in accordance with New York notice of
claim statutes); Hyde, 2001 WL 521699, at *4; Davidson v. Bronx
Mun. Hosp.,

64 N.Y.2d 59,

been strictly construed.
(2d Cir. 1975).

62

(N.Y. 1984).

These provisions have

Shakur v. McGrath, 517 F.2d 983, 985

Because Plaintiff has failed to file a Notice

of Claim against the newly named defendants, his state-law
claims against them fail.

See Plaintiff's Four Notices of Claim

dated January 27, 2010, annexed to Mettham Deel. as Ex. C.

Since these claims are barred, adding Officers Weiss
and Mascol is permissible only if these amended claims relate
back to the original complaint under Rule 15(c) of the Federal
7

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 9 of 19

Rules of Civil Procedure.
"!2:_,

See Krupski v. Costa Crociere S. p.

560 U.S. 538, 541 (2010); Soto v. Brooklyn Correctional

Facility, 80 F.3d 34, 35 (2d Cir. 1996)

(a party may amend its

complaint after the statute of limitations expires to add
additional defendants only if the amendment would "relate back"
to the date that the original complaint was filed) .

Rule 15 ( c) ( 1) ( C) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure provides that an amendment that attempts to bring a
new party into a lawsuit will "relate back" to the date of the
original pleading when (1) the claim arises out of the same
conduct originally pleaded and (2) within 120 days of the
original filing date, the party to be added both "received such
notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in defending
on the merits;" and the party had actual or constructive notice
that "that the action would have been brought against it, but
for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity."
Plaintiff argues this provision allow him to add Officers Weiss
and Mascol.

See Pl.'s Mem. in Supp't 6.

Claims against any newly added defendants will not
"relate back" to the date of the original complaint where the
plaintiff's failure to name the prospective defendant was "the
result of a fully informed decision as opposed to a mistake

8

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 10 of 19

concerning the proper defendant's identity."

See Krupski, 560

U.S. at 541; Cornwell v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir.
1994)

(failure to name a known party constitutes a choice not to

sue rather than a mistake of a party's identity).

An amended

complaint seeking to replace a John Doe with a named defendant
after the expiration of the statute of limitations does not
relate back to the initial complaint

under Rule 15(c) because

the "failure to identify individual defendants when the
plaintiff knows that such defendants must be named cannot be
characterized as a mistake."
Dep't, 66 F.3d 466, 470

Barrow v. Wethersfield Police

(2d Cir. 1995); see also Tapia-Ortiz v.

Doe, 171 F.3d 150, 152 (2d Cir. 1999).

Where a plaintiff is

aware of the purported misconduct of certain individuals, and
where a plaintiff "was not required to sue them . .

. her

failure to do so in the original complaint, in light of her
obvious knowledge and the detailed nature of that pleading[]
. must be considered a matter of choice, not mistake."

Cornwall

v. Robinson, 23 F.3d 694, 705 (2d Cir. 1994); see also Barrow,
66 F.3d at 470

("the failure to identify individual defendants

when the plaintiff knows that such defendants must be named
cannot be characterized as a mistake"); Abdell v. City of New
York,

05-CV-8453, 2006 WL 2620927, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 12,

2012)

("Where a plaintiff fails to timely sue a potentially

liable party despite incriminating disclosures made within the
9

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 11 of 19

statute of limitations, the Court cannot find that a mistake was
made for relation back purposes.").

Here, Plaintiff knew the identities of Officers Mascol
and Weiss within the applicable statute of limitations and did
not name them as defendants or serve them with a summons and
complaint during that time.

This constitutes a deliberate

choice, not a mistake of identity as contemplated by Rule 15.
Since the claims would not relate back, this proposed amendment
would be futile and this portion of the motion is denied.

Plaintiff May Include Its Section 1983 Claim Against JHMC

Plaintiff moves, over JHMC's objection, for leave to
reinstate a Section 1983 claim against JHMC.

See Pl.'s Mem. in

Supp't 7-15; JHMC Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n 3-16.

As discussed

above, undue delay, futility, bad faith,

or undue prejudice to

the opposing party warrant denial of a motion to amend under
Rule 15.

See McCarthy,

482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007).

With respect to futility: "to maintain a viable

§

1983

action against a municipality, a government agent (such as [a
private corporation]), or individual policymaking defendants in
their official capacities ... , a plaintiff must demonstrate that

10

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 12 of 19

a constitutional deprivation occurred as the result of an
express policy or custom promulgated by that entity or an
individual with policymaking authority."
1758635, at *3

Schoolcraft, 2011 WL

(internal quotations and citations omitted).

The deposition testimonies of two physicians involved
in the decision to commit Schoolcraft, Ors. Bernier and Isakov,
and the testimony of JHMC through Dr. Dhar, suggest that JHMC's
policy was to "to involuntarily commit a patient where there was
any risk of dangerousness" rather than the "substantial risk of
dangerousness" standard which has been held to be
constitutional.

Pl.'s Mem. in Supp't 8-10

(emphasis added)

(citing Project Release v. Prevost, 722 F.2d 960,
Cir. 1983)).

972-74

(2d

Indeed, JHMC admitted that its practice, contrary

to written policy, was to involuntarily commit for any risk, not
simply for a substantial risk.

Dhar Tr. at 134:21-135:04

("Q.

So under Jamaica's policy, any possible risk is a sufficient
basis [upon] which to involuntary admit somebody, because of the
conclusion that they are dangerous to themselves or others; is
that correct? .

A.

Yes.").

The proposed amendment

adequately alleges that the decision to involuntarily commit
Schoolcraft was taken by "JMHC officers, employees or agents
pursuant to the customs .

[of]

JHMC" and that "Defendants

. while acting under color of state law, engaged in conduct
11

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 13 of 19

which constituted a custom, usage or practice .

. forbidden by

the Constitution of the United States," specifically, failing to
"perform the proper and necessary tests to determine" that
Schoolcraft posed a substantial risk of physical harm to himself
or others.

TAC~~

243-44, 282-87.

These allegations are

sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, and are therefore not
futile.

Dr. Dhar's deposition took place in July 2014.

Though

Plaintiff has not justified the delay between the date of the
deposition and the request for leave to amend, JHMC too has not
explained how it would be prejudiced or otherwise harmed beyond
the inconvenience of potentially having to amend its summary
judgment briefing.

JHMC has also not demonstrated Plaintiff's

bad faith in making this request in December.

While admittedly

an inconvenience for the Defendants and the Court, the request
came prior to the deadline for summary judgment briefings and
the timing alone does not indicate bad faith.
permitted.

12

The amendment is

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 14 of 19

Plaintiff May Request Declaratory and Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff moves, over JHMC's objection, for leave to
add a claim seeking declaratory and injunctive relief,
specifically, a declaration that the City Defendants' conduct
was illegal and an injunction requiring JHMC and the City
Defendants to expunge from Schoolcraft's medical files any
"record or a finding that Officer Schoolcraft was mentally ill,
dangerous or otherwise a person who required involuntary
commitment to a psychiatric ward."

Pl.'s Mem. in Supp't 15.

City Defendants object on the basis that the proposed
injunctive relief would prejudice them, since they lacked
sufficient notice upon which to develop the evidence that would
constitute their defense to this proposed claim and would
require extra time and pages in their summary judgment papers to
respond.

City Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n 15.

Specifically, the City

Defendants are concerned about their ability to address an April
2009 decision to remove Schoolcraft's weapon on the basis of the
fact that Schoolcraft had a prescription for a psychotropic
medication from his private doctor.

Id.

However, as noted

above, "the adverse party's burden of undertaking discovery,
standing alone, does not suffice to warrant denial of a motion
to amend a pleading."

Continental, 889 F.2d at 1255.

13

Likewise,

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 15 of 19

"expenditure of additional time, effort, or money" does not
constitute prejudice.

Block, 988 F.2d at 351.

Therefore,

Plaintiff may amend to include this claim.

Plaintiff May Make His Proposed "Typographical or Editorial"
Amendments

Plaintiff moves for leave to make various
"typographical or editorial" modifications to the SAC.
Mem. in Supp't 15-16.

Pl.' s

Both City Defendants and JHMC object, on

the grounds that the proposed changes are substantive rather
See City Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n

than editorial or typographical.

11-15; JMHC Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n 17.

The most significant

amendments to which Defendants specifically object are discussed
below seriatim.

City Defendants object to amendments alleging
existence of quotas for stops, arrests, and summons, to
paragraphs that previously alleged the existence of summons
quotas only.

City Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n 12.

City Defendants

contend that they have "spent considerable time researching and
drafting their summary judgment motion based on the unique
argument regarding a summons quota" and that the changes would
alter the "landscape of discovery and litigation to date,"

14

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 16 of 19

therefore the amendments should be barred.
Opp'n 12.

City Defs.' Mem. in

Three considerations counsel against adopting the

City Defendants' position.

First, as discussed above,

additional discovery, and expenditure time and effort do not
warrant rejection of a motion to amend.

Continental, 889 F.2d

Second, Defendants will be

at 1255; Block, 988 F.2d at 351.

allotted additional time in which to prepare arguments
addressing the TAC's new amendments.

Third, the pre-existing

allegations in the SAC commonly refer to quotas for
"arrest/summons" or "arrests and summons," undermining City
Defendants' argument that the SAC is currently limited to
summons quotas alone.
83.

See e.g., SAC ']['][ 2, 38, 40, 54, 62-63,

These amendments are permitted.

City Defendants object to amendments changing
allegations that Defendants "issued legal process" and "arrested
plaintiff" to allegations that Defendants "issued and/or
commenced legal process" and "arrested and/or instituted legal
process [against] plaintiff."

City Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n 12;

Pl's Mem. in Supp't Ex. 3 (TAC with track changes showing
current SAC) ']['][ 266-67

(formerly ']['][ 282-83 in SAC).

They also

object to additional language alleging that City Defendants
destroyed evidence and that Defendant Sgt. Frederick Sawyer
stated that "This is what happens to rats" while handcuffing
15

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 17 of 19

Schoolcraft.

City Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n 12-13; Pl's Mem. in

Supp't Ex. 3 (TAC with track changes showing current SAC)
183, 291

(formerly

~

310 in SAC).

~~

City Defendants have not

demonstrated how these amendments would be futile, how they
would result in undue delay or prejudice, or that they were
requested in bad faith.

These amendments are permitted.

The same conclusion applies to:

(a) City Defendants'

contentions that Plaintiff should not be allowed to alter the
attribution of a previously alleged statement, from Plaintiff's
"supervisors" to a "PBA union officer;" (b) City Defendants'
contentions that the proposed amendments omit "salient facts"
that are "central facts in dispute in this litigation;" (c) City
Defendants' and JMHC's contentions that Plaintiff should not be
allowed to omit his race from the Complaint; and (d) City
Defendant's bulleted list of objectionable modifications to
factual allegations.

City Defs.' Mem. in Opp'n 12, 14; JHMC

Def.'s Mem. in Opp'n 17; Pl's Mem. in Supp't Ex. 3 (SAC with
track changes showing proposed TAC)

~~

6, 33, 83, 106, 125, 130,

131, 13 6, 13 9, 14 6, 1 7 4 , 18 8 , 216, 3 4 3 (formerly 3 2 4 ) .

These proposed amendments are most fairly read as
clarifications and corrections of the factual allegations rather
than wholesale new allegations.

Should these "corrections" in

16

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 18 of 19

fact prove inaccurate, all parties will have the opportunity to
demonstrate as much through the additional time afforded by the
Court for modifications to the summary judgment submissions.

In

any event, the bases for denying Plaintiff's motion to amend
with respect to this amendment have not been established.

The

proposed amendments are therefore permitted.

Conclusion

Plaintiff's motion to amend the SAC is granted in part
and denied in part.

Specifically, all proposed amendments save

the request to add Officers Weiss and Mascol are permitted.
Plaintiff will file a new TAC in keeping with this Opinion
within a week of the signing of this Opinion.

Defendants need

not file separate Answers to the TAC, and the TAC's allegations
will be deemed denied by all Defendants on the basis of the
briefing in opposition to the instant motion.

All parties shall have an additional week following
filing of the TAC to file amended summary judgment papers
referencing the TAC rather than the SAC.

The hearing on all

summary judgment motions in this case, consistent with this
Court's Order dated January 15, 2015, is rescheduled for
Wednesday February 11, 2015 in Courtroom 18C, United States

17

Case 1:10-cv-06005-RWS Document 340 Filed 01/16/15 Page 19 of 19

Courthouse, 500 Pearl Street, to provide Defendants with
additional time during which to prepare their modified summary
judgment papers.

It is so ordered.

r

New York, NY
January/
2015

6,

SWEET
U.S.D.J.

18