Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al

Filing 461

REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW in Support re: 438 MOTION to Bifurcate for Trial Plaintiff's Monell Claim Against the City of New York. MOTION for Reconsideration of the Court's May 5 2015 Order Concerning Summary Judgment. This memornandum is a Reply only on the issue of reconsideration; the Reply on bifurcation was filed previously. Document filed by Christopher Broschart(Tax Id. 915354 in his official capacity), Timothy Caughey(Tax Id. 885374 Individually), Kurt Duncan(Shield No. 2483, Individually), William Gough(Tax Id. 919124, Individually), Elise Hanlon(in her official capacity as a lieutenant with the New York City Fire Department), Shantel James(Shield No. 3004 in his official capacity), Theodore Lauterborn(Tax Id. 897840 in his official capacity), Michael Marino, Gerald Nelson(Assistant Chief Patrol Borough Brooklyn North, Tax Id. 912370 in his official capacity), The City Of New York. (Scheiner, Alan)

10-CV-6005 (RWS)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ADRIAN SCHOOLCRAFT,
Plaintiff,
-againstTHE CITY OF NEW YORK, et al.,
Defendants.

REPLY MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN FURTHER
SUPPORT OF THE CITY DEFENDANTS’ MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION

ZACHARY W. CARTER
Corporation Counsel of the City of New York
Attorney for Defendants
100 Church Street
New York, N.Y. 10007
Of Counsel: Alan Scheiner
Tel: [phone]
Cheryl Shammas
Tel: [phone]
Kavin Thadani
Tel: [phone]
Matter #: 2010-033074

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................................. ii 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT ........................................................................................ 1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I
THE
COLLECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE
DOCTRINE ALLOWS DR. LAMSTEINREISS’S
KNOWLEDGE
TO
BE
IMPUTED
TO
THE
ARRESTING
OFFICERS
BECAUSE
IT
IS
UNDISPUTED
THAT
SHE
COMMUNICATED
WITH
THE
ARRESTING OFFICERS AND WAS
INVOLVED IN THE INVESTIGATION. ..........................1 
POINT II
ALL CLAIMS AGAINST LT. CAUGHEY
SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE HE
WAS NOT PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN
ANY ACTIONABLE CONDUCT. .....................................4 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 8 

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Cases

Pages

Bender v. City of New York,
78 F.3d 787 (2d Cir. 1996)............................................................................................. 7
Black v. Town of Harrison,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16597 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2002) ............................................... 6
5 Borough Pawn, LLC v. Marti,
753 F. Supp. 2d 186 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)............................................................................ 6
Charles v. City of New York,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46741 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) ............................................. 7
Colon v. City of New York,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46451 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2014) ........................................... 1, 2
Cortina v. United States,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76032 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011) .............................................. 5
Crawford v. City of New York,
477 Fed. Appx. 777 (2d Cir. 2012) ............................................................................ 2, 3
Gaffney v. City of New York,
2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 4592 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 2011) ...................................... 7
Howell v. New York Post Co.,
81 N.Y.2d 115, 612 N.E.2d 699, 596 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1993) .......................................... 7
Ladoucier v. City of New York,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61379 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2011)................................................ 6
Panetta v. Crowley,
460 F.3d 388 (2d Cir. 2006)........................................................................................... 2
Schoolcraft v. City of New York,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58831 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2015).................................... 3, 5, 6, 7
Stone v. Port Authority of New York & New Jersey,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92950 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014) ................................................ 6
Sylvester v. City of New York,
385 F. Supp. 2d 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)............................................................................ 7
United States v. Cruz,
834 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1987)............................................................................................. 2
ii

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The City defendants respectfully submit this Reply memorandum of law in further
support of their motion for reconsideration of the Court’s decision on summary judgment.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE
COLLECTIVE
KNOWLEDGE
DOCTRINE ALLOWS DR. LAMSTEINREISS’S KNOWLEDGE TO BE IMPUTED TO
THE ARRESTING OFFICERS BECAUSE IT
IS
UNDISPUTED
THAT
SHE
COMMUNICATED WITH THE ARRESTING
OFFICERS AND WAS INVOLVED IN THE
INVESTIGATION
The City defendants moved for reconsideration in part to request that the Court to amend
its statement suggesting that Captain Lauterborn must have relayed Dr. Lamstein-Reiss’s (“Dr.
Lamstein’s”) statements to fellow officers in order for the collective knowledge doctrine to apply
to Dr. Lamstein’s knowledge. City Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for
Reconsideration and Bifurcation, Docket No. 439, (“City Moving Mem.”), at 4-8. Plaintiff,
however, implicitly concedes the City defendants’ point that Lauterborn need not have relayed
Lamstein’s statements to the other defendants for the doctrine to apply. Indeed, the sole legal
authority upon which plaintiff relies so states: “The doctrine recognizes that, in light of the
complexity of modern police work, the arresting officer cannot always be aware of every aspect
of an investigation; sometimes his authority to arrest a suspect is based on facts known only to
his superiors or associates.” Colon v. City of New York, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46451, *13-14
(E.D.N.Y. Apr. 2, 2014) (citations and quotations omitted); see Plaintiff’s Memorandum in
Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration, Docket No. 449 (“Plf. Opp. Mem.”), at 6 (citing

Colon v. City). “In order for the collective knowledge doctrine to apply to actions taken by an
officer, there must [only] have been some communication between the officers involved.”
Colon, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46451 at *14.
But, plaintiff argues that, in addition to “some communication,” Captain Lauterborn or
another officer involved must reasonably rely on whatever communication occurs in taking
action. Plf. Opp. Mem. at 6. Plaintiff does not say, however, why reasonable reliance is missing
here, or what would be required to show it. He cannot do so, because plaintiff fundamentally
misconstrues the collective knowledge doctrine and conflates it with the rule that an officer may
reasonably rely on statements made to him by other officers, or by other witnesses. See, e.g.,
Panetta v. Crowley, 460 F.3d 388, 395 (2d Cir. 2006).
Under the collective knowledge doctrine as set forth by the Second Circuit, no specific
statement to the arresting officer is required. Therefore, Dr. Lamstein’s knowledge may be
considered in determining whether there was exigent circumstances or probable cause, because
she is indisputably part of the investigation and was in “some communication:” about Adrian
Schoolcraft with one of the officers involved (that is Lauterborn). City Moving Mem.” at 4-8.
As the City defendants previously noted (id.), in United States v. Cruz, 834 F.2d 47, 51 (2d Cir.
1987), the Second Circuit stated plainly: “The determination of whether probable cause to arrest
exists can be based on the collective knowledge of all of the officers involved in the surveillance
efforts because the various law enforcement officers in this investigation were in communication
with each other.” Id. In Cruz the court did not even discuss what was said between the officers
involved in the investigation. Id.
The Second Circuit could not be more clear on this point, stating in Crawford v. City of
New York that although another officer had communicated the basic allegations against a suspect

2

to the arresting officers, “probable cause would have existed even if he had not.” Crawford v.
City of New York, 477 Fed. Appx. 777, 779 (2d Cir. 2012) (emphasis added). The Second
Circuit explained further: “If one officer in a police department has knowledge of facts that
establish probable cause to arrest a suspect, the suspect suffers no constitutional deprivation if he
is arrested by a different officer who lacks such knowledge.” Id. at n. 1.1
Dr. Lamstein is a doctor of psychology assigned by the police department to evaluate
Schoolcraft’s mental health; she was in communication with an officer (Lauterborn) who was
investigating Schoolcraft’s AWOL status on October 31, 2009; and she participated in that
investigation by calling Schoolcraft. Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
58831, *29-30 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 2015). This alone, under Second Circuit law, imputes her
knowledge to the officer defendants under the collective knowledge doctrine, regardless of the
specifics of what she conveyed to Captain Lauterborn, let alone whatever he relayed to other
officers. Nevertheless, the evidence will show that Dr. Lamstein communicated the essential
facts to Lauterborn, and, as set forth above, even under plaintiff’s view of the law no further
communication was needed.

1

If the Eastern District’s opinion in Colon v. City of New York, relied on by plaintiff, is read to require more specific
communication to support the collective knowledge rule, that holding would be contrary to the law in this Circuit
and in any event is not binding on this Court.

3

POINT II
ALL CLAIMS AGAINST LT. CAUGHEY
SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE HE WAS
NOT PERSONALLY INVOLVED IN ANY
ACTIONABLE CONDUCT
The City defendants moved for reconsideration of this Court’s suggestion that defendant
Caughey was a proper defendant on a First Amendment claim, although all individual defendants
are entitled to qualified immunity on that claim. City Moving Mem. at 10. In opposing this
motion, plaintiff does not dispute that if any defendants are entitled to qualified immunity for the
First Amendment claim, then Caughey is too. Plaintiff makes no argument that Caughey alone
should be denied qualified immunity. Reply Mem. at 7.
Rather, plaintiff repeats his odd argument that qualified immunity should not be granted
because it should be based on the law governing at the time, not the current law. This is an odd
position, because under the law governing at the time, as this Court previously held, plaintiff has
no First Amendment claim against Caughey at all. City Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration, Docket No. 456 (“City Opp. Mem.”), at
17-20. Accordingly, if plaintiff now has such a claim for Caughey’s conduct (which defendants
continue to deny2), then Caughey and all other individual defendants must be shielded from such
a claim by qualified immunity. Id.
Plaintiff also assert that Caughey is a proper defendant in the state law claims of assault
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and falsely asserts that Caughey never moved for
dismissal from those claims. In fact, the City defendants moved for dismissal of all claims
against Caughey because no actionable conduct has been alleged against him, and that remains

2

See City Opp. Mem, at 10-11; City Moving Mem, at 9-10 n.7; infra at 6-7.

4

the case. See Revised City Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment,
Docket No. 343 (“City SJ Mem.”), at 16-17.
Caughey’s conduct described by Schoolcraft in the precinct on October 31, 2009 cannot,
as a matter of law, constitute an assault. Caughey said nothing to Schoolcraft other than to ask to
review his memo book. “Schoolcraft testified that, when Lieutenant Caughey returned the memo
book to Schoolcraft later that day, Schoolcraft noticed, and became alarmed, that several pages
of the memo book containing his entries about corruption or misconduct were earmarked or
folded down. . . . Schoolcraft contends . . . that Lieutenant Caughey later started behaving in an
unusual manner towards Schoolcraft.” Schoolcraft, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58831, at *24. All
that plaintiff said of this in his Rule 56.1 statement was the conclusory and subjective assertion
that “Lieutenant Caughey started acting toward Officer Schoolcraft in a menacing manner.”
Plaintiff’s 56.1 Statement, Docket No. 307 (“Plf. 56.1”), ¶ 54. 3 In deposition, plaintiff admitted
that he had no specific fear of bodily harm, let alone a reasonable fear: “I don't recall any specific
any specific thing that I thought he would do to me. I was just concerned, and I felt it was
appropriate to remove myself from that situation.” POX 13, at 122:8-12. This is not sufficient
for the tort of assault.
It is not enough even if plaintiff claims that he was frightened or “menaced.” Rather, he
must plead and prove facts showing that it was objectively reasonable for him to be in fear of an
imminent physical, offensive touching: “To establish an assault claim under New York law,
plaintiff must show that defendant placed the plaintiff in reasonable fear of imminent harmful or
offensive bodily contact.” Cortina v. United States, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76032, *5-6

3

The deposition testimony cited by plaintiff states only that Caughey put his hand on his gun. Id. (citing PX 4).
Plaintiff’s own statements, not put before the Court on summary judgment but available for submission should the
Court desire it, make clear that Caughey never removed his gun from his holster during this interlude, whether he
was touching his gun or not.

5

(S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011) (emphasis added) (quoting 5 Borough Pawn, LLC v. Marti, 753 F.
Supp. 2d 186, 200-01 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)); see also Black v. Town of Harrison, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 16597, *15 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 5, 2002) (“A plaintiff pleading assault must allege facts that
support a finding that the defendant intentionally placed the plaintiff in reasonable fear of
imminent harmful or offensive bodily contact.”); Stone v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 92950, *17 (E.D.N.Y. July 8, 2014) (same); Ladoucier v. City of New York, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61379, *23-24 (S.D.N.Y. June 6, 2011) (same). In a police station, a police
supervisor touching how own gun cannot reasonably be perceived as a threatening act and
therefore cannot constitute the tort of assault.
No other conduct by Caughey is even remotely actionable. Plaintiff asserts that Caughey
engaged in “harassing conduct” leading up to October 31, 2009 that could constitute “intentional
infliction of emotional distress” (“IIED”). Plf. Opp. Mem. at 8. But Caughey did not do
anything to Schoolcraft before October 31, 2009. Although the Court’s opinion mistakenly
attributes Weiss’ alleged conduct to Caughey, taking plaintiff’s actual allegations as true,
Caughey did not issue a command discipline against Schoolcraft, nor did he refer Schoolcraft to
the Early Intervention Unit, nor did he do anything adverse to Schoolcraft, other than review his
memo book (a normal supervisory function) and the so-called “menacing,” both on October 31,
2009. Compare Schoolcraft, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58831, at *155, with Plf. 56.1, ¶¶ 24, 29,
passim.
The City defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the IIED claim on the
grounds that it was duplicative of other claims. City SJ Mem. at 21. The Court found however
that some of plaintiff’s allegations – that he was "publicly embarrassed and humiliated” “was
caused to suffer severe emotional distress,” and “was forced to incur substantial expenses and had his

6

professional reputation destroyed” – did not overlap with other claims. Schoolcraft, at *131-32.
But the allegations cited by the Court have nothing to do with Caughey.
In fact, there is nothing that Caughey allegedly did which could meet the high standards
of misconduct under New York law for an IIED claim.
To maintain a claim of IIED under New York law, the plaintiffs must establish
“(1) extreme and outrageous conduct, (2) intent to cause severe emotional
distress, (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the injury, and (4)
severe emotional distress.” Bender v. City of New York, 78 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir.
1996) (citing Howell v. New York Post Co., 81 N.Y.2d 115, 612 N.E.2d 699, 702,
596 N.Y.S.2d 350 (1993)). In Howell, the New York Court of Appeals noted that
“the requirements of the rule are rigorous, and difficult to satisfy”; that “of the
intentional infliction of emotional distress claims considered by [the New York
Court of Appeals], everyone has failed because the alleged conduct was not
sufficiently outrageous”; and that “liability has been found only where the
conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go
beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” Howell, 81 N.Y.2d at 122 (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
Sylvester v. City of New York, 385 F. Supp. 2d 431, 441 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). Reviewing an
officer’s memo book and acting in a suspicious or even threatening manner cannot be
conduct “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency.” Id. Indeed, no defendants’ alleged “harassment” could rise
to that level. See, e.g., Charles v. City of New York, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46741, *3537 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2014) (“Even if a jury were to conclude that Ricupero fabricated
the assault [by the plaintiff], and that Sciuto was complicit, such behavior, without more,
is not sufficiently outrageous.”); Gaffney v. City of New York, 2011 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
4592, *32-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Sept. 22, 2011) (“Here, defendants' conduct, which includes
altering plaintiffs work responsibilities, instituting disciplinary proceedings against her,
sending her letters and memoranda, and communicating with employees under her

7

supervision, does not rise to the level of outrageousness necessary to support a claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.”)
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons and those stated in the City defendants’ prior submissions, the
Court should grant the City defendants’ motion for reconsideration.
Dated:

New York, New York
July 23, 2015
Respectfully submitted,
ZACHARY W. CARTER
Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York
Attorneys for City Defendants
100 Church Street, Room 3-174
New York, New York 10007
[phone]
By:

8

/s/ Alan Scheiner
Alan Scheiner
Senior Counsel
Cheryl Shammas
Senior Counsel
Kavin Thadani
Senior Counsel
Assistant Corporation Counsel
Special Federal Litigation Division