Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al
Filing
494
FILING ERROR - WRONG EVENT TYPE SELECTED FROM MENU - SECOND MOTION in Limine precluding testimony as to DJ action. Document filed by Isak Isakov.(Lee, Brian) Modified on 9/22/2015 (db).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ADRIAN SCHOOLCRAFT,
Plaintiff,
-against-
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, DEPUTY CHIEF MICHAEL
MARINO, Tax Id. 873220, Individually and in his Official
Capacity, ASSISTANT CHIEF PATROL BOROUGH
BROOKLYN NORTH GERALD NELSON, Tax Id. 912370,
Individually and in his Official Capacity, DEPUTY
INSPECTOR STEVEN MAURIELLO, Tax Id. 895117,
Individually and in his Official Capacity CAPTAIN
THEODORE LAUTERBORN, Tax Id. 897840, Individually
and in his Official Capacity, LIEUTENANT JOSEPH GOFF,
Tax Id. 894025, Individually and in his Official Capacity,
SGT. FREDERICK SAWYER, Shield No. 2576, Individually
and in his Official Capacity, SERGEANT KURT DUNCAN,
Shield No. 2483, Individually and in his Official Capacity,
LIEUTENANT CHRISTOPHER BROSCHART, Tax Id.
915354, Individually and in his Official Capacity,
LIEUTENANT TIMOTHY CAUGHEY, Tax Id. 885374,
Individually and in his Official Capacity, SERGEANT
SHANTEL JAMES, Shield No. 3004, AND P.O.'s "JOHN
DOE" #1-50, Individually and in their Official Capacity (the
name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are
presently unknown) (collectively referred to as "NYPD
defendants"), JAMAICA HOSPITAL MEDICAL CENTER,
DR. ISAK ISAKOV, Individually and in his Official
Capacity, DR. LILIAN ALDANA-BERNIER, Individually
and in her Official Capacity and JAMAICA HOSPITAL
MEDICAL CENTER EMPLOYEE'S "JOHN DOE" # 1-50,
Individually and in their Official Capacity (the name John
Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently
unknown),
Defendants.
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MEMORANDUM OF LAW
Of Counsel:
Brian E. Lee
10 CV 6005 (RWS)
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF MOTION IN
LIMINE BY DEFENDANT ISAK ISAKOV, M.D. TO
PRECLUDE TESTIMONY ON THE PURPORTED
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIM AS THE
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTION DOES NOT
CONFER FEDERAL JURISDICTION UNLESS IT ALREADY
EXISTS
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Any testimony on the purported declaratory judgment claim against Dr. Isakov
should be precluded as the Court lacks jurisdiction over the Declaratory Judgment claim.
The Declaratory Judgment Act does not in itself provide subject matter jurisdiction, but
simply provides a remedy for disputes already within realm of federal jurisdiction. Since
all federal claims were dismissed against Dr. Isakov, there is no subject matter jurisdiction
over this claim. 28 U.S.C.A. § 2201, § 2202. Supplemental jurisdiction allows for a hearing
of the state law claims (28 U.S.C. § 1367), but this does not provide a basis for jurisdiction
for the federal declaratory relief sought.
PERTINENT HISTORY
This Court, in the decision May 5, 2015, Docket No. 436 (Exhibit A), pages 198-199
held that the declaratory judgment claims were properly included, inter alia, against this
defendant. That was in response to our claim that the prior order (dated January 2015 and
filed under Docket No. 340 (Exhibit B), pages 14-15) only permitted declaratory judgment
claims against the City.
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The Third Amended Complaint (Exhibit C) containing this claim may be found at
Docket 342, and sets forth the following on page 64 in paragraph 373 the paragraph
claiming relief:
Declaratory judgment in favor of plaintiff and against each of the
defendants, finding that the defendants’ conduct was unlawful,
including without limitation, findings that the claims for relief
have been established; that the practices and policies of the
NYPD on quotas for stops, summons and arrests and the
manipulation and downgrading of crime reports are unlawful;
that the practices and policies for falsification of training
records are unlawful; and that the NYPD and JHMC records
should be expunged to the extent that those records suggest
that plaintiff is (or or ever was) emotional disturbed, or
suffering from a mental illness or dangerous to himself or
others (emphasis supplied).
POINT I
TESTIMONY AS TO THE CLAIMED UNLAWFUL
CONDUCT OF DR. ISAKOV SHOULD BE PRECLUDED AS
THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION TO HEAR A
FEDERAL DECLARATORY JUDGMENT CLAIM AGAINST
DR. ISAKOV
The Declaratory Judgment Act (hereafter “DJA”), found at 28 U.S.C. §2201, provides
as follows in pertinent part:
In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, * * * any
court of the United States, upon the filing of an appropriate
pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of
any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not
further relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall
have the force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall
be reviewable as such.
28 U.S.C.A. § 2201 (West).
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The statute envisions the granting of relief only where there is a preexisting ground
of federal jurisdiction. “The operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is procedural
only.” Aetna Life Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240, 57 S.Ct. 461, 463,
81 L.Ed. 617, 108 A.L.R. 1000. Amplifying this, the Court in Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips
Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72, 70 S. Ct. 876, 879, 94 L. Ed. 1194 (1950), found that in
enacting the DJA Congress was enlarging the range of available remedies but not
extending the jurisdictional basis required for federal court litigation.
The Court
continued:
When concerned as we are with the power of the inferior
federal courts to entertain litigation within the restricted area
to which the Constitution and Acts of Congress confine them,
‘jurisdiction' means the kinds of issues which give right of
entrance to federal courts. Jurisdiction in this sense was not
altered by the Declaratory Judgment Act. Prior to that Act, a
federal court would entertain a suit on a contract only if the
plaintiff asked for an immediately enforceable remedy like
money damages or an injunction, but such relief could only be
given if the requisites of jurisdiction, in the sense of a federal
right or diversity, provided foundation for resort to the federal
courts. The Declaratory Judgment Act allowed relief to be
given by way of recognizing the plaintiff's right even though
no immediate enforcement of it was asked. But the
requirements of jurisdiction—the limited subject matters which
alone Congress had authorized the District Courts to
adjudicate—were not impliedly repealed or modified. See Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300, 63 S.Ct.
1070, 1074, 87 L.Ed. 1407; Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549,
551—552, 66 S.Ct. 1198, 1199, 90 L.Ed. 1432.
Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667, 671-72.
A declaratory judgment action must meet all the substantive and procedural
jurisdictional prerequisites of the usual civil action. Maryland Cas. Co. v. Rosen, 445 F.2d
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1012 (2d Cir. 1971). The claims against Dr. Isakov and the medical defendants lack such
prerequisites. “The Federal Declaratory Judgment Act is merely an added ground upon
which litigants may enter the federal courts. One of the essential prerequisites of any civil
action in the federal courts is that it state a ‘case or controversy’ within Article III of the
Constitution. (Alabama State Federation of Labor, Local Union No. 103, United Brotherhood of
Carpenters and Joiners of America v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 65 S.Ct. 1384, 89 L.Ed. 1725 (1945);
Standard Accident Insurance Co. v. Alexander, Inc., 23 F.Supp. 807 (D.Tex.1938).)” Maryland
Cas. Co., 445 F.2d 1012, 1014 (2d Cir. 1971).
It was held in Ragoni v. United States, 424 F.2d 261, 264 (3d Cir. 1970), that 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201, “is limited in operation to those cases which would otherwise be within the
jurisdiction of the federal courts; the mere fact that a declaratory judgment is being sought
is not, of itself, ground for federal jurisdiction.” Further, this section is not jurisdictional,
and a plaintiff must show that his complaint falls within ambit of a jurisdictional statute.
Southern Trust Ins. Co. v. Griner, 550 F.Supp. 39 (S.D.Ga.1982).\
Since there is no ground for federal jurisdiction against Dr. Isakov, there is no basis
for a Declaratory Judgment against him, and any claims in that regard should be precluded
by this Court.
Thus, in this case, the only federal claims against this defendant were dismissed by
this court. The court found that this defendant was not a state actor and the 1983 claims
were dismissed. Exhibit A, page 198. The court permitted supplemental jurisdiction
because of the “common nucleus of overlapping facts” as to the state claims of medical
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malpractice, false arrest and false imprisonment. Id., pp. 198-199. No federal claims
remained against Dr. Isakov and the medical defendants. As a result, there is no
jurisdiction for this court to hear the Declaratory Judgment claims, and no testimony
should be permitted in that regard.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully requested that this Court grant
defendant's motion in its entirety, together with such other and further relief as this Court
deems just and proper.
Dated:
Lake Success, New York
September 21, 2015
Respectfully submitted,
IVONE, DEVINE & JENSEN, LLP
By:
/s/ Brian E. Lee
Brian E. Lee (BEL 9495)
Attorneys for Defendant
ISAK ISAKOV, M.D.
2001 Marcus Avenue
Lake Success, New York 11042
(516) 326-2400
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