Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al
Filing
60
OPINION: #100312 For the following reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part, and Defendant's motion to stay discovery is denied. For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's § 1983 claims against JHMC are dismissed without prejudice, but the Court shall exercise supplemental jurisdiction to retain Plaintiff's state law claims against JHMC. JHMC's motion to stay discovery is denied. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 5/5/2011) (jfe) Modified on 5/12/2011 (ajc).
USDCSDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECI'RONlCALLY FILED
DOC #:
DATE FILED: .!l IIJ l I
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN
STRICT OF NEW YORK
-x
ADRIAN SCHOOLCRAFT,
Plaintiff,
10 Civ. 6005
- against
OPINION
THE CITY OF NEW YORK ET AL.,
Defendants.
---x
Sweet, D.J.
On October 12, 2010, Defendant Jamaica Hospital Medical
Center ("Defendant" or "JHMC") filed a motion to dismiss
iff Adrian Schoolcraft's ("Plaintiff" or "Schoolcraft")
aims against it.
On February 2, 2010, JHMC also filed a motion
to stay discovery pending resolution of the its motion to
dismiss.
For
following reasons, Defendant's motion to
dismiss is granted in part and denied in
motion to stay discovery is denied.
I.
Prior Proceedings
1
, and Defendant's
On August 10, 2010, Plaintiff filed a complaint aga
the City of New York, several members of the New York City Pol
Department ("NYPD fI
others.
)
I
JHMC, two doctors employed by JHMC, and
On September 13, 2010, Plaintiff filed an amended
("AC").
compl
On October 12, 2010, JHMC fi
motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against it.
considered fully submitted on January 26, 2011.
the present
The motion was
On February 2,
2010, JHMC filed a motion to stay discovery pending resolution of
smiss.
its motion to
This motion was considered fully
submitted on March 2, 2011.
II.
Statement of Facts
New York
Schoolcraft joined
ty Police Department
in July 2002, working at the 81st precinct until October 31,
2009.
(AC
~~
26 27).
He all
s that, in response to his refusal
to adhere to and later attempts to expose the strict enforcement
an illegal quota policy in his precinct, defendant NYPD
ficers inst
rd. at
~~
ed a campaign to intimidate and discredit him.
34 170).
Plaintiff alleges
he was arrested, forcibly removed from
, on October 31, 2009,
s home, transported to
JHMC, and wrongfully committed against his will for six days
under NYPD's classification as an Emotionally Disturbed Person
(hereinafter "EDP").
(AC at
~
171)
2
days of
Plaintiff alleges that he spent the first
his confinement at JHMC in the psychiatric emergency room where
NYPD officers kept watch over him, physically and emotionally
abused him, and handcuffed both of
(AC at
~~
171 79).
s arms tightly to a gurney.
During that time he claims that he was not
world, and he was not provided a
allowed contact with the outs
proper bed to sleep in.
(AC at
~~
171 79).
Plaintiff alleges
that, even though there was no medical basis to detain him and
that hospi
records clearly indicate that he was lucid,
rational,
ly coherent, and posed no risk to himself or others,
JHMC held PIa
iff against his will at the urging
the NYPD.
(AC ~~ 184 90, 201-02).
At the end of his sixth day of confinement at JHMC,
School
was allegedly released despite no change of
circumstances concerning his psychiatric state, and without
explanat
(AC
~
192).
Plaintiff claims
JHMC acted under
the coercion of and in concert with the NYPD to facilitate the
constitutional violations
licted upon him, and in furtherance
of the NYPD's ultimate attempt to silence and
scredit him.
Plaintiff has submitted three claims against JHMC.
See Claims Seven, Eight, and Nine, AC
3
~~
270 284).
Plaintiff
alleges that:
U.S.C.
§
(a) JHMC violated his civil rights pursuant to 42
1983 by involuntarily hospitaliz
New York Mental Hygiene Law
§
him in violation of
9.39, thereby depriving Plaintiff
of his substantive and procedural due
ss rights as set forth
in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
270-276) i
(b) JHMC conspired with
civil rights pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
(c) JHMC violated his rights to due
§
Constitution (AC
~~
NYPD to violate Plaintiff's
§
1983
(AC
~~
277 282) i and,
pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
1983 by involuntarily hospitalizing him without notice, hearing
or an opportunity to be heard or to challenge his confinement, in
violation of the Fifth and
Constitution (AC
~~
Amendments to the
283 284).
III. Applicable Standard
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 (a) (2) requires "a
short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader
is entitled to relief.
To
pleadings
II
a motion to dismiss and for judgment on
to Rules 12 (b) (6) and 12 (c) 1,
"a complaint
1 The
standard used to decide a motion for judgment on the
made pursuant to Rule 12(c) is identical to the standard used to decide a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6).
See,
Patel v. Contemporary Classics of Beverly Hills, 259 F.3d 123, 126
r. 2001) (collecting cases) .
4
must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'ff
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009)
Corp. v.
~wombly,
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007».
(quoting Bell Atl.
Though the court
must accept the factual allegations of a complaint as true, it is
Unot bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a
factual
legation.
550 U.S. at 555).
II
Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (quoting Twombly,
Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to
"nudge [ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to
plausible."
IV.
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
Discussion
Defendant contends that Plaintiff's claims against it
should be dismissed on three grounds.
First, Plaintiff's
§
1983
claims should be dismissed because JHMC cannot be liable through
the doctrine of respondeat superior and is not liable directly.
Second, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that JHMC was a
state actor under
§
1983.
Third, after dismissing Plaintiff's
federal claims brought under
§
1983, the Court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's remaining
state law claims against JHMC.
5
a. Plaintiff Has Failed to Establish JHMC's Liability
Under § 1983
While Defendant contends that
aintiff cannot rely
upon the doctrine of respondeat superior to render JHMC liable
for Plaintiff's injuries, Plaintiff contends that his allegations
are against JHMC as a state actor 2
ly.
The question then
becomes whether Plaintiff may pursue JHMC directly, or whether it
would have to approach JHMC through the acts of its employees.
Section 1983 provides
no person may deprive
another, under color of state law, of rights secured by the
Constitution or the laws of
In assessing liability under
between the government it
alleged to be state actors.
United States.
§
42 U.S.C.
§
1983.
1983, courts do not distinguish
f and private entities who are
See Allen v. Mattingly, No. 10 Civ.
667, 2011 WL 1261103, at *16 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2011)
private entity to be state actor for purposes of
§
(finding
1983).
See
2 As noted above, Defendants contend that JHMC is not a state actor and that
Plaintiff fails to suf
conspiracy under § 1983. Because
Plaintiff's claims
even if JHMC is a state actor or
conspired with the NYPD, the Court does not need to decide this issue. That
having been stated, it does appear that JHMC is a state actor based on
Plaintiff's al
that the hospital's employees acted under the
compulsion of, and in concert with, the NYPD. Sybalski v. Independent Group
546 F.3d 255, 258 (2d Cir. 2008). Furthermore,
that JHMC was used as a detention facility, JHMC
can be seen as a state actor through its assumption of a traditional
government function.
Plaintiff also appears to sufficiently plead a §
1983 conspiracy by al
that JHMC's employees formed an agreement with
NYPD officers to collaborate in depriving Plaintiff of his constitutional
rights and acted pursuant to that agreement. See
200
6
also Whalen v. Allers, 302 F. Supp. 2d 194, 202
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(holding that a private corporate employer found to be a "state
actor" for purposes of § 1983 cannot be held vicariously liable
under § 1983 since "there is no tenable reason [ ] to distinguish
a private employer from a municipality.") i Temple v. Albert, 719
F. Supp. 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(neither the Supreme Court nor
the Second Circuit have directly addressed the issue of whether a
private entity can
held liable under
1983 on a respondeat
§
superior theory, but that numerous other courts have relied on
Monell to find that there is no tenable reason to distinguish a
private entity hired by a municipality from the municipality
itself)
Dolan v. Richards, No. 10 Civ. 5809, 2011 WL 1197462, at
i
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011).
ke government entities, private corporations "can act
only through natural persons," and their
conduct of their employees.
through
ViI
§
1983 liability arises
Coward v. Town and
of Harrison, 665 F. Supp. 2d 281, 308 (S.D.N.Y. 2009)
(quot
of St. Louis v.
(1988)) .
k, 485 U.S. 112, 122
Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)
I
depended on
s rationale in finding that governments will be
held responsible for the acts of their employees only where
"their official pol
F.3d 65,
72
(2d Cir.
ies cause their employees to violate another
1999).
7
person's constitutional rights."
-----"---
, 485 U.S. at 122
(discussing the rationale of Monell
Therefore, Defendant is correct in asserting that, as
state actors, "[p]rivate employers are not liable under
1983
§
for the constitutional torts of their employees unless the
plaintiff proves that action pursuant to of
nature caused a constitutional tort."
Store
cial policy of some
Rojas v. Alexander's Dep't
Inc., 924 F.2d 406, 408 (2d Cir. 1990)
marks and citations omitted).
See
so
-----
(internal quotation
Allen, 2011 WL 1261103,
at *16 n. 20 ("liability under Section 1983 cannot be based on
respondeat superior")
U.S. 658, 694
(citing Monell v.
't of Soc. Servs., 436
(1978); Jett v. Dallas I
School District,
491 U.S. 701, 736 (1989».
State actors "may be sued directly under § 1983 for
constitutional deprivations
licted upon private individuals
pursuant to [the state actor's] custom, policy, ordinance,
regulation, or decision."
397 (2d Cir. 1983)
Adam v. Met
Batista v.
z, 702 F.2d 393,
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978»
Authori
891441, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2011)
i
see also
No. 07 Civ. 8807, 2011 WL
(same);
ttle v.
Cor:rections Corp. of America, 103 Fed. Appx. 898, 900-01 (6th
Cir. 2004)
(dismissing claim where the pIa
8
iff failed to
lege
that private state actor was liable through a policy or custom)
Bradl
i
of New York, No. 08 Civ. 1106, 2009 WL 1703237,
at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 18, 2009)
(dismissing claim where conspiracy
was adequately pleaded because employee actions were not pursuant
to policy or custom).
under
§
Thus,
~[t]o
hold a
[state actor] liable
1983 for the unconstitutional actions of its employees, a
plaintiff is required to plead and prove three elements:
(1) an
official policy or custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be
subjected to (3) a deni
irmer & Co.
of a constitutional right."
Inc., No. 08 Civ. 11368, 2009 WL 4333457, at
*3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2009)
see
so Adams v. Ci
Kahn v.
(quoting Batista
702 F.2d at 397);
of New York, No. 08 Civ. 5263, 2010 WL
743956, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2010) i Gayton v. McCoy, 593 F.3d
610, 622 (7th Cir. 2010)
("Generally, to maintain a viable § 1983
action against a municipality, a government agent (such as [a
private corporation]), or individual policymaking defendants in
their offi
al capacities_, a
aintiff must demonstrate that a
constitutional deprivation occurred as the result of an express
policy or custom promulgated by that entity or an individual with
policymaking authority. II) •
"The Supreme Court has identified at least two
situations that constitute a municipal policy:
(1) where there is
an officially promulgated policy as that term is generally
9
understood
i.e., a formal act by the municipality's governing
body), and (2) where a single act is taken by a municipal
employee who, as a matter of State law, has final policymaking
authority in the area in which the action was taken."
Coward,
665 F. Supp. 2d at 308 (quoting Newton, 566 F. Supp. 2d at 271)
(citing Monell, 436 U.S. at 690, and Pembaur v. City of
Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 81 (1986)).
"A municipal 'custom,'
on the other hand, need not receive formal approval by the
appropriate decisionmaker ...
Supp. 2d at 271).
Instead,
/I
Id.
(quoting Newton, 566 F.
"an act performed pursuant to a
'custom' that has not been formally approved by an appropriate
decisionmaker may
rly subject a municipality to liability on
the theory that the relevant pract
the force of law."
Id.
is so widespread as to have
(quoting Board of
Commissioners of
Oklahoma v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 404
(1997)).
To
prevail on this theory of municipal liability, however, a
plaintiff must prove that the custom at issue is well settled.
See Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 127 (the Supreme Court "has long
recognized that a plaintiff may be able to prove the existence of
a widespread practice that, although not authorized by written
law or express municipal policy, is 'so permanent and well
settled as to const
1aw.'ff)
e a "custom or usage" with the force of
(quoting Adickes v. S.H. Kress
68 (1970)).
10
&
Co., 398 U.S. 144, 167
Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged that JHMC's
employees acted pursuant to an official JHMC policy, the
direction of a JHMC policymaker, or JHMC custom when they
part
ipated in the deprivation of Plaintiff's constitutional
rights.
In fact, Plaintiff appears to allege that the hospital's
employees defied its standard practices in taking orders from
and/or collaborating with the NYPD to deprive him of his
constitutional rights.
JHMC's liability under
Therefore, Plaintiff f
§
Is to establish
1983, and his federal claims against
JHMC are dismissed.
b. Supplemental Jurisdiction Over Plaintiff's State
Law Claims Against JHMC is Appropriate
Defendants contend that, with Plaintiff's federal
claims against JHMC dismissed, the Court should decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims
against JHMC.
28 U.S.C.
§
1367 provides as follows:
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have
original jurisdiction, the district courts shall have
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that
are so related to claims in the action within such
original jurisdiction that they form part of the same
case or controversy under Article III of the United
States Constitution.
Such supplemental jurisdiction
shall include claims that involve the joinder or
intervention
additional parties.
11
See also In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE") Products
Liabil
ion, 510 F. Supp. 2d 299, 320
(S.D.N.Y. 2007)
("In passing the statute, Congress gave district courts
jurisdiction over claims and parties over which the court lacked
original jurisdiction under sections 1331 and 1332, so long as
all of the claims arise out of the same case or controversy under
Article 111.11).
Federal and state claims form satisfy
§
1367(a)
if they "derive from a common nucleus of operative facts or when
both claims would normally be expected to be tried
judicial proceeding./I
Id. at 331,
a single
(quoting Achtman v.
McInerney & Squire, LLP, 464 F.3d 328, 335 (2d Cir. 2006))
Plaintiff contends that
s federal claims against the
NYPD and JHMC doctors arise from the same set of facts as his
remaining state law claims against JHMC.
Plaintiff's
allegations, that the NYPD removed him from his horne and forcibly
detained him at JHMC for approximately six days, and that JHMC
and its employees violated federal and state laws through their
complicity in the NYPD's actions and failure to satisfy their
duties to Plaintiff, arise from a common nucleus of overlapping
facts.
See Id. at 322
("'In determining whether two disputes
arise from a common nucleus of operative fact, we have
traditionally asked whether the facts underlying the federal and
state claims substantially overlapped. ..
12
[or] the federal claim
necessarily brought the facts underlying the state claim before
the court.'")
(quoting Achtman, 464 F.3d at 335)
quotations omitted).
(internal
Furthermore, under these circumstances,
considerations of judic
economy warrant exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff's state law claims
against JHMC.
See United Mine workers of America v. Gibbs, 383
U. S. 715, 726 (1966)
justification lies
(" [Supplemental jurisdiction's1
considerations of judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to litigants") .
Defendant points to
§
1367(c) and contends that the
court should decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
because it would be "fundamentally unfair" to keep JHMC in the
case and harm its reputation when only two of their doctors have
been identified as Defendants.
Section 1367(c) (4) provides that
the court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction if,
"in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons
for declining jurisdiction."
18 U.S.C.
§
1367(c) (4).
Defendant
has not established that sufficiently exceptional circumstances
exist here.
13
c.
The Motion to Stay Discovery is Moot
Defendant's motion to stay discovery while the Court
considered Defendant's motion to dismiss is moot, as the motion
to dismiss has now been ruled upon.
V.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons,
aintiff's
§
1983 claims
against JHMC are dismissed without prejudice, but the Court shall
exercise supplemental jurisdiction to retain Plaintiff's state
law claims against JHMC.
JHMC's motion to stay discovery is
denied.
It is so ordered.
New
May
Yo~
'6
I
NY
2011
14
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