Schoolcraft v. The City Of New York et al
Filing
650
LETTER addressed to Judge Robert W. Sweet from Alan H. Scheiner dated 09/29/2016 re: Response to Plaintiff's Request in Letter of 9/22/2016. Document filed by The City Of New York.(Scheiner, Alan)
ZACHARY W. CARTER
Corporation Counsel
THE CITY OF NEW YORK
ALAN H. SCHEINER
Senior Counsel
phone: (212) 356-2344
fax: (212) 788-9776
ascheine@law.nyc.gov
LAW DEPARTMENT
100 CHURCH STREET
NEW YORK, NY 10007
September 29, 2016
BY ECF
Honorable Robert W. Sweet
United States District Judge
Southern District of New York
500 Pearl Street
New York, New York 10007
Re: Schoolcraft v. City of New York, 10-CV-6005 (RWS)
Your Honor:
I am a Senior Counsel in the office of Zachary W. Carter, Corporation Counsel of the
City of New York, representing the motion respondent City of New York (the “City”), in
connection with the above-captioned matter. I write to briefly respond to plaintiff’s request in
the letter of Nat Smith, of September 22, 2016, that the Court order payment of the fee award
within 30 days of September 6, 2016.
The plaintiff’s application is without basis. First, plaintiff cites no legal authority for
such an order. Rule 69(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governs the enforcement of
money judgments, and specifies that enforcement shall be presumptively governed by state law.
State law contains no provision for an order requiring payment of a judgment within 30 days.
Second, the requested payment would be premature because the Court’s order is nonfinal as a result of plaintiff’s own motions for reconsideration. See United States v. Rodriguez,
892 F.2d 233, 235 (2d Cir. 1989) (“The FRAP 4(b) clock stops when a party files a motion for
reconsideration; that is, a timely motion for reconsideration renders the judgment non-final for
appeal purposes . . . .”)(citations omitted). The Court’s award contains numerous interlocking
determinations, and it is not severable into a minimum amount plus the amount that plaintiff
would like to add to it. Due to plaintiff’s own motions, the entire fee award remains subject to
modification and/or eventual appeal, upon which it can be stayed and after which it may go
down and not only up. Were a formal stay pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 62(b) deemed required
pending plaintiff’s own motion for reconsideration, such a stay should be granted because it
would be inequitable for plaintiff to both challenge the award and enforce it at the same time.
Sweet, J.
September 29, 2016
Page 2
Third, the 30-day period for payment demanded by plaintiff is unreasonable. For
example, by statute, a municipality in New York is given 90 days to pay settlements. N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 5003-a. There is no reason to expect payment of such a large sum as was awarded
here in only 1/3 of that time.
Accordingly, plaintiff’s request for a 30-day payment order should be denied.
We thank the Court for its consideration of this matter.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/
Alan H. Scheiner
Senior Counsel
Special Federal Litigation Division
cc: All counsel by ECF
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?