Liriano et al v. ICE/DHS et al
Filing
21
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER granting 11 Motion to Dismiss; granting 11 Motion for Summary Judgment. For the foregoing reasons, we grant defendants' motion and dismiss the complaint in its entirety. (Signed by Judge Naomi Reice Buchwald on 10/25/2011) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (mro)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
----------------------------------------X
JOVANNY LIRIANO and EMELY ORTIZ,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
- against -
10 Civ. 6196 (NRB)
ICE / DHS, BRIAN J. FLANAGAN and
ICE / DHS AGENTS, et al.,
Defendants.
----------------------------------------X
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Plaintiffs
Jovanny
Liriano
(“Liriano”)
and
his
daughter
Emely Ortiz (“Emely”), appearing pro se, bring this suit against
the
U.S.
Immigration
and
Customs
Enforcement
(“ICE”),
ICE
Deportation Officer Brian J. Flanagan (“Officer Flanagan”), and
“six to seven” unknown ICE agents who participated in the arrest
of Liriano.
Plaintiffs assert (i) claims against the United
States1 under the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), 28 U.S.C. §§
1346(b),
2671
et
suffered
as
result
against
the
a
seq.,
individual
of
for
physical
Liriano’s
officers
and
arrest,
under
Bivens
emotional
trauma
and
(ii)
claims
Six
Unknown
v.
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
for
unspecified
constitutional
violations.
1
Presently
before
Although ICE is the named defendant rather than the United States, the
United States is the only proper defendant in an action under the FTCA. See
C.P. Chem. Co. v. United States, 810 F.2d 34, 37 n.1 (2d Cir. 1987) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 2679(a)).
1
this Court is defendants’ motion to dismiss the FTCA claims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and to grant summary judgment on the Bivens
claims
pursuant
Procedure.
to
Rule
56
of
the
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
For the reasons set forth below, defendants’ motion
is granted in its entirety.
BACKGROUND2
I.
Factual Background
Liriano, a citizen of the Dominican Republic, was deported
to the Dominican Republic in June 2005 after a 2001 conviction
in New York for sale of a controlled substance.
2
(R. 56.1 ¶ 1,
The background is derived from plaintiffs’ complaint, Defendants’ Statement
of Undisputed Facts Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1, filed March 25, 2011
(“R. 56.1”), the Declaration of Brian J. Flanagan in Support of Defendants’
Motion for Summary Judgment (“Flanagan Decl.”), filed March 25, 2011, and the
exhibits annexed thereto.
For purposes of reviewing the motion to dismiss,
all nonconclusory factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true.
See S. Cherry St., LLC v. Hennessee Grp. LLC, 573 F.3d 98, 100 (2d Cir.
2009).
With respect to the motion for summary judgment, we note that
plaintiffs failed to comply with Rule 56.1 of the Local Rules of the United
States District Courts for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York
(“Local Rules”), which mandates that “[t]he papers opposing a motion for
summary
judgment
shall
include
a
correspondingly
numbered
paragraph
responding to each numbered paragraph in the statement of the moving party .
. . .” Local Rule 56.1(b). While we are thus entitled to treat all facts in
defendants’ 56.1 statement as admitted, see Local Rule 56.1(c), we employ our
broad discretion in this area and conduct our own review of the record to
confirm defendants’ recitation of the facts and supplement those facts where
necessary.
See Holtz v. Rockefeller & Co., Inc., 258 F.3d 62, 73 (2d Cir.
2001) (“A district court has broad discretion to determine whether to
overlook a party’s failure to comply with local court rules.
Thus . . .
while a court is not required to consider what the parties fail to point out
in their Local Rule 56.1 statements, it may in its discretion opt to conduct
an assiduous review of the record even where one of the parties has failed to
file such a statement.”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
After engaging in such a review, we note that the facts recited in
defendants’ 56.1 statement are derived almost entirely from court documents
pertinent to Liriano’s arrest and subsequent plea.
2
Compl. ¶ 12).
Liriano illegally re-entered the United States
following his deportation.
(Compl. ¶ 12).
On February 3, 2007, Liriano was arrested in Manhattan by
the New York City Police Department for violation of a local
law.
(R. 56.1 ¶ 2.)
Liriano was fingerprinted in connection
with this arrest, and ICE was subsequently notified that the
fingerprints
taken
by
the
Police
fingerprints
taken
of
Liriano
at
Department
the
time
matched
of
his
the
2005
deportation.
On
February
14,
2009,
a
criminal
complaint
was
filed
against Liriano in the Southern District of New York, charging
him with one count of illegal re-entry by a felon, in violation
of 8 U.S.C. § 1326.
Judge
Gabriel
Liriano.
Gorenstein
That same day, Magistrate
signed
an
arrest
warrant
for
(R. 56.1 ¶ 5.)
Also
ordered
W.
(R. 56.1 ¶ 4.)
on
the
February
relevant
14,
2009,
Magistrate
cell
phone
service
Judge
provider
Gorenstein
to
furnish
technical assistance, in the form of GPS tracking technology, to
ascertain the physical location of a cell phone believed to
belong to Liriano.
also
authorized
(R. 56.1 ¶ 6.)
the
use
of
a
Magistrate Judge Gorenstein
pen
register
with
a
caller
identification and/or trap and trace device on the cell phone
that Liriano was believed to be using.
(R. 56.1 ¶ 6.)
Based on
information obtained from the pen register and the GPS tracking
3
technology, ICE officials located Liriano’s apartment at 2467
Valentine Avenue in the Bronx, New York.
On
Officer
February
16,
Flanagan
Liriano.
2009,
arrived
Liriano
was
a
at
the
inside
eight-year old daughter.
team
(Flanagan Decl. ¶ 11.)
of
Bronx
the
ICE
officers
apartment
apartment
to
with
by
arrest
Emely,
his
After the officers announced their
presence, Liriano “decided not to open the door.”
16.)
led
(Compl. ¶
Liriano claims that he chose not to do so “because his
daughter was frightened by the excessive bang or knock on the
door.”
(Compl.
protracted
¶
16.)
standoff,
The
situation
during
which
developed
plaintiffs
allege
into
the
a
ICE
officers “were using profanity and serious threats” and Emely’s
fear
escalated
to
(Compl. ¶¶ 18-21.)
arrived,
Liriano
the
point
she
urinated
on
herself.
A full five hours after the ICE officers
finally
(Compl. ¶¶ 13, 18.)
that
opened
the
door
to
the
apartment.
Plaintiffs allege that when Liriano did
open the door, the officers “heavily armed came through the door
at gun point and pushed [Liriano] against the wall.”
(Compl. ¶
32.)
Following
this
arrest,
Liriano
pleaded
guilty
to
the
illegal re-entry charge and was sentenced by Judge Berman to
thirty-eight months imprisonment.
4
(R. 56.1 ¶¶ 9-10.)
II.
Procedural History
Plaintiffs filed an administrative claim against ICE on May
19, 2010.
(Compl. at A-18.)
The claim, filed on a Form SF-95,
sought relief for emotional trauma suffered by plaintiffs as a
result
of
(Compl.
the
at
circumstances
A-18.)
ICE
surrounding
has
not
yet
Liriano’s
arrest.
adjudicated
this
administrative claim.
Plaintiffs filed the instant complaint on August 18, 2010.
The
complaint
emotional
seeks
trauma
monetary
suffered
damages
by
for
plaintiffs.
the
physical
Specifically
and
with
regard to Emely, plaintiffs allege that she has developed severe
anxiety attributable to defendants’ actions, for which she is
now undergoing treatment at the Child and Family Institute in
Manhattan.
(Compl. ¶¶ 60-61.)
Plaintiffs also request that
this Court enter preliminary and permanent injunctions requiring
ICE to properly train its officers in order to avoid the abuse
allegedly suffered by plaintiffs.
(Compl. at 13.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Legal Standard
Defendants contend that plaintiffs’ claims under the FTCA
should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) or Rule 12(b)(6)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The defendants further
contend that summary judgment should be granted on the Bivens
5
claims
pursuant
to
Rule
56
of
the
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure.
As a general matter, a pro se complaint is reviewed under a
more lenient standard than that applied to “formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers.”
(per curiam).
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)
Courts must therefore interpret pro se pleadings
“to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.”
Pabon v.
Wright, 459 F.3d 241, 248 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Burgos v.
Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994)).
A.
Motion to Dismiss Purusant to Rule 12(b)(1)
A motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
must be granted when the district court lacks the statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate the claim.
Morrison v. Nat’l
Austrl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008).
When
subject matter jurisdiction is challenged, the plaintiff bears
the burden of establishing a factual basis for jurisdiction.
Aurecchione v. Schoolman Transp. Sys., Inc., 426 F.3d 635, 638
(2d Cir. 2005).
B.
Motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56
Summary judgment is appropriate when “the movant shows that
there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(a).
“The mere existence of some alleged factual
dispute
the
between
parties
will
6
not
defeat
an
otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement
is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.”
Scott v.
Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986)) (internal alterations
omitted); see also Quarles v. Gen. Motors Corp. (Motors Holding
Div.), 758 F.2d 839, 840 (2d Cir. 1985).
facts
that
governing
judgment.”
might
law
affect
will
the
properly
outcome
of
preclude
“Only disputes over
the
the
suit
entry
under
of
the
summary
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden rests
with the moving party to make a prima facie showing that no
issues of material fact exist for trial.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330-31 (1986).
See Celotex Corp. v.
Once this showing is
made, “[t]o defeat summary judgment, the non-movant must produce
specific facts” to rebut the movant’s showing and to establish
that there are material issues of fact requiring trial.
Wright
v. Coughlin, 132 F.3d 133, 137 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex,
477 U.S. at 322).
In determining whether a genuine issue of
material fact exists, a court must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and make all reasonable
inferences in that party’s favor.
See Fincher v. Depository
Trust & Clearing Corp., 604 F.3d 712, 720 (2d Cir. 2010).
Even though plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, this does not
relieve them of their duty to meet the requirements necessary to
7
defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony
Records, 351 F.3d 46, 50 (2d Cir. 2003).
II.
FTCA Claims
The FTCA waives the sovereign immunity of the United States
for the common law torts committed by its employees while acting
within
the
1346(b)(1).
scope
of
their
employment.
See
28
§
However, exhaustion of administrative remedies is a
prerequisite to suit in federal court under the FTCA.
2675(a).
U.S.C.
See id. §
A plaintiff may not bring suit under the FTCA unless
the plaintiff first brought a claim to the appropriate Federal
agency and that agency either made a final denial of the claim
or failed to make a disposition on the claim within six months
after it was filed.
See id.
Here, plaintiffs filed their administrative claim on May
19, 20103 and brought suit less than three months later, on
August
dismiss
18,
the
2010.
Defendants
complaint
for
maintain
lack
of
that
this
jurisdiction
Court
must
because
the
complaint was brought before the administrative claim was denied
3
Liriano did send a letter to the Department of Homeland Security on October
20, 2009, containing similar allegations to those in the Form SF-95 he later
submitted. (See Compl. at A-15.) However, the October 20, 2009, letter does
not qualify as a formal administration complaint for purposes of the FTCA’s
exhaustion requirement.
While individuals may submit administrative
grievances through means other than a Form SF-95, in order to serve as a
formal complaint, any “other written notification” must be “accompanied by a
claim for money damages in a sum certain.” 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a). Because the
October 20, 2009, letter did not specify an amount of damages being sought by
plaintiffs, it did not include a claim for a “sum certain” and therefore “did
not constitute the filing of a formal administrative claim for FTCA
purposes.” Johnson v. Smithsonian Inst., 189 F.3d 180, 190 (2d Cir. 1999).
8
and before six months had passed after the administrative claim
was filed.
We are compelled to agree with this assessment.
In
McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110 (1993), the Supreme
Court
held
that
the
FTCA’s
exhaustion
requirement
is
“unambiguous” and strict adherence to the statutory command is
therefore
Circuit
necessary.
has
Following
consistently
held
this
that
guidance,
the
the
Second
FTCA’s
exhaustion
requirement is jurisdictional and cannot be waived.
See, e.g.,
Garland-Sash v. Lewis, 348 F.App’x. 639, 642 (2d Cir. 2009)
(citing Celestine v. Mount Vernon Neighborhood Health Ctr., 403
F.3d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 2005); Keene Corp. v. United States, 700
F.2d 836, 841 (2d Cir. 1983)).
The requirement that prematurely
filed FTCA claims be dismissed holds even when, as here, the
FTCA claims would be ripe if re-filed at the date of the court’s
decision.
See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 112-13; see also Tarafa v.
B.O.P. MDC Brooklyn, No. 07-CV-00554 (DLI)(LB), 2007 WL 2120358,
at *3 (E.D.N.Y. July 23, 2007) (“[A]lthough it is this court's
view that dismissing [plaintiff’s] FTCA claim and requiring him
to re-file is the ultimate exercise of form over substance, this
court must dismiss [plaintiff’s] FTCA claim under the Supreme
Court's dictates in McNeil.”) (internal citation and quotation
marks omitted).
The fact that plaintiffs are acting pro se does
not alter this outcome.
See McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113 (“[W]e have
never
procedural
suggested
that
9
rules
in
ordinary
civil
litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by
those
who
proceed
without
counsel.”).
Therefore,
we
are
required to dismiss plaintiffs’ FTCA claims without prejudice.4
III. Bivens Claims
Plaintiffs assert Bivens
and
the
other
constitutional
arresting
violations.
claims against Officer Flanagan
ICE
officers
Liberally
for
construing
unspecified
plaintiffs’
allegations, we take the complaint to assert claims for unlawful
home
entry
and
excessive
force,
in
violation
of
Flanagan
and
the
Fourth
Amendment.
Defendants
contend
that
Officer
the
other
arresting officers are entitled to qualified immunity on any
constitutional claims asserted against them.
“When considering
a government official’s qualified immunity claim, we ask first
4
While plaintiffs are permitted to re-file their FTCA claims, we note that
after a brief review of the claims, they appear to be without merit.
We
interpret
plaintiffs’
complaint
as
asserting
claims
for
intentional
infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), negligent infliction of emotional
distress (“NIED”), and property damage. Any IIED or NIED claims are likely
precluded by the fact that the alleged injuries arose as a result of a lawful
arrest.
See Csoka v. County of Suffolk, 85 F. Supp. 2d 117, 123 (E.D.N.Y.
2000) (“A lawful arrest cannot support a claim for intentional or negligent
infliction of emotional distress.”). Even without this barrier to recovery,
plaintiffs would likely not be able to recover on their IIED claim because
defendants’ behavior does not appear to rise to the exceedingly high level of
outrageousness required under New York law to sustain an IIED claim.
See
Stuto v. Fleishman, 164 F.3d 820, 827 (2d Cir. 1999).
Plaintiffs would
likely also be unable to recover on an NIED claim for Emely’s distress
because Emely did not witness any serious injury inflicted on her father, and
defendants’ actions do not appear to have actually endangered Emely’s
physical safety.
See Mortise v. United States, 102 F.3d 693, 696 (2d Cir.
1996) (describing the elements of an NIED claim under both the “direct duty
theory” and the “bystander theory”). Finally, any claim for property damage
would likely fail because plaintiffs did not seek relief for property damage
in their administrative complaint and thus the claim would not meet the
FTCA’s exhaustion requirement.
10
whether,
‘taken
asserting
the
in
the
injury,
light
the
most
facts
favorable
alleged
conduct violated a constitutional right.’”
show
to
the
the
party
officer’s
Mills v. Fenger, 216
F.App’x. 7, 8 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 201 (2001)) (internal alterations omitted).
A. Unlawful Entry
“An
arrest
warrant
founded
on
probable
cause
implicitly
carries with it the limited authority to enter a dwelling in
which the suspect lives when there is reason to believe the
suspect is within.”
United States v. Lovelock, 170 F.3d 339,
343 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573,
603 (1980)) (internal alteration omitted).
Thus, when asking
whether officers are authorized to enter a home to execute a
warrant
for
an
individual’s
arrest,
“the
proper
inquiry
is
whether there is a reasonable belief that the suspect resides at
the place to be entered . . . and whether the officers have
reason to believe that the suspect is present.”
United States
v. Lauter, 57 F.3d 212, 215 (2d Cir. 1995).
In
the
instant
matter,
Magistrate
Judge
Gorenstein
had
approved an arrest warrant for Liriano on a complaint charging
illegal re-entry.
Magistrate Judge Gorenstein had also issued a
court order permitting ICE officers to use GPS technology to
track the precise physical location of Liriano’s cell phone.
This
tracking
information
allowed
11
the
officers
to
locate
Liriano’s apartment in the Bronx.
Liriano admits that after the
officers arrived at the apartment and announced their presence,
he
engaged
in
continued
conversations
with
them
during
the
extended period in which the door to the apartment remained
closed.
Given this evidence, it is clear that the officers held
a reasonable belief that Liriano resided at the Bronx apartment,
and it is implicit in Liriano’s allegations that the officers
had
reason
eventually
to
believe
entered
the
Liriano
was
present
apartment.
at
the
Plaintiffs
are
time
they
therefore
unable to sustain a claim that the officers’ conduct constituted
unlawful home entry.
B. Excessive Force
To prevail on a Fourth Amendment claim of excessive force,
a plaintiff must show that the amount of force used by law
enforcement was “objectively unreasonable in light of the facts
and circumstances confronting [the officers], without regard to
[their] underlying intent or motivation.”
Jones v. Parmley, 465
F.3d 46, 61 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 397 (1989)).
Officers’ actions are not to be judged in
hindsight, but from the perspective of a reasonable officer on
the scene.
Id.
later
unnecessary
seem
Thus, “not every push or shove, even if it may
in
the
peace
of
a
judge's
chambers,
violates the Fourth Amendment,” Maxwell v. City of New York, 380
F.3d 106, 108 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396)
12
(internal alteration omitted), and officers may need to use some
degree of force in the course of an arrest, particularly where
they
are
forced
to
make
split-second
judgments
in
tense
situations.
Plaintiffs’ complaint can be read to allege two distinct
forms of excessive force: (1) the profanity and verbal threats
made by the arresting officers during the protracted period when
Liriano was unwilling to open the apartment door, and (2) the
aggressive method by which the arresting officers entered the
apartment once Liriano did open the door.
Plaintiffs’
establish
a
claims
of
verbal
constitutional
abuse
violation
are
as
a
insufficient
matter
of
to
law.
“[V]erbal harassment or profanity alone, unaccompanied by any
injury
no
matter
how
inappropriate,
unprofessional,
or
reprehensible it might seem, does not constitute the violation
of any federally protected right . . . .”
F.
Supp.
460,
474
(S.D.N.Y.
1998)
Shabazz v. Pico, 994
(internal
quotation
marks
omitted); see also Harwe v. Floyd, No. 3-09-cv-1027 (MRK), 2011
WL
674024,
at
*1
(D.
Conn.
Feb.
17,
2011)
(“[T]he
Fourth
Amendment to the United States Constitution does not require . .
. police officers to be polite”); Davidson v. Tesla, No. 3-06cv-861 (JCH), 2008 WL 410584, at *4 (D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2008)
(“[Plaintiff’s] complaint that [the officer] behaved towards him
in an angry, hostile, aggressive and belligerent manner [] fails
13
to establish a cognizable constitutional injury as a matter of
law.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Plaintiffs
also
fail
to
establish
a
viable
claim
of
excessive force with respect to the manner in which the officers
entered
the
apartment.
Plaintiffs
simply
assert
that
the
officers came through the door “heavily armed . . . at gun point
and pushed [Liriano] against the wall.”
not
excessive
for
the
officers
to
(Compl. ¶ 32.)
draw
their
It was
weapons
when
entering the apartment pursuant to the arrest warrant, see Wims
v. N.Y. City Police Dept., No. 10 Civ. 6128 (PKC), 2011 WL
2946369,
at
*5
(S.D.N.Y.
July
20,
2011),
especially
given
Liriano’s refusal to open the apartment door for a full five
hours.
Moreover, plaintiffs have not alleged any comments or
other circumstances to suggest that the officers displayed their
weapons in a uniquely threatening manner so as to constitute
excessive force.
See Mills, 216 F.App’x. at 9-10.
Plaintiffs’
allegation that the officers pushed Liriano against the wall
likewise
fails
to
present
an
actionable
constitutional
claim
because it does not suggest a level of force that is more than
de minimis.
See Wims, 2011 WL 2946369, at *4 (citing Romano v.
Howarth, 998 F.2d 101, 105 (2d Cir. 1993)).
again
buttressed
by
the
tense
circumstances
officers’ entry into the apartment.
14
This conclusion is
surrounding
the
IV.
Injunctive Relief
Finally, plaintiffs’ claims for preliminary and permanent
injunctions must be dismissed because plaintiffs lack standing
to request such relief.
To
establish
plaintiff
must
standing
show
that
when
he
seeking
is
“under
injunctive
threat
of
relief,
a
suffering
‘injury in fact’ that is concrete and particularized; the threat
must be actual and imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; it
must
be
fairly
defendant;
and
traceable
it
must
be
to
the
likely
challenged
that
a
action
favorable
decision will prevent or redress the injury.”
of
the
judicial
Summers v. Earth
Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 129 S.Ct. 1142, 1149 (2009).
When a
plaintiff
injury
seeks
injunctive
relief
based
on
a
prior
attributable to the defendants, the plaintiff must demonstrate
that he is likely to suffer future injury due to “a recurrence
of
the
allegedly
unlawful
conduct.”
Amnesty
Int’l.
USA
v.
Clapper, 638 F.3d 118, 136 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting City of Los
Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 107 n.8 (1983)).
There is no likelihood that Liriano will be subject to
future similar treatment because he will be deported from the
United States after he serves his sentence for illegal re-entry.
Plaintiffs
also
do
not
present
any
facts
demonstrating
that
Emely will likely suffer future injury as a result of actions
similar to those that occurred during the arrest of her father.
15
plaintiffs'
Therefore,
request
for
injunctive
relief
is
dismissed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons,
we grant defendants'
motion and
dismiss the complaint in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.
Dated:
New York, New York
October 25, 2011
L~
NAOMI REICE BUCHWALD
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies of the foregoing Order have been mailed on this date to
the following:
Pro Se Plaintiff
Jovanny Liriano, #61949-054
Moshannon Valley Correctional Center
Unit A, Pod 3
555-1 Cornell Drive
Philipsburg, PA 16866-0798
Attorney for Defendants
David Bober
United States Attorney Office
One St. Andrew's plaza
New York, NY 10007
16
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