Garmon v. County of Rockland et al
Filing
32
OPINION AND ORDER: For the reasons set forth above t Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTED. The Complaint is DISMISSED in its entirety. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close this case and to enter judgment in accordance with this Order. (Signed by Judge Andrew L. Carter, Jr on 2/11/2013) (js)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
USDCSDNY
DOCUMENT
ELECTRONICALLY FILED
DOC #:_ _~=--_ _ __
DATE FILED:-.1- -//. /3
------------------------------X
GEORGE GARMON, As Proposed
Administrator of the Estate of
ANTONIO D. GARMON, ANTONIO D.
GARMON and GEORGE GARMON,
Individually,
Plaintiffs,
10 Civ. 7724 (ALC) (GWG)
OPINION
- against -
&:
ORDER
COUNTY OF ROCKLAND, TOWN OF
HAVERSTRAW, HAVERSTRAW TOWN
POLICE DEPARTMENT, JAMES HANSEN,
IAN KAYE, M. ROSA, SGT. I. KAYE,
and JOHN DOE #1-8 (the name John
Doe being fictitious, as the
true names are presently unknown),
Defendants.
------------------------------x
ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge:
I.
Procedural Background
Plaintiff George Garmon ("Plaintiff") filed a Complaint
against Defendants County of Rockland, Town of Haverstraw,
Haverstraw Town Police Department, James Hansen, Ian Kaye, M.
Rosa, Sgt. I. Kaye, and John Doe #1-8, claiming his son died of
a drug overdose while in police custody.
Plaintiff, on his
son's behalf, is pursuing various federal and state law claims.
By Stipulation and Order of January 31, 2011, Defendant County
of Rockland was dismissed from this action.
1
On June 18, 2012, Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss for
lack of standing.
Plaintiff filed an affirmation in opposition
on August 16, 2012, and Defendants filed a reply on August 25,
2012.
Since Plaintiff is not the administrator of his son's
estate, he lacks standing to sue on his son's behalf.
The
Complaint is DISMISSED for lack of standing.
II.
Factual Background
Plaintiff George Garmon is the father of Antonio D. Garmon
("decedent").
On June 20, 2009, Antonio Garmon was arrested in
Haverstraw, New York and charged with criminal possession of a
controlled substance.
After his arrest, the decedent allegedly
complained of pain and discomfort, which was ignored.
of a drug overdose while in police custody.
He died
Plaintiff claims
the decedent was subject to an illegal search and seizure and
was arrested without probable cause.
Further, Defendants did
not provide for the administration of proper and adequate
medical care to the decedent, ultimately resulting in his death.
Antonio Garmon died intestate, leaving his children and
Plaintiff as potential heirs.
On or around May II, 2012,
Valencia Smith, the decedent's daughter, received Letters of
Administration for the Estate of Antonio Garmon from the
Rockland County Surrogate's Court.
Subsequently, Ms. Smith
executed a document in Little Rock, Arkansas, granting Plaintiff
Power of Attorney from August 8, 2012 to January I, 2013.
2
Defendants filed the instant motion pursuant to Rule
12(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, seeking
dismissal of the Complaint on the grounds that Plaintiff lacks
standing to litigate the claims contained therein.
III. Standard of Review
"[I]t is the burden of the party who seeks the exercise of
jurisdiction in his favor, clearly to allege facts demonstrating
that he is a proper party to invoke judicial resolution of the
dispute." Bd. of Educ. of Mt. Sinai Union Free Sch. Dist. v.
N.Y. State Teachers Ret. Sys., 60 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1995)
(quoting FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231
(1990».
The Court must accept as true all well-pled facts
alleged in the Complaint and must draw all reasonable inferences
in Plaintiffs' favor. Sweet v. Sheahan, 235 F.3d 80, 83 (2d Cir.
2000)
"But, when the question to be considered is one involving
the jurisdiction of a federal court, jurisdiction must be shown
affirmatively, and that showing is not made by drawing from the
pleadings inferences favorable to the party asserting it."
Shipping Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Drakos, 140 F.3d 129, 131 (2d Cir.
1998).
Rather, Plaintiffs must prove subject matter
jurisdiction exists by a preponderance of the evidence. Makarova
v. United States, 201 F.3d 110, 113 (2d Cir. 2000).
3
IV.
Discussion
Plaintiff alleges several causes of action in the Complaint
individually and on behalf of the decedent.
In particular,
Plaintiff asserts violations of the Fourth, Fifth, and
Fourteenth Amendments and various state law claims for the
decedent.
Individually, Plaintiff claims loss of companionship.
A. Plaintiff's Standing to Bring Claims on Behalf of Decedent
Defendants contend Plaintiff does not have the capacity to
sue on behalf of the decedent.
Specifically, New York law gives
the power to bring claims for a decedent to the administrator of
the estate.
Since Plaintiff was not named as the administrator,
he is attempting to assert legal rights that should properly be
asserted by Ms. Smith, the administratrix of Antonio Garmon's
estate.
Therefore, Plaintiff lacks standing and the Court
should dismiss the Complaint for want of subject matter
jurisdiction.
"Standing is a proper ground upon which to challenge a
court's subject matter jurisdiction:
'If plaintiffs lack Article
III standing, a court has no subject matter jurisdiction to hear
their claim.'" Clarex Ltd. v. Natixis Sec. Am. LLC, No. 12 Civ.
0722 (PAE) , 2012 WL 4849146, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2012)
(quoting Mahon v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 683 F.3d 59, 62 (2d Cir.
2012)).
"In essence the question of standing is whether the
litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of the
4
dispute or of particular issues." Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
750-751 (1984)
(1975».
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
Since the absence thereof is considered a
jurisdictional defect, "standing is to be determined as of the
commencement of suit." Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 571 n.5 (1992).
Accordingly,
"courts cannot consider any
amendments to the initial complaint or any post-filing
assignments to plaintiffs to determine whether plaintiffs have
standing." Clarex, 2012 WL 4849146, at *3 (citing Fenstermaker
v. Obama, 354 Fed. Appx. 452, 455 n.1 (2d Cir. 2009)}.
An analysis of standing may involve the constitutional
requirement, which mandates a "case or controversy" exist for
the exercise of federal jurisdiction in accordance with Article
III of the Constitution, or the prudential considerations, which
serve as "judicially self-imposed limits on the exercise of
federal jurisdiction." Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
Prudential
considerations include barring a litigant who is attempting to
assert another person's legal rights. Id.
Like the
constitutional requirement, prudential considerations are
generally jurisdictional perquisites to suit. Lerner v. Fleet
Bank, N.A., 318 F.3d 113, 126-27 (2d Cir. 2003)
{citing Thompson
v. County of Franklin, 15 F.3d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1994}).
5
i. Determining the Proper Party In Interest
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that "actions
must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest."
Fed. R. Civ. P. 17(a) (1).
Rule 17(a) (1) (B) allows an
administrator to sue in his or her own name "without joining the
person for whose benefit the action is brought[.]"
Since
Plaintiff is not the administrator of the decedent's estate,
capacity to sue is determined by New York law in accordance with
Rule 1 7 (b) (3) .
ii. Administrator's Ability to Bring Claims for the Estate
"Only a duly appointed personal representative may bring
suit on behalf of a decedent" in New York. Palladino v. Metro.
Life Ins. Co., 590 N.Y.S.2d 601, 602 (App. Div. 3d Dep't 1992)
N.Y. EPTL
11-3.1 (2012).
§
i
"A personal representative is a
person who has received letters to administer the estate of a
decedent."
§
1-2.13.
"Inasmuch as letters of administration
have not been issued to plaintiff, he has no standing to sue."
Palladino, 590 N.Y.S.2d at 602i see also Brandon v. Columbian
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 694 N.Y.S.2d 134, 134 (App. Div. 2d Dep't
1999)
("The plaintiff lacks standing to sue on behalf of the
decedent's estate since she has not received letters of
administration. ") i Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324,
331 (2d Cir. 1982)
(finding under New York law, the
administratrix has standing to assert civil rights claim for the
6
decedent's personal injuries).
The power of attorney executed by Ms. Smith has no effect
on Plaintiff's inability to litigate the decedent's claims.
Ms.
Smith cannot delegate her responsibilities of administering the
estate to Plaintiff. See In re Will of Jones, 1 Misc. 3d 688,
689 (Sur. Ct. Broome County 2003)
(~[A]
fiduciary cannot
delegate the responsibility for the entire administration of the
estate .
./1) i
In re Sadlo, No. 2009-97727/A, 2009 WL
3066665, at *2 (Sur. Ct. Dutchess County Sept. 25, 2009)
(describing an executor's actions as
~patent[ly]
impermissi[ble]/I where the executor signed a power of attorney
allowing a third-party to act in his place as the estate
representative) .
In Friedman v. Clearview Gardens, Plaintiff attempted to
bring suit on behalf of his decedent-mother's estate, even
though the letters of administration were issued to Plaintiff's
brother. Friedman v. Clearview Gardens Second Corp., No.
23317/10, 2011 WL 489545, at *1-2 (Sup. Ct. Feb. 3, 2011).
Plaintiff submitted a document to the court indicating his
brother had given him power of attorney to bring suit. Id. at
*2.
First, the court noted,
~only
a duly appointed personal
representative may bring suit on behalf of a decedent's estate./I
Id.
Regarding the power of attorney relied on by Plaintiff, the
court held,
7
Even assuming that
this delegation of authority
encompasses the power to commence an action [, ]
an executor is not authorized to give a power of
attorney granting powers to act on the executor's
behalf as personal representative of the estate of
decedent.
The proffered power of attorney is,
therefore, ineffective to provide plaintiff with the
authority to prosecute the cause of action .
in
place of the executor.
Id.
The current facts align closely with Friedman, and there is
no reason to depart from the same outcome in this case.
Since
Plaintiff was not named the administrator of the estate, he does
not have standing to bring claims belonging to the decedent.
iii. Prudential Considerations Undermine Plaintiff's Standing
The prudential considerations that are part of the standing
inquiry further undermine Plaintiff's position that he is a
proper party in this action.
The central question "'is whether
the constitutional or statutory provision on which the claim
rests properly can be understood as granting persons in the
plaintiff's position a right to judicial relief.'") Leibovitz v.
N.Y. City Transit Auth., 252 F.3d 179, 185 (2d Cir. 2001)
(quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 500-01).
The decedent's claims, assuming the allegations are true,
may be cognizable under
§
1983.
On the other hand, the right to
bring claims on behalf of the decedent does not originate with
1983 but rather, arises from state law allowing the estate to
pursue claims available to the decedent notwithstanding his
death. See
§
11-3.1 "(Any action, other than an action for
8
§
injury to person or property, may be maintained by and against a
personal representative in all cases and in such manner as such
action might have been maintained by or against his decedent.") .
It is also state law that forecloses Plaintiff's ability to seek
relief here.
New York courts have unequivocally found the
administrator of the estate is authorized to pursue judicial
intervention on behalf of the decedent. See cases cited supra
Part III.A.ii.
As such, it is clear state law does not give
Plaintiff the right to bring the decedent's claims against
Defendants. Prudential considerations further counsel the Court
to decline jurisdiction by reaching the conclusion that
Plaintiff lacks standing in this case.
B. Plaintiff's Individual Claim
The
services
remaining
l
or
Nevertheless
I
claim
support
for
is
loss
of
brought
by
companionship
Plaintiff
I
society
I
individually.
loss of companionship is a derivative claim that
is not cognizable under
§
1983.
Nealy v.
587 F. Supp. 2d 579, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2008)
claim for loss of companionship,
U. S.
Surgical Corp.,
("Under New York law
societYI
l
a
services I or support
is derivative of the related primary causes of action; dismissal
of
the
primary
claims
requires
dependent derivative claims.
II )
the
Court
to
(collecting cases).
dismiss
any
There is no
independent basis to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiff/s loss
of companionship claim
l
and therefore
9
I
it is dismissed.
V.
Conclusion
For
the
reasons
set
forth
above t
Defendant t s
Motion
Dismiss the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction is GRANTBD.
Complaint is DISMISSBD in its entirety.
to
The
The Clerk of Court is
respectfully directed to close this case and to enter judgment
in accordance with this Order.
SO ORDBRED.
Dated: New York, New York
February ~, 2013
~7~~
Andrew L. Carter, Jr.
United States District Judge
10
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