Naghright v. Karan Weiss et al
Filing
98
OPINION: re: granting 79 FIRST MOTION for Reconsideration. filed by Stephen M. Robbins. Based on the conclusions set forth in this Order, Robbins' motion for reconsideration is granted, and Plaintiff's cause of action for fraud is dismissed in its entirety. (Signed by Judge Robert W. Sweet on 6/20/2012) (pl)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
-x
JAMIE A. NAUGHRIGHT,
10 Civ. 8451
Plaintiff,
OPINION
againstDONNA KARAN WEISS, URBAN ZEN, LLC,
STEPHEN M. ROBBINS, JANE DOES 1 25,
Defendants.
--x
A P PEA RAN C E S:
Attorney for
aintiff
LAW OFFICES OF M. ARI JACOBSON
1029 Teaneck Road, Suite 2D
Teaneck, NJ 07666
By:
M. Ari Jacobson,
Attorneys for Defendants Donna Karan Weiss & Urban
Zen, LLC
GORDON & SILBER, P.C.
355 Lexington Avenue
New York, NY 10017
By:
Laura Elizabeth Rodgers, Esq.
At
for Defendant
GRANT RICHMAN, PLLC
Liberty Building, Route 9W
Stony Point, NY 10980
By:
Howard Stewart Richman, Esq.
Robbins
Sweet, D.J.
Defendant Stephen M. Robbins ("Robbins") has moved,
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Local Civil Rule 6.3 for
reconsideration of a portion of the Court's March 8, 2012
opinion (the "March 8 Opinion").
In the March 8 Opinion, the
Court partially granted Robbins' motion to dismiss the fraud
claim brought against him by Plaintiff Jamie A. Naughright
{"Naughright," or the "Plaintiff"}, but permitted a portion of
Plaintiff's fraud cause of action to survive the motion to
dismiss.
In this present motion, Robbins is requesting that
the Court reconsider the portion of the March 8 Opinion
regarding Plaintiff's fraud claim against Robbins and issue an
order, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12{b} (6), dismissing
Plaintiff's fraud claim in its entirety.
For the reasons set
forth below, Robbins' motion for reconsideration is granted,
and Plaintiff's fraud claim against Robbins is dismissed in
its entirety.
Prior Proceedings
Naughright, a resident of Florida, filed her initial
complaint against Defendants Donna Karan Weiss and urban Zen
1
(the "Karan Defendants," and, with Robbins, the "Defendants"),
who are domiciled in New York, and Robbins, who is a
California resident, in the Southern District of New York on
November 8, 2010.
Naughright's complaint alleged thirteen
causes of action, all arising out of treatment rendered to
Naughright by Robbins on November 9, 2009, which is alleged to
have resulted in physical injury suffered by Naughright.l
Both
the Karan Defendants and Robbins moved to dismiss Naughright's
initial complaint pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b) (6).
On
November 18, 2011, the Court granted Defendants' motions to
dismiss, allowing Naughright twenty days to replead.
On December 9, 2011, Naughright filed her Amended
Complaint, which alleged six causes of action characterized as
(1) negligent misrepresentation against the Karan Defendants,
(2) negligence against Robbins,
(3) fraud against Robbins,
medical malpractice against Robbins,
(5) battery against
Robbins and (6) failure to obtain consent against Robbins.
1
(4)
On
A more complete detailing of the facts alleged by
Naughright can be found in the Court's November 18, 2011
opinion granting Defendants' motion to dismiss the initial
complaint, as well as in the March 8 Opinion, which granted in
part and denied in part Defendants' motion to dismiss the
Amended Complaint. See Naughright v. Weiss, 826 F. Supp. 2d
676 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Naughright v. Weiss, No. 10 Civ. 8451,
2012 WL 760185, at *1 3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2012).
2
January 10, 2012, the Karan Defendants filed their motion to
dismiss the Amended Complaint, and Robbins filed a motion to
dismiss on January 11.
In the March 8 Opinion, the Court
granted in part and denied in part Defendants' motions,
dismissing the negligent misrepresentation claim against the
Karan Defendants and partially dismissing the fraud claim
against Robbins, but denying Robbins' motion to dismiss the
negligence, medical malpractice, battery and the failure to
obtain consent claims.
With respect to the fraud claim against Robbins, the
Amended Complaint pled fraud on account of three of Robbins'
statements:
(1) statements made during Robbins' November 7,
2009 presentation in which
represented that he was
affiliated with UCLA and USC Medical Centers;
(2) statements
made on November 7, 2009 in which Robbins stated that he could
cure Naughrighti and (3) statements that Robbins made
representing that
the LAPD.
was affiliated as a medical doctor with
In the March 8 Opinion, the Court dismissed the
Amended Complaint's fraud claim with respect to the
allegations concerning Robbins' statements that he could cure
Naughright and that he was affiliated as a medical doctor with
the LAPD, as the Amended Complaint failed to provide
3
sufficient information concerning the time and place of these
alleged statements to satisfy the pleading requirements of
Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
See Naughright, 2012 WL 760185, at *8.
However, with respect to Robbins' statement that he was
associated with UCLA and USC, the March 8 Opinion held that
the Amended Complaint provided sufficient factual detail to
satisfy the strictures of Rule 9(b), and Plaintiff's fraud
allegations concerning this statement were held to be
sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss.
On March 20, 2012, Robbins filed his motion for
reconsideration, requesting that the Court revisit its ruling
regarding Plaintiff's fraud claim and issue an order
dismissing the Amended Complaint's fraud claim in its
entirety.
After a delay in the briefing schedule caused by
Plaintiff's retaining of counsel, the motion was marked fully
submitted on June 7, 2012.
The Applicable Standards
A. Applicable Standard For A Motion To Reconsider
4
The Plaintiff requests reconsideration of the March
8 Opinion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e) and Local Civil
Rule 6.3.
The standards governing motions under Local Rule
6.3 along with Fed. R. Civ. P. 59 are the same, and a court
may grant reconsideration where the party moving for
reconsideration demonstrates an "intervening change in
controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need
to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice."
Henderson v. Metro. Bank & Trust CO'
375 76 (S.D.N.Y. 2007)
502 F. Supp. 2d 372,
(quotation marks and citations
omitted); Parrish v. Sollecito
(S.D.N.Y. 2003)
I
253 F. Supp. 2d 713, 715
l
("Reconsideration may be granted to correct
ear error, prevent manifest injustice or review the court's
decision in light of the availability of new evidence.")
(citing
Atl. Ai
Ltd. v. Nat'l Mediation Bd., 956
F.2d 1245, 1255 (2d Cir. 1992))
Place
2001)
I
i
Catskill Dev., L.L.C. v. Park
154 F. Supp. 2d 696, 701-02
(S.D.N.Y.
(granting reconsideration due to the court/s erroneous
application of a statute).
The moving party must demonstrate
controlling law or factual matters put before the court on the
underlying motion that the movant believes the court
overlooked and that might reasonably be expected to alter the
court/s decision.
See Linden v. Dist. Council 1707-AFSCME,
5
415 Fed. Appx. 337, 338-39 (2d Cir. 2011)
(affirming dismissal
of reconsideration motion as movant did not identify any
relevant facts or controlling authority that the lower court
. Appx.
overlooked); Lichtenberg v. Besicorp Grp. Inc., 28
73
1
75 (2d Cir. 2002)
firming dismissal
reconsideration
motion where movant "failed to demonstrate that the [lower]
court overlooked any fact of consequence or controlling legal
authority at the time the court decided [the case] II) •
The reason for the rule confining reconsideration to
matters that were "overlooked
ll
is to "ensure the finality of
decisions and to prevent the practice of a losing party
examining a decision and then plugging the gaps of a lost
motion with additional matters."
Press
l
Inc., No. 97 Civ. 690 (MBM)
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 18
omitted).
1
2000)
Pol
v. St. Martinis
----~~------------------
I
2000 WL 98057
1
at *1
(citation and quotation marks
A court must narrowly construe and strictly apply
Local Rule 6.3
1
so as to avoid duplicative rulings on
previously considered issues
l
and to prevent the rule from
being used as a substitute for appealing a final judgment.
See In re Bear Stearns Cos.
Lit
and ERISA
., 08 M.D.L. No. 1963, 2009 WL 2168767, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
16, 2009)
("A motion for reconsideration is not a motion
6
to reargue those issues already considered when a party does
not like the way the original motion was resolved.")
(quoting
Davey v. Polan, 496 F. Supp. 2d 387, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 2007));
v. Lansa
at *2
Inc., No. 01 Civ. 3578, 2008 WL 4376367,
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 25, 2008)
("The standard for granting
such a motion is strict, and reconsideration will generally be
denied unless the moving party can point to controlling
decisions or data that the court overlooked-matters, in other
words, that might reasonably be expected to alter the
conclusion reached by the court.")
marks omitted)
i
(citations and quotation
Ballard v. Parks tone
LLC, No. 06 Civ.
13099, 2008 WL 4298572, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2008)
("Local Rule 6.3 is to be narrowly construed and strictly
applied in order to avoid repetitive arguments on issues that
the court has fully considered.")
(quoting Abrahamson v. Bd.
of Educ. of the Wappingers Cent. Sch. Dist., 237 F. Supp. 2d
507, 510 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
Motions for reconsideration "are not vehicles for
taking a second bite at the apple,
. and [the court]
[should] not consider facts not in the record to be facts that
the court overlooked."
769 (2d Cir. 2008)
Rafter v. Liddle, 288 Fed. Appx. 768,
(citation and quotation marks omitted) .
7
B. Applicable Standard For A Motion To Dismiss Pursuant To
Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6)
On a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12t all
factual allegations in the complaint are accepted as true t and
all inferences are drawn in favor of the pleader.
Polar Molecular Corp., 12 F.3d 1170( 1174 (2d
Mills v.
r. 1993).
The
issue "is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but
whether the claimant is entitled to of
the
ims."
evidence to support
Inc. v. Town of Darien( 56 F.3d
ViI
375, 378 (2d Cir. 1995).
To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule
12(b) (6)
1
"a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter,
accepted as true
l
to 'state a
plausible on its face.
,It
aim to relief that is
Ashcroft v. Iqbal 1 556 U.S. 662, 678,
129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009)
V.
(quoting Bell Atl
Twombly 1 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 1 167 L.Ed.2d 929
(2007)).
Plaintiffs must allege sufficient facts to "nudge [
their claims across the line from conceivable to plaus
------~
I
550 U.S. at 570.
e."
Though the court must accept the
factual allegations of a complaint as true, it is "not bound
8
to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual
allegation." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S.
at 555).
Robbins' Motion For Reconsideration Is Granted
Under New York law, "[w]here a fraud claim gives
rise to damages which are not separate and distinct from those
flowing from an alleged medical malpractice cause of action,
it must be dismissed."
561, 658 N.Y.S.2d 73
Karlin v. IVF Am., 239 A.D.2d 560,
(2d Dep't 1997); accord Luciano v.
Levine, 232 A.D.2d 378, 379, 648 N.Y.S.2d 149 (2d Dep't 1996);
see also
2002) ;
_ _d -_ _ _ _ _ _
~L__t~e_i_n,
232 F. Supp. 2d 192, 200 (S.D.N.Y.
----~~------------------~----~
1998 WL 142354, at *4
, No.
95 Civ. 6214 (RPP),
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 1998) i Rizk v. Cohen
73 N.Y.2d 98, 105-06, 538 N.Y.S.2d 229, 535 N.E.2d 282
(1989).
In evaluating the merits of Plaintiff's fraud claim in the
March 8 Opinion, this Court focused exclus
lyon the issue
of whether Plaintiff's Amended Complaint satis
ed the
heightened pleading requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
Because controlling precedent governing Plaintiff's fraud
claim was not addressed, Robbins' motion for reconsideration
is granted.
9
Robbins' Motion To Dismiss Plaintiff's Fraud Claim In Its
Entirety Is Granted
Amended Complaint fails to allege a fraud claim
that gives rise to damages which are separate and distinct
from those flowing from the alleged medical malpractice cause
of action.
aintiff's Amended Complaint, in alleging a cause
of action for medical malpractice, states, that "Robbins held
himself out to be a medical professional credentialed to do
the State of Californian but
business in the medical field
that "[iJn fact, Robbins was not a qualified, licensed medical
professional in any jurisdiction. 1I
i n t i ' s remaining fraud cia
Amend. Compl.
~~
56, 57.
is premised on the
allegation that "[iJn his presentation on November 7, 2009,
Robb
falsely represented that he was affiliated with UCLA
and USC Medical Centers and that he could cure Naughright.n
Id.
~
49.
out of Robb
damages
The Amended Complaint details no damages arising
s' alleged fraud that are separate from those
intiff suffered as a result of Robbins' alleged
medical malpractice.
Because New York law prohibits the
nging of both a medical malpractice claim and a fraud claim
when no separate damages arose out of the
10
leged fraud,
ausible fraud claim upon
aintiff has failed to establish a
which relief can be granted, and Count III of the Amended
Complaint is dismissed in its entirety pursuant to Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12 (b) (6) .
Plaintiff, in opposing Robbins' motion for
reconsideration, contends that Plaintiff's fraud
aim can co
exist with her malpractice claim because Robbins' affirmative
srepresentations caused additional harm.
Plaintiff contends
that the Amended Complaint establishes that first Robbins
negligently injured Plaintiff's spine before informing her
that she needed to "let go" because she had "control issues."
Plaintiff also contends that Robbins statement regarding
Plaintiff's "control issues" diverted
r from see
ng a cure,
and where fraud diverts a patient from seeking a cure, a
medical pract
ioner can be held liable.
Finally, Plaintiff,
citing cases related to punitive damages, contends that a
fraud claim is warranted on account of "Robbins' pattern of
wanton damage./I
Plaintiff's arguments in no way relate to the
alleged fraudulent statements at issue in this motion for
reconsideration, namely the statements Robbins allegedly made
on November 7, 2009 in which he claimed that he was affiliated
with UCLA and USC Medical Centers.
11
Because Plaintiff has
led to present a fraud claim that gives rise to damages
that are separate and distinct from those flowing from an
alleged malpractice cause of action,
Plaintiff's fraud claim
is dismissed in its entirety_
Conclusion
Based on the conclusions set forth above, Robbins'
motion for reconsideration is granted, and Plaintiff's cause
of action for fraud is dismissed in its entirety.
It is so ordered.
New York, NY
June 1.-(>, 2012
ROBERT W. SWEET
U.S.D.J.
12
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