Randle v. Alexander et al
Filing
295
OPINION AND ORDER: re: 240 MOTION for Partial Summary Judgment . filed by Dennis Benites, William Monzon, 241 MOTION for Summary Judgment on Behalf of the State Represented Defendants filed by Sean Duncan, K. Nelson, Ry an Mcnulty, Marinelli, Kenneth Decker, Melissa Collins, Charles Gordon, Mitchell Lake, Tracy Alexander, Donald Selsky, Steven Kaska, 239 MOTION for Summary Judgment filed by H. Hanaman. For the foregoing reasons, Defendants 039; motions for summary judgment are DENIED. The parties are directed to confer regarding trial dates and to submit a joint letter by March 22, 2016, proposing trial dates in April, May, or June 2016. The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Docket Numbers 239, 240, and 241. SO ORDERED. (Signed by Judge J. Paul Oetken on 3/16/2016) (ama)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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EL’REKO D’WAYNE RANDLE,
:
:
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Plaintiff,
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:
-v :
SERGEANT TRACY ALEXANDER et al.,
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Defendants. :
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10-CV-9235 (JPO)
OPINION AND ORDER
J. PAUL OETKEN, District Judge:
Plaintiff El’Reko D’Wayne Randle filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Randle
alleges that prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment by forcing him to fight and
ultimately kill another prisoner while they watched. He also alleges Eighth Amendment
violations related to a two-year period of solitary confinement. In three separate motions,
Defendants move for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 239-41.) For the reasons that follow, the
motions are denied.
I.
Factual Background
There are a number of Defendants in this action. Dennis Benitez, William Monzon,
Harold Hanaman, and Kyle Nelson (collectively, the “Guard Defendants”) were correctional
officers (“C.O.s”) at Green Haven Correctional Facility (“Green Haven”) in January 2009.
Tracy Alexander was a sergeant at Green Haven at that time. John Marinelli is a psychologist
who treated Randle at Upstate Correctional Facility (“Upstate”).
Steven Kafka and Sean Duncan are investigators in the New York State Department of
Corrections and Community Supervision (“DOCCS”) Inspector General’s Office (the “IG’s
1
Office”). 1 During relevant periods, Donald Selsky and Kenneth Decker worked for the DOCCS
Assistant Commissioner, and Ryan McNulty, Melissa Collins, Mitchel Lake, and Charles
Gordon worked for the DOCCS Bureau of Mental Health Services. The parties refer to
Defendants named in this paragraph as the “Mental Health Defendants.” (Dkt. No. 60 ¶ 28; Dkt.
No. 99 at 2; Dkt. No. 241 (“Def.’s Mot.”) at 1 n.3.)
Randle is currently incarcerated at Sullivan Correctional Facility. 2 This case arises out of
events that occurred when he was imprisoned at Green Haven, Upstate, and Clinton Correctional
Facility (“Clinton”) between 2009 and 2011.
A.
The Green Haven Fights
This dispute centers on two fights at Green Haven between Randle and a prisoner named
Melvin Johnson (the “Green Haven Fights”). (Dkt. No. 293 ¶ 1.) According to Randle, in early
January 2009, C.O. Benitez approached him, told him he had the “option” to fight Johnson, and
said he would “cover-up the fact that the officers forced the[] [prisoners] to fight.” (Id. ¶ 30.)
Several days later, C.O. Benitez instigated a fight by telling Randle that Johnson had accused
him of violating prison rules. (Id. at ¶¶ 3, 30.) Defendants dispute both that C.O. Benitez
threatened Randle and that he instigated the fight, but agree that the prisoners began fighting on
January 9, 2009, after correctional officers released Randle from his cell. (Id. ¶ 5.)
The first fight took place in Johnson’s cell. Defendants allege that Randle hit Johnson
approximately twenty times, aiming for his head. (Def.’s Mot. at 6.) Randle does not recall how
1
The DOCCS Inspector General’s Office was renamed the Office of Special Investigation in
2014. (See Dkt. No. 241 at 1 n.2.) The parties refer to the office by its prior name. For clarity,
the Court does so as well.
2
The Court takes judicial notice of this fact based upon a search of the DOCCS Inmate
Population Information Search. See http://nysdoccslookup.doccs.ny.gov/ (last viewed March 14,
2016).
2
many times he struck Johnson, but “doubt[s] it was more than five times.” (Dkt. No. 293 ¶ 5.)
The parties agree that C.O. Monzon stopped the fight “with verbal commands” and then escorted
Randle to the “mantrap,” a room with locked doors on two sides. (Id. ¶ 6; Def.’s Mot. at 7.)
The parties offer conflicting descriptions of events inside the mantrap. Randle avers that
he and Johnson were taken to the mantrap together, where C.O. Benitez told them to “finish what
y’all started.” (Dkt. No. 293 ¶ 7, 32.) He states that C.O.s Hanaman and Nelson were in a room
adjacent to the mantrap called the “Bubble” when he entered, and that shortly thereafter, C.O.
Nelson left “without taking any action to ensure the inmates had been secured.” (Dkt. No. 276
¶ 8; Dkt. No. 293 ¶ 6, 38.) The prisoners then began to fight for a second time. (Dkt. No. 293
¶40.) Randle avers that “multiple voices cheered from inside the Bubble after he struck
Johnson,” and that “none of the officers attempted to stop the fight.” (Id. ¶ 8.) At some point,
Johnson fell to the ground and did not get up. Sergeant Alexander then arrived at the scene and,
according to Randle’s sworn testimony, said “why is this piece of shit laying here on my floor?”
(Id. ¶ 42.) Johnson later died of his injuries.
Defendants state that C.O. Hanaman was the only officer in the Bubble when C.O.
Monzon brought Randle into the mantrap. (Id. ¶ 6.) They aver that C.O. Nelson was “securing
the A-4 Gallery” during the second fight and did not arrive at the mantrap until after the fight
concluded. (Id. ¶ 8; Def.’s Mot. at 8.) Their account of the facts does not include cheering by
officers during the fight, nor does it contain Sergeant Alexander’s statement about Johnson.
Defendants assert that the second fight lasted “about fifteen seconds.” (Dkt. No. 293 ¶ 8.)
Sergeant Alexander and the Guard Defendants each wrote incident reports after the fight.
According to Randle, the Guard Defendants conversed while writing their “one-to-two page
3
reports” over the course of five hours, and Sergeant Alexander “referred to the[] [Guard
Defendants’] reports when he wrote his own.” (Id. ¶¶ 44-46.)
After the fight, Randle was sentenced to ten years in the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”),
a form of solitary confinement. (Id. ¶ 54; Def.’s Mot. at 8; Dkt. No. 278-3 at 160 (“Benitez
Dep.”) (describing SHU custody as equivalent to solitary confinement).) He was transferred to
the SHU at Upstate on February 12, 2009. (Def.’s Mot. at 8.)
B.
SHU Confinement
Randle was held in the SHU at Upstate from “approximately February 12, 2009 to April
16, 2009.” (Dkt No. 293 ¶ 10.) During that period, he received mental health treatment from
Defendant Marinelli. (Dkt. No. 293 ¶ 10.) The parties dispute how many times Randle met with
Marinelli, how thoroughly Marinelli reviewed Randle’s records, and what Randle’s “OMH
Mental Health Level” was during his confinement at Upstate. Randle asserts that he met with
Marinelli three times; Defendants state that Marinelli met with Randle “at least seven times.”
(Id. ¶ 12, 18.) Randle asserts that Marinelli knew that he had attempted suicide multiple times,
but “brushed [him] off” when he said “he didn’t feel safe being in the cell by himself.” (Id. ¶12.)
Defendants state that Randle “denied suicidal thinking” and was “consistently assessed as a low
suicide risk” by Marinelli and other prison staff. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 17.)
On April 16, 2009, Randle “cut himself seriously enough that he required sutures at an
outside hospital.” (Id. ¶ 21.) After being released from the hospital, he was transferred to a
“mental health crisis unit” at Clinton. (Id.) Shortly thereafter, Randle was sent to Clinton’s
“Group Therapy Program” (“GTP”), a “SHU-based intervention” in which “seriously mentally
ill inmates are housed in SHU blocks.” (Id. ¶¶ 21, 92.) Randle stayed in the Clinton SHU until
August 2010, when he was sent to the GTP at Elmira Correctional Facility (“Elmira”). (Id.
4
¶135.) He was transferred to a hospital on October 19, 2010 after a suicide attempt, and returned
to Elmira thereafter. (Id. ¶ 137.) Randle was then sent to the GTP at Wende Correctional
Facility. (Id. ¶ 140.) He was released from the Wende GTP, and thus SHU custody, on June 20,
2011, when he was sent to Five Points Correctional Facility. (Id.)
Randle alleges that the Mental Health Defendants denied multiple requests to transfer
him to a less restrictive mental health program during his two year period of confinement in the
GTP. (Id. ¶ 22.) The parties agree that the Mental Health Defendants reviewed and denied
Randle’s transfer requests (Id. ¶ 24), but dispute whether the denials were warranted. Randle
asserts that the GTP is intended to be “a time-limited intervention with a goal of stabilizing
inmates.” (Id. ¶ 25.) He avers that employees in the Office of Mental Health, including
members of his “treatment team,” recommended him for transfer from the GTP multiple times,
but that each time DOCCS employees denied, canceled, or failed to implement the
recommendations “to punish [him] for the outcome of the [Green Haven Fights].” (Id. ¶¶ 103,
106, 109, 112, 114, 116, 123; see also Dkt. No. 291 (“Pl.’s Opp.”) at 41.) The Mental Health
Defendants assert that the GTP was appropriate for Randle and that employees in the various
programs provided Randle with adequate care. (Id. ¶ 24.)
C.
Grievances
On February 2, 2009, Randle filed a grievance alleging that C.O.s Benitez and Monzon
had encouraged the Green Haven Fights and fabricated a misbehavior report about their role in
the incident. (Id. ¶ 54; Def.’s Mem. at 19; Dkt. No. 272-2; Dkt. No. 292-21.) Green Haven’s
Superintendent decided to refer the grievance to the IG’s Office. (Dkt. No. 293 ¶ 55.) Randle
appealed that decision to the Central Office Review Committee (“CORC”), which upheld the
Superintendent’s decision. (Dkt. No. 292-22; Dkt. No. 293 ¶ 55.) After an investigation, the
5
IG’s Office determined that the allegation that C.O. Benitez “failed to follow safety protocols”
was “substantiated.” (Dkt. No. 292-23 at 3-4.)
On August 4, 2009, during his incarceration at the Clinton GTP, Randle wrote a letter to
Diane Van Buren, Assistant Commissioner in DOCCS Central Office. (Dkt. No. 292-29; Dkt.
No. 293 ¶ 65.) The letter requested that Van Buren “please help me get to a program where the
CO’s don’t harass and the workers are really sincere with helping guys like me.” (Dkt. No. 29229.) Van Buren forwarded the letter to the Superintendent at Clinton and asked him to
investigate Randle’s concerns. (Dkt. No. 292-31.)
On May 11, 2010, Randle filed a formal grievance from the Clinton GTP. (Dkt. No. 29227.) The grievance challenged Randle’s ongoing incarceration in the SHU and requested that his
“SHU time be depleted.” (Id.) On May 28, 2010, Clinton’s Superintendent informed Randle
that his request for “reconsideration of his SHU time” was “non-grievable pursuant to Directive
#4040 401.3(e)(2).” (Id. at 8.) He directed Randle to “address this issue by writing to the
Director of SHU in central office.” (Id.) Randle appealed to the CORC, which upheld the
Superintendent’s determination in an opinion issued on August 11, 2010. (Id. at 2.) Two days
later, Randle wrote another letter to Van Buren. (Dkt. No. 292-32.) It stated:
[T]he purpose of this letter to your office is because I have been in this G.T.P Program
since early April 2009 . . . . the average inmate [who] participates in this G.T.P. only
stays approximately 90 days and move[s] on . . . . I’m suppose[d] to progress to the next
level or next program but for some reason(s) that’s unknown to me I’m stagnated in this
G.T.P. which is in a SHU environment . . . .
(Dkt. No. 292-32 at 2-3.)
D.
Staff Sanctions
Both the IG’s Office and the New York State Police investigated the Green Haven Fights.
(Dkt. No. 279 ¶ 29.) In October 2009, C.O.s Benitez and Monzon received notices of discipline
6
dismissing them from service for “fail[ure] to properly safeguard inmates under [their]
supervision” in connection with the January 9, 2009 fight. (Dkt. Nos. 278-5, 278-6.) Both C.O.s
pursued arbitration after receiving the notices. On April 15, 2010, an arbitrator determined that
C.O. Benitez was “guilty of failing to properly provide for an inmate under his direction.” (Dkt.
No. 278-7 at 44.) C.O. Benitez was thereafter reinstated to his position at Green Haven. (Dkt.
No. 278-3 at 149-51.) After an unpaid suspension of approximately seven months, C.O. Monzon
also returned to work. (Dkt. No. 278-2 at 147-55.)
II.
Procedural History
Randle filed this case pro se on December 1, 2010, and on March 22, 2011, Magistrate
Judge Fox granted his application for appointment of pro bono counsel. (Dkt. Nos. 1, 8.) Randle
thereafter filed the operative Complaint, which Defendants moved to dismiss. (Dkt. Nos. 60, 8688.) On May 30, 2013, the Court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part.
(Dkt. No. 99.)
In June 2015, Randle withdrew two of his claims and dismissed all claims against seven
of the original Defendants. (Dkt. No. 230.) As a result, three claims and fourteen Defendants
remain. In three separate motions, Defendants moved for summary judgment on August 10,
2015. (Dkt. Nos. 239-241.)
III.
Discussion
Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is
material if it “might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A dispute is genuine if, considering the record as a
whole, a rational juror could find in favor of the non-moving party. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S.
7
557, 586 (2009) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587
(1986)).
In assessing a motion for summary judgment, the court views the evidence “in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party and draw[s] all reasonable inferences in its favor.” Allen
v. Coughlin, 64 F.3d 77, 79 (2d Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). “It is well established that
‘[c]redibility assessments, choices between conflicting versions of the events, and the weighing
of evidence are matters for the jury, not for the court on a motion for summary judgment.’”
Curry v. City of Syracuse, 316 F.3d 324, 333 (2d Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Randle asserts three claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He asserts two claims—an Eighth
Amendment claim for cruel and unusual punishment and a § 1983 conspiracy claim—against the
Guard Defendants and Sergeant Alexander. He asserts an Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference claim against the Mental Health Defendants and Defendant Marinelli. Defendants
move for summary judgment on each of these claims.
A.
Exhaustion
Pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), “[n]o action shall be brought
with respect to prison conditions under Section 1983 . . . until such administrative remedies as
are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). Nonexhaustion is an affirmative defense on
which defendants bear the burden of proof. Randle v. Alexander, 960 F. Supp. 2d 457, 483
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Oetken, J.) (citing Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007)).
Under Second Circuit precedent, a prisoner’s failure to exhaust can be excused where: (1)
administrative remedies were not in fact available; (2) the defendant forfeits the defense of
nonexhaustion or engages in conduct that estops the defendant from asserting the defense; or (3)
special circumstances “have been plausibly alleged that justify the prisoner’s failure to comply
8
with administrative procedural requirements.” Hemphill v. New York, 380 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir.
2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Messa v. Goord, 652 F.3d 305,
309 (2d. Cir. 2011) (reciting the Hemphill factors). 3 “The most commonly recognized special
circumstances are where the inmate reasonably misunderstood the relevant grievance
procedures.” Black v. Fischer, No. 12-CV-2341, 2013 WL 1314940, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28,
2013) (citations omitted). Whether the third Hemphill exception applies is “determined by
looking at the circumstances which might understandably lead usually [uncounseled] prisoners to
fail to grieve in the normally required way.” Daughtrey v. City of New York, No. 11-CV-9693,
2012 WL 4849137, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 29, 2012) (quoting Giano v. Goord, 380 F.3d 670 678
(2d Cir. 2004)), adopted in full, 2012 WL 4854720 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2012) (Engelmayer, J.).
A number of Defendants argue that Randle failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Sergeant Alexander and C.O.s Nelson and Hanaman contend that Randle cannot sue them in this
forum because (1) he did not name them in grievances about the Green Haven Fight and (2) his
grievances did not include all of the allegations contained in his Complaint. (Def.’s Mem. at 1819; Dkt. Nos. 274, 284.) The Mental Health Defendants argue that Randle did not “comply with
the DOCCS mandatory grievance procedure” with respect to claims arising from his requests to
be transferred out of the Clinton GTP. (Def.’s Mot. at 19.)
The first argument fails because a prisoner need not name individual defendants or
articulate legal theories in a grievance to comply with the PLRA. See Jones, 549 U.S. at 217
3
In the Opinion denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss Randle’s Third Amended Complaint, the
Court concluded that all of the Hemphill factors survive the Supreme Court’s decision in
Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006). See Randle v. Alexander, 960 F. Supp. 2d 457, 484 n.5
(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (Oetken, J.); see also Stevens v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-1918 (JPO), 2012
WL 4948051, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2012) (addressing Hemphill and Woodford).
9
(“[N]othing in the [PLRA] imposes a ‘name all defendants’ requirement”); Espinal v. Goord,
558 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2009) (holding that the PLRA does not require a New York state
prisoner “to name particular officials who are allegedly responsible for misconduct . . . in order
to later bring suit against those officials in federal court.”); Mena v. City of New York, No. 12CV-6838, 2013 WL 1352081, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013), adopted in full, 2013 WL 3580057
(S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2013) (“[A]s in a notice pleading system, the grievant need not lay out the
facts, articulate legal theories, or demand particular relief. All the grievance need do is object
intelligibly to some asserted shortcoming.” (quoting Brownwell v. Krom, 446 F.3d 305, 310 (2d
Cir. 2006))).
Here, Randle filed a grievance alleging that correctional officers encouraged the Green
Haven Fights and fabricated “a misbehavior report that was . . . contrary to the facts.” (Dkt. No.
293 ¶ 54 (citing Cailteux Decl. Ex. 20 (“February 2, 2009 Inmate Grievance Compl.”)).) He
appealed that grievance to the CORC, thereby exhausting his remedies in the New York State
prison system. The fact that Randle’s grievance did not describe his allegations in legal terms or
name all the officers he now sues does not bar him from proceeding in this Court. Randle’s
actions were sufficient to comply with the PLRA with respect to all claims arising out of the
Green Haven Fights, including claims against correctional officers who were not specifically
named.
As to the Mental Health Defendants, Randle filed a grievance at Clinton in which he
sought to be transferred out of the SHU. (Dkt. No. 297-27.) In response to that grievance,
Clinton’s Superintendent informed him that “reconsideration of his SHU time” was “nongrievable” pursuant to DOCCS policy and that he should address his concerns to DOCCS central
office. (Dkt. No. 292-32.) Randle appealed to the CORC and, two days after it upheld the
10
Superintendent’s decision, wrote a letter to DOCCS official objecting to his continued
confinement in the GTP.
Defendants contend that these actions are insufficient to exhaust Randle’s “mental health
deliberate indifference [claim] for failure to transfer from the Clinton GTP.” (Def.’s Mot. at 20.)
They argue that Randle should have filed formal grievances against them challenging the denial
of his transfer requests and his ongoing confinement in the GTP. Randle argues that, while he
did not file additional grievances addressing his continued confinement in the SHU, he
reasonably believed that “formal grievance channels were closed to him in relation to complaints
regarding his transfer from the GTP (the most restrictive of SHU programs).” (Dkt. No. 291 at
21.)
Randle’s argument prevails. Randle filed a grievance seeking to have his “SHU time . . .
depleted” and appealed the Superintendent’s determination that DOCCS policy rendered his
“SHU time . . . non-grievable.” (See Dkt. No. 292-27.) In light of the CORC’s opinion
upholding the Superintendent’s decision, which expressly disclaimed jurisdiction over Randle’s
SHU sentence, it was reasonable for Randle to believe he could no longer file grievances about
his desire to be transferred to a less restrictive mental healthcare program. To the extent that
Randle did not exhaust administrative remedies related to claims arising from the denial of his
requests to leave the Clinton GTP, special circumstances justified his actions. Hemphill, 380
F.3d at 686; see Taylor v. Swift, 21 F. Supp. 3d 237, 243 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) (“Even if plaintiff
erred in interpreting the scope of [a prison directive listing his complaint as non-grievable], his
mistake was reasonable and his non-exhaustion does not provide a basis for dismissing the
claims . . . .”); Smith v. City of New York, No. 12-CV-3303, 2013 WL 5434144, at *27
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2013) (“[S]pecial circumstances may justify [plaintiff’s] failure to exhaust
11
his administrative remedies because [an officer] allegedly misrepresented that his issue was nongrievable.”).
B.
Failure to Intervene
The Eighth Amendment, which applies to states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
prohibits “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend VIII. To establish an Eighth
Amendment violation, a prisoner must show both that the deprivation of his right to be free from
cruel and unusual punishment was “sufficiently serious” and that the defendant acted with a
“sufficiently culpable state of mind.” Randle, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 470 (quoting Farmer v.
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). “In the context of prison conditions, courts have defined
this culpability as ‘deliberate indifference’ to the health and safety of inmates.” Id. (citations
omitted).
Randle asserts that the Guard Defendants violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free
from cruel and unusual punishment by using excessive force against him. 4 He argues that C.O.
Benitez violated his rights directly and that the other Guard Defendants subjected themselves to
liability by failing to intervene to protect his Eighth Amendment rights. Id. at 472 n.2; see also
Jean-Laurent v. Wilkinson, 540 F. Supp. 2d 501, 512 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating the standard for a
failure to intervene claim).
C.O. Nelson moves for summary judgment on Randle’s excessive force claim. He argues
that he cannot be liable for failure to intervene because “the evidence shows that he was simply
4
Randle’s first Eighth Amendment claim against the Guard Defendants and Sergeant Alexander
is based on three distinct theories of liability: (1) excessive force; (2) failure to protect; and (3)
denial of the right to reasonably safe conditions of confinement. Randle, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 47275. In the Opinion denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court held that Randle had stated
a claim under all three theories of liability. Id. Because C.O. Nelson moves for summary
judgment only on Randle’s excessive force claim, the Court need not and does not address the
other two theories.
12
not present” during the second Green Haven Fight. (Def.’s Mot. at 20.) Randle avers that C.O.
Nelson was in the Bubble when the fight began and left shortly thereafter “without taking any
action to ensure the inmates had been secured.” (Dkt. No. 293 ¶ 40; Dkt. No. 291 (“Pl.’s Opp.”)
at 22-23.) The parties thus genuinely dispute a material fact, namely, whether C.O. Nelson was
present at any point during the second fight. A genuine dispute of material fact therefore
precludes summary judgment on this claim. Curry, 316 F.3d at 333.
C.
Conspiracy
Randle claims that the Guard Defendants engaged in a conspiracy to violate his Eighth
Amendment rights in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. He argues, specifically, that the Guard
Defendants conspired to force him to fight Johnson and then coordinated a cover-up of the Green
Haven Fights.
To prove a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must show: “(1) an agreement
between two or more state actors[;] (2) to act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional injury;
[and] (3) an overt act done in furtherance of that goal causing damages.” Tolliver v. Ercole, No.
08-CV-4023, 2010 WL 1222053, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2010) (citations and alternations
omitted). Plaintiffs may make this showing through “either . . . direct or circumstantial
evidence.” Stein v. Janos, 269 F. Supp. 2d 256, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). “To survive a motion for
summary judgment, a plaintiff’s evidence of a [§ 1983] conspiracy must, at least, reasonably lead
to the inference that the defendants positively or tacitly came to a mutual understanding to try to
accomplish a common and unlawful plan.” Id. at 261-62 (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Defendants present three arguments for summary judgment on Randle’s conspiracy
claim. (Def.’s Mot. at 23-25; Dkt. No. 265 (“Benitez Mot.”) at 3.) C.O. Nelson argues, first,
13
that C.O. Benitez never threatened Randle, and second, that there is no evidence of a cover-up by
the prison officers. (Def.’s Mot. at 24-25.) Defendants’ third argument, which C.O.s Benitez,
Monzon, and Nelson advance, is that Randle cannot assert a claim based on a false misbehavior
report because he has no right to a truthful report. (Id. at 25-26; Benitez Mot. at 9.)
Each of these arguments fails. The assertion that C.O. Benitez never threatened Randle
does not warrant summary judgment because it conflicts with Randle’s sworn account of the
facts. (See Pl.’s Opp. at 24-25 (citing Dkt. Nos. 60, 293).) Whether Randle’s version of events
is credible is a question for the factfinder.
As to the alleged cover-up, Randle avers that, in the presence of prisoners and other
officers, C.O. Benitez threatened to conceal forced fights. He also states that, after forcing him
to fight Johnson, the Guard Defendants spent five hours together writing one- to two-page
incident reports in the same room. (Pl.’s Opp. at 26 (citing Dkt. No. 293 ¶¶ 44-46.).) Randle
cites Sergeant Alexander’s “three sentence[]” report, which “referred to [the Guard Defendants’]
reports,” as further proof that the prison officers “coordinate[d] their stories.” (Id.) Construing
the evidence in the light most favorable to Randle, and drawing all inferences in his favor, the
Court concludes that Randle has presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to create a genuine
dispute as to whether the Guard Defendants conspired to conceal their role in the Green Haven
Fights.
As to Defendants’ third argument, Randle need not have a right to a truthful misbehavior
report to allege an unconstitutional conspiracy. Randle has not sued to contest the misbehavior
report; he cites that report, and the circumstances under which it was written, as evidence of a
conspiracy to conceal a fight that led to a prisoner’s death. Any agreement between prison
officers to effectuate or conceal a forced fight is an “act in concert to inflict an unconstitutional
14
injury” in violation of § 1983. Randle, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 475. Because material questions
about the existence of such an agreement remain, the motion for summary judgment on Randle’s
conspiracy claim is denied. 5
D.
Supervisory Liability
A defendant must have been personally involved in the alleged conduct to be liable under
§ 1983. Randle, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 477 (citation omitted). Accordingly, “the doctrine of
respondeat superior does not apply” to § 1983 claims. Id. (quoting Harrison v. Goord, No 07CV-1806, 2009 WL 1605770, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. June 9, 2009)) (alteration omitted). However, a
correctional officer who serves as a supervisor may be liable under § 1983 if:
(1) [he] participated directly in the alleged constitutional violation, (2) [he], after being
informed of the violation through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) [he]
created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional practices occurred, or allowed
the continuance of such a policy or custom, (4) [he] was grossly negligent in supervising
subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) [he] exhibited deliberate
indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to act on information indicating that
unconstitutional acts were occurring.
Id. at 477-78 (quoting Colon v. Coughlin, 58 F. 3d 865, 873 (2d Cir. 1995)) (citing Hernandez v.
Keane, 341 F.3d 137, 145 (2d Cir. 2003)).
Randle asserts both his cruel and unusual punishment claim and his § 1983 conspiracy
claim against Sergeant Alexander under a theory of supervisory liability. As the Court explained
in the Order denying Defendants’ motion to dismiss, “Randle alleges that Alexander was
personally involved in the unconstitutional behavior of the Guard Defendants [because] he was
5
In their briefs, Sergeant Alexander and the Guard Defendants move for summary judgment on
Randle’s “alleg[ation] that [they] wrote false reports.” (Def.’s Mot. at 25; see also Dkt. No. 265
at 9.) Defendants Benitez and Monzon also move for summary judgment on Randle’s “claim for
improper cell searches or property deprivation.” (Dkt. No. 265 at 7.) Randle responds that he
has never alleged independent constitutional claims based on false reports, searches, or property
deprivation. (Pl.’s Opp. at 26; Dkt. No. 277.) The Court concurs that no such claims have been
asserted, and accordingly, need not address these arguments for summary judgment.
15
‘grossly negligent in managing [those officers]’ and [because he] ‘implicitly created and/or
allowed an informal policy’” to persist wherein the violations were able to occur. Id. (second
alteration in original) (citing Compl. ¶ 126).) Defendants now argue that Randle “cannot put
forth any evidence to support these claims beyond mere speculation.” (Def.’s Mot. at 28.)
Randle responds to Defendants’ argument by citing a number of sworn facts.
Specifically, he contends that Sergeant Alexander: (1) testified that he never gave his officers
“training updates” on how to break up fights; (2) “admitted [in a deposition that] he did not know
whether DOCCS had any policies or procedures concerning correctional officers forcing inmates
to fight each other”; (3) admitted he did not know whether C.O.s Benitez and Monzon should
have activated their personal alarms during the Green Haven Fights; (4) did not know whether it
was against DOCCS policy to place inmates in the mantrap unrestrained; (5) interviewed the
Guard Defendants about the fight together rather than separately; (6) allowed officers to write
their incident reports together in the same room for five hours; (7) used the officers’ reports for
his own incident report rather than drafting a statement of his own; (8) did not recommend
counseling of the Guard Defendants after the Green Haven Fights; (9) “adamant[ly]” opposed
discipline despite findings by the IG’s Office that Randle’s allegations were “substantiated”; and
(10) testified under oath that he could not identify any instance in which he had sided with an
inmate over an officer. (Pl.’s Opp. at 28-30; Dkt. No. 293 ¶¶ 42-53.) Randle also avers that,
when Sergeant Alexander arrived at the scene of the second fight, he referred to Johnson, who
later died of his injuries, as a “piece of shit lying on [his] floor.” (Dkt. No. 293 ¶ 42.)
In citing these specific examples, and presenting testimony and documents to support
them, Randle has raised a material question of fact as to whether Sergeant Alexander’s conduct
constituted the sort of gross negligence, deliberate indifference, or direct participation that is
16
required to sustain a claim for supervisory liability under § 1983. Assessing the veracity of
testimony presented by Randle and Sergeant Alexander, and choosing between the parties’
versions of events, is a “matter[] for the jury, not for the court on a motion for summary
judgment.” Curry, 316 F.3d at 333. Sergeant Alexander’s motion for summary judgment is
therefore denied.
E.
Deliberate Indifference Claims
“The Eighth Amendment forbids deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of
prisoners, which includes needs for mental health care.” Spavone v. New York State Dep’t of
Corr. Servs., 719 F.3d 127, 138 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
To establish an Eighth Amendment violation, the plaintiff must show, first, that “the alleged
deprivation of adequate medical care [was] sufficiently serious,” and second, that the defendants
were “subjectively reckless in their denial of medical care.” Id. (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted).
In determining the seriousness of a medical condition, courts consider “(1) whether a
reasonable doctor or patient would find it important and worthy of comment; (2) whether the
condition significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; (3) and whether it causes chronic
and substantial pain.” Randle, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (citing Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d
263, 279 (2d Cir. 2006)) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted). In assessing the
subjective prong of the deliberate indifference standard, courts ask whether the defendant acted
or failed to act while aware of “a substantial risk that serious inmate harm [would] result.”
Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280.
Randle asserts deliberate indifference claims against Marinelli and the Mental Health
Defendants. He argues that Marinelli recklessly disregarded his risk of suicide and that the
17
Mental Health Defendants refused to transfer him out of the GTP despite repeated
recommendations from his mental health “treatment teams.” (Pl.’s Opp. at 30-38.)
1.
Defendant Marinelli
Marinelli makes three arguments for summary judgment. He argues that (1) the care he
gave Randle was objectively reasonable; (2) there is no evidence that he “acted with a
sufficiently culpable state of mind”; and (3) Randle’s ten-year sentence to solitary confinement,
rather than Marinelli’s care, was what caused his suicide attempt on April 16, 2009. (Def.’s Mot.
at 30-34.)
The first argument fails because there is a genuine dispute about the treatment that
Randle received. (Def.’s Mot. at 34.) Marinelli contends that he “performed daily visits” to
Randle and assessed him as a low suicide risk because he “never told anyone . . . he was suicidal
[or] . . . exhibited behavior indicative of suicidal tendencies.” (Id. at 33.) Randle asserts that
Marinelli met with him only three times over more than two months, and that as a result of
merely “skimming” his mental health records, had a “near complete lack of knowledge regarding
[his] prior history of suicidal tendencies” and “auditory hallucinations.” (Pl.’s Opp. at 33.)
There remain basic, material questions of fact about the care Randle received from Marinelli, and
whether that care was objectively reasonable.
As to the subjective prong of deliberate indifference analysis, Randle argues that
Marinelli had access to and ignored his history of suicide attempts, conducted a cursory review
of his mental health records, wholly failed to review his medical records, and knew that he was
“undergoing stress because of the [Green Haven] fight.” (Pl.’s Opp. at 34.) Randle also avers
that Marinelli “brushed [him] off,” told him “lay down,” and said he would “get over it” when
Randle reported that he did not “feel safe being in the cell by [him]self.” (Id. at 33 (citing Dkt.
18
No. 293 ¶ 87); Dkt. No. 293 ¶ 12.) These sworn assertions raise material questions of fact about
whether Marinelli acted with “a mental state equivalent to subjective recklessness, as that term is
used in criminal law.” Randle, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 480; see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 835 (noting
that the subjective element of deliberate indifference entails “more than mere negligence” and
“less than acts or omissions for the very purpose of causing harm or with knowledge that harm
will result”). In such circumstances, summary judgment is inappropriate.
Finally, as to causation, Marinelli need not be the reason Randle felt suicidal to be liable
for deliberate indifference to the suicide risk that he posed. Randle has raised material questions
of fact about whether Marinelli engaged in subjectively reckless and objectively unreasonable
conduct in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The motion for summary judgment on Randle’s
first deliberate indifference claim is denied.
2.
Mental Health Defendants
The Mental Health Defendants present two arguments for summary judgment. First, they
assert that Randle’s care in the GTP was objectively reasonable because the GTP program model
“met or exceeded national and state standards.” (Def.’s Mot. at 36.) Second, they argue that
their refusal to transfer Randle from the GTP was motivated by security concerns, and thus, that
they lack the requisite mental state for a deliberate indifference claim. (Id. at 36-40.)
The fact that the GTP program model conforms to correctional standards does not mean
that all prisoners in the GTP have automatically received constitutionally adequate care. “[T]he
objective component of an Eighth Amendment claim is necessarily contextual and fact-specific.”
Williams v. Smith, No. 02-CV-4558, 2009 WL 2431948, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009)
(quoting Smith v. Carpenter 316 F.3d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 2003)). In this case, Randle avers that
prison officials recklessly interfered with his mental healthcare by ignoring repeated
19
recommendations from his treatment team to transfer him to a less restrictive mental health
program. Randle avers that he has “psychotic disorder and personality disorder,” as well as a
“history of self-harm and multiple suicide attempts,” and that continued confinement in the
GTP—which was supposed to be a short-term program—exacerbated his mental state. (Dkt. No.
293 ¶¶ 70-71, Pl.’s Opp. at 41.) He also states that two of his suicide attempts, on April 15,
2010, and April 18, 2010, occurred days after DOCCS officials canceled a transfer that had
already been approved. (Dkt. No. 293 ¶¶ 121-124.) This Court has already held that “Randle’s
allegations [against the Mental Health Defendants], if true, state objectively serious
deprivations.” Randle, 960 F. Supp. 2d at 481. Whether Randle’s account of his treatment is
accurate depends on the credibility of witness testimony and resolution of disputed questions of
material fact.
As to Defendants’ mental state, the parties present two different versions of the facts.
The Mental Health Defendants contend that they refused to transfer Randle because he presented
a legitimate security risk. (Def.’s Mot. at 38.) To support this argument, they cite Randle’s
history of “problematic behavior.” (Id. at 40.) Randle argues that the Mental Health Defendants
invoked DOCCS security policies “to punish [him] for the outcome of the Force Fight.” (Pl.’s
Opp. at 41.) He notes that his treatment providers recommended transfer multiple times between
May 4, 2009, and July 1, 2010, with full knowledge of his disciplinary record. (Id.; see also Dkt.
No. 293 ¶¶ 105-135.) Randle also cites an email, written in May 2010 shortly after his treatment
team recommended transfer, in which one Mental Health Defendant wrote to another: “Hope we
can fill [vacancies in a less restrictive program] . . . but not with Randle! :) .” (Dkt. No. 293
¶ 128.)
20
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Randle, and drawing all inferences
in his favor, the Court concludes that Randle has raised a genuine dispute of material fact about
whether the Mental Health Defendants refused his transfer for punitive reasons, evincing
deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs. See Bussey v. Fischer, No. 10-CV-1021,
2011 WL 4862478, at *11 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2011) (quoting Harrison v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132,
138 (2d Cir. 2000)), adopted in full, 2011 WL 4499324 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2011) (“[I]f prison
officials consciously delay or otherwise fail to treat an inmate’s serious medical condition ‘as
punishment or for other invalid reasons’ . . . such conduct is actionable as deliberate
indifference.”). The motion for summary judgment on Randle’s second deliberate indifference
claim is denied.
F.
Qualified Immunity
The doctrine of qualified immunity protects prison officials from liability if “their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.” Gonzalez v. City of Schenectady, 728 F.3d 149, 154 (2d
Cir. 2013) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). To resolve qualified
immunity claims, courts first consider whether the plaintiff “has shown facts making out
violation of a constitutional right.” Id. Courts then assess whether the right at issue was “clearly
established,” and even if it was, whether it was “objectively reasonable” for the official to
believe his conduct was lawful. Id. (quoting Taravella v. Town of Wolcott, 599 F.3d 129, 133-34
(2d Cir. 2010)).
Eleven Defendants—C.O. Nelson, Sergeant Alexander, Marinelli, and the Mental Health
Defendants—assert qualified immunity in this case. For the reasons outlined above, Randle has
presented enough evidence to make out violations of his Eighth Amendment rights against each
21
of these Defendants. The question is whether those rights were clearly established during his
incarceration at Green Haven, Upstate, and Clinton.
Sergeant Alexander and C.O. Nelson argue that “it was objectively reasonable for [them]
to believe [their] actions did not violate clearly established law.” (Def.’s Mot. at 44.) The Court
rejected this argument when it denied Defendants’ motion to dismiss. See Randle, 960 F. Supp.
2d at 479 (“[T]here can be no serious contention on the part of Defendants that it is objectively
reasonable to threaten inmates until they agree to fight each other in front of prison officials. In
sum, not only did Defendants’ behavior—as alleged in the Complaint—violate Randle’s clearly
established constitutional rights, but it was also objectively unreasonable.”). Sergeant Alexander
and C.O. Nelson renew their arguments now on the grounds that they (1) “were not present at the
time of any of the fights,” and (2) “did not violate any of [Randle’s] constitutional rights.”
(Def.’s Mot. at 44.) These are contested assertions of fact, not rationales for immunity. There
remains no serious contention that it was objectively reasonable for Sergeant Alexander and C.O.
Nelson to engage in the conduct alleged. The only issue is whether Defendants in fact acted as
Randle alleges they did.
As to the remaining Defendants, a prisoner’s right to be free from deliberate indifference
to his serious medical needs has been clearly established for decades. Estelle v. Gamble, 429
U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (“[T]he [Eighth] Amendment proscribes more than physically barbarous
punishments. . . . [Supreme Court precedents] establish the government’s obligation to provide
medical care for those whom it is punishing by incarceration.”); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at
828 (“A prison official's ‘deliberate indifference’ to a substantial risk of serious harm to an
inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.”); Langley v. Coughlin, 888 F.2d 252, 254 (2d Cir.
1989) (“We think it plain that from the legal standpoint [that] psychiatric or mental health care is
22
an integral part of medical care. It thus falls within the requirement of Estelle v. Gamble that it
must be provided to prisoners.” (citation omitted)).
Marinelli argues that it was not clearly established that “any action or inaction by him
violated [Randle’s] Eighth Amendment rights to adequate mental healthcare.” (Def.’s Mot. at
45.) This argument conflates whether a right is clearly established with whether a defendant is
liable in a particular case. There is no question that Randle’s right to constitutionally adequate
healthcare was established when Marinelli provided treatment at Upstate, and that if Marinelli
acted as Randle avers, a “rational trier of fact” could find in his favor. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 586;
see Sinkov v. Americor, Inc., 419 F. App’x 86, 89 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding that the evidence was
sufficient “to support a conclusion by a reasonable juror that [defendant] was actually aware of
[plaintiff’s] risk of suicide and was deliberately indifferent to that risk” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Allah v. Kemp, No. 08-CV-1008, 2010 WL 5860290, at *8-9 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 9,
2010), adopted in full, 2011 WL 705210 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2011) (rejecting a qualified
immunity argument “in [the] inmate suicide context”).
The Mental Health Defendants’ argument for qualified immunity also fails. It is clearly
established that prison officials may not punish a prisoner by denying, delaying, or interfering
with his medical treatment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (“[D]eliberate indifference . . .
constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’ . . . whether the indifference is
manifested by prison doctors in response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in
intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the
treatment . . . .” (footnotes and citation omitted)); see also Thomas v. Ashcroft, 470 F.3d 491, 497
(2d Cir. 2006) (reversing dismissal of a deliberate indifference claim where prison officials
allegedly “knew of [a prisoner’s] urgent medical needs but ignored them, and nevertheless
23
ordered or acquiesced in his transfer to a facility where he received no medication”); Smith, 316
F.3d at 186 n.10 (“[W]hen a degenerative medical condition is neglected over sufficient time, the
alleged deprivation of care . . . may properly be viewed as a ‘refusal’ to provide medical
treatment.”); Hernandez v. Keane, No. 97-CV-1267, 2000 WL 16951, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 7,
2000) (citing Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05) (“Deliberate indifference is shown when prison
officials intentionally deny, delay access to or interfere with prescribed treatment.”). No
reasonable prison official would have believed it was lawful to keep Randle in the GTP in order
to punish him, despite repeated recommendations to transfer him from his healthcare providers.
The question in this case is whether the Mental Health Defendants were in fact motivated by
legitimate security concerns. That is a question for the factfinder rather than the Court.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendants’ motions for summary judgment are DENIED.
The parties are directed to confer regarding trial dates and to submit a joint letter by March 22,
2016, proposing trial dates in April, May, or June 2016.
The Clerk of Court is directed to close the motions at Docket Numbers 239, 240, and
241.
SO ORDERED.
Dated: March 16, 2016
New York, New York
____________________________________
J. PAUL OETKEN
United States District Judge
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