Mikityanskiy v. Rowpar Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Filing
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OPINION re: 7 MOTION to Dismiss or, Alternatively, to Transfer Venue filed by Rowpar Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 20 MOTION to Strike Document No. 19 filed by Leonid Mikityanskiy. Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to a recent legislative ov erhaul of 35 U.S.C. § 292, and plaintiff moves to strike defendants supplemental briefs on the issue. Defendants motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiffs motion to strike is denied. (Signed by Judge Thomas P. Griesa on 12/1/2011) (mro) Modified on 12/1/2011 (mro).
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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LEONID MIKITYANSKIY,
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Plaintiff
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– against –
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ROWPAR PHARMACEUTICALS, INC.,
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Defendant.
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11 Civ. 698 (TPG)
OPINION
Plaintiff Leonid Mikityanskiy brings this qui tam action for false patent
marking against defendant Rowpar Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Rowpar”). Plaintiff
alleges that Rowpar marked its product, CloSys™ Complete Oral Healh
System™ toothpaste (“CloSys”), with fifteen patent numbers that had expired
some years earlier and that this action, in conjunction with defendant’s alleged
knowledge of the patents’ expiration, constituted the false marking of an
unpatented article with the purposes of deceiving the public in violation of the
version of 35 U.S.C. § 292(a) in force at the time plaintiff brought suit. Plaintiff
seeks a remedy of $500 per offending article falsely marked as patented, with
half the recovery payable to the United States government and the remainder to
plaintiff, as provided by the prior version of the statute.
Defendant moves to dismiss pursuant to a recent legislative overhaul of
35 U.S.C. § 292, and plaintiff moves to strike defendant’s supplemental briefs
on the issue. Defendant’s motion to dismiss is granted and plaintiff’s motion to
strike is denied.
Background
Rowpar is an Arizona corporation with its principal place of business in
Scottsdale, Arizona. The company—through its own actions and those of its
contractors—designs, markets, manufactures and distributes CloSys and
Dentist’s Choice oral healthcare products nationwide. Rowpar has acquired a
number of patents in conjunction with its business, and in accordance with
standard business practices, it marks product packaging with applicable
patent numbers and commonly advertises its products as “patented.”
On January 14, 2011, plaintiff, a registered patent attorney based in
Brooklyn, purchased a tube of CloSys in Philadelphia. This tube was marked
with fifteen patents—U.S. Patent nos. 4,689,215; 4,696,811; 4,786,492;
4,788,053; 4,792,442; 4,808,389; 4,818,519; 4,837,009; 4,851,213;
4,886,657; 4,889,714; 4,925,656; 5,200,171; 5,489,435; and 5,618,550—that
plaintiff later determined had expired between 2004 and 2007. Plaintiff alleges
that defendant placed this tube and untold thousands of like tubes into the
stream of commerce after the expiration of the patents in question and with the
intent to deceive the public into believing the articles were currently patented.
Plaintiff alleges that defendant’s course of conduct violates 35 U.S.C. §
292(a). The version of the statute in effect when the action was brought
provided that “whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in
connection with any unpatented article, the word ‘patent’ or any word or
number importing that the same is patented for the purpose of deceiving the
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public…[s]hall be fined not more than $500 for every such offense.” 35 U.S.C.
§ 292 (2010). It further provided that "[a]ny person may sue for the penalty, in
which event one-half shall go to the person suing and the other to the use of
the United States.” Id. Plaintiff’s claim finds support in case law on the prior
version of the statute, which treated products covered by expired patents as
unpatented articles.
Rowpar had initially moved to dismiss the case under Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6) for insufficient pleading under Rule 9(b)and on other grounds or,
alternatively, to transfer the case to the District of Arizona pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1404.
Then on September 16, 2011, President Obama signed the Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act (the “Act”), which revised 35 U.S.C. § 292. The Act altered
the statute in several relevant respects, and its changes “apply to all cases,
without exception, that are pending on, or commenced on or after, the date of
the enactment of this act.” Pub. L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). Most
importantly, Congress added Section 292(c), which states that “the marking of
a product, in a manner described in subsection (a), with matter relating to a
patent that covered that product but has expired is not a violation of this
section.” Id. Furthermore, Section 292(a) now provides that “only the United
States may sue for the [$500] penalty authorized by this section.” 35 U.S.C. §
292 (2011). Congress also replaced the prior version of Section 292(b) with a
new section providing that “a person who has suffered a competitive injury as a
result of a violation of this section” may bring suit for damages adequate to
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compensate that injury. Id.
Defendant submitted supplemental briefs to inform the court of the
changes to 35 U.S.C. § 292 and to argue that they warrant dismissal of
plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff then moved to strike defendant’s supplemental
briefs.
Discussion
The Act plainly applies to this suit and deprives the plaintiff of any cause
of action. He can longer plausibly allege a violation of 35 U.S.C. § 292, as his
complaint was wholly predicated on a theory of false marking overruled by
Congress. What’s more, plaintiff now lacks standing to sue for a violation of 35
U.S.C. §292.1 As such, plaintiff cannot state facts sufficient to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. See Bank of N.Y. v. First Millennium, Inc.,
607 F.3d 905, 922 (2d Cir. 2010). Thus, plaintiff’s motion to dismiss under
Rule 12(b)(6) is granted.
Obviously, defendant had a right to submit briefing on the change in the
statute, so plaintiff’s motion to strike is denied.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court should grant defendant’s motion to
dismiss plaintiff’s claim and deny plaintiff’s motion to strike.
SO ORDERED.
1
Plaintiff does not argue, nor could he credibly do so, that he is a “person who has suffered a competitive injury as a
result of a violation of [35 U.S.C. § 292.]”
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Dated: New York, New York
December 1, 2011
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