Almanzar v. Zam Realty Mgmt. Co.
Filing
18
OPINION AND ORDER: Zam's 9/19/2011 motion to dismiss is granted. The Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Zam and to close the case. (Signed by Judge Denise L. Cote on 11/22/2011) Copies Mailed By Chambers. (ft)
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
------------------------------------------ X
:
PEDRO ALMANZAR,
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-v:
:
ZAM REALTY MANAGEMENT CO., LLC,
:
:
Defendant.
:
:
------------------------------------------ X
11 Civ. 1168 (DLC)
OPINION AND ORDER
APPEARANCES:
For the plaintiff:
Pedro Almanzar, proceeding pro se
587 E. 139th Street
Apt# 1B
Bronx, NY 10454
For the defendant:
Stuart Alan Weinberger
Lewis Steven Goldberg
Goldberg & Weinberger, LLP
630 Third Avenue, 18th Floor
New York, NY 10017
DENISE COTE, District Judge:
Plaintiff Pedro Almanzar (“Almanzar”), proceeding pro se,
brings this action pursuant to the New York State Human Rights
Law, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290-97, against Zam Realty Management
(“Zam”).
Almanzar alleges that Zam discriminated against him
based on his Hispanic background and age when it fired him in
2008 and then opposed his request for unemployment benefits.
Almanzar requests that he be found to qualify for unemployment
1
benefits.
Zam has moved to dismiss Almanzar’s second amended
complaint (“SAC”).
For the following reasons, the motion to
dismiss is granted.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are taken from the SAC and the
documents attached to it unless otherwise noted, and assumed to
be true for the purposes of this motion.
LaFaro v. New York
Cardiothoracic Group, PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009).
Almanzar, a Hispanic resident of the Bronx, New York in his late
60s, began working for Zam in April 2007 as a building
superintendant.
York.
Zam is a company located in the Bronx, New
The complaint does not state the date that Almanzar was
fired, but Zam alleges that it was on April 21, 2008.
After he was fired, Almanzar called the unemployment office
to retrieve his benefits, but Zam prevented him from receiving
those benefits because it alleged that he was fired due to
misconduct.
An administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denied his
request for unemployment benefits on July 23, 2008.
The ALJ
found that Almanzar’s misconduct had resulted in his discharge - Almanzar had allegedly been fired after the third day on which
he had left the premises of the building at which he worked
without notifying Zam.
Therefore, the ALJ determined Almanzar
2
was not qualified to receive unemployment benefits under New
York Labor Law § 593(3).
The Unemployment Insurance Appeal
Board upheld the ALJ’s decision on December 15, 2008.
See
Matter of Almanzar, 65 A.D.3d 1418, 1418 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009).
The Appellate Division, in turn, affirmed this decision on
September 17, 2009.
Id.
In a letter dated October 6, 2009,
Almanzar was informed by the Office of the Attorney General of
the State of New York that his only legal recourse was to appeal
to the New York Court of Appeals.
On June 24, 2009, Almanzar filed a complaint with the New
York State Division of Human Rights.
In the SAC, Almanzar does
not state what was the resolution of that complaint, but Zam
alleges that on January 5, 2010 the Division of Human Rights
found there was “[in]sufficient evidence to establish a nexus
between [Almanzar] being denied unemployment benefits and [his]
race/color.”
Almanzar’s complaint was also filed with the
United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”),
which closed his file because it “adopted the findings of the
state or local fair employment practices agency that
investigated this charge.”
The EEOC Dismissal and Notice of
Rights letter was issued August 12, 2010.
Almanzar filed this action on February 14, 2011, asserting
an employment discrimination claim under Title VII.
On March 9,
Chief Judge Loretta A. Preska ordered Almanzar to amend his
3
complaint within sixty days, as the original complaint did not
allege facts sufficient to support his allegations of
discrimination.
Almanzar filed an amended complaint on April 8.
In the
amended complaint, Almanzar alleged only a violation of the New
York State Human Rights Law, having declined to check the line
that would indicate he also asserted a claim under Title VII.
On July 5, Zam filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint,
arguing that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over
the case and that Almanzar had failed to state a cause of
action.
In an Order dated July 5, Almanzar was permitted to
file a second amended complaint to address the deficiencies
identified in Zam’s motion to dismiss by August 2.
Almanzar was
informed that this would be his last opportunity to amend his
complaint to address these deficiencies.
Almanzar filed the SAC on July 26, again alleging only a
claim under the New York State Human Rights Law.
motion to dismiss on September 19.
Zam filed this
Almanzar failed to file an
opposition by October 14, and as of the date of this Opinion,
has not filed anything further with the Court.
DISCUSSION
Zam has moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
4
“Determining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction is a
threshold inquiry and a claim is properly dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) when the
district court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to
adjudicate it.”
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d
167, 170 (2d Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Federal courts are
courts of limited jurisdiction and a plaintiff wishing to file a
lawsuit in federal court must assert a specific grant of subject
matter jurisdiction authorizing the court to hear the case.
See
Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State Oil Co., 582 F.3d
393, 397 (2d Cir. 2009).
District courts have original
jurisdiction over cases in which there is a federal question, 28
U.S.C. § 1331, and cases between citizens of different states,
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
There is no question that there is not diversity
jurisdiction in this case.
Almanzar alleged that he is a
resident of New York and that Zam is located in New York.
On the face of the complaint, Almanzar has also not alleged
a claim raising a federal question.
Although his first
complaint stated a claim under Title VII, both the amended
complaint and the SAC allege only a state law claim.
Even when
this deficiency was pointed out in Zam’s motion to dismiss the
amended complaint, Almanzar persisted in not alleging a Title
VII claim or any other federal claim in the SAC.
5
But even if Almanzar’s complaint was construed liberally to
include a Title VII claim, and therefore to raise a federal
question, this Court would still lack subject matter
jurisdiction due to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
Under this
doctrine, lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to review
judgments of state courts, or to hear cases that “seek to
resolve issues that are inextricably intertwined with earlier
state court determinations.”
Vargas v. City of New York, 377
F.3d 200, 205 (2d Cir. 2004) (citation omitted).
Rooker–Feldman directs federal courts to abstain from
considering claims when four requirements are met: (1)
the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the plaintiff
complains of injuries caused by the state court
judgment, (3) the plaintiff invites district court
review of that judgment, and (4) the state court
judgment was entered before the plaintiff’s federal
suit commenced.
McKithen v. Brown, 626 F.3d 143, 154 (2d Cir. 2010).
claims meet each of these four requirements.
Almanzar’s
Making the same
allegations, Almanzar was unsuccessful in state court.
Although
he does not specifically allege that his injuries are caused by
a state court judgment, Almanzar’s denial of unemployment
benefits stems from an unfavorable ruling by the Appellate
Division.
The SAC asks this Court to have his “unemployment
benefits returned to [him].”
This request necessarily
implicates review of the state administrative and judicial
findings, which culminated in a judgment of the Appellate
6
Division.
This judgment was entered more than a year before he
filed this action.
Thus, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also
deprives this Court of subject matter jurisdiction over
Almanzar's claim.l
CONCLUSION
Zam's September 19, 2011 motion to dismiss is granted.
The
Clerk of the Court is directed to enter judgment for Zam and to
close the case.
Court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§
1915(a) (3), that any appeal from this Order would not be taken
in good faith, and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied
for the purpose
an appeal.
See Coppedge v. United States,
369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
Dated:
New York, New York
November 22, 2011
D
United St
1
Judge
Zam also alleges that it is entitled to dismissal of this
action because a determination of Almanzar's claim by the New
York State Division of Human Rights deprives this court
subject matter j
sdiction over his New York State Human Rights
Law claimi because res udicata bars his claim; and because he
led to state a cause
action. This Opinion having already
found that there is no subject matter jurisdiction over
Almanzar's claims, these arguments need not be addressed.
7
COPIES MAILED TO:
Pedro Almanzar
th
587
139 Street,
Apartment #lB
Bronx, NY 10454
Stuart Weinberger
Goldberg and Weinberger, LLP
630 Third Avenue, 18 th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?